Blackamore v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ELIJAH BLACKAMORE,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00605
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of
the Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the
administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
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the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 US 389, 401
(1971).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial-evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff was twenty years old on his alleged onset date of January 23, 2018.
(ECF No. 5-6, PageID.239). He has obtained at least a high school education and
worked previously as a fry cook. (ECF No. 5-6, PageID.204, 213). Plaintiff applied
for SSI on December 5, 2022 (ECF No. 5-3, PageID.78), due to avoidant personality
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disorder, major depressive disorder, social phobia (anxiety), and folliculitis (ECF
No. 5-6, PageID.212).
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after
which time he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Following an administrative hearing, ALJ Eric Westley, in an opinion dated April 30,
2024, determined that Plaintiff did not qualify for SSI. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.33-
53). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it
the Commissioner’s final decision in the matter. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.16).
Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. 1 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
1
1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will
not be found to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings, 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b);
2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found
“disabled,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c);
3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment
which meets the duration requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed
impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of
“disabled” will be made without consideration of vocational factors, 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d);
4. If an individual is capable of performing his past relevant work, a finding of
“not disabled” must be made, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e);
5. If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of
past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and
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Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an
exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to disability
benefits, and he satisfies his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so
severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful
employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A). While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of
the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step
four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is
determined. O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th
Cir., Jan. 7, 2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from avoidant personality disorder
(APD); major depressive disorder (MDD); an anxiety disorder; and post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), severe impairments that whether considered alone or in
combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any
residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work
can be performed, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
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impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.35-42).
With respect to Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the
ability to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: “he can understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions in a routine work setting with few, minor changes,” and “he can respond
appropriately to supervisors, coworkers, and work situations if” (1) “the tasks
performed are goal-oriented (but not at a production rate pace),” (2) “the work does
not require more than superficial interaction (meaning that it does not require
negotiating with, instructing, persuading, or directing the work of others),” and
(3) “the occupation does not require tandem work or interaction with the public.”
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.42-43).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his past relevant
work, at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
substantial evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number
of specific jobs that Plaintiff can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there are approximately 553,000
jobs in the national economy that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform.
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.74-75). This represents a significant number of jobs. See,
e.g., Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016)
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(“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and
others have deemed ‘significant’ ”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was not entitled to SSI benefits.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ did not properly
assess a medical opinion, consider all Plaintiff’s impairments, or properly address
Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms.
I. 	Medical Source Opinion
Plaintiff’s treating therapist, Rachel Hooley, MA, LLP, LLPC, filled out a form
about Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related mental activities. (ECF No. 5-17,
PageID.1251-53). The ALJ found that Ms. Hooley’s assessments were unpersuasive
because her opinion was “neither supported by the counseling records nor consistent
with the other evidence of record.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.50-51). Plaintiff argues
that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Hooley’s statements
is not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 9, PageID.1273). The Court
disagrees.
Because Plaintiff filed his application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated
the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This regulation provides
that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a).
Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate his determination of the persuasiveness of
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a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id. § 416.920c(b)(1).
These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, he is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),
the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.
(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
Ms. Hooley opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff had “extreme” functional
limitations in his ability to “[i]nteract with others” and in “maintaining
concentration, persistence[,] or pace.” (ECF No. 5-17, PageID.1252). She further
opined that Plaintiff had “marked” 2 functional limitations in his abilities to
2 “Marked means more than moderate but less than extreme.” (ECF No. 5-17,
PageID.1252).
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“[u]nderstand, remember or apply information” and to “[a]dapt or manage oneself.”
(Id.). Ms. Hooley also stated that Plaintiff’s impairments would cause him to be
absent from a job “[m]ore than four days per month.”3 (ECF No. 5-17, PageID.1251).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Ms. Hooley’s
opinions, but the Court finds no reversible error in this regard as substantial
evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s evaluation.
First, as to supportability, the ALJ found that Ms. Hooley’s opinion was “not
supported by the examination records from Shepard House Counseling: although the
claimant often reported a depressed mood and anxiety and had some periods of
retrogression, in large part, his counselor noted the claimant to be improving and
making progress.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.51). Plaintiff argues that “many”
instances of improvement that the ALJ noted were prior to Plaintiff’s SSI application
date of December 5, 2022, and that a majority of his treatment notes reported
regression. (ECF No. 9, PageID.1273). The ALJ’s finding is supported by
substantial evidence.
3 An opinion regarding absenteeism is not considered a medical opinion under the
regulations. See, e.g., Chicky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-cv-819, 2018 WL
3720065, at *7 (W.D. Mich. July 23, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 3708053 (W.D. Mich.
Aug. 2, 2018) (“ ‘A treating physician’s estimate of how often a patient who is not
working would likely be absent from work if he had a job is not a medical opinion,
and it is not entitled to any particular weight.’ ” (quoting Murray v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:10-cv-297, 2011 WL 4346473, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2011), adopted
by 2011 WL 4346386 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2011))); Valdes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 1:08-cv-872, 2010 WL 911181, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2010) (same).
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Because SSI benefits are not awarded retroactively for months prior to the
application for benefits, the relevant time period runs from the date Plaintiff filed
his application for SSI benefits, December 5, 2022, through April 30, 2024, the date
of the ALJ’s decision. See Casey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 987
F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.1993) (“The proper inquiry in an application for SSI benefits
is whether the plaintiff was disabled on or after her application date.”) Although
“[e]vidence from outside the relevant time period is minimally probative and is
considered only to the extent that it illuminates the claimant’s condition during the
relevant period,” Woodard ex rel. MLW v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:14-CV-1050,
2016 WL 8671977, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2016), the ALJ must still “consider all
evidence” in the record when making a disability decision, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B).
Even without considering the Shepard House Counseling records from before
Plaintiff’s application date, of the fifty counseling sessions that Plaintiff attended
between December 5, 2022, and March 15, 2024, at which the clinician also recorded
either Plaintiff’s “symptom change” or “functional change,” the clinician noted at 41
sessions that Plaintiff at least “mildly” improved in either category. (ECF No. 5-9,
PageID.505-08, 510, 513-514; ECF No. 5-12, PageID.638-39, 641-47, 651-53, 657-58;
ECF No. 5-14, PageID.723-24, 726-32, 734-37, 740-43, 745-49). Comparing that
number to the sixteen sessions within the same timeframe at which the clinician
noted that Plaintiff had at least “mildly” regressed in either category, the ALJ’s
finding that Ms. Hooley’s opinion was unsubstantiated by the counseling records is
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reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.4 (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.509-10,
512, 514; ECF No. 5-12, PageID.640, 649, 653, 656, 658, 660; ECF No. 5-14,
PageID.726, 729, 731-32, 734, 738).
Second, as to consistency, the ALJ found that Ms. Hooley’s proposed
limitations were inconsistent with other evidence in the record. (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.37-41, 51). At various examinations in the relevant period between
December 2022 and February 2024, apart from some findings related to mood, affect,
and some restlessness, the record largely indicates that Plaintiff’s impairments were
well-controlled with medication and therapy. (ECF No. 5-11, PageID.570-87
(12/20/2022 record noting that Plaintiff was restless and “a bit” anxious); ECF No. 5-
8, PageID.396 (12/21/2022 record noting that Plaintiff’s affect and mood were normal
and that he reported a stable mood on medication); ECF No. 5-10, PageID.549-56
(2/20/2023 record noting that Plaintiff’s mood was “sad/depressed,” his affect was
“mood congruent,” and that his medication was subsequently increased); ECF No. 5-
10, PageID.541-48 (3/20/2023 record noting that Plaintiff’s mood was
“sad/depressed” and his affect was “restricted/constricted” but that he did not want
to change his medication dosage); ECF No. 5-10, PageID.525-32 (4/17/2023 record
noting that Plaintiff reported that his depression, mood, and anxiety improved and
4 The clinician sometimes recorded that Plaintiff both regressed and improved in
one category in a session. (ECF No. 5-12, PageID.658; ECF No 5-14, PageID.726,
729, 734). The clinician also recorded that Plaintiff sometimes improved and
stabilized in one category. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.506, 508; ECF No. 5-12,
PageID.647, 651-52, 657; ECF No. 5-14, PageID.728, 730, 749).
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that his mood and affect were normal); ECF No. 5-10, PageID.517-24 (6/12/2023
record noting that Plaintiff’s mood and affect were normal and that Plaintiff reported
a stable mood and denied feeling depressed and anxious); ECF No. 5-13, PageID.713-
21 (9/6/2023 record noting that Plaintiff’s mood was anxious, that Plaintiff reported
“some anxiety,” and that another medication was added); ECF No. 5-13, PageID.704-
711 (10/4/2023 record noting that Plaintiff denied depression symptoms and reported
that he did not start the new medication because he was improving using therapy
skills); ECF No. 5-13, PageID.680-98 (1/5/2024 record noting that Plaintiff’s mood
was anxious and his affect was normal and that Plaintiff reported that he was “doing
better”); ECF No. 5-13, PageID.671-78) (1/8/2024 record noting that Plaintiff
reported increased depression and anxiety because of the holidays and that the
medication was “somewhat helpful,” Plaintiff’s mood was anxious and his affect
“blunted,” and he was prescribed a mood medication); ECF No. 5-13, PageID.662-69
(2/19/2024 record noting that Plaintiff’s mood and affect were normal and that
Plaintiff reported that the mood medication was beneficial before it wore off). In
sum, the ALJ’s finding that the evidence in the record was inconsistent with Ms.
Hooley’s opinion is substantially supported by the evidence.
Plaintiff argues that, despite his progress, he continued to report anxiety and
depression symptoms and his providers continued to note his regression and
prescribe medications with increased doses at times. (ECF No. 9, PageID.1273-75).
But the ALJ considered this evidence in making his RFC determination. Earlier in
the opinion, the ALJ explicitly noted Plaintiff’s medication changes, self-reports of
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symptoms, and treatment notes of his regression amongst his description of
Plaintiff’s mental health treatment records. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.37-42, 45-47).
“Courts are allowed to read ALJ decisions as a whole” even if the ALJ described
treatment records elsewhere in the decision. Paul B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:24-CV-01156, 2025 WL 3150302, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2025).
Plaintiff’s argument merely highlights that there may be substantial evidence
to support an alternative conclusion, which is not enough to disturb the ALJ’s
findings. Weighing conflicting evidence is the role of the ALJ, not of the Court.
Sallaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3825, 2024 WL 2955645, at *7 (6th Cir. June 12,
2024). As long as substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court must defer to it, “even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would
have supported an opposite conclusion.” Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614
(6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.
2001) (“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because
there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.”)
(citations omitted). In sum, the ALJ analyzed Ms. Hooley’s opinions pursuant to
the proper standards, and the ALJ’s evaluation is supported by substantial
evidence.5
5 Plaintiff also argues in one sentence that the ALJ should not have found the
opinion of consultative examining psychologist, Dr. Paul Kitchen, Ph.D.,
unpersuasive (ECF No. 9, PageID.1274) because his findings that Plaintiff would
have marked limitations in social interaction and difficulty adapting to change (ECF
No. 5-7, PageID.376) were consistent with Ms. Hooley’s opinion. As a threshold
matter, Plaintiff's one-sentence argument is insufficient to warrant judicial
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II. 	Plaintiff’s Credibility and Impact of Impairments
Plaintiff contends that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ’s analysis ignores (1) Plaintiff’s testimony about his inability to
concentrate caused by anxiety from interacting with people; (2) that Plaintiff would
be off-task 20% of the time and/or absent two times per month, of which the VE found
each to be work preclusive; and (3) that Plaintiff’s impairments prevent him from
“physically perform[ing] the requirements of work on a consistent basis.” (ECF
No. 9, PageID.1275-77). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly
considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and impairments and that substantial
evidence supports the RFC. (ECF No. 10, PageID.1283-86).
At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he has “trouble dealing with people”
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.64), that it was “hard for [him] to focus when being around
people” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.65), and that he “struggle[s] with paying attention”
when he is anxious (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.67). The ALJ then questioned the VE
about a hypothetical individual who had certain limitations, and he identified that
the individual could find work as a hospital cleaner, counter supply worker, and a
housekeeping cleaner. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.74-75). The ALJ asked how being
off-task and unproductive 20% or more of the workday would impact that
consideration. “[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by
some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for
a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court
to . . . put flesh on its bones.” McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir.
1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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individual’s ability to perform, to which the VE answered that each would be work
preclusive. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.75-76).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider Plaintiff’s subjective
symptoms and the combined effects of his mental illness and panic attacks, a
combination that Plaintiff opined renders him unable to perform competitively in
the work force. But the record reflects that the ALJ took into account all of
Plaintiff’s impairments and subjective symptoms in reaching the determination that
he could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with nonexertional
limitations. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.42-43).
The ALJ summarized his six-page RFC analysis as follows:
In construing the evidence in the claimant’s favor, while also
exercising an abundance of caution, the undersigned finds that the
claimant retains the mental abilities as set forth in the above residual
functional capacity assessment. 	The symptoms and effects of
treatment related to the claimant’s mental impairments support
limiting the complexity of tasks, production and time demands,
workplace changes, and the nature and frequency of interactions with
others, as noted above. This residual functional capacity finding is
supported by, and consistent with, the evidence of record, including the
medical evidence, examination findings, the persuasive portions of the
medical opinions of record, and the claimant’s allegations consistent
with the medical evidence. This finding reasonably accommodates the
physical and mental limitations the claimant experiences from
impairments.
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.49).
The ALJ stated the proper standard and properly determined Plaintiff's RFC
by considering his impairments, discussing each of Plaintiff’s impairments
individually, and reaching his decision. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.42-51). For
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example, Plaintiff testified that “[he] could physically do” work where no one was
“really interacting with [him]” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.68), which the ALJ accounted
for in his RFC determination (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.42-43). Additionally, it was
proper for the ALJ to take Plaintiff’s daily activities into account in making his
credibility determination of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. 	See Cruse v.
Commissioner, 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007); Blacha v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990).
In sum, the medical record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s
impairments are not as severe or as limiting as Plaintiff asserts. Plaintiff
essentially urges the Court to re-weigh the evidence and to reach a different
conclusion, which the Court cannot do. The ALJ articulated a clear rationale for
his conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s subjective allegations, and the ALJ’s
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this argument is
rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
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OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: April 21, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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