Williams #214991 v. Van Dam et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SEBASTIAN PATRICK WILLIAMS #214991,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00560-RJJ-PJG
UNKNOWN VAN DAM,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 20). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Defendant’s motion be granted and this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Michigan, where the
events at issue occurred. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against seven individuals
employed at ECF. (ECF No. 1). A majority of Plaintiff’s claims against all but
Defendant Van Dam were dismissed on screening. (ECF Nos. 6, 7). At this juncture,
the only claims remaining in this matter are the following against Defendant Van Dam,
the chaplain: (1) Plaintiff’s personal capacity First Amendment free exercise and
retaliation claims, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, for
damages; (2) Plaintiff’s official and personal capacity First Amendment free exercise and
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retaliation claims, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, for
declaratory and injunctive relief; and (3) Plaintiff’s official capacity claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). (ECF No. 6). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following regarding
these remaining claims.
Plaintiff follows the practices of the Nation of Islam (NOI). (ECF No. 1,
PageID.4). On September 12, 2024, Defendant initiated a meeting with Plaintiff and
another inmate about why the inmate was standing near the door of the NOI study group
room and why Plaintiff had asked the inmate, “Is the mosque secure?” (Id.). Plaintiff
explained that the inmate was there “not to impede anyone from entering or leaving the
room, but to place a hand up to draw attention to himself” in case someone attempted to
“disturb” the opening prayer ceremony. (Id.). Defendant read the inmates a policy
directive regarding the prohibition of militaristic behavior, and Plaintiff assured
Defendant that “no prisoner doing our services would be anywhere near the door” and
that they only salute the NOI flag. (Id.). Following the opening prayer, Plaintiff
quoted from NOI literature, stating to the study group three times, “Whose soldiers are
we?” (Id.). After the third recitation, the group responded, “Muhammad’s soldiers,
sir.” (Id.). Plaintiff then stated, “If we’re soldiers for Muhammad, let’s get after his
people.” (Id.). The group responded, “Yes, sir!” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4-5).
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The next day, Defendant charged Plaintiff with a misconduct violation of
insolence. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5). Following a hearing on the misconduct report, on
October 2, 2024, Plaintiff was found not guilty of insolence. (Id.).
On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff again repeatedly recited the NOI literature
quotations following the opening prayer. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5-6). Defendant then
told Plaintiff, “I told you you [sic] cannot use those words.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.6).
Plaintiff informed Defendant that he was found not guilty of insolence to which
Defendant responded, “We’ll see what the Deputy has to say about it.” (Id.). After
speaking with an unnamed deputy warden, Defendant told Plaintiff, “If you use those
words again you will get a DDO (Disobeying a Direct Order) misconduct report.” (Id.).
On October 4, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a Step I grievance alleging that Defendant
threatened to issue Plaintiff a misconduct violation for disobeying a direct order if he
continued to repeatedly state the recitations from NOI literature, which was denied
through Step III. (ECF No. 1, PageID.9-10). On October 10, 2024, Defendant
cancelled the NOI service scheduled for that day. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7). In December
2024, Plaintiff filed another grievance against Defendant, alleging that Defendant
refused to procure requested items for the NOI study group, which was rejected through
Step III. (ECF No. 1, PageID.11).
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Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff has
not properly exhausted his administrative remedies. Plaintiff has responded to
Defendant’s motion. The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D.
MICH. LCIVR 7.2(d).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on “whether
its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman, 993 F.3d 465,
474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the non-
moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence,
which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350,
357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the non-
moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730,
734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
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While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-moving
party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present “significant
probative evidence,” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack v.
Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party
cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a
jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings
Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d
at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a
sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether
the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law.”
Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the
opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof
faces a “substantially higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002).
Where the moving party has the burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to
hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.”
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Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof “is inappropriate when the
evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.”
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner asserting an action regarding prison
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust his administrative remedies. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). This obligation only extends, however, to
such administrative remedies as are available. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016)
(a prisoner “must exhaust available remedies but need not exhaust unavailable ones”).
Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is “an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which the defendant bears the
burden of establishing. Ibid.
With respect to what constitutes proper exhaustion, the Supreme Court has stated
that the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” defined as
“compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). In Bock, the Court reiterated that
Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all
that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’ The level
of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim,
but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.
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Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 articulates the applicable grievance procedures
for prisoners in MDOC custody. Prior to submitting a grievance, a prisoner must
attempt to resolve the issue with staff, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his
control, or the issue falls within the jurisdiction of Internal Affairs. MDOC Policy
Directive 03.02.130 ¶ W (Sept. 25, 2023 and Oct. 21, 2024). The prisoner must attempt
to resolve the matter within two days of becoming aware that there exists a grievable
issue. (Id.).
If this attempt is unsuccessful (or such is inapplicable), the prisoner may submit
a Step I grievance, but such must be submitted within five business days after
attempting to resolve the matter with staff. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ CC
(Sept. 25, 2023 and Oct. 21, 2024). The issues asserted in a grievance “should be stated
briefly but concisely” and the “[d]ates, times, places, and names of all those involved in
the issue being grieved are to be included.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ Y (Sept.
25, 2023 and Oct. 21, 2024).
If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely
response, he may appeal to Step II within ten business days of the response, or if no
response was received, within ten business days after the response was due. MDOC
Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ JJ (Sept. 25, 2023 and Oct. 21, 2024). If the prisoner is
dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he
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may appeal the matter to Step III. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ NN (Sept. 25,
2023 and Oct. 21, 2024).
In support of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, he provides evidence
that Plaintiff pursued two grievances through Step III. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.172-
186). Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he filed any additional grievances
regarding the allegations in his complaint.
A. ECF-24-10-1715-28E1
On October 4, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a Step I grievance against Defendant,
alleging that Defendant threatened to issue Plaintiff a misconduct violation for
disobeying a direct order if he continued to repeatedly state the recitations from NOI
literature. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.183). This grievance was rejected, stating that
Defendant was following policy to prohibit inmates from referring to themselves as
soldiers, which constitutes barred “militaristic behavior” under MDOC Policy Directive
05.03.150 ¶ Z (April 19, 2024). (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.183-184). Plaintiff appealed
this denial to both Step II and Step III, which were both rejected. (ECF No. 21-3,
PageID.180-182).
1 This Step I grievance was seemingly misnumbered as ECF-25-01-41007-20Z (ECF
No. 21-3, PageID.183) and later amended in the subsequent Step II and Step III
rejections to be ECF-25-01-41007-28E (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.180-82). Accordingly,
the Court will refer to this grievance as ECF-25-01-41007-28E.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Step II grievance was properly rejected for being
untimely. The Court agrees. A grievance “shall be rejected” if it is not filed in a timely
manner. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ P(5) (Sept. 25, 2023 and Oct. 21, 2024).
Under MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ JJ (Sept. 25, 2023 and Oct. 21, 2024), Step II
appeals must be filed within ten business days of receiving the response. “Grievances
and grievance appeals at all steps shall be considered filed on the date received by the
Department.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ Z (Sept. 25, 2023 and Oct. 21, 2024).
Here, defendant submits evidence that Plaintiff received his Step I response on
October 22, 2024, and that he filed his Step II grievance on November 8, 2024—13
business days later. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.182). Plaintiff’s Step III rejection upheld
his Step II rejection for untimeliness. Therefore, Defendant demonstrates that this
grievance was untimely. Plaintiff objects to this but has not presented any evidence
that would show that the grievance was timely. In other words, he has not created a
genuine issue of fact. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the rejection of this
grievance was improper. Accordingly, this grievance cannot serve to exhaust any of
Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
B. ECF-25-01-41007-28D
On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a Step I grievance against Defendant
because he allegedly refused to procure requested items for the NOI study group. In
the grievance, Plaintiff stated, inter alia, that Defendant’s “blatant display of bigotry”
violated MDOC policy. (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.179). This grievance was rejected for
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containing “prohibited language” with “blatant display of bigotry” circled. (Id.).
Plaintiff appealed this denial to both Step II and Step III, which were both rejected.
(ECF No. 21-3, PageID.175, 177-78).
Defendant argues that this grievance was properly rejected. The Court agrees.
A grievance may be rejected if it contains “language that demeans the character. . . of
any person unless it is part of the description of the grieved behavior and is
essential to that description.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ P(6) (Oct. 21,
2024) (emphasis added). The rejection of this grievance is not unreasonable.
Plaintiff’s characterization of Defendant’s actions as bigoted was not essential to the
description of the incident. Accordingly, this grievance was properly rejected and
cannot serve to exhaust any of Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
For the reasons articulated above, the undersigned finds that both of Plaintiff’s
grievances were properly rejected. Plaintiff has likewise failed to present evidence that
he submitted any other grievances or otherwise properly exhausted his claims.
Defendant has satisfied his burden to show that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his
claims against him. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
motion be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) be granted. Plaintiff’s remaining claims
against Defendant Van Dam be dismissed without prejudice for failure to properly
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exhaust administrative remedies. The undersigned further recommends that appeal of
this matter would not be taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: January 29, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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