Hawthorne #180295 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICKY HAWTHORNE #180295,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00416
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) and Wilkinson’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 24).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Defendants’
motion be granted and this action be terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the MDOC at the Muskegon Correctional
Facility (MCF) in Muskegon, Muskegon County, Michigan, where the alleged events at
issue occurred. Plaintiff initiated this action against the MDOC and three MDOC
employees. (ECF No. 1). The Court screened out two Defendants. (ECF Nos. 5, 6).
At this juncture, the following claims remain in the case against Defendants Wilkinson
and MDOC: (i) Eighth Amendment claims under Section 1983 against Defendant
Wilkinson in his individual capacity and his official capacity seeking injunctive relief;
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and (ii) Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) claims
against Defendant MDOC. (Id.).
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following regarding his claims against
Defendants Wilkinson and MDOC. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff suffers from back, neck, hip,
leg, and knee ailments, causing him limitations in bending, standing, and walking.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.9). Plaintiff shares a cell and sleeps on the bottom bunk. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.11). The bunk has a ladder affixed to the middle of it that prevents
Plaintiff from swinging his legs when he gets in and out, and maneuvering around the
ladder causes Plaintiff pain in his neck, back, hip, and legs. (ECF No. 1, PageID.11-13).
On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a healthcare request, explaining the
above ailments and requesting that something be done about his mattress and the bunk
ladder. (ECF No. 1, PageID.15-16). A non-party nurse responded that the healthcare
staff could not do anything about his mattress, bunk, or ladder. (Id.). On October 17,
2024, Plaintiff filed Grievance MCF-2024-10-1000-28C against the nurse on the matter.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.16). At some point between October 17, 2024, and October 29,
2024, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Wilkinson “regarding [Plaintiff’s] disabilities and
need for reasonable accommodations that included a special mattress to help relieve
[Plaintiff] of the pains to [his] back and hips.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.17). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Wilkinson said that he was “aware of [Plaintiff’s] disabilities,
but that it is now a custody issue that [Plaintiff had] to take up with custody.” (Id.).
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On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff submitted an “Offender ADA Reasonable
Accommodation Request/Appeal Form, CSJ-562, setting forth [Plaintiff’s] medically
documented disabilities and need for a single-man cell and other accommodations,” “to
the worksite offender ADA coordinator.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.18). On November 19,
2024, non-parties April McLaughlin, Mitchell Keys, and Plaintiff’s prison counselor,
along with Defendant Wilkinson and an unidentified official, “stood a distan[ce] from
[Plaintiff’s] cell/door looking into the room/cell.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.18). Plaintiff
states that the door was open, and he “could hear this group discussing only the ladder
that was append [sic] to [Plaintiff’s] assigned bunkbed.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.18-19).
At some point, “Defendant Wilkinson came into the room,” and “stated, ‘Let me be
straight; you’re not getting the top bunk raised; you’re not getting a special mattress;
the ladder stays on the bunk; and in no way will you be getting a single-man cell.’ ”
(ECF No. 1, PageID.19). In response, Plaintiff told Defendant Wilkinson that Plaintiff
had “seen healthy prisoners and prisoners with lesser disabilities than what [Plaintiff]
suffer[s] . . . get a single-man cell.” (Id.)
The next day, Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding Defendant Wilkinson’s
statements on the prior day. (ECF No. 1, PageID.20). At some point between
November 21, 2024, and December 3, 2024, Plaintiff “learned from the statewide ADA
coordinator for Defendant MDOC and the worksite offender[] ADA coordinator that
Defendant Mike Wilkinson could have reasonably accommodated [Plaintiff’s]
disabilities, but refused to do so.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.21). The “Statewide Offender
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ADA-Coordinator’s response [indicated that] ‘[t]he coordinator’s actions and referral for
the prisoner to follow up with healthcare was and is the appropriate action and the
proper avenue for the offender.’ ” (ECF No. PageID.22).
Defendants Wilkinson and MDOC now move for summary judgment on
exhaustion grounds. (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ motion.
(ECF No. 42). The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. MICH.
LCIVR 7.2(d).
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner asserting an action regarding prison
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust his administrative remedies. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). This obligation only extends, however, to
such administrative remedies as are available. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016)
(a prisoner “must exhaust available remedies but need not exhaust unavailable ones”).
Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is “an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which the defendant bears the
burden of establishing. Ibid.
With respect to what constitutes proper exhaustion, the Supreme Court has stated
that the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” defined as
“compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). In Bock, the Court reiterated that
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Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all
that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’ The level
of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim,
but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.
Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 articulates the applicable grievance procedures
for prisoners in MDOC custody. Prior to submitting a grievance, a prisoner must
attempt to resolve the issue with staff, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his
control, or the issue falls within the jurisdiction of Internal Affairs. MDOC Policy
Directive 03.02.130 ¶ W (Oct. 21, 2024). The prisoner must attempt to resolve the
matter within two days of becoming aware that there exists a grievable issue. (Id.).
If this attempt is unsuccessful (or such is inapplicable), the prisoner may submit
a Step I grievance, but such must be submitted within five business days after
attempting to resolve the matter with staff. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130); ¶ CC
(Oct. 21, 2024). The issues asserted in a grievance “should be stated briefly but
concisely” and the “[d]ates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue
being grieved are to be included.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ Y (Oct. 21, 2024).
If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely
response, he may appeal to Step II within ten business days of the response, or if no
response was received, within ten business days after the response was due. MDOC
Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ JJ (Oct. 21, 2024). If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the
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Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal the matter
to Step III. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ NN (Oct. 21, 2024).
I. Defendant MDOC
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not name the MDOC in any relevant
grievances that he pursued through Step III. (ECF No. 25, PageID.220). In response,
Plaintiff does not point to any provision of the MDOC grievance policy generally
forbidding him from exhausting claims against the MDOC, nor does he contend that he
was otherwise prevented from doing so. (ECF No. 42). Although this Court has held
that summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion is not appropriate as to the MDOC
itself, see Annabel v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:18-CV-914, 2020 WL 919700, at *1 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 26, 2020), the Sixth Circuit has more recently rejected the proposition that
the MDOC grievance process is generally unavailable for institutional actors. See
Kitchen v. Snyder, No. 20-1936, 2021 WL 4470032, at *3-4 (6th Cir. June 23, 2021); see
also Miles v. Michigan, No. 2:23-CV-31, 2024 WL 1200182, at *12 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 20,
2024). Accordingly, Defendant MDOC has met its burden to establish that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against it. See Rosencrantz v.
Schmalbach, No. 1:24-CV-886, 2025 WL 4082253, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025) (“It
is well understood that if a prisoner identifies by name a specific individual in a Step I
grievance, that grievance can serve to exhaust claims only as to the individual named in
the Step I grievance.”).
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II. Defendant Wilkinson
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Wilkinson and
MDOC provide evidence that Plaintiff pursued only one grievance through Step III about
the alleged events that names Defendant Wilkinson: Grievance MCF-24-11-1113-28I.1
(ECF No. 25-3, PageID.246-50).
Grievance MCF-24-11-1113-28I does not establish that Plaintiff has properly
exhausted his remaining claims against Defendant Wilkinson. On November 20, 2024,
Plaintiff submitted Grievance MCF-24-11-1113-28I, alleging that, the day before,
Defendant Wilkinson visited his cell with the ADA coordinator, the assistant ADA, and
an unidentified male regarding an accommodation request form that Plaintiff submitted.
(ECF No. 25-3, PageID.249). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wilkinson “stepped into
[Plaintiff’s] room” and stated to him, “Let me be straight, you’re not getting the top bunk
raised up; you’re not getting any special mattress; the ladder stayed on the bunk; and in
no way you’re getting a single-man cell under any circumstances.” (Id.). Plaintiff
further asserted that Defendant Wilkinson “originally” told him that “this was a custody
issue” and that “he spoke as if he ha[d] already decided [Plaintiff’s] request and denied
1 To exhaust a claim, inter alia, the grievance must identify an individual and match the
issues in the complaint. See Rosencrantz, No. 1:24-CV-886, 2025 WL 4082253, at *3 (“It
is well understood that if a prisoner identifies by name a specific individual in a Step I
grievance, that grievance can serve to exhaust claims only as to the individual named in
the Step I grievance.”); see also Smith v. Washington, No. 24-12652, 2025 WL 2947014,
at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“To exhaust a claim under the PLRA, an incarcerated
person’s grievance claim must match the issue(s) found in the individual’s § 1983
complaint.”).
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them.” (Id.). This Step I grievance was rejected for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff made
“[n]o attempt to resolve” his grievance with Defendant Wilkinson before filing the
grievance, and (2) Plaintiff asserted “multiple issues” in the single grievance. (ECF
No. 25-3, PageID.249-50). Plaintiff appealed to Step II, in which the rejection was
upheld. (ECF No. 25-3, PageID.247-48). Plaintiff also appealed to Step III, but the
rejection was again upheld. (ECF No. 25-3, PageID.246-47).
Defendants argue that this grievance was properly rejected. The Court agrees.
A grievance may be rejected if it contains, inter alia, “multiple unrelated issues,” MDOC
Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ P(1) (Oct. 21, 2024), or if
[t]he grievant did not attempt to resolve the issue with the staff
member involved prior to filing the grievance unless prevented by
circumstances beyond their control or if the issue falls within the
jurisdiction of Internal Affairs in the Office of Executive Affairs. An
attempt to resolve Health Care grievances regarding routine care is
accomplished by submitting a Health Care Request form (CHJ-549) to the
facility Health Care staff as directed in PD 03.04.100 “Health Services.”
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶¶ P(4) (Oct. 21, 2024). Plaintiff argues that his
statement in response to Defendant Wilkinson refusing his requests was his attempt to
resolve the issue. (ECF No. 42, PageID.386). According to his complaint, Plaintiff
merely stated, “I have seen healthy prisoners and prisoners with lesser disabilities than
what [Plaintiff] suffer[s] with get a single-man cell”; asked Defendant Wilkinson’s role
in Plaintiff’s accommodation request, and reminded Defendant Wilkinson that he
previously told Plaintiff “it was a custody issue.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.19). Regardless,
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the rejection of this grievance for either given reason is not unreasonable, and Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that the rejection of this grievance was improper.2
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact. In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff argues that Grievance MCF-24-10-
1000-28C, which alleges that an MCF nurse denied his inquiry about accommodations,
serves to exhaust his claims, but the grievance does not name Defendant Wilkinson.
(ECF No. 42-2, PageID.396-401). Accordingly, the grievance cannot serve to exhaust
any claims against Defendants Wilkinson. See Rosencrantz v. Schmalbach, No. 1:24-
CV-886, 2025 WL 4082253, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025) (“It is well understood that
if a prisoner identifies by name a specific individual in a Step I grievance, that grievance
can serve to exhaust claims only as to the individual named in the Step I grievance.”).
Accordingly, Defendant Wilkinson has satisfied his burden to show that Plaintiff failed
to properly exhaust the claims against him, and the undersigned recommends that
Defendants’ motion be granted.
2 To the extent that Plaintiff should have submitted a healthcare request form
under P(4) of the MDOC Policy Directive, Plaintiff admitted in his Step II appeal form
that he failed to do so regarding the incident with Defendant Wilkinson. (ECF No. 25-
3, PageID.247). Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that he exhausted his
non-grievable ADA accommodation appeal, “the relevant consideration is whether
plaintiff exhausted a grievance under Policy Directive 03.02.130 prior to filing this
lawsuit.” Diemond v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:20-CV-473, 2021 WL 2942604, at
*4 (W.D. Mich. May 25, 2021).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court recommends that Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) be granted and this action be terminated.
For the same reasons the undersigned makes these recommendations, the undersigned
finds that an appeal of such would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the undersigned further recommends that an appeal of
this matter by Plaintiff would not be in good faith.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: March 19, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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