Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HARLI JOHNSON,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-404
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides
that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be
conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
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The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 US 389, 401
(1971).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial-evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 26 years of age on her alleged onset date. (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.58). She successfully completed high school and worked previously as a
department manager and a department store clerk. (Id.) Plaintiff applied for
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benefits on February 27, 2022, and asserted her amended onset-of-disability date as
February 28, 2021,1 due to lupus, migraines, degenerative disc disease, and anxiety.
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.33; ECF No. 5-7, PageID.318).
Plaintiff’s applications were denied, after which time she requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following an administrative hearing,
ALJ William Reamon, in an opinion dated April 9, 2024, determined that Plaintiff
did not qualify for benefits. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.33-60). The Appeals Council
declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s final
decision in the matter. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an
exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
1 At Plaintiff’s hearing, she amended her alleged onset date to February 28, 2021,
from December 7, 2021, as stated in her applications. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.33,
70-71; ECF No. 5-6, PageID.294, 296).
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Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that she is entitled to disability
benefits, and she satisfies her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so
severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her
age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful
employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A). While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of
the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step
four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is
determined. O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th
Cir., Jan. 7, 2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from lupus; lumbar degenerative
disc disease with spinal stenosis, status-post L4-L5 lumbar discectomy; obesity; and
a depressive disorder, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in
combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any
impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.36-41).
With respect to Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the
ability to perform light work subject to the following limitations: (1) she can
occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; (2) she can frequently perform
crouching, crawling, kneeling, balancing, stooping, and climbing of ramps and stairs;
(3) she can limitedly perform the understanding, remembering, and carrying out of
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simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, which could be done on a timely basis; and
(4) can tolerate occasional work setting changes. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant
work, at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
substantial evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number
of specific jobs which Plaintiff can perform, her limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there are approximately 258,000
jobs in the national economy that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform.
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.104-05). This represents a significant number of jobs. See,
e.g., Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and
others have deemed ‘significant’ ”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was not entitled to benefits.
I. 	Residual Functional Capacity
A claimant’s RFC represents the “most [a claimant] can still do despite [his]
limitations.” Sullivan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 595 Fed. Appx. 502, 505
(6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2014); see also, Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at
*1 (Social Security Administration, July 2, 1996) (a claimant’s RFC represents her
ability to perform “work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on
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a regular and continuing basis,” defined as “8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule”).
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ did not properly assess the medical opinions, consider all Plaintiff’s
impairments, or properly address Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms.
In support of his RFC assessment, the ALJ noted the following, inter alia. In
May 2015, before the alleged onset date, MRI scans showed disc degeneration from
L2 to L5, a central and right paracentral disc protrusion at the L4-L5 level, and a
midline disc protrusion at the L2-L3 level. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.43; ECF No. 5-8,
PageID.467). In 2017, Plaintiff was diagnosed with lupus. (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.43; ECF No. 5-8, PageID.467; ECF No. 5-8, PageID.489). In April 2018,
Plaintiff underwent a discectomy at the L4 and L5 levels. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.43;
ECF No. 5-8, PageID.468). In April 2021, Plaintiff weighed 282 pounds at five feet
nine inches with a BMI of 41.6. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.47; ECF No. 5-8, PageID.466).
In April 2023, she weighed 259 pounds with a BMI of 38.2. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.47;
ECF No. 5-11, PageID.864). Plaintiff appeared obese during evaluations. (ECF No.
5-2, PageID.47; ECF No. 5-9, PageID.594; ECF No. 5-10, PageID.774; ECF No. 5-12,
PageID.945, 1033).
The record contains frequently normal findings related to gait and/or
ambulation (ECF No. 5-8, PageID.469, 594, 601, 609, 616; ECF No. 5-10, PageID.768,
774; ECF No. 5-11, PageID.874; ECF No. 5-12, PageID.945, 1007, 1013, 1019, 1026,
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1033), normal findings as to strength (ECF No. 5-8, PageID.469, ECF No. 5-9,
PageID.594, 616; ECF No. 5-10, PageID.706), and unremarkable respiratory findings
(ECF No. 5-9, PageID.568, 594, 615; ECF No. 5-10, PageID.768; ECF No. 5-11,
PageID.874; ECF No. 5-12, PageID.945). The record does not contain ongoing
complaints of difficulty tolerating environmental factors. (ECF Nos. 5-8 through 5-
18.). Finally, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff had some improvement with
treatment, including medication. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.568, 572, 575, 576, 633; ECF
No. 5-11, PageID.925; ECF No. 5-12, PageID.1009, 1013, 1019; ECF No. 5-15,
PageID.1370; ECF No. 5-16, PageID.1659).
The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff experienced certain physical limitations and,
accordingly, restricted Plaintiff to a limited range of light work. The ALJ examined
the evidence in detail, and his RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff has not articulated any error in the ALJ’s RFC assessment, but instead,
merely urges this Court to re-weigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion.
The ALJ is tasked with determining a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c),
416.946(c). While the ALJ may not “play doctor” and substitute his own opinion for
that of a medical professional, the ALJ is not required to tailor his RFC assessment
to any particular opinion or item of medical evidence. See, e.g., Poe v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 342 Fed. Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir., Aug. 18, 2009). Instead, the
ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence and the
claimant’s testimony to form an assessment of her residual functional capacity.”
Webb v. Commissioner of Social Security, 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004).
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This is precisely what the ALJ did, and the ALJ’s RFC assessment is
supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have
weighed and evaluated the evidence differently is not grounds for relief.
Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
II. 	Medical Source Opinion
Jason S. Knight, M.D., PhD., filled out a form about Plaintiff’s ability to do
work-related physical activities. (ECF No. 5-13, PageID.1079-81). The ALJ found
that the doctor’s assessments were “only mildly persuasive” because his report was
“internally inconsistent,” based “primarily if not exclusively on the claimant’s
subjective complaints,” and “not consistent with the medical evidence of record as a
whole.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.55-56). Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief
because the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Knight’s statements is not supported by
substantial evidence. The Court disagrees.
Because Plaintiff filed her application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ
evaluated the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This
regulation provides that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate his determination
of the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors
listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id.
§ 416.920c(b)(1).
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These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, he is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),
the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.
(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
An examination of Dr. Knight’s opinions and the evidence of record
demonstrates that the ALJ’s assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Dr.
Knight opined the following. Plaintiff could lift and carry ten pounds occasionally
and frequently, sit for a maximum of three hours with normals breaks in an eight-
hour workday, and stand and walk for less than two hours with normal breaks in an
eight-hour workday, assessing she could sit twenty minutes and stand ten minutes
before changing position to relieve discomfort. (ECF No. 5-13, PageID.1079).
Plaintiff must walk around every ten minutes for five minutes each time to relieve
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discomfort. (Id.). Plaintiff needed the opportunity shift position at will from
sitting or standing/walking and that she would sometimes need to lie down at
unpredictable intervals during an eight-hour workday, stating that “[h]er health has
required her to lie down for 12 to 18 hours a day.” (Id.). Plaintiff could occasionally
twist and climb stairs, but she could only rarely, defined as up to five percent of an
eight-hour workday, stoop and crouch and never climb ladders. (ECF No. 5-13,
PageID.1080). Plaintiff’s physical abilities to reach, finger, push/pull, and handle
were affected by the impairment but not her ability to physically feel. (Id.).
Plaintiff must avoid all exposure to extreme cold and direct sunlight as well as even
moderate exposure to extreme heat; high humidity; fumes, odors, dusts, gases;
soldering fluxes; solvents/cleaners; and chemicals. (Id.). Plaintiff had no limits
regarding exposure to perfumes. (Id.). (Ex. 29F/3). “Kneeling is a problem,”
[v]ision is impaired during migraines,” “[c]rawling and balancing are also difficult,”
and “[s]peaking can be limited by brain fog and word-finding difficulties.” (Id.).
Plaintiff would be absent from work more than four days a month. (Id.). Plaintiff
has not been able to work since February 2021, and Dr. Knight could not “confidently
say when things [would] improve enough for her to work again.” (ECF No. 5-13,
PageID.1081).
As stated above, the ALJ found that Dr. Knight’s assessments were based
“primarily if not exclusively on the claimant’s subjective complaints in formulating
the limitations” on the form. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.55). On January 4, 2024, Dr.
Knight’s office messaged Plaintiff regarding her “disability forms,” stating that [i]t
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might be in the best interest to do a phone or virtual visit to go over this form and
what he needs to put.” (ECF No. 5-17, PageID.1705). The next day, Dr. Knight
messaged Plaintiff, requesting that they conduct a virtual visit so that they could
“look at the form together in order to make sure [his] answers [were] aligning with
what [Plaintiff was] expecting.” (ECF No. 5-17, PageID.1720). Further, the ALJ
pointed out that “Dr. Knight’s treatment notes from May 2021, July 2022, [and]
September 2022 do not contain any specific, objective physical examination
findings.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.56; ECF No. 5-9, PageID.564-67, 633-34; ECF No.
5-10, PageID.737-41). To the extent that Dr. Knight relied on Plaintiff’s self-reports
in filling out the form, the ALJ properly considered this in his assessment of Dr.
Knight’s opinions. See Kepke v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 636 Fed.Appx. 625, 630 (6th
Cir. 2016) (“The ALJ also properly discounted [the physician’s] opinion because it
relied heavily on [the claimant’s] self-reporting, . . . [which] signal[ed]
unreliability.”).
The ALJ also noted that Dr. Knight’s report was “internally inconsistent”
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.56), pointing to Dr. Knight’s statement that Plaintiff could sit
for twenty minutes at a time but needed to walk around every ten minutes for five
minutes (ECF No. 5-13, PageID.1079), which is a proper consideration. See
Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 442 (6th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
claimant’s challenge to the ALJ’s evaluation of a physician’s opinion based in part
on internal inconsistencies).
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The ALJ further stated that Dr. Knight’s opinions were inconsistent with
medical evidence in the record as a whole, noting that the record contains relatively
mild objective examination findings. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.56). In April 2021,
Plaintiff had normal movement of all extremities with no edema. (ECF No. 5-8,
PageID.466-70). In August 2021, although Plaintiff had symptoms of a moderate
flare, her shoulders, neck, spine, hips, knees, and feet were without deformity,
warmth, tenderness, or impairment in range of motion. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.569).
Plaintiff had intact findings on cranial nerve testing, intact sensation, and normal
muscle bulk. (Id.). In November 2021, Plaintiff had a moderate flare with similar
symptoms and findings except for her hands. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.572).
The record also demonstrates that Plaintiff had some improvement with
treatment. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.568, 572, 575, 576, 633; ECF No. 5-11,
PageID.925; ECF No. 5-12, PageID.1009, 1013, 1019; ECF No. 5-15, PageID.1370;
ECF No. 5-16, PageID.1659). In January 2022, Plaintiff reported that she did not
have pain or fatigue. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.615). She had full range of motion of
the neck; normal movement of all extremities with no contractures, malalignment,
tenderness, or bony abnormalities; and normal tone with intact sensation, reflexes,
and coordination. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.615-16). In March 2022, Plaintiff’s
photosensitive inflammatory rash and arthritis of bilateral elbows, wrists and
ankles both improved. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.576). In June 2022, Plaintiff had
only mild disc space narrowing at the L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels. (ECF No. 5-9,
PageID.617). In July 2022, Plaintiff reported that her lupus symptoms were
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intermittent. (ECF No. 5-9, PageID.633). In November 2022, Plaintiff rated her
pain a “zero” on a scale of one to ten (ECF No. 5-10, PageID.764), and in February
2023, Plaintiff rated her pain a “one” on a scale of one to ten (ECF No. 5-11,
PageID.870).
In May 2023, at a consultative physical examination, Plaintiff had reduced
lumbar extension and subjective reports of pain with palpation and range of motion,
but Plaintiff’s examination findings were otherwise unremarkable. (ECF No. 5-11,
887-890). Specifically, Plaintiff was “able to tandem walk, get on and off exam
table, stand from a seated position, maintain balance in a standing position, stand
on heels and toes, squat and rise, make a closed fist, grasp and manipulate small
and large objects, open a door, pick up a coin, tie shoes, [and] button clothes.” (ECF
No. 5-11, PageID.887). In August 2023, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Knight in a
questionnaire that, “[w]ith some difficulty,” she could vacuum and carry a basket of
laundry up a flight of stairs. (ECF No. 5-15, PageID.1399).
In sum, the ALJ analyzed Dr. Knight’s opinions pursuant to the proper
standard and his assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
this argument is rejected.
III. Plaintiff’s Subjective Allegations
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ improperly
discounted her subjective allegations. (ECF No. 9, PageID.1809-11). Plaintiff
testified that her migraines occurred “one to three times a week” and “about at least
eight times a month” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.91) with each one lasting “as short as
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four hours and as long as two days” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.91-92). Plaintiff testified
that when she gets migraines, “[she] can’t do anything except try to take either
Tylenol or Excedrin Migraines.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.91). The ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s “migraines are not severe” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.39) because “the medical
evidence of record does not document specialized care, such as with a neurologist,
pain clinic, or headache clinic, despite specialized care for other conditions, nor does
the record document recurrent emergency room evaluations due to uncontrolled
migraine headaches” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.36). Additionally, “[t]he medical
evidence of record shows the claimant frequently presented with unremarkable or
mild neurological and/or mental findings.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.36).
While “pain alone, if the result of a medical impairment, may be severe enough
to constitute disability,” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984), a
claimant’s “statements about [her] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish
that [she is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also, Hash v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 309 Fed. Appx. 981, 989 (6th Cir., Feb. 10, 2009).
Instead, a claimant’s assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated
pursuant to the following standard. First, it must be determined whether the
claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be
expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. See Titles II and XVI:
Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016
WL 1119029 at *3-4 (S.S.A., Mar. 16, 2016). Next, the intensity and persistence of
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the claimant’s symptoms are evaluated to determine the extent to which such limit
her ability to perform work-related activities. Id. at *4-9.2
As is also well recognized, “subjective complaints may support a finding of
disability only where objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged
symptoms.” Workman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 Fed. Appx. 794, 801
(6th Cir., July 29, 2004). Where the objective medical evidence fails to confirm the
severity of a claimant’s subjective allegations, however, the ALJ “has the power and
discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to resolve the significant conflicts in the
administrative record.” In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s credibility
assessment “must be accorded great weight and deference.” Ibid. It is not for this
Court to reevaluate such evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s determination is
supported by substantial evidence, it must stand. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 540 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2013) (“[w]e have held
that an administrative law judge’s credibility findings are virtually
unchallengeable”).
2 Social Security Ruling 16-3p rescinded Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Id. at *1.
However, the adoption of this new Social Security Ruling did not alter the analysis
for evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements. Instead, as the Social Security
Administration stated, it was simply “eliminating the use of the term ‘credibility’ [so
as to] clarify that that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an
individual’s character.” Ibid. As courts recognize, aside from this linguistic
clarification, “[t]he analysis under SSR 16-3p otherwise is identical to that
performed under SSR 96-7p.” Young v. Berryhill, 3:17-cv-395 DW, 2018 WL
1914732 at *6 (W.D. Ky., Apr. 23, 2018).
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There is no dispute that Plaintiff experiences significant limitations resulting
from her various impairments. As discussed above, however, the evidence does not
support Plaintiff’s testimony that she is limited to the extent alleged. The Court is
not permitted to re-weigh the evidence. The ALJ articulated a clear rationale in
support of his decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and the ALJ’s
conclusions and rationale are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this
argument is rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: March 5, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Greens
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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