Gillam-Shaffer v. Michigan Public Health Institute, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
THOMAS GILLAM-SHAFFER, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-396
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
MICHIGAN PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses motions to dismiss filed
by Defendants Michigan Public Health Institute and Yvette Chase (ECF No. 18), and
Defendant State of Michigan (ECF No. 20). 	Plaintiff has not filed a response to
either of these motions.
Pro 	Se 	Plaintiff 	Thomas 	Gillam-Shaffer filed 	an 	unsigned 	complaint 	on
February 3, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	Plaintiff later submitted a signed amended
complaint. 	Pursuant to this Court’s Order of May 1, 2025 (ECF No. 13), ECF No.
12-1 became Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. 	In his verified First Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 	1964 	when 	the 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	complaint 	investigation 	alleging 	sexual
harassment in Plaintiff’s personnel file.
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Plaintiff filed an action with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in this case. 	The EEOC issued a determination that the agency would not
pursue further investigation into Plaintiff’s claims. 	(ECF No. 14-1, PageID.42.)
The EEOC specified that Plaintiff had ninety days to file a lawsuit. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff
filed his complaint outside of the ninety-day window. 	Accordingly, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the Court grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF
No. 19 & 21) for Plaintiff’s lack of timeliness, or, alternatively, for Plaintiff’s failure
to state a claim for which relief may be granted. 	Additionally, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of
time (ECF No. 29).
II. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is an Environmental Health Navigator with Michigan Public Health
Institute (MPHI). 	(ECF No. 14, PageID.30.) 	He has held this position since April
2022. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff asserts that he became a contracted State of Michigan
employee through MPHI on April 17, 2025. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff says he identifies as an
African-American and a Christian. 	(Id., PageID.28.)
Plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2023, a memo from Director Yvette Chase
titled “Complaint Investigation Findings – Inappropriate Comments” was placed into
Plaintiff’s personnel file. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff asserts that the complaint stems from
allegations made by Plaintiff’s co-worker Ammar Alzuad. 	(Id.) 	He states that the
memo is “a damaging litany of part fact and part misrepresentations and falsehoods.”
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(Id., PageID.30.) 	Plaintiff says that Alzuad falsely accused him of the following, as
summarized in the EEOC charge file:
(ECF No. 14, PageID.31.)
Plaintiff asserts that these statements are misrepresented, outright lies, and
distortion. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff says that the complaint stated a “violation of Sexual and
Other Unlawful Harassment occurred.” 	(Id., PageID.32.)
Plaintiff contends that the allegations in the memo are a detriment to his
African-American identity and livelihood. 	(Id.) 	He also asserts that MPHI ignored
his pleadings around these incidents and was “unreasonable to assume the Alzuad
would be offended, by the kind of subject matter be broached himself prior, given that
at other times he willfully engaged in similar discussions of a sexual nature at work,
with his co-workers.” 	(Id., PageID.34.)
Further, Plaintiff states that MPHI hired Alzuad for the same position as
Plaintiff but allowed Alzuad to work in the position for nearly a year without meeting
the hiring eligibility standards. 	(Id., PageID.30.) 	Plaintiff asserts that this
“incentivized a hostile and competitive environment” between himself and Alzuad.
(Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that MPHI’s actions related to this matter caused him to
become “miserable, ill, dejected and cut off from aid and assistance in plaintiff’s
counter complaints.” 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff further states that the Defendants’ actions
“prolonged physical, mental and emotional illness for the plaintiff that persists to the
present due to the level of cruelty inflicted.” 	(Id.)
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the E.E.O.C. in this matter. 	The EEOC issued
Plaintiff the following determination on October 29, 2024:
(ECF No. 14-1, PageID.42.) 	Plaintiff proceeded to file the present action on
February 3, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1.)
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III. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time
As an initial matter, Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time on
November 21, 2025. 	(ECF No. 29, PageID.188.) 	In his motion, Plaintiff broadly
asks this Court to extend relevant deadlines. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff states that Defendants
have not responded to his “overtures via e-mail.” 	(Id.)
Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file a response is considered under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. 	Rule 6(b)(1)(A) allows extensions for good cause if the request was
made before the original time expired. 	Rule 6(b)(1)(B) allows an extension of time
after the time had expired due to excusable neglect.
The Court is aware that this rule “gives the court extensive flexibility to modify
the fixed time periods found throughout the rules, whether the extension is sought
before or after the actual termination of the allotted time.” 	4B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1165 (4th ed.) 	But the Court must also
consider its obligation to construe, administer, and employ the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in a manner that will lead to a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of this matter. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Here, Defendants filed their motions to dismiss on August 18th and 19th of
this year. 	Under this District’s local rules, Plaintiff had twenty-eight days after
service to file a response to Defendants’ motions. 	W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2. 	Plaintiff
is well past this deadline and, in the opinion of the undersigned, has not articulated
good 	cause 	or 	excusable 	neglect 	for 	the 	delay. 	Therefore, 	the 	undersigned
respectfully recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of
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time (ECF No. 29).
IV. 	Motion to Dismiss Standard
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if plaintiffs
do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
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long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” 	Id.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. 	As such, his pleadings are subject to less
stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
IV. Analysis
In both motions to dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s case should be
dismissed because (1) his complaint is untimely, and (2) he fails to state a claim for
which relief may be granted. 	Plaintiff has not filed a response to these arguments.
A. Timeliness
First, regarding timeliness, Defendants argue that Plaintiff filed beyond the
statutory limit. 	Title VII specifies that a plaintiff must file an action in federal or
state court within 90 days after receiving a Notice to Sue from the EEOC. 	See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the
Commission . . . the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety
days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge. . . .”); Minor v. Northville Pub. Sch., 605 F. Supp.
1185, 1189 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 	The 90-day filing deadline acts as a statute of
limitations. 	Austion v. City of Clarksville, 244 F. App’x 639, 648 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“Once the administrative agency notifies the plaintiff of the dismissal of the charge
by issuing a right to sue letter, the plaintiff has 90 days to file a civil action.”); Gui v.
Inkster Sch. Dists., No. 12-15654, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43134, 2013 WL 1282020, at
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*3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2013) (“Any action not commenced within ninety days of
receiving a right-to-sue notice will be time barred.”).
“The federal courts have strictly enforced Title VII's ninety-day statutory limit.”
Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 557 (6th
Cir. 2000). 	The Sixth Circuit has held that there is a rebuttable presumption of
receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue five days after mailing. 	Graham-Humphreys, 209
F.3d at 557. 	As that panel explained:
The Sixth Circuit has resolved that notice is given, and hence the ninety-
day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following the
EEOC’s 	mailing 	of 	an 	RTS 	notification 	to 	the 	claimant's 	record
residential address, by virtue of a presumption of actual delivery and
receipt within that five-day duration, unless the plaintiff rebuts that
presumption with proof that he or she did not receive notification within
that period.
Id. (italics in original) (footnote omitted).
Here, the Notice was issued on October 29, 2024. 	Applying the five-day
presumption, Plaintiff was required to file his complaint on or before February 1,
2025. 	Plaintiff did not file his original complaint until February 3, 2025, two days
after the deadline.
Filing a complaint two days late is sufficient to warrant dismissal. 	Although
“[t]he 90-day filing requirement is not jurisdictional and is therefore subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling[,]” it is strictly applied, and a Court must
dismiss a suit “[e]ven where a plaintiff misses the filing deadline by only one day . . .
.” 	McKibben v. Hamilton Cnty., No. 99-3360, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12123, 2000 WL
761879, at *3 (6th Cir. May 30, 2000) (citing Truitt v. Cnty. of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644,
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646 (6th Cir. 1998); Goodman v. City Prods. Corp., Ben Franklin Div., 425 F.2d 702,
703-04 (6th Cir. 1970)).
It should also be noted that the Right to Sue letter issued to Plaintiff (ECF No.
14-1, PageID.42) included a warning regarding the 90-day time limit to file suit.
Plaintiff has not provided a response to Defendants’ motion asserting waiver,
estoppel, or equitable tolling. 	As such, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff’s
complaint is untimely. 	The undersigned respectfully recommends dismissal of
Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff filed beyond the statutory limit.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. 	Plaintiff brings a Title VII claim. 	The Sixth Circuit has
explained:
To establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination under Title VII,
a plaintiff must show that: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) was
qualified for the job; 3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and
4) was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated
differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. See Talley
v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, 61 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1995).
Newman v. Fed. Express Corp., 266 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2001).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class and
was qualified for the job. 	However, Defendants MPHI and Chase argue that
Plaintiff has not established he suffered an adverse employment decision. 	(ECF No.
18, PageID.66.) 	The Sixth Circuit has defined an adverse employment action in the
Title VII context as “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [a
plaintiff’s employment.” 	Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 391 (6th Cir.
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2010) (citation omitted). 	Further, “[a]dverse employment actions are typically
marked by a significant change in employment status, including hiring, firing, failing
to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.” 	Id.
Here, Plaintiff does not cite any changes in his terms and conditions of
employment, much less an adverse change. 	Plaintiff claims he suffered “prolonged
physical, mental and emotional illness” and says that the memo is a detriment to his
identity and livelihood. 	However, these adversities do not establish a change in
terms or conditions of employment.
Additionally, Plaintiff seeks a “restoration of forgone merit increase in pay for
the prior year equal to the merit increase of 2025.” 	(ECF No. 14, PageID.36.) 	While
pay is certainly a term and condition of employment, Plaintiff has not established
that any deduction in merit increases happened because of the alleged discrimination.
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he asserts that he remains employed at MPHI as an
Environmental Health Navigator. 	Nowhere in his complaint does Plaintiff mention
a loss of employment, reassignment, lost promotion, or change in benefits. 	As such,
in 	the 	opinion 	of 	the 	undersigned, 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	established 	an 	adverse
employment action sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
under Title VII. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted.
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The 	undersigned 	does 	not 	engage 	in 	further 	analysis 	of 	Defendants’
arguments.
V. Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
the Court GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF No. 19 & 21) for Plaintiff’s
lack of timeliness, or, alternatively, for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. 	Additionally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (ECF No. 29).
Dated: 	December 30, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). 	All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any
further right of appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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