Barnes #331194 v. Ward

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONNIE BARNES, #331194,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-338
CHRISTOPHER WARD,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 13). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Defendant’s motion be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a prisoner under the custody of the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC), initiated this action against the Food Service Director of the
Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF) where the relevant events occurred. In his
complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff alleges the following.
On December 28, 2024, Plaintiff, who identifies as Muslim, observed a Jewish
inmate receive halal meat, which Plaintiff was previously denied. On January 3, 2025,
Plaintiff wrote Defendant a letter, stating that “Muslims should be receiving the same
Halal meat that is being provided to the Jewish faith inmates.” On January 6, 2025,
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Defendant initiated a one-on-one meeting with Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s letter.
On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a Step I grievance, which the MCF Grievance
Coordinator rejected the next day, categorizing the grievance as a “joint grievance” and
stating that Plaintiff failed to attempt to resolve the issue before submitting the
grievance. Plaintiff appealed this rejection to both Step II and Step III, which were
both rejected. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s failure to provide him with a halal
diet violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Defendant now moves for summary
judgment on the ground that Plaintiff has not properly exhausted his administrative
remedies. Plaintiff has responded to Defendant’s motion. The Court finds that oral
argument is unnecessary. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 7.2(d).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on “whether
its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman, 993 F.3d 465,
474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the non-
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moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence,
which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350,
357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the non-
moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730,
734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-moving
party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present “significant
probative evidence” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack v. Damon
Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party cannot
merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may
disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings Corp., Inc.,
379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d
at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a
sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether
the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law.”
Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
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While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the
opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof
faces a “substantially higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002).
Where the moving party has the burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to
hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.”
Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof “is inappropriate when the
evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.”
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner asserting an action regarding prison
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust his administrative remedies. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). This obligation only extends, however, to
such administrative remedies as are available. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016)
(a prisoner “must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”).
Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is “an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which the defendant bears the
burden of establishing. Ibid.
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With respect to what constitutes proper exhaustion, the Supreme Court has stated
that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion” defined as
“compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). In Bock, the Court reiterated that
Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all
that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’ The level
of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim,
but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.
Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 articulates the applicable grievance procedures
for prisoners in MDOC custody. Prior to submitting a grievance, a prisoner must
attempt to resolve the issue with staff, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his
control, or the issue falls within the jurisdiction of Internal Affairs. MDOC Policy
Directive 03.02.130 ¶ W (Oct. 21, 2024). The prisoner must attempt to resolve the
matter within two days of becoming aware that there exists a grievable issue. (Id.).
If this attempt is unsuccessful (or such is inapplicable), the prisoner may submit
a Step I grievance, but such must be submitted within five business days after
attempting to resolve the matter with staff. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ CC
(Oct. 21, 2024). The issues asserted in a grievance “should be stated briefly but
concisely” and the “[d]ates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue
being grieved are to be included.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ Y (Oct. 21, 2024).
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If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely
response, he may appeal to Step II within ten business days of the response, or if no
response was received, within ten business days after the response was due. MDOC
Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ JJ (Oct. 21, 2024). If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the
Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal the matter
to Step III. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ NN (Oct. 21, 2024).
In support of his motion, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to properly
pursue a grievance concerning the claim asserted against him for two reasons. (ECF
No. 14, PageID.61-64). First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to attempt to
resolve the issue before submitting a Step I grievance. The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff responds that he attempted to resolve the issue prior to filing the
grievance by writing a letter to Defendant and later meeting with him. On January 6,
2025, Plaintiff asserts that he met with Defendant, who allegedly told Plaintiff that he
had no control over why Plaintiff did not receive a halal diet in response to Plaintiff’s
January 3, 2025 letter. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed his Step I grievance the next day,
which stated that “Food Director Ward called grievant out for an interview in response
to a complaint by Grievant.” Plaintiff stated the efforts he made to resolve the issue
prior to submitting his grievance. Specifically, Plaintiff demonstrated that he met with
Defendant the day before filing his grievance. Thus, it is not reasonable to conclude
that Plaintiff failed to attempt to resolve his issue prior to filing a grievance.
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The Court is reluctant to interject itself into the MDOC’s prison grievance process.
Nevertheless, courts are not obligated to simply disregard errors or mistakes in the
enforcement or application of prison grievance policies. See, e.g., Burnett v. Walsh, 18-
11063, 2020 WL 3716555 at *3-4 (E.D. Mich., June 15, 2020) (court recommended that
motion for summary judgment on failure to exhaust grounds be denied after finding that
MDOC “improperly rejected” prisoner’s grievance)1; Ashley v. Boayue, 19-10484, 2020
WL 5985203 at *5-6 (E.D. Mich., Feb. 18, 2020) (court recommended that motion for
summary judgment on failure to exhaust grounds be denied in part after finding that
MDOC “improperly rejected” prisoner’s grievance)2.
Defendant next argues that the Step I grievance was properly rejected because it
was an impermissible “joint grievance” under MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ P(7)
(Oct. 21, 2024). The Court again disagrees.
A Grievance Coordinator may reject a grievance if “[t]wo or more prisoners and/or
parolees have jointly filed a single grievance regarding an issue of mutual impact or
submit identical individual grievances regarding a given issue as an organized protest.”
Id. Here, although Plaintiff’s Step I grievance states that “Grievant & other Muslims”
were affected by the issue, the record does not indicate that multiple prisoners jointly
filed the grievance together. Plaintiff is the only prisoner identified as a “grievant” in
1 This recommendation was adopted as the opinion of the Court after no party objected
thereto. Burnett v. Walsh, 18-11063, 2020 WL 3639564 (E.D. Mich., July 6, 2020).
2 This recommendation was adopted as the opinion of the Court after no party objected
thereto. Ashley v. Boayue, 19-10484, 2020 WL 4282198 (E.D. Mich., July 27, 2020).
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the grievance forms. Plaintiff’s mere mention of a category of prisoners potentially
impacted by his claim is not the same as multiple prisoners “jointly fil[ing]” a single
grievance together. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ P(7) (Oct. 21, 2024).
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s grievance was improperly rejected on the
grounds that it was a “joint grievance.”
For the reasons articulated above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s grievance
was improperly rejected. Because Plaintiff’s grievance was improperly rejected,
Defendant has not satisfied his burden to show that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust
his claims against him. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
motion be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) be denied.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: January 16, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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