Emery v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JACOB E., 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00284
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Maarten Vermaat
U.S. Magistrate Judge
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
OPINION
This opinion addresses Plaintiff’s appeal of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Christopher Ambrose’s decision partially denying Plaintiff’s request for Disability
Insurance Benefits (DIB). 	Judge Ambrose determined that from July 30, 2021,
through April 8, 2024, Plaintiff was under a disability as defined by the Social
Security Act. 	Plaintiff agrees with that finding.
Additionally, 	Judge 	Ambrose 	determined 	that 	beginning 	April 	9, 	2024,
Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. 	Plaintiff
disagrees with that finding and this appeal is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The record before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff suffers from a number
of severe medically determinable impairments, including palatal myoclonus with
palatal tremor, insomnia, residuals of COVID-19, depression, and anxiety. 	Plaintiff
asserts that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s disability ended on April 9, 2024,
was arbitrary, not supported by evidence, and that the ALJ erred in considering
opinion evidence by not appropriately evaluating the mandatory facts of consistency
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and supportability. 	The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ gave good reasons for
finding that Plaintiff’s disability ended on April 9, 2024, and that the ALJ followed
the regulations and did not err in considering the opinion evidence from the medical
providers.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned affirms the ALJ’s decision.
I. 	Procedural History
A. 	Key Dates
The ALJ’s decision notes that Plaintiff applied for DIB on July 2, 2022, alleging
an onset date of July 30, 2021. 	ECF No. 4-2, PageID.30. 	Plaintiff’s claim was
initially denied by the Social Security Administration (SSA) on January 24, 2023.
Id. 	The claim was denied on reconsideration on May 16, 2023. 	Id. 	Plaintiff then
requested a hearing before an ALJ. 	ALJ Ambrose conducted a hearing on Plaintiff’s
claim on April 9, 2023, and issued his decision on May 16, 2024. 	Id., PageID.30, 44.
Plaintiff timely filed this lawsuit on March 14, 2025. 	ECF No. 1.
B. 	Summary of ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ’s decision correctly outlined the five-step sequential process for
determining whether an individual is disabled. 	ECF No. 4-2, PageID.31-32. 	The
ALJ also outlined the eight-step sequential process for determining whether a
disability continued through the date of the decision. 	Id., PageID.32-33. 	The ALJ
explained the transition to the eight-step process as follows:
If the claimant is found disabled at any point in the process, I must also
determine if his disability continues through the date of the decision. In
order to find that the claimant’s disability does not continue through the
date of the decision, I must show that medical improvement has
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occurred which is related to the claimant’s ability to work, or that an
exception applies (20 CFR 404.1594(a)). In most cases, I must also show
that the claimant is able to engage in substantial gainful activity (20
CFR 404.1594(a)). In making this determination, I must follow an
additional eight-step evaluation process for the Title II claim (20 CFR
404.1594). If I can make a decision at a step, the evaluation will not go
on to the next step.
Id., PageID.32.
Before stating her findings at each step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
Date Last Insured (DLI) was December 31, 2026. 	Id., PageID.34.
At Step One of the five-step process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA) since July 30, 2021. 	Id.
At Step Two of the five-step process, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: palatal myoclonus with palatal tremor, insomnia,
residuals of COVID-19 infection, depression, and anxiety. 	Id., PageID.34.
At Step Three of the five-step process, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
the severity of one or the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1.
Before going on to Step Four of the five-step process, the ALJ found that the
Plaintiff had the following RFC from July 30 through April 8, 2024:
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: He could not climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds or be exposed to unprotected heights. He could not tolerate
frequent verbal communication. He was able to perform simple, routine,
repetitive tasks with occasional interaction with coworkers and the
public. In addition, due to his palatal myoclonus and mental conditions,
he would miss two days of work per month and he would be off-task at
least 15% of the workday in addition to his regularly scheduled breaks.
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Id., at 35.
The ALJ included the following:
 	a summary of the regulations regarding how the ALJ will address
Plaintiff’s symptoms, id., PageID.35,
 	a summary of Plaintiff’s statements, id.,
 	a summary of the medical records relating to his January 2021 COVID-
19 infection, and symptoms including palatal myoclonus with palatal
tremor, with symptoms of a clicking spasm that seemed to come from
his larynx, right side contracture with grunting vocalization, Bell’s
palsy, fatigue, loss of motor function, neuropathy, brain fog, sleeping
issues, and treatment with Dr. Dale Ekbom, M.D., and voice therapy
with Heidi Vogley, CCC-SLP, id., PageID.36.
 	a summary of opinions by the State agency medical and psychological
consultants, and the opinion of voice therapist Heidi Vogley, CCC-SLP,
id.,
At Step Four of the five-step process, the ALJ concluded that, from July 30,
2021, through April 8, 2024, the Plaintiff was unable to perform Past Relevant Work
(PRW). 	Id., PageID.37-38.
At Step Five of the five-step process, the ALJ considered the Plaintiff’s age,
education, work experience and RFC and concluded that no jobs existed from July 30,
2021, through April 8, 2024, that Plaintiff could perform. 	Id., PageID.38. 	The ALJ
found that Plaintiff was disabled as defined under the Social Security from July 30,
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2021, through April 8, 2024. 	Id., PageID.39. 	Plaintiff does not challenge this
portion of the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ, however, concluded that “[t]he claimant’s disability ended April 9,
2024, and the claimant has not become disabled again since that date (20 CFR
404.1594(f)(8)).” 	Id., PageID.44. 	In making this finding, the ALJ considered the
eight-step process.
The ALJ then explained that Plaintiff had no new impairments since April 9,
2024, the date that his disability ended. 	Id. PageID.39.
The ALJ addressed Step One by finding that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since July 30, 2021.
At Step Two of the eight-step process, the ALJ then determined that beginning
April 9, 2024, the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 	Id. 	The ALJ considered listings 2.00
(speech 	impairment), 	11.00 	(neurological 	impairment), 	3.00 	(respiratory
impairment), and 12.04, 12.06 (mental impairments).
The ALJ considered paragraph B criteria and determined that Plaintiff had a
mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, moderate
limitations in interacting with other people and in concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining 	pace, 	and 	no 	limitation 	in 	adapting 	or 	managing 	himself. 	Id.,
PageID.40.
At Steps Three through Six, the ALJ determined that medical improvement in
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Plaintiff’s condition occurred as of April 9, 2024. 	The ALJ explained:
Id., PageID.41.
The ALJ found that beginning April 9, 2024, Plaintiff had the RFC to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: He cannot climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds or be exposed to unprotected heights. He cannot tolerate
frequent 	verbal 	communication. 	He 	can 	perform 	simple, 	routine,
repetitive tasks with occasional interaction with coworkers and the
public.
Id.
In addition to stating that Plaintiff had reported improvement in his condition,
the ALJ discussed the following regarding Plaintiff:
Id., PageID.42.
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The ALJ found the prior administrative findings of the State agency medical
consultants unpersuasive because they were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s medical
symptoms and diagnosis. 	Id.
Additionally, the ALJ found persuasive prior administrative findings of the
State agency psychological consultants who determined that Plaintiff could perform
simple repetitive tasks and occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors.
Id. 	The ALJ determined that these findings were consistent with Plaintiff’s
inpatient psychiatric treatment, his relative normal mental status examinations, and
were consistent with the treatment he received for anxiety and depression. 	Id.
Further, the ALJ found treating provider Heidi Vogley’s opinion that Plaintiff
could not perform unskilled work as unpersuasive because it was an opinion that was
outside her area of expertise. 	Id., PageID.42-43.
At Steps Seven through Eight, the ALJ determined that as of April 9, 2024,
based upon Plaintiff’s RFC, he could perform jobs in the national economy and, as of
that date, he was not disabled under the Social Security Act. 	Plaintiff challenges
this portion of the ALJ’s decision.
II. 	Standard of Review
Review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to two issues: (1) “whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards,” and (2) “whether the findings of the ALJ are
supported by substantial evidence.” 	Winslow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 F. App’x
418, 420 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405
(6th Cir. 2009)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	The Court may not conduct a de novo review of
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the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. 	Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 	It is the Commissioner who is charged
with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and the
Commissioner’s findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla of evidence but
“such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” 	Jones v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th
Cir. 1991). 	In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must
consider the evidence on the record as a whole and whatever evidence in the record
fairly detracts from its weight. 	Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 735
F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. 	Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545
(6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 	This standard affords the administrative decision
maker 	considerable 	latitude 	and 	acknowledges 	that 	a 	decision 	supported 	by
substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have
supported a contrary decision. 	Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that he was no longer disabled
as of April 9, 2024, is not supported by any medical evidence in the record. 	The
Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ cannot simply designate a date out of the blue” to
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support a termination of benefits date. 	ECF No. 14, PageID.1144.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform the full range of work with
limitations. 	Prior to April 9, 2024, the RFC included: 	“In addition, due to his
palatal myoclonus and mental conditions, he would miss two days of work per month
and he would be off-task at least 15% of the workday in addition to his regularly
scheduled breaks.” 	ECF No. 4-2, PageID.35.
After April 9, 2024, the RFC no longer included missing two days of work per
month and being off-task 15% of the workday. 	Id., PageID.41.
RFC is an administrative finding of fact reserved for the Commissioner. 	20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); Deaton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 315 F. App’x
595, 598 (6th Cir. 2009). 	While the RFC determination is made by the ALJ, an ALJ’s
RFC determination must be supported by substantial evidence. 	Torres v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec, 490 F. App’x 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2012). 	If the record contains “conflicting
evidence that would suggest further limitations, under the substantial evidence
standard, 	administrative 	findings 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	reversal 	merely 	because
substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion.” 	Id.
Ultimately, the ALJ may consider all relevant evidence on record, including an
individual’s medical history, reports of daily activity, and recorded observations.
SSR 96-8p. 	The “ALJ is charged with the responsibility of determining the RFC
based on her evaluation of the medical and nonmedical evidence.” 	Rudd v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not just pick a random date out
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of the blue in determining that Plaintiff’s condition improved to the point that he no
longer would miss two days of work per month and would not be off-task at least 15%
of the workday. 	The ALJ held a hearing on April 9, 2024, where he was able to
observe and question Plaintiff about his medical condition and symptoms. 	Initially,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff would be capable of performing work from July 30,
2021, through April 8, 2024, “with two days off and time off task due to symptoms of
his mental impairments and fatigue” days in bed, and a week of hospitalization.
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.37. 	The ALJ noted significant medical improvement, and that
Plaintiff had testified at the April 9, 2024, hearing that he was doing better. 	Id.,
PageID.65. 	Plaintiff’s mother noted that he could live on his own, and can perform
activities such as personal care, preparing meals, cleaning, laundry, yard work,
driving a vehicle, shopping for groceries, and managing personal finances. 	Id.,
PageID.40.
In addition to the ALJ’s reasoning quoted above, the ALJ cited to the medical
records noting improvement. 	Id., PageID41; (citing ECF No. 4-8, PageID.484; ECF
No. 4-9, PageID.651; ECF No. 4-10, PageID.809; ECF No. 4-11, PageID.879; ECF No.
4-13, PageID.1000; ECF No. 4-15, PageID.1062). 	Further, the ALJ relied on the
assessments of the State agency psychological consultants that Plaintiff could
perform repetitive tasks and occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors.
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.42.
Plaintiff has not shown error in the ALJ’s RFC assessment but essentially
requests that the Court reach a different conclusion by reweighing the medical
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evidence and evaluating the evidence differently. 	But that is not ground for relief.
Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1259726, at *5 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 7, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL
1251232 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2024), and report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1258380 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2024). 	As stated above it is
the ALJ’s responsibility to determine Plaintiff’s RFC. 	Here, the ALJ properly
considered the medical and non-medical evidence in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was no longer disabled
after April 9, 2024.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the supportability and
consistency of the medical opinions. An ALJ is required to evaluate the medical
opinions pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 404.1520c. 	The ALJ “will not defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s),” including opinions from a treating source.
20 U.S. § 404.1520c(a). 	Instead, an ALJ will articulate his or her determination of
the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors in
paragraph 	(c)(1) 	through 	(c)(5) 	of 	this 	section, 	as 	appropriate.” 	20 U.S. 	§
404.1520c(b)(1). 	These 	factors 	include: 	(1) 	supportability, 	(2) 	consistency, 	(3)
relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) other factors which tend to
support or contradict the opinion. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5). 	In general, the
ALJ must explain his consideration of the supportability and consistency factors but
the ALJ is not required to explain how the remaining factors were considered.
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20 C.F.R. § 	404.1520c(b)(2). 	The 	regulation 	explains 	“supportability” 	and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting 	explanations 	presented 	by 	a 	medical 	source 	are 	to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), 	the 	more 	persuasive 	the 	medical 	opinions 	or 	prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
(2) Consistency. 	The 	more 	consistent 	a 	medical 	opinion(s) 	or 	prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2).
As to the persuasiveness of the opinions of the medical providers, the ALJ was
unpersuaded by the State agency medical consultants who found Plaintiff’s physical
impairments non-severe. 	ECF No. 4-2, PageID.42. 	This finding was favorable to
Plaintiff.
The ALJ found the State agency psychological consultants who determined
that Plaintiff could perform simple repetitive tasks and occasionally interact with the
coworkers and supervisors as persuasive because the evidence was supported by
Plaintiff’s in-patient hospitalization in September 2022 and his relatively normal
mental status examinations. 	Id. 	The ALJ found the findings were consistent with
Plaintiff’s treatment for anxiety and depression. 	Id.
The ALJ was unpersuaded by the opinion of voice therapy treating provider
Heidi Vogely1 that Plaintiff could not perform his prior work due to the claimant’s
1 	Vogely testified that she is a speech language pathologist and specializes in the
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difficulty with attention and focus and would be unable to perform unskilled work,
due to “overwhelming depression knowing what he is not able to do.” 2 	Id.,
PageID.42. 	The ALJ found that this opinion was outside the area of Vogely’s
expertise. 	Plaintiff has not set forth reasons that could establish that the ALJ erred
in making this conclusion.
Judge 	Ambrose 	found 	that 	the 	psychological 	consultant 	opinions 	were
supported 	by 	Plaintiff’s 	September 	2022 	inpatient 	hospitalization 	records 	and
consistent with Plaintiff’s treatment for anxiety and depression. 	Here, while ALJ
Ambrose’s direct treatment of supportability and consistency was brief, his reasoning
for finding the opinion of the State agency psychological consultants persuasive is
sufficiently supported by his earlier discussion of Plaintiff’s medical records during
the RFC analysis. 	See e.g., Forrest v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 591 Fed. Appx. 359, 366
(6th Cir. 2014) (“here the ALJ made sufficient factual findings elsewhere in his
decision to support his conclusion at step three”); Crum v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 660 F.
App’x 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2016) (it is sufficient for an ALJ’s reasons for determining
the consistency of a medical opinion to be found elsewhere in the decision); Dunlavy
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3333, 2024 WL 4558606, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2024)
(finding that the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinion was supported where the
inconsistencies in the record were discussed in the same section of her decision);
Lillian A. v. O’Malley, No. 4:23-CV-4-CRS-HBB, 2024 WL 987571, at *2 (W.D. Ky.
voice arena. 	ECF No. 4-2, PageID.98.
2 	The ALJ did determine that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant
work. 	ECF No. 4-2, PageID.43.
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Mar. 7, 2024) (“Indeed, an ALJ’s reasons for rejecting or adopting a medical opinion
may be gleaned from elsewhere in the written decision: ‘meaningful judicial review
exists – even if the ALJ provided only a cursory or sparse analysis – if the ALJ made
sufficient factual findings elsewhere in the decision that supports her conclusion.’”)
(citing Booker R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-170, 2023 WL 4247312, at *4–5
(S.D. Ohio June 29, 2023).
The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s decision meets the requirements of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and is supported by substantial evidence.
IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court respectfully affirms the ALJ decision because the ALJ
properly applied the regulations and because substantial evidence supports his
decision.
Dated: 	February 13, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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