Hart v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SEAN HART,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-155
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Section
405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if
the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be
conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States
Magistrate Judges to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition of Social Security appeals, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Livingston v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 776 Fed. Appx. 897, 898 (6th Cir., June 19, 2019).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords to
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 36 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.41).
He successfully completed high school and worked previously as a poultry farm
laborer, food service worker, and nurse assistant. Id. Plaintiff applied for DIB
benefits on December 21, 2021, and SSI benefits on January 15, 2022, alleging that
he had been disabled since July 1, 2020, due to degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine, narrowing of the spinal cord, bulging discs, bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome, bipolar disorder, panic attacks, and carpal tunnel surgery. (PageID.29,
419).
Plaintiff’s applications were denied, after which time he requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following an administrative hearing,
ALJ William Reamon, in an opinion dated January 25, 2024, determined that
Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits. (PageID.29-43, 107-49). The
Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the
Commissioner’s final decision in the matter. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
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provide that if a claimant suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well as an
exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate he is entitled to disability benefits
and he satisfies his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that
he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). While
the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential
evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the
procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined.
O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th Cir., Jan. 7,
2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc disease,
degenerative joint disease, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, bipolar disorder, and
anxiety, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with
other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in
the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(PageID.32-35).
With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform light work subject to the following
limitations: (1) he can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, and ramps/stairs;
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(2) he can frequently balance and kneel; (3) he can occasionally stoop, crouch, and
crawl; (4) he must avoid concentrated exposure to extremes of cold, vibration, and
hazards; (5) he must avoid concentrated proximity to dangerous moving machinery
and unprotected heights; (6) he can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks on a
sustained basis; (7) he can tolerate occasional interactions with the general public
and supervisors; and (8) he can tolerate occasional work setting/work process
changes. (PageID.35).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work at
which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
substantial evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number
of specific jobs which Plaintiff can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there existed approximately
420,000 jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could
perform. (PageID.42). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g.,
Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix
thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others
have deemed ‘significant’”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits.
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I. 	Medical Source Opinion
As part of his disability application, Plaintiff submitted several statements
from Dr. Sheila Gendich. (PageID.662-70, 944-47). Dr. Gendich reported that
Plaintiff experienced far greater limitations than the ALJ recognized. The ALJ,
however, found the doctor’s observations less than persuasive. (PageID.39-40).
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s assessment of Dr.
Gendich’s statements is not supported by substantial evidence.
Because Plaintiff filed his application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated
the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This regulation provides
that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a).
Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate his determination of the persuasiveness of
a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id. § 416.920c(b)(1).
These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
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(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
A. 	Dr. Gendich’s Statements Regarding Plaintiff’s Mental Functioning
Dr. Gendich assessed Plaintiff’s mental ability to function in 25 different
categories. (PageID.664-65). The doctor reported that Plaintiff was: (1) “unable to
meet competitive standards” in 15 categories 1 ; (2) “seriously limited, but not
precluded” from employment in 3 categories2; and (3) “limited but satisfactory” in 7
categories3. Id. Dr. Gendich also reported that Plaintiff’s symptoms would likely
1 These categories included: (1) maintain attention for two-hour segment; (2) work
in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted;
(3) complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms; (4) perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods; (5) ask simple questions or request
assistance; (6) deal with normal work stress; (7) interact appropriately with the
general public; and (8) maintain socially appropriate behavior. (PageID.664-65).
2 These categories are: (1) adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness;
(2) respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; and (3) get along with
co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral
extremes. (PageID.664-65).
3 These categories are: (1) remember work-like procedures; (2) understand and
remember very short and simple instructions; (3) carry out very short and simple
instructions; (4) sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; (5) make
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“interfere with attention and concentration needed to perform even simple work
tasks. . .25% or more” of the time during a “typical workday.” (PageID.663). The
doctor further reported that Plaintiff’s “impairments or treatment would cause [him]
to be absent from work. . .more than four days per month.” (PageID.665).
The ALJ concluded that this statement was “not persuasive.” (PageID.39).
In support of this determination, the ALJ observed that Dr. Gendich’s statements
were inconsistent with the observations and conclusions of other care providers.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s other care providers observed that Plaintiff: (1) was
cooperative; (2) exhibited no behavioral concerns; (3) exhibited “logical/coherent”
thought process; (4) exhibited “intact” judgment; (5) exhibited “good” or “fair”
concentration; and (6) was “independent” in daily living skills save “paying bills” and
“cooking.” (PageID.604-05, 646, 648-49, 693-95, 716, 723, 726, 730, 734, 737, 741).
The ALJ also noted that Dr. Gendich was not a specialist in treating emotional
disorders and, moreover, that the doctor’s own contemporaneous observations
regarding Plaintiff’s emotional well-being were not consistent with her subsequent
statements. (PageID.39). Specifically, Dr. Gendich often reported that Plaintiff
was not experiencing anxiety or depression and that his medications lessened his
symptoms. (PageID.539, 549, 553, 560-61, 565, 570, 890, 960, 980). The doctor
consistently reported that Plaintiff experienced no limitations performing daily
simple work-related decisions; (6) accept instructions and respond appropriately to
criticism from supervisors; and (7) be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate
precautions. (PageID.664).
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activities and no difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions.
(PageID.860, 867, 873, 888-89, 959, 965, 972-73, 978-79). The doctor also observed
that Plaintiff was cooperative and exhibited no deficiencies in judgment or thought.
(PageID.875, 967). The doctor also reported, in August 2023, that Plaintiff was
“exercising walking fishing l[]oosing weight.” (PageID.954). In sum, Dr. Gendich’s
contemporaneous treatment notes do not contain insights or observations consistent
with the extreme limitations at issue. (PageID.520-74, 853-90, 950-96).
As noted above, the ALJ, in his RFC assessment, limited Plaintiff to simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks, only occasional interactions with the general public
and supervisors, and only occasional changes in work setting or work process.
These limitations are supported by the record. To the extent Dr. Gendich’s
statements are interpreted as articulating even greater non-exertional limitations,
the ALJ reasonably discounted such and his rationale for doing so is supported by
substantial evidence.
B. 	Dr. Gendich’s Statements Regarding Plaintiff’s Physical Functioning
With respect to Plaintiff’s physical functional abilities, Dr. Gendich reported
the following. Plaintiff can continuously sit for 20 minutes and continuously stand
for 5-10 minutes. (PageID.945). During an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff can sit and
stand/walk for “less than 2 hours” each. (PageID.946). Plaintiff cannot lift any
amount of weight and must have his legs elevated when sitting. (PageID.946).
Plaintiff can “never” perform the following: (1) look down; (2) turn head left or right;
(3) look up; (4) hold head in static position; (5) twist, (6) stoop; or (7) crouch/squat.
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(PageID.946-47). Plaintiff’s “impairments or treatment” would cause him to be
absent from work “more than four days per month.” (PageID.947).
As the ALJ concluded, the doctor’s extreme opinions are not consistent with
the record. Examinations performed by Plaintiff’s other care providers revealed
results that were consistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (PageID.720, 725-27,
730, 733-34, 741-42, 828-29). Likewise, imaging tests, specifically x-rays and an
MRI examination of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine, were not inconsistent with the ALJ’s
RFC assessment. Furthermore, as the ALJ noted, examinations conducted by Dr.
Gendich revealed results which are inconsistent with her extreme opinions.
(PageID.529, 534, 560, 565, 570, 862, 875, 954, 966). The doctor’s observation that
Plaintiff was exercising, walking, and fishing are also inconsistent with her opinions.
In sum, the ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Gendich’s opinions and the reasons
articulated by the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Respectfully submitted,
Date: December 23, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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