Kesteloot v. Commissioner of Social Security

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHELI KESTELOOT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-92
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant,
__________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review
of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) which denied her claim
for disability insurance benefits (DIB).
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on July 15, 2022, alleging a disability onset
date of April 25, 2020. PageID.37. Plaintiff identified disabling conditions of major depressive
disorder, plantar fasciitis, anxiety, high blood pressure and high cholesterol. 	PageID.227.
Plaintiff earned an associate’s degree and had past relevant employment as a buyer and a shoe
salesperson. PageID.48, 60, 228. An administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed plaintiff’s claim
de novo and entered a written decision denying benefits on December 20, 2023. PageID.37-49.
This decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become the final decision of
the Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal courts review the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial
evidence and give fresh review to its legal interpretations.” 	Taskila v. Commissioner of Social
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 1
of 9

2
Security, 819 F.3d 902, 903 (6th Cir. 2016). This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision
is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990).
“[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97,
103 (2019). “Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means —
and means only — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record
taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).
The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. 	This Court does not
review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or weigh the evidence. Brainard v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record
also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the
Commissioner’s decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record.
Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). “If the
[Commissioner’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if the
reviewing court would decide the matter differently, and even if substantial evidence also supports
the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286
(6th Cir. 1994).
A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to
benefits. 	A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 2
of 9

3
of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1505; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923
(6th Cir. 1990). 	In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step
analysis:
The Social Security Act requires the [Commissioner] to follow a “five-step
sequential process” for claims of disability. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that
she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time she seeks
disability benefits. 	Second, plaintiff must show that she suffers from a “severe
impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. A “severe impairment” is
one which “significantly limits . . . 	physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Third, if plaintiff is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a
severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the
impairment meets a listed impairment, plaintiff is presumed to be disabled
regardless of age, education or work experience. 	Fourth, if the plaintiff's
impairment does not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, plaintiff is not
disabled. For the fifth and final step, even if the plaintiff’s impairment does prevent
her from doing her past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy
that plaintiff can perform, plaintiff is not disabled.
Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations
caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant
work through step four. 	Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.
2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a
significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile.” Id. If it is determined that a claimant
is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis
v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).
II. 	ALJ’s DECISION
Plaintiff’s claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. At the first step, the ALJ
found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of
April 25, 2020, and met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 3
of 9

4
December 31, 2025. 	PageID.39. At the second step, the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe
impairments of major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. 	PageID.39. 	At the
third step, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1. PageID.41.
The ALJ decided at the fourth step that:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has
the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: is able to carry out simple
instructions that do not involve detailed or complex decision making or judgment;
can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting; cannot be required to
work at a production rate pace such as assembly line work, or have hourly quota
requirements but is able to complete flexible daily quotas by end of day; and can
have occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public.
PageID.43. 	The ALJ also found that plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work.
PageID.48.
At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could perform a significant
number of unskilled jobs at all exertional levels. 	PageID.48-49. 	Based on the testimony of
vocational expert (VE), the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform the requirements of unskilled
occupations in the national economy at all exertional levels such as laundry worker (medium work)
(55,000 jobs), floor waxer (medium work) (500,000 jobs), and industrial cleaner (medium work)
(380,000 jobs). 	PageID.49. 	Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not under a
disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 25, 2020 (the alleged onset date)
through December 20, 2023 (the date of the decision). PageID.49.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 4
of 9

5
Plaintiff raised one multi-faceted and non-specific error1:
The 	Commissioner 	erroneously 	failed 	to 	give 	appropriate
weight to the opinions of the medical experts, violated agency
rules, failed in her duties to provide a fair and full hearing and
misapplied the law.
Plaintiff’s brief consists of a recital of some of the administrative record
(PageID.631-638) and a short argument:
The Commissioner erred when she found the opinions of Katherine
Jackson, PA-C, to be “unpersuasive”. Instead, the Commissioner found that the
opinions of non-examining State agency psychological consultants Karon Hanson,
Ph.D., and Joseph Deloach, Ph.D., to be “partially persuasive”. (PageID.25) As
Claimant’s counselor since 2021, Ms. Jackson is certainly in a better position to
evaluate and opine on Claimant’s mental complaints and physical limitations than
a non-examining psychological source.
Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 10, PageID.637-638). Plaintiff asks that the Court reverse the
Commissioner’s decision and award her benefits. PageID.638.
Plaintiff cites no authority to support her claim. Plaintiff is essentially asking this
Court to perform a de novo review of the cited portions of the administrative record and award
benefits based on PA-C Jackson’s opinion. However, the Court does not perform such a review.
See Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681. 	This Court’s review is focused on determining whether the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
McKnight, 927 F.2d 241. As discussed, if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it must be affirmed even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.
See Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286; Willbanks, 847 F.2d at 303.
1 Plaintiff’s statement of error is overly broad and does not comply with the Court’s requirements. The Court’s
directions for filing briefs (ECF No. 7) states in pertinent part, “Plaintiff's initial brief . . . must contain a Statement
of Errors, setting forth in a separately numbered section, each specific error of fact or law upon which Plaintiff seeks
reversal or remand. Failure to identify an issue in the Statement of Errors constitutes a waiver of that issue.”
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 5
of 9

6
The applicable regulations provide that the Social Security Administration (SSA)
“will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). In these
claims, the SSA “will articulate in our determination or decision how persuasive we find all of the
medical opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in [the claimant’s] record.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b). 	In addressing medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings, the ALJ will consider the following factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3)
relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and, (5) other factors. 	See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(1)-(5).
The most important factors which the ALJ considers in evaluating medical opinions
are “supportability” and “consistency”. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The regulations explain
“supportability” 	as, 	“[t]he 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical 	evidence 	and 	supporting
explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). The regulations explain “consistency”
as, “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with
the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive
the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 	20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(2). In addition, the regulations recognize that “[b]ecause many claims have
voluminous case records containing many types of evidence from different sources, it is not
administratively feasible for us to articulate in each determination or decision how we considered
all of the factors for all of the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings in your
case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1).
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 6
of 9

7
Here, the ALJ reviewed the medical evidence. PageID.44-47. While plaintiff listed
some physical conditions, she “indicated her primary reason for being unable to work is due to her
depression.” PageID.44. In this regard, the ALJ found that,
She was mainly treated with medication through her primary care provider, from
which the claimant reported having some improvement in mood and the ability to
better control panic attacks. 	Overall, mental status exams showed no agitation,
sufficient fund of knowledge, no flight of ideas, no grandiosity, no hallucination,
no memory loss, no mood swings, normal insight, normal attention span and
concentration, no pressured speech, and no suicidal ideation (Ex. 1F; 3F; 4F).
Id.
The ALJ considered the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants
Karon Hanson, Ph.D., and Joseph Deloach, Ph.D., who concluded that,
The claimant could complete simple, routine, and repetitive work, in a workplace
environment that was not fast-paced and did not impose significant production
quotas, on a sustained and consistent basis (Ex. 1A; 3A).
PageID.46. The ALJ found the opinions partially persuasive and consistent with each other. Id.
The ALJ also found that,
The claimant’s reports of chronic depression with little motivation/energy and
isolation from others supports moderate limitation in social interaction as well as
concentration, persistence, and pace. Her ability to mainly carry out activities of
daily living when she needs to and exhibiting normal behavior, interaction, and
understanding during appointments supports mild limitation in the other areas, and
not more than moderate limitation overall.
PageID.46-47.
The ALJ found the May 2023 opinion of plaintiff’s treating health provider, PA-C
Jackson, to be unpersuasive. 	PageID.47. 	PA-C Jackson found that plaintiff had a number of
serious limitations which were effectively work preclusive. 	For example. PA-C Jackson found
that,
in regard to performing unskilled work: the claimant was unable to meet
competitive stands in her ability to: remember work-like procedures; maintain
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 7
of 9

8
regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances;
sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; and deal with normal work
stress.
PageID.47 (emphasis added). Among other limitations, PA-C Jackson found that,
the claimant had no useful ability to function in her ability to: complete a normal
workday 	and 	work 	week 	without 	interruptions 	from 	psychologically 	based
symptoms; perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length
of rest periods; and deal with normal work stress.
Id. (emphasis added).
The ALJ found that PAC-Jackson’s opinion was unpersuasive, as 	well as
inconsistent with the opinions of the psychological consultants. Id. The ALJ also found that,
The extent of Ms. Jackson’s opinion is unsupported. 	For example, Ms. Jackson
found the claimant was not able to meet competitive standards or had no useful
ability to function in many areas. However, that assessment is unsupported by
evidence of the claimant’s conservative treatment, some improvement with
medication, lack of psychotic behavior, lack of inpatient or emergent care, her
ability to live alone and mainly carry out activities of daily living when she needs
to, her ability to manage her own healthcare and understand and participate
appropriately during appointments, and the majority of normal mental status
findings. This evidence supports at least moderate limitations, but does not support
the extent of limitations found by Ms. Jackson. Therefore, her opinion is not
persuasive.
Id.
This is not a case where the ALJ found that the claimant had minimal limitations.
Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s impairments resulted in significant work-related limitations
such as: she carry out only “simple instructions that do not involve detailed or complex decision
making or judgment”; she can tolerate only “occasional changes in a routine work setting”; she
“cannot be required to work at a production rate pace such as assembly line work, or have hourly
quota requirements but is able to complete flexible daily quotas by end of day”; and she can have
only “occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public.” 	PageID.43.
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 8
of 9

9
The VE testified that a person with these significant limitations could still perform unskilled work
such as a laundry worker, a floor waxer, and an industrial cleaner. PageID.74-75.
Based on this record, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim of error should be denied.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For these reasons, I respectfully recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be
AFFIRMED.
Dated: February 19, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case 1:25-cv-00092-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/19/26 Page 9
of 9