Goben v. Kent, County of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
AULTON DANIEL GOBEN, III, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00017
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Judge
v.
COUNTY OF KENT, et al.,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. 	(ECF No. 101.)
Plaintiff – Kent County Jail inmate Aulton Daniel Goben – filed an unverified
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the remaining Defendant – Kent
County Deputy Joe Proulx – violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment1
and state law. 	Goben alleges Deputy Proulx failed to provide him with appropriate
and timely medical care after he (Goben) had an altercation in the jail with another
inmate.
1 	In the screening opinion, the Court was unsure whether the Fourteenth
Amendment, applicable to pretrial detainees, or the Eighth Amendment, applicable
to those convicted of a crime, applied to Plaintiff. 	Defendant represents that
Plaintiff was detained because he committed an offense while he was on parole.
Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment applies because Plaintiff was not a pretrial
detainee at the time of the alleged violations.
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Defendant Proulx filed a motion for summary judgment. 	For the reasons set
forth below, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment and dismiss him from this lawsuit.
II. 	Factual Allegations
On March 21, 2025, this Court entered an opinion dismissing all claims except
for claims arising out of an altercation on December 23, 2024. 	The Court previously
summarized the facts as follows:
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Inmates John
Does #1–3 “battered/assaulted” him “inside of [his] cell,” and he alleges
that these inmates “breached their []KCCF[] Handbook duty.” (Id.,
PageID.6, 7.) Plaintiff claims that “before the incident took place,
Shaverlier stated, ‘Do you want to go to war,’ through [Plaintiff’s] cell’s
intercom.” (Id., PageID.6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “Shaverlier,
Sutton, or Dunham did not protect [him] from the battery/assault or
contact a nurse for medical attention.” (Id., PageID.6–7.) Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendants Dominguez and Unknown Party #1 [Defendant
Proulx] 	“breached 	their 	duty 	to 	get 	[Plaintiff] 	medical 	attention,”
explaining that “both deputies had spoken to the deputies responsible
beforehand, and they all s[aw] that [Plaintiff] was visibly bleeding on
the floor, carpet, and door of [the] housing unit.” (Id., PageID.7.) Plaintiff
claims that two days prior to the December 23, 2024, incident, he
overheard Defendant Inmate John Doe #2 say that “Shaverlier asked
him to perform the mentioned battery/assault,” but Plaintiff “did not
know at the time that [he] was the target being discussed.” (Id.) Plaintiff
also overheard Defendant Inmate John Doe #2 say that “he ‘did not want
to perform the task’ and Shaverlier had threatened to [sic] something to
his ‘people(s)’ if he did not perform the task.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that
he believes “the imminent danger that [he] is in is retaliation for a[n]
incident with Kent Deputies on a previous detention.” 	(Id.)
(ECF No. 11, PageID.33-34.)
On December 8, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend his
complaint to substitute Defendant Proulx for a John Doe Defendant. 	ECF No. 82.
On January 2, 2026, the Court dismissed Defendants Dominguez and Shaverlier from
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this lawsuit. 	ECF No. 90. 	Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Proulx for failing to
provide medical care remains. 	Defendant Proulx moves for summary judgment.
III. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
IV. 	Failure to Provide Medical Care
Goben says he was denied medical care by Deputy Proulx. 	The evidence is
clear that Goben was provided with medical care.2 	Immediately after the incident,
2 	Defendants 	have 	submitted 	three 	surveillance 	videos 	that 	depict 	the
altercation and events that occurred after the altercation. 	The videos do not have
sound.
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Goben was evaluated by medical personnel, and he was taken to the hospital for
further evaluation:
(ECF No. 62-1, PageID.224-225.)
An Eighth Amendment claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has
an objective and a subjective component. 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). 	To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical
need at issue is sufficiently serious. 	Id. 	In other words, the inmate must show that
he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. 	Id.
The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the
seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.”
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); Phillips v. Roane
Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008). 	Where a prisoner challenges their
treatment as inadequate, a prisoner must show more than a serious medical need.
Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). 	To establish the objective
component in a situation where a prisoner asserts that the care received was
inadequate, a prisoner must prove grossly inadequate care which generally requires
the introduction of medical evidence typically in the form of expert testimony. 	Id.
The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim requires an inmate
to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying
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medical care. 	Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). 	Deliberate
indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 	“[T]he official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 	Id. at 837. 	To prove a
defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence .
. . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from
the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” 	Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)).
The subjective component was summarized in Rhinehart. 	There, the court of
appeals stated the following:
[T]he plaintiff must show that each defendant acted with a mental state
“equivalent to criminal recklessness.” 	This showing requires proof that
each 	defendant 	“subjectively 	perceived 	facts 	from 	which 	to 	infer
substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference,
and that he then disregarded that risk” by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.
A plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove subjective
recklessness: A jury is entitled to “conclude that a prison official knew
of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” And
if a risk is well-documented and circumstances suggest that the official
has been exposed to information so that he must have known of the risk,
the 	evidence 	is 	sufficient 	for 	a 	jury 	to 	find 	that 	the 	official 	had
knowledge.
But the plaintiff also must present enough evidence from which a jury
could conclude that each defendant “so recklessly ignored the risk that
he was deliberately indifferent to it.”
Id. 738–39 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
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Goben has presented no evidence showing that he was denied medical care.
The evidence clearly shows otherwise. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, no genuine
issue 	of 	material 	fact 	exists 	with 	respect 	to 	Goben’s 	Fourteenth 	Amendment
deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Deputy Proulx. 	Thus, Proulx is
entitled to summary judgment.
V. 	Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	dismissal 	of 	the
complaint against them based upon qualified immunity. 	“Under the doctrine of
qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing 	discretionary 	functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises
the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’”
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 	The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of
Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must
“determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id.
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the
right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a
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reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 	A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if
either step of the analysis is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted,
810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S., at
666, 	132 	S.Ct. 	2088. 	Otherwise, 	the 	rule 	is 	not 	one 	that 	“every
reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
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before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018).
In the opinion of the undersigned, for the reasons set forth above, no genuine
issue of material fact exists entitling Defendant to summary judgment. As such,
Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
VI. 	State Law Claims
To the extent that Goben raises state laws claims against Defendant Proulx it
is recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his
state law claims. 	In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy
and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against
needlessly deciding state law issues.” 	Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d
1178, 	1182 	(6th 	Cir. 	1993). 	Ordinarily, 	when 	a 	district 	court 	has 	exercised
jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and
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the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining
state-law 	claims. 	Id. 	Dismissal, 	however, 	remains 	“purely 	discretionary.”
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
If the Court adopts the undersigned’s recommendation, it will dismiss all of
Goben’s federal law claims against Defendant Proulx. 	The balance of the relevant
considerations 	would 	therefore 	weigh 	against 	the 	exercise 	of 	supplemental
jurisdiction. 	As such, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Goben’s state law claims against
Defendant Proulx.
VIII. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendant Proulx’s motion
for summary judgment and dismiss him from this case.
If the Court accepts this recommendation, the case will be dismissed.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14)
days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	April 7, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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