Cooper-Keel v. Weaver et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NEVIN P. COOPER-KEEL, JD, 	Case No. 1:24-cv-01318
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
ROBERT WEAVER, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation addresses Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s 	Second 	Amended 	Complaint 	(ECF 	No. 	20), 	Plaintiff’s 	response 	in
opposition (ECF No. 23), and Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s response (ECF No. 25).
Plaintiff – Nevin Cooper-Keel – is the sole proprietor of the bail bonds agency
Atwater Bail Bonds (“Atwater”). 	(ECF No. 16, PageID.139.) 	In his first complaint,
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants – Kalamazoo County (the “County”) and
County employees Special Deputy Robert Weaver and Undersheriff Michele Greenlee
– under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 16, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff then filed a first amended complaint on February 24, 2025, (ECF No.
9), and, with the Court’s permission, filed his second amended complaint on April 14,
2025 (ECF No. 16).
Plaintiff’s claims center around his request to sell two properties in a sheriff’s
auction. 	As background, in August 2023, Plaintiff’s bail bonds agency posted a
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$100,000 bond for Tyrone Hollin in the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court. 	(ECF No.
16, PageID.140.) 	In exchange for the bond, Hollin and his aunt, Dianne Anderson,
assigned mortgages to two houses to Atwater’s insurance company, United States
Fire Insurance Company (“USFINS”), as collateral. 	(Id.) 	Eventually, Hollin failed
to appear in the case. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff demanded payment from Hollin and Anderson
to no avail. 	(Id.)
Subsequently, Plaintiff went to the Kalamazoo County Sheriff’s office and
asked Special Deputy Weaver about procedures to sell the two homes in the sheriff’s
foreclosure auction. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff proceeded to advertise the foreclosure sale in
the local newspaper. 	(Id., PageID.141.) 	Plaintiff says he spent around $2,100 on
newspaper advertisements. 	(Id.)
Before the Sheriff’s sale, but after Plaintiff paid for the advertisements, Deputy
Weaver told Plaintiff that only a bank can foreclosure on a mortgage and that
Plaintiff must be represented by an attorney. 	(Id.) 	Deputy Weaver also explained
that the sheriff’s department does not do sales for mortgages related to bail bonds.
(Id.) 	Deputy Weaver sent the issue to Undersheriff Greenlee and consulted with
Kalamazoo County’s attorney Lewis Smith before confirming that the County’s
position was that they are not required to sell the two properties in the sheriff’s public
auction. 	(Id., PageID.142.) 	Plaintiff admits that Deputy Weaver told him that
foreclosure requires attorney representation and a judicial foreclosure. 	(Id.)
It appears that Plaintiff filed a foreclosure action against Anderson, Hollin,
and 	another 	individual 	on 	February 	21, 	2025, 	in 	Kalamazoo 	County. 	See
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Attachment A: Cooper-Keel v. Hollin, et al., Case No. 2025-0126-CH (Mich. 9th Jud.
Cir.). 	Instead of pursuing recourse exclusively in the state court system, Plaintiff
has also brought the present suit in this Court. 	Now, Plaintiff asserts that Deputy
Weaver, Undersheriff Greenlee, and Kalamazoo County violated the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law, when they refused to sell the two
properties in the sheriff’s sale.
Plaintiff’s claims are summarized below:
Count 	Basis 	Defendants
1 	42 USC § 1983, asserting that
Defendants, acting under color of state
law, violated his rights under 1st, 5th,
and 14th Amendments by “refusing to sell
the houses I own the mortgage for and
have duly foreclosed on by advertisement”
Kalamazoo County, Special
Deputy Weaver, Undersheriff
Greenlee
2 	Violation of state law foreclosure-by-
advertisement statute, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.3201 et. seq.
Kalamazoo County, Special
Deputy Weaver, Undersheriff
Greenlee
3 	State law tortious interference with
Plaintiff’s contracts with non-parties
Kalamazoo County, Special
Deputy Weaver, Undersheriff
Greenlee
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. 	(ECF
No. 20.) 	First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not provide proper service.
Next, Defendants assert that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction because they were
not properly served. 	Additionally, Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s complaint arises under Michigan law rather
than federal law. 	Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s federal claims are
grossly deficient and should therefore be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
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Plaintiff responds that the Defendants were notified of the action and that he
continues 	to 	experience 	damages 	due 	to 	Defendants’ 	policies. 	(ECF 	No. 	23,
PageID.209-10.)
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff is effectively asking this Court to
declare that the Kalamazoo Sheriff’s Office violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
by refusing to bypass Michigan foreclosure procedure. 	Plaintiff’s complaint fails to
allege a viable federal claim. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that the Court grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for
which relief may be granted.
II. 	Relevant Documents
Along 	with 	his 	initial 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	included 	the 	following
documentation of the mortgage transfers from Tyrone Hollin and Diane Anderson to
Plaintiff’s business entities.
(ECF No. 1-1, PageID.15.)
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(ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19.)
Plaintiff also includes the following Judgment After Bond Forfeiture against
Atwater Bail Bonds following Hollin’s failure to appear in court:
(ECF No. 1-1, PageID.13.)
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Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that the following documents demonstrate
that he reassigned the mortgages from United States Fire Insurance Company to
Atwater Bail Bonds:
(ECF No. 1-1, PageID.23.)
(ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25.)
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III. 	12(b)(6) Standard of Review
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if plaintiffs
do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
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therein.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. 	As such, his pleadings are subject to
less stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
IV. 	Analysis
a. First Amendment Claim
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that “it was a violation of my 1st
Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances in the matter
of foreclosure by advertisement without being represented by an attorney.” 	(ECF
No. 	16, 	PageID.144.) 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	Deputy 	Weaver 	did 	not 	“chill”
Plaintiff’s right to petition since after Deputy Weaver denied foreclosing on the real
estate, Plaintiff promptly submitted the properties for public auction, filed the
present 	action, 	and 	sought 	judicial 	foreclosure 	in 	the 	Ninth 	Circuit 	Court 	of
Kalamazoo County. 	(ECF No. 20-1, PageID.178.)
Regarding the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, the
Sixth Circuit has explained:
The First Amendment guarantees “the right of the people ... to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “The
right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of
that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of
expression.” McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86
L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). … A citizen’s right to petition the government does
not 	guarantee 	a 	response 	to 	the 	petition 	or 	the 	right 	to 	compel
government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.
Apple v. Glenn, 183 F. 3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff is arguing that the Kalamazoo County Sheriff’s Office violated
his First Amendment rights because they refused to conduct a sale they claim cannot
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be held without judicial foreclosure. 	This is fundamentally an issue of state
foreclosure law, not a First Amendment claim. 	In fact, Plaintiff is currently
pursuing foreclosure through the state courts. 	See Attachments A & B.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertions do not rise to a First Amendment infringement
action. Plaintiff does not claim that any Defendant chilled his expression in anyway.
As such, this Court cannot entertain his First Amendment claim.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends this Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
b. Fifth Amendment Claim
As applied to the state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits taking “private property…for
public use, without just compensation.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	The Sixth Circuit
has applied a two-part test to Takings Clause claims analysis:
First, “the court must examine whether the claimant has established a
cognizable property interest for the purposes of the Just Compensation
Clause.” Coalition for Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365
F.3d 435, 481 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Raceway 	Park, 	Inc. 	v. 	Ohio, 	356 	F.3d 	677, 	683 	(6th 	Cir.
2004) (“[T]here is no taking if there is no private property in the first
place.”). Second, “where a cognizable property interest is implicated, the
court must consider whether a taking occurred.” Coalition for Gov’t
Procurement, 365 F.3d at 481.
The Takings Clause is about what happens when property is taken for
public use. Thus, success on Plaintiffs’ Takings Clause claim necessarily
implies that they actually had a protected property interest.
Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 609 (6th Cir. 2016).
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The Takings Clause does not apply to the case at hand. 	Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants refused to have a sheriff’s sale because the properties Plaintiff attempted
to foreclose on were mortgages related to bail bonds. 	(ECF No. 16, PageID.141.)
Plaintiff does not assert that his property was ever taken for public use.
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim.
c. 	Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 	“In order to establish a procedural due process claim, a
plaintiff must show that (1) he had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by
the Due Process Clause; (2) he was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the
state did not afford him adequate procedural rights prior to depriving him of the
property interest.” 	Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 894 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted.)
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ refusal to sell the properties in the
sheriff’s weekly auction violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
(ECF No. 16, PageID.144.) 	Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants deprived him
of his interest in the properties, only that Defendants refused to carry out the
foreclosure sale. 	Again, Plaintiff does not assert that he was deprived of any
protected interest, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
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Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
d. State Law Claims
In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts multiple state law claims
in addition to his federal claims. 	(ECF No. 16, PageID.144-45.) 	In determining
whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, “[a] district court
should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of
litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.”
Landefeld 	v. 	Marion 	Gen. 	Hosp., 	Inc., 	994 	F.2d 	1178, 	1182 	(6th 	Cir. 	1993).
Ordinarily, when a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim
solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed
prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. 	Id. 	Dismissal,
however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556
U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise,
LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
If the Court adopts the undersigned’s recommendation, it will dismiss all of
Plaintiff’s federal claims. 	The balance of the relevant considerations would therefore
weigh against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 	As such, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The undersigned does not undertake further analysis of the arguments
presented.
V. 	Recommendation
The undersigned respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants’
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motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which relief
may be granted.
Dated: 	November 17, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). 	All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any
further right of appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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