Teets #759627 v. Vanderwagon et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JACOB ROBERT TEETS #759627,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-1249
S. VANDERWAGON, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before me is Defendants Jordan Lanore, Kyle Jacobson, and Quinzell Pannell’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 81.) The motion is fully briefed and ready for decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court GRANT the motion and dismiss
this action with prejudice.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff, a prisoner currently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP), filed his complaint in this action on February 21,
2024, based on events that occurred at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility in February
2022. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are his Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Sgt.
Jordan Lanore, Corrections Officer (CO) Kyle Jacobson, and CO Quinzell Pannell.
Plaintiff entered the MDOC system in 2016. At that time, he was given a bottom bunk
detail due to a seizure disorder. (ECF No. 82-2 at PageID.354.) The bottom bunk detail has
remained in effect throughout the entire period of Plaintiff’s incarceration, and he has been
prescribed Keppra for his seizures. (Id. at PageID.355.) Due to his seizure disorder, Plaintiff had
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never been assigned a top bunk during his confinement until the time of the incident at issue. (Id.
at PageID.356.)
A. 	The Complaint
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on the night of February 20, 2022, a Shift
Commander identified as Unknown Party #2 moved him from his bottom bunk assignment to a
top bunk assignment in a different cell. 1 (ECF No. 1 at PageID.8.) Plaintiff alleges that Sgt.
Wakefield, who has been dismissed from the action, escorted him to his new assigned bunk and
that Plaintiff showed Sgt. Wakefield his top bunk accommodation. However, Sgt. Wakefield told
Plaintiff that “he could do nothing about it” and advised Plaintiff “to kite the [prison counselor] in
the morning.” (Id.) That night, Plaintiff kited dismissed Defendants Douglas and Unknown Party
#1. Plaintiff alleges that he showed his bottom bunk detail to Defendants Lanore, Jacobson, and
Pannell the next morning, but “none did anything to get [Plaintiff] moved.” Id. Subsequently, on
the morning of February 23, 2022, Plaintiff “had a seizure and fell out of the top bunk and obtained
multiple injuries.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he alerted Defendant Pannell about his fall, who told
Plaintiff that it was logged into the unit logbook. (Id.)
B. 	Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony
In his deposition, Plaintiff provided more details about his claim. Plaintiff testified that it
“probably [had been] about a year” since he fell out of bed due to a seizure. (ECF No. 82-2 at
PageID.356.) Plaintiff said that he informs medical when he has a serious seizure but does not do
so if the seizure is minor, i.e., when he suffers no injury. (Id.) Plaintiff confirmed that he showed
1 I previously denied on numerous grounds Plaintiff’s motion to amend to identify Unknown
Defendant 2nd Shift Commander as Sgt. Mattthew Jacoutot, including that his claim against Sgt.
Jacoutot is barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims. (ECF
No. 80.)
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his bottom bunk detail, which he kept with him, to Sgt. Wakefield when Sgt. Wakefield walked
him to the new cell. (Id. at PageID.357–58.) That night he sent a kite to the Resident Unit
Supervisor and the Prison Counselor requesting a change to a bottom bunk based on his medical
detail. (Id. at PageID.358–59.)
The next morning, Plaintiff spoke with Sgt. Lanore and showed Lanore his bottom bunk
detail. (Id. at PageID.359–60.) Sgt. Lanore looked at the detail and said, “what am I supposed to
do about it?” (Id. at PageID.360.) Sgt. Lanore said that he would look into the matter, but Plaintiff
never heard back from him. (Id.) Plaintiff next spoke with CO Jacobson, who pushed Plaintiff back
into his cell as he was attempting to walk out. Plaintiff wanted CO Jacobson to call and get him
moved to a bottom bunk. Jacobson told Plaintiff that he “wasn’t going to [call]” because “[h]e
didn’t care.” (Id. at PageID.362–63.) As for CO Pannell, Plaintiff said that he called the
“infirmary,” or healthcare, and told them that Plaintiff had a bottom bunk medical detail and
needed to be moved. (Id. at PageID.362.)
C. 	Defendants’ Evidence
Defendants submit, among other things, their declarations. In his declaration, Sgt. Lanore
states that he does “not recall” any conversation with Plaintiff about a bottom bunk detail. (ECF
No. 82-3 at PageID.367.) He further states that when he discusses a medical detail with a prisoner,
he contacts healthcare, as policy requires, to verify whether the prisoner currently has such a detail.
Sgt. Lanore states that if healthcare verifies the detail, he contacts the Control Center to request
modification of the cell assignment and notes the phone call in the unit logbook to make a record
of the interaction. (Id.) Sgt. Lanore states that his practice is to note significant interactions with
prisoners in the logbook and that the Dublin Unit logbook contains no entries regarding Plaintiff
or any medical detail issues from February 21 through February 23, 2022. (Id. (citing ECF No. 82-
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6).) Sgt. Lanore states that neither he nor COs are authorized to change or modify cell or bunk
assignments and that instead, the Control Center Supervisor is responsible for such decisions. (Id.
at PageID.368.)
CO Jacobson does not recall Plaintiff informing him of a bunk assignment issue. (ECF No.
83-2 at PageID.405.) Jacobson states that he did not have authority to make or alter cell or bunk
assignments and that if a prisoner claimed to have a bottom bunk detail, he would usually call
healthcare to verify the existence of a bottom bunk detail. (Id. at PageID.404–05.) He would then
report the issue to his supervisor if healthcare confirmed the existence of a bottom bunk detail. (Id.
at PageID.405.) Like Sgt. Lanore, CO Jacobson confirms that the Control Center Supervisor is
responsible for housing assignments. (Id.) CO Jacobson states that if Plaintiff had informed him
of the bottom bunk detail, he would have followed his standard procedure. (Id.)
Unlike Sgt. Lanore and CO Jacobson, CO Pannell recalls Plaintiff telling him that he had
a bottom bunk detail but denies that Plaintiff showed it to him.2 (ECF No. 83-3 at PageID.408.)
CO Pannell states that if Plaintiff had shown him his detail, he would not have been able to move
Plaintiff to a bottom bunk because policy required him to verify medical details with healthcare.
(Id. at PageID.409.) Pannell further states that he informed Plaintiff that he could not change
Plaintiff’s cell assignment and advised him to speak to the Prison Counselor. (Id.) He further states
that had Plaintiff actually showed him the bottom bunk detail, he would have informed a sergeant
so that they could address the issue with the Control Center. (Id.)
2 Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument (ECF No. 90 at PageID.420–21), Defendant Pannell’s answer
to Plaintiff’s interrogatory No. 7 about a conversation with Plaintiff on February 23, 2022, does
not contradict his statement in his declaration about what occurred on February 21, 2022.
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II. 	Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	Personal Involvement
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims fail for lack of personal involvement. It is well
established that a defendant cannot be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that they
personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in, the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246
(6th Cir. 1989); Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). “Plaintiff must state a
plausible constitutional violation against each individual defendant—the collective acts of
defendants cannot be ascribed to each individual defendant.” Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617,
626 (6th Cir. 2012). In short, a “plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant was personally
involved in the activity that forms the basis of the complaint.” Eckford-El v. Toombs, 760 F. Supp.
1267, 1272 (W.D. Mich. 1991); see also Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d
556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court has consistently held that damage claims against government
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officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts
that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must present evidence of
the defendant’s involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Bennett v. Schroeder, 99 F.
App’x 707, 713 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to a substantial risk of serious harm by
ignoring his bottom bunk detail that accommodated his seizure disorder. Plaintiff has created
through his deposition testimony an issue of fact as to whether he notified Defendants about his
bottom bunk detail. Nonetheless, Defendants contend that they lacked the requisite personal
involvement in the alleged violation because none of them had the authority to address Plaintiff’s
bunk or cell assignment. (ECF No. 82 at PageID.3335–36.) Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive.
To prevail on his claim, Plaintiff need not show that Defendants had the final authority to
remedy the situation, but only that they disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. The situation
here is analogous to a prisoner suffering a heart attack or stroke in his cell. A corrections officer
or sergeant aware of such facts, even without any medical training, is required by Eighth
Amendment standards to notify healthcare personnel of the situation so that the prisoner may
receive the medical care he needs. The same is no less true here; a corrections officer who is
notified that a prisoner’s bunk placement is contrary to his medical detail must do something in
order to alleviate the risk to the prisoner.
The cases Defendants cite are inapposite. In Dykes v. Corizon, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-113, 2024
WL 2732226 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2024), adopted by 2024 WL 2717390 (W.D. Mich. May 28,
2024), the court observed, “Dietician Willard never met Dykes; she was not aware that Dykes
existed prior to this lawsuit.” Id. at *5. Moreover, Willard simply created the vegan religious diet
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at issue and had “no input as to whether Dykes should have been placed on a therapeutic diet based
on his gastrointestinal distress of G6PD deficiency.” Id. In Rains v. Wellman, No. 2:20-cv-32, 2022
WL 18587783 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2022), adopted by 2023 WL 543075 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 27,
2023), the court found that Dietician Willard had no personal involvement in the alleged violation
because the plaintiff’s only allegation was that she failed to respond to his kite about his soy
intolerance. Id. at *6. In contrast, here, Plaintiff alleges that he had direct contact with Defendants
about his bottom bunk detail and that they failed or refused to address the situation. Neither Dykes
nor Rains involved similar circumstances. Finally, Streeter v. Macomb County, No. 22-cv-10287,
2024 WL 4124677 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2024), misses the mark. In Streeter, a jail nurse designated
the plaintiff to a detox unit and lower bunk. The defendant at issue, Officer Kennedy, moved the
plaintiff from a detox holding cell to a regular holding cell that had no upper bunk. Officer
Kennedy left work later that morning hours before the plaintiff was transferred to a cell that had
an upper bunk, from which he fell shortly after he was placed in the cell. The court found that
Officer Kennedy was not personally involved in placing the plaintiff in a cell with upper bunks
because he was not at work at the time the plaintiff was moved to the new cell. Id. at *3–4.
Defendants’ contention that they, like Officer Kennedy, had no personal involvement because they
were not working when Plaintiff was assigned to a top bunk is nonsensical in light of Plaintiff’s
allegations. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants assigned him to a top bunk or even escorted
him to his new cell and top bunk assignment. Instead, he alleges that he notified them of his bottom
bunk detail the day after he was moved, while they still had time to take corrective action.
B. 	Conditions of Confinement
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against
those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual
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punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, directing that they may
not use excessive physical force against prisoners and must also “take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must show
that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted
with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80
(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (applying deliberate indifference standard to
medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate
indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference standard
includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at
35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the
subjective prong, an official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety.” Id. at 837.
1. 	Objective Prong
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish the objective prong of his claim because
he cannot show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm. As
support, they cite the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished order in Millhouse v. Jones, No. 20-5300, 2021
WL 1063196 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021), which affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the defendants on the plaintiff’s claim that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing
to comply with his medical orders to be placed in a bottom bunk to accommodate his back
problems.
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The plaintiff in Millhouse, a federal prisoner, had been treated for back and other problems
and had undergone a back surgery while incarcerated at a federal facility in Pennsylvania. While
at that facility, the plaintiff was issued a bottom bunk medical order. The plaintiff was transferred
to another facility in Kentucky, where he was assigned a top bunk. Id. at *1. Thereafter, the plaintiff
spent time in both bottom and top bunks and fell from a top bunk several times. The court found
that the plaintiff failed to establish both the objective and subjective components of his claim. In
particular, the court noted that “[a]lthough [the plaintiff] described minor injuries after falling from
the top bunks, he occupied a top bunk for more than 100 days without incident.” Id. at *2.
According to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in that case, of the 455 days the
plaintiff spent at the Kentucky facility, he spent over 100 nights in a top bunk and fell three times.
Millhouse v. Jones, No. 6:18-CV-125, 2020 WL 2844954, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 30, 2020), adopted
by 2020 WL 1042513 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2020). The court found the fact that the plaintiff “spent
so many nights on the top bunk . . . relevant to the issue of whether Defendants unnecessarily and
wantonly inflicted pain.” Id. In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff’s injuries from his three
falls—resulting in a knot on the back of his head and pain in his left elbow and left knee; a shoulder
injury; and injury to his left knee and elbow—“were minimal,” indicating that the plaintiff was not
facing substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at *1, 7.
A decision from this district cited Millhouse in concluding that the plaintiff failed to allege
an Eighth Amendment claim. Turner v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrs., No. 1:21-cv-790, 2022 WL
2071729 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2022), rev’d on other grounds, 2023 WL 2755655 (6th Cir. Apr. 3,
2023). The plaintiff in Turner alleged that he transferred to a new facility with a previously-issued
bottom bunk detail but was assigned to a top bunk shortly after his arrival. Although Turner warned
the defendants about the dangers associated with top bunks, the defendants ignored his warnings.
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Several months later, Turner fell while using a desk to dismount his top bunk. Id. at *2. The court
observed that the risks posed to Millhouse were greater than the risks posed to Turner because
Millhouse had suffered chronic leg pain and burning and neuropathy in his foot for years before
he fell, indicting that he may have faced heightened difficulty mounting or dismounting a top bunk,
while Turner failed to allege that prisoners at his facility frequently fell due to toppling furniture
used in mounting or dismounting top bunks or that his condition requiring unspecified chronic care
affected his ability to access the top bunk. In addition, the court noted that, while Millhouse fell
on his first night in a top bunk, Turner did not fall until seven months later, and Millhouse fell
more often than Turner. The court observed that the risk of harm was greater for Millhouse than
for Turner, yet the Sixth Circuit held that Millhouse failed to satisfy either prong of the deliberate
indifference test. Id. at *5.
Defendants contend that Millhouse is pertinent here because Plaintiff had gone well over
well over 100 days without falling out of bed due to a seizure prior to the accident. (ECF No. 82
at PageID.341.) In fact, Plaintiff testified that it had been about a year since he fell out of bed due
to a seizure. (ECF No. 82-2 at PageID.356.) Defendants further note that, like Millhouse, Plaintiff
suffered relatively minor injuries due to the fall, consisting of a knot on his head and pain in his
body and bruises. (ECF No. 82 at PageID.341 (citing ECF No. 82-9).) Defendants also note that,
in contrast to Millhouse, Plaintiff alleges that he was moved to a bottom bunk on February 23,
2022, after the accident, and he does not allege that he was later moved back to a top bunk. (Id.)
Plaintiff responds that Millhouse is not pertinent here because it is an out-of-state case from
Kentucky and did not involve a prisoner with a history of seizures. (ECF No. 90 at PageID.426–
27.)
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Although Millhouse is not precisely on point, it is close enough to provide guidance in
resolving the objective component of Plaintiff’s claim. The fact that Millhouse was decided by a
Kentucky district court is irrelevant, as the court applied the same Eighth Amendment law
applicable to Plaintiff’s claim, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision. In addition, while
Millhouse did not suffer from seizures, he had medical issues that increased his risk of falls from
a top bunk. For present purposes, the important points are that Millhouse fell from a top bunk three
times in 100 days, while Plaintiff had not fallen out of bed due to a seizure for about a year. And,
like 	Millhouse, 	Plaintiff’s 	injuries 	were 	relatively 	minor. 	For 	these 	reasons, 	Millhouse
demonstrates Plaintiff’s failure to establish that he was subjected to “a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
2. 	Subjective Component
While I conclude that Plaintiff’s claim fails on the objective component, it also fails on the
subjective prong as to Defendant Pannell. 3 Regarding CO Pannell, Plaintiff testified in his
deposition that CO Pannell did something to address the situation. He called the infirmary and said
that Plaintiff had a bottom bunk detail and needed to be moved. (ECF No. 82-2 at PageID.362.)
Thus, even if his efforts were unsuccessful in changing Plaintiff’s top bunk situation, Plaintiff’s
3 The same does not hold true for Defendants Lanore and Jacobson. As for CO Jacobson, accepting
Plaintiff’s version, a reasonable jury could conclude that Jacobson’s express refusal to do anything
about Plaintiff’s top bunk assignment amounted to deliberate indifference. The situation is a bit
different for Sgt. Lanore, as Plaintiff testified that he spoke to Lanore about his bottom bunk detail
and showed him a copy and Lanore said he would “check into it,” while Lanore does “not recall
having such conversation with [Plaintiff].” (ECF No. 82-3 at PageID.367.) Although Plaintiff said
in his deposition that he has no idea whether Sgt. Lanore actually looked into the matter (ECF No.
82-2 at PageID.363), accepting Plaintiff’s testimony as true, a reasonable jury could infer Sgt.
Lanore’s failure to take reasonable steps to address the situation based on his own testimony about
logbook entries and the absence of any such entry pertaining to Plaintiff’s bottom bunk detail. (Id.
at PageID.367–68.)
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own testimony shows that CO Pannell acted reasonably and was not deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff.4
B. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified
immunity provides that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate a clearly
established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th
Cir. 1999). An “objective legal reasonableness” test is used to determine whether the official could
reasonably have believed her conduct was lawful. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639
(1987). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
The qualified immunity inquiry requires a court to decide whether the facts as alleged or
shown make out a constitutional violation and whether the right that was allegedly violated was a
clearly established right at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. If the court can conclude
that either no constitutional violation occurred or that the right was not clearly established,
qualified immunity is warranted. The court may consider either prong of the inquiry without regard
to sequence. Id. at 236. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish that a constitutional violation
occurred, I further recommend that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
4 This conclusion holds true regardless of whether Pannell properly followed or complied with
MDOC policies or procedures.
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C. 	Unknown Party #2
In addition to granting summary judgment, I recommend that the Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims against Unknown Party #2 due to failure to timely serve Unknown Party #2
within the time set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) or to timely move to amend to
identify the unknown party. Moreover, as explained in the December 29, 2025 Order (ECF No.
80), Plaintiff’s claims against Unknown Party #2 are now time-barred and should be dismissed
with prejudice.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 81.) I further recommend that the claims against Unknown Party
#2 be dismissed with prejudice.
Dated: June 2, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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