Moon #956376 v. Mendez et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAVID MOON,
Case No. 1:24-cv-1138
Plaintiff,
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v.
UNKNOWN MENDEZ, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action by plaintiff David Moon, a prisoner in the custody
of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Plaintiff’s lawsuit involves incidents at the
MDOC’s Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC). The remaining defendants are Corrections
Officer (CO) Mendez, CO Meyers (also named as “Meyer”), CO Anderson, CO House, CO
Lobdell, CO Pepper, Sgt. Darnell, Sgt. Matthews, Prison Counselor (PC) Thompson, PC Frias,
Resident Unit manager (RUM) Normington, RUM Battle, Case Manager Bullen (also named as
“Mullen”), administrative staff member Alexander, Inspector/Prison Rape Elimination Act
(PREA) Coordinator Harrison, Inspector/PREA Coordinator Fuller, Assistant Deputy Warden
(ADW) Addis, ADW Hadden (als named as “Haddon”), Deputy Warden Brokaw, and Warden
Macauley. See Order (ECF No. 15, PageID.129). Plaintiff also sued “Unknown Parties” who were
not served. 	Id. 	This matter is now before the Court on defendants Meyers, House, Lobdell,
Matthews, Thompson, Frias, Normington, Battle, Bullen, Alexander, Harrison, Fuller, Addis,
Hadden, Brokaw, and Macauley’s combined motion to dismiss and for summary judgment (ECF
No. 18).
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I. 	Background
The Court previously identified plaintiff as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that she is a Gender Dysphoric (GD) Intersex Woman and
that her pronouns are She/Her/Hers. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) 	Plaintiff’s
chosen name is Azelie Delaina Moon. (Id.) Plaintiff’s appearance and mannerisms
are 	feminine, 	and 	she 	is 	currently 	receiving 	treatment 	for 	GD, 	PTSD,
Hypothyroidism, and an unspecified skin condition. (Id.)
Opinion (ECF No. 9, PageID.81-82). Plaintiff states that she was transferred to IBC in December
of 2023, after being subjected to unconstitutional conduct as described in another lawsuit. Id. at
PageID.82.
Plaintiff’s extensive allegations are set forth in the Court’s Opinion which
performed an initial review of the complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
(ECF No. 9, PageID.81-88). 	The Court allowed the following claims to proceed: Eighth
Amendment claims against Thompson, Frias, Normington, Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw,
Macauley, Anderson, Meyers, Harrison, Mendez, Pepper, and Darnell; First Amendment
retaliation claims against Addis, Meyers, and Anderson; and, the supplemental state law claims.
Opinion at PageID.108-109. Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims are summarized as follows.
Eighth Amendment (failure to protect plaintiff due to improper classification
at a previous prison)
Plaintiff alleges that she was improperly classified under PREA guidelines
at a previous facility and despite bringing the issue to the attention of Defendants
Thompson, Frias, Normington, Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw, and Macauley over
the course of several months, the issue was never investigated or rectified. Plaintiff
contends that Defendants Thompson, Frias, Normington, Battle, Addis, Haddon,
Brokaw, and Macauley were aware of the risk associated with improperly
classifying and housing transgender and intersex prisoners and did so knowingly as
a result of Plaintiff’s prior grievances. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Plaintiff alleges that
because of her improper classification, she was pressured into a sexual relationship
with her cellmate but when she complained to Defendants House, Matthews,
Thompson, and Frias, she was threatened with a trip to the hole if she did not stop
complaining. (Id.) Plaintiff withdrew her complaint, but subsequently kited and
made 	verbal 	requests 	to 	Defendants 	Normington 	and 	Battle 	to 	have 	her
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classification changed. Plaintiff also sent a letter to Defendants Addis, Haddon,
Brokaw, and Macauley and eventually filed a grievance. (Id. PageID.6-7.) Taking
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as is required at this stage of the proceedings, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendants House, Matthews, Thompson, Frias, Normington, Battle, Addis,
Haddon, Brokaw, and Macauley.
Opinion at PageID.91.
Eighth Amendment (failure to protect plaintiff from another inmate)
Plaintiff was attacked by another inmate in March of 2024, and reported the
attack to Defendant House and Defendant Lobdell, who told Plaintiff to handle it
herself and refused to provide Plaintiff with any protection. (Id., PageID.7.) The
next day, Plaintiff told Defendants Normington and Thompson about the assault,
but they failed to provide protection and merely told her that her clothing choices
were offensive. (Id.) Plaintiff was again assaulted by the same inmate on August
23, 2024. Plaintiff asserts that the incident was caught on security camera footage
and that Defendants Anderson, Meyers, Thompson, and Frias reviewed the footage,
but took no action to protect Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant
Anderson verbally sexually harassed her on more than one occasion and was known
to verbally abuse other GD and homosexual inmates. (Id., PageID.8.) Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant Harrison did not comply with PREA safety regulations and
failed to separate her from Defendant Anderson, who was the subject of a PREA
complaint. (Id.) These allegations, taken as true, are similarly sufficient to state
Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants House, Lobdell, Normington,
Thompson, Anderson, Meyers, Thompson, Frias, and Harrison.
Id. at PageID.91-92.
Eighth Amendment (sexual abuse)
Plaintiff alleges that on September 4, 2024, prior to being placed in a cell in
segregation, Defendant Mendez leered at Plaintiff and rubbed his hands together
while saying, “Let’s see some tits!” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) Plaintiff
refused to strip and when Plaintiff reported the incident to Defendant Cooley he
said that Defendant Mendez did not want to look at Plaintiff because he was not
“into fags.” (Id., PageID.9-10.) Defendant Pepper then arrived and ordered Plaintiff
to strip and as Plaintiff was removing her bra, Defendant Pepper said, “those are
probably the nicest tits I’ve seen on one of you boys in a while,” which caused
Plaintiff to feel humiliated, degraded, and objectified. (Id., PageID.10.)
Plaintiff was then placed in a filthy cell with live electrical wires and feces
backed up in the toilet, as well as brackish water in the sink, and her complaints
about the condition of the cell were ignored by Defendants Mendez, Pepper, Staley,
Dewy, Gillepsie, Arredondo, Darnell, Ramirez, and Serritos. (Id.) Plaintiff was
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forced to drink from the filthy sink, which caused her to become ill. (Id.) Later the
same day, while reviewing a ticket on Plaintiff, Defendant Darnell told Plaintiff
that she needed to sit in the filth of her cell and that no one would believe the word
of a “fag.” (Id., PageID.10.) The next day, after Plaintiff threatened to kill herself
and was removed from the cell, Defendant Mendez told her to get “wet and sexy”
for him in the shower and that he would “f**k her with a bowling pin for the shit
she pulled in 3 block” if he could. (Id., PageID.11) Defendant Mendez then ordered
Plaintiff to “fist” herself and threatened to come into the shower if Plaintiff did not.
(Id.) As with the prior Defendants, these allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to
state Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Mendez, Pepper, and Darnell.
Id. at PageID.93-94.
First Amendment (retaliation by Addis)
Plaintiff states that in March of 2024, she sent a kite to the Inspector’s office
after being attacked by an inmate, and Defendant Addis responded by telling
Plaintiff’s assailant that Plaintiff had reported him. Plaintiff was not provided with
protection. (Id., PageID.7.). Taking Plaintiff’s statement regarding this event as
true, the Court finds that, at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation against Defendant
Addis.
Id. at PageID.106.
First Amendment (retaliation by Meyers and Anderson)
On August 30, 2024, Defendant Meyers told Plaintiff that he would not
write a misconduct on her for being down the hallway, if she dropped her grievance
and stopped wearing “all that gay shit.” (Id., PageID.8.) Plaintiff refused and wrote
a grievance on Defendant Meyers. (Id.) The next day, Defendant Anderson
reviewed Plaintiff on the Class III misconduct ticket issued by Defendant Meyers
and stated that he would throw the misconduct out if Plaintiff gave up on her
grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff refused, and Defendant Anderson told Plaintiff that staff
at IBC did not like “faggots” and would find a way to dismiss her grievances. (Id.)
The misconduct ticket was eventually dismissed because of due process violations.
(Id., PageID.9.) The Court concludes that, at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation against
Defendants Meyers and Anderson based on this conduct.
Id. at PageID.106-107.
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II. 	Motion to dismiss
Defendants Fuller, Alexander and Bullen have moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court discourages the filing of
motions to dismiss because it has conducted an initial review of the complaint under the PLRA
and determined that it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	However, in this instance, the
allegations against Fuller, Alexander, and Bullen are sparse, and plaintiff concedes to the dismissal
of these three defendants. 	See Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 23, PageID.237-238) (“plaintiff
really has no legs to stand on to argue that Fuller, Alexander or Bullen remain as parties to this
Suit”). Accordingly, the Court should grant defendants’ motion to dismiss Fuller, Alexander and
Bullen.
III. 	Summary Judgment
A. 	Legal standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
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In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
B. 	Lack of Exhaustion
1. 	Exhaustion requirement
The PLRA provides that a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust available administrative remedies. 	See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). A prisoner must
exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may not be able to obtain the
specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 520;
Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. One reason for creating prisoner grievance procedures under the PLRA
was to create an administrative record for the court.
Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court. This
has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the
quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).
In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural
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rules. Id. at 218; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “Compliance with prison grievance
procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S.
at 218.
2. 	MDOC Grievance process
The MDOC requires prisoners to follow a three-step process to exhaust grievances.
See MDOC Policy Directive (“PD”) 03.02.130 (effective September 25, 2023). A prisoner must
first attempt to resolve a problem with the staff member within two business days of becoming
aware of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. Id. at
¶ W. If the issue is not resolved, then the grievant may file a Step I grievance on the prescribed
form within five business days after the grievant attempted to resolve the issue with appropriate
staff. 	Id. at ¶¶ W, Y, and CC. 	The Policy Directive provides the following directions for
completing grievance forms:
The issue should be stated briefly but concisely. Information provided is to be
limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where,
why, how). Dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being
grieved are to be included.
Id. at ¶ Y (emphasis in original). Within five business days after attempting to resolve a grievable
issue with appropriate staff, the prisoner must send the Step I grievance to the appropriate
grievance coordinator. Id. at ¶ CC. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does
not receive a timely response, he must request the appropriate form and send it to the Step II
Grievance Coordinator. Id. at ¶ JJ. Finally, if a prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step II response,
or does not receive a timely response, he must send a completed Step III grievance, using the
appropriate form, to the Grievance and Appeals Section. Id. at ¶ NN.
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3. 	PREA
PD 03.02.130 (Sexual Abuse and Sexual Harassment of Prisoners – Prison Rape
Elimination Act (PREA) (eff. April 5, 2021)) provides a different for procedure for grieving
matters which involve alleged sexual abuse1 :
Grievances filed regarding sexual abuse, including those filed by a third
party, shall not be processed as grievances under this policy but shall be reported
in accordance with PD 03.03.140 “Sexual Abuse and Sexual Harassment of
Prisoners - Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA).” Any grievance submitted under
this policy that contains an allegation of sexual abuse shall be copied by the
Grievance Coordinator and forwarded to the PREA Coordinator for investigative
referral if warranted. The original grievance shall be returned to the prisoner. If the
grievance also includes a non-PREA grievable issue, it will need to be refiled by
the prisoner on the appropriate Prisoner/Parolee Grievance form.
PD 03.02.103 ¶ D.
The 	policy 	directive 	also 	provides 	guidance 	on 	grieving 	claims 	of 	sexual
harassment and retaliation:
VV. The MDOC has eliminated the administrative grievance procedure for
addressing prisoner grievances regarding sexual abuse. If prisoners utilize the
prisoner grievance system to report an allegation of sexual abuse, the facility
Grievance Coordinator shall forward the sexual abuse allegation to the facility
PREA Coordinator for further handling in accordance with this policy, and the
sexual abuse grievance shall be removed from the grievance process. The prisoner
shall be notified in writing that this has occurred.
WW. Prisoners may utilize the prisoner grievance system in accordance with PD
03.02.130 “Prisoner/Parolee Grievances” to report allegations of sexual harassment
or retaliation. However, because grievances require processing time and may not
prompt immediate action, prisoners in need of immediate assistance should notify
an employee.
PD 03.03.140 ¶¶ VV and WW.
Here, defendants acknowledge three PREA investigations related to the claims
alleged 	in 	the 	complaint. 	These 	appear 	in 	the 	MDOC’s 	Administration 	Investigations
1 PD 03.03.140 ¶ S sets out acts which constitute sexual abuse of a prisoner by an employee.
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Management (AIM) data base: AIM #50533 (alleged abusive sexual language, threats, and
retaliation by CO Anderson on August 28, 2024); AIM #50687 (alleged abusive sexual language
and retaliation by CO Anderson on August 28 and September 3, 2024, and misconduct by CO
Meyers on an unspecified date between August 28 and September 3, 2024); and AIM #50731
(alleged abusive sexual language by CO Mendez, non-defendant Cooley, CO Pepper, and CO
Darnell, and threats by CO Mendez on September 4 and 5, 2024. See Defendants’ Brief (ECF No.
19, PageID.173, citing MDOC Litigation Specialist Douglas Kline’s Affidavit (ECF No. 19-6).2
Based on this record, defendants acknowledge: that AIM #50533 and #50687
exhausted the Eighth Amendment and First Amendment retaliation claims against CO Anderson;
that AIM #50687 exhausted the Eighth Amendment claim against CO Meyers; and that AIM
#50731 exhausted the Eighth Amendment claims against CO Mendez, CO Pepper, and CO
Darnell. See Defendants’ Brief at PageID.173. These claims are not part of the present motion
for summary judgment.
However, plaintiff’s remaining Eighth Amendment claims against defendants
Normington, Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw, Macauley, and Harrison and plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Addis and Meyers are subject to the three-step
grievance requirement of PD 03.02.130. 	Defendants contest exhaustion as to these non-PREA
claims.
2 With respect to CO Meyers, defendants state that “AIM #50687 exhausted only the Eighth Amendment claim against
Meyers as Moon did not allege retaliation by Meyers in her letter which prompted the investigation.” Defendants’
Brief at PageID.173. Defendants cited Mr. Kline’s Affidavit, which pointed out that AIM#50687 arose from a letter
submitted by plaintiff, and that plaintiff “did not allege any retaliatory conduct by CO Meyers in the letter or during
the investigation.” See Kline Aff. at PageID.218.
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C. 	Discussion
Defendants identified one grievance which plaintiff filed at IBC and pursued
through Step III before filing this complaint, i.e., IBC-24-03-0643-28f (“643”). 	This grievance
lists an incident date of March 8, 2024, and appears to complain about events which occurred at
another correctional facility before plaintiff was transferred to IBC in December 2023: plaintiff’s
placement in the general population at that facility; the GDRC’s (Gender Dysphoria Review
Committee’s) failure to place plaintiff’s GD management plan in her file in July 2023; plaintiff’s
transfer to Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) in September 2023 (a facility which was not set
up to house intersex prisoners); and plaintiff being subjected to physical and sexual assaults at
LCF. Grievance 643 (ECF No. 19-4, PageID.200). Grievance 643 was not directed against any
of the defendants in this case. Rather, plaintiff directed the grievance at the GDRC (i.e., “my
Grievance is against GDRC xiling [sic] me and the months of horrors I faced as a result”). Id. The
MDOC rejected the grievance because plaintiff “is on modified access pursuant to paragraph PP
through TT and has filed a grievance in violation of those paragraphs.” 	PageID.201-202.
Plaintiff’s Step II appeal of the rejection was denied because “[her] appeal provides no reasoning
as to why [the grievance] was submitted in violation of the policy standards.” PageID.198. The
Step III appeal was rejected because it was “Missing Step II response.” PageID.194. The Step III
rejection is vaguely worded with no reference to a violation of the policy directive and an issue as
to whether the Step III rejection was proper. See Martin v. Randall, No. 1:22-cv-123, 2024 WL
643963 at *4 (Jan. 19, 2024), R&R adopted, 2024 WL 640249 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2024) (“[T]he
MDOC's Step III rejection – which did not cite a legal basis for the rejection – does not preclude
proper exhaustion.”).
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Nevertheless, plaintiff did not properly exhaust Grievance 643 because she did not
name any of the defendants in the grievance. Furthermore, this grievance is not relevant to this
lawsuit. Grievance 643 involved plaintiff’s classification at LCF in 2023. The grievance did not
address plaintiff’s present claim that defendants misclassified her at IBC and failed to protect her
in 2024. 	Accordingly, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Normington,
Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw, Macauley, and Harrison and plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claims against defendants Addis and Meyers are not properly exhausted.
In her response, plaintiff contends that the MDOC thwarted her attempts to file
grievances. It is well established that, “An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies
as are ‘available’.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). “[W]hen prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation . . . , such interference with an inmate's pursuit of relief renders the administrative
process unavailable.” Id. at 644. Here, plaintiff appears to contend that the grievance procedure
was “rendered unavailable when administrators took her original white copies of grievance forms
and returned only the color-coded carbon copies, then refused to process [her] appeals without the
white cop[ies]”. 	Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 23, PageID.232). 	Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the MDOC prevented her from using the grievance procedure. 	Plaintiff has
provided no specific evidence to support this claim. In this regard, plaintiff made a vague reference
to “her Complaint as a Verified affidavit” (id.) and filed a conclusory declaration stating “[d]espite
my attempts at proper exhaustion MDOC staff have thwarted my attempts” (Declaration (ECF No.
24, PageID.265)).
Plaintiff also refers to grievances IBC-24-09-1787-28z (“1787”) and IBC-24-09-
1788-28z (“1788”) which she claims “advanced” to Step III. Id. at PageID.238-239. 	The record
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reflects that these grievances were rejected because they involved pending PREA investigations.
Grievance 1787 was directed at CO Anderson with an incident date of September 3, 2024. The
Step II response stated that this was related to a PREA investigation, AIM #50725. See Grievance
1787 (ECF No. 28-1, PageID.291). Grievance 1788 was also directed at CO Anderson with an
incident date of September 4, 2024. The Step II response stated that this was related to a PREA
investigation, AIM #50687. See Grievance 1788 (ECF No. 28-1, PageID.294).
Finally, plaintiff contends that the PREA complaint exhausted her retaliation claim
against CO Meyers. 	However, plaintiff does not present evidence to demonstrate that she
addressed retaliation by CO Meyers in her letter which resulted in a PREA investigation,
AIM#50687. 	See Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 23, PageID.242). 	In this regard, there is no
evidence that plaintiff pursued a separate retaliation claim against Meyers. See PD 03.03.140 ¶
WW (a prisoner may use the prisoner grievance process to report allegations of sexual harassment
or retaliation).
Based on this record, plaintiff has failed to properly exhaust her Eighth Amendment
claims against defendants Normington, Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw, Macauley, and Harrison,
and failed to exhaust her First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Addis and Meyers.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted on these claims.
III. 	State law claims
Plaintiff’s complaint against defendants Bullen, Alexander, Fuller, Normington,
Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw, Macauley, and Harrison also included state law claims.
Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state law claim solely by virtue
of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will
dismiss the remaining state law claims. See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514,
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521 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff's federal law claim,
it should not reach state law claims.”); Landefeld v. Marion General Hospital, Inc., 994 F.2d 1178,
1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court
should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation
and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld, 994 F.2d at
1182; see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Residual
jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the
avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law
issues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.”
Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of
supplemental 	jurisdiction. 	Accordingly, 	plaintiff’s 	state 	law 	claims 	against 	defendants
Normington, Battle, Addis Haddon, Brokaw, Macauley, and Harrison should be dismissed.
IV. 	Recommendation
For these reasons, I respectfully recommend that defendants Bullen, Alexander, and
Fuller’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be GRANTED.
I further recommend that defendants Normington, Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw,
Macauley, and Harrison’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) be GRANTED.
I further recommend that the Court DISMISS the state law claims alleged against
defendants Bullen, Alexander, Fuller, Normington, Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw, Macauley,
and Harrison.
I further recommend that defendants Bullen, Alexander, Fuller, Normington,
Battle, Addis, Haddon, Brokaw, Macauley, and Harrison be DISMISSED from this action.
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I further recommend that defendant Meyers’ motion for summary judgment on the
First Amendment retaliation claim (ECF No. 18) be GRANTED.
If the Court adopts this report and recommendation, then this action will proceed
as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Anderson, Meyers, Mendez, Pepper
and Darnell, and with plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against defendant Anderson.
Dated: January 27, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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