Staffney #955531 v. Richmond et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAWAII STAFFNEY,
Case No. 1:24-cv-1102
Plaintiff,
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v.
UNKNOWN RICHMOND and
UNKNOWN FIDLER,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiff
Kawaii Staffney, a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC).
The incident occurred at the MDOC’s Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF). 	Plaintiff sued
Correctional Officer (CO) Adam Richmond and Sgt. Cody Fidler. This matter is now before the
Court on Sgt. Fidler’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion (ECF No. 15).
I. 	Background
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants CO Richmond and Sgt. Fidler
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, on December 1, 20221 , plaintiff was involved
in a fight with another prisoner when CO Richmond deployed his taser, striking plaintiff without
warning. Compl. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2-3). 	Plaintiff alleged that he fell uncontrollably to the
ground and injured his left shoulder. Id. After the incident, Sgt. Fidler refused to take plaintiff to
1 In his complaint, plaintiff identifies the incident as occurring on “12/1/21”. See Compl. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2).
However, defendant Fidler points out that based on the grievance record, “2021 appears to be a scrivener’s error and
December 1, 2022, is the correct date.” Defendant’s Brief (ECF No. 16, PageID.51, fn. 1).
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healthcare to have his shoulder examined or to have the taser prongs removed. Id. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at PageID.4.
II. 	Summary Judgment
A. 	Legal standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
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B. 	Lack of Exhaustion
1. 	Exhaustion requirement
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner bringing an
action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust available
administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731 (2001). A prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may
not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. See
Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. 	One reason for creating prisoner grievance
procedures under the PLRA was to create an administrative record for the court.
Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court. This
has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the
quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).
In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural
rules. Id. at 218; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “Compliance with prison grievance
procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S.
at 218.
2. 	MDOC Grievance process
The MDOC requires prisoners to follow a three-step process to exhaust grievances.
See MDOC Policy Directive (“PD”) 03.02.130 (effective March 18, 2019). A prisoner must first
attempt to resolve a problem with the staff member within two business days of becoming aware
of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. Id. at ¶ Q. If
the issue is not resolved, then the grievant may file a Step I grievance on the prescribed form within
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five business days after the grievant attempted to resolve the issue with appropriate staff. Id. at ¶¶
Q and S. The Policy Directive provides the following directions for completing grievance forms:
The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. 	Information provided is to be
limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where,
why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being
grieved are to be included.
Id. at ¶ S (emphasis in original). The prisoner must send the Step I grievance to the appropriate
grievance coordinator. Id. at ¶ W. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does
not receive a timely response, he must request the appropriate form and send it to the Step II
Grievance Coordinator. Id. at ¶ DD. Finally, if a prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step II response,
or does not receive a timely response, he must send a completed Step III grievance, using the
appropriate form, to the Grievance and Appeals Section. Id. at ¶ HH.
3. 	Discussion
Here, defendant Sgt. Fidler identified one grievance related to the alleged incident,
DRF-22-12-2531-26A (“2531”). See MDOC Prisoner Step III Grievance Report (ECF No. 16-3,
PageID.75)2 ; Grievance 2531 (ECF No. 16-3, PageID.76-80). 	This grievance is directed at CO
Richmond for using a taser (in his words):
At this date 12-1-22 and Time between 8:00 PM and 9:00 PM 900 [unintelligible]
middle Dayroom, I got into an altercation with another inmate. CO Strayer told me
to stop fighting and I comply with her commands, and I back up with my hands up,
2 The Step III Grievance Report covered the time frame of January 1, 2019 through March 17, 2025. PageID.75. This
included the time period before and after plaintiff filed his complaint. While the complaint was docketed on October
21, 2024, it was “filed” on October 11, 2024 (when plaintiff’s unsigned complaint was postmarked). As defendant
explained,
Under the prison “mailbox rule,” pro se prisoner civil right lawsuits are considered “filed” on the
date it is signed and deposited in the prison mail system. Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th
Cir. 2008); Scott v. Evans, 116 F. App’x 699, 701 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). As Staffney did
not date his complaint, the MDOC Defendants will use the postmark date as the filing date. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.5–6.)
Defendant’s Brief (ECF No. 16, PagrID.51, fn. 2).
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and C/O Richmond came in like a mad man and use excessive use of force by
Tazzing me when I was no threat to inmate or no officers.
Grievance 2531 at PageID.79. The grievance was denied at Steps I, II and III. Id. at PageID.76-
80. 	Nothing in this grievance addressed plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim that Sgt. Fidler
refused to take him to health care to treat his shoulder and remove the taser prongs.
In his response, plaintiff points out that he tried to resolve the grievance with Sgt.
Fiddler and that Fidler was interviewed as part of the investigation. Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No.
21, PageID.94). In this regard, PD 03.02.130 ¶ Q states in pertinent part, “Prior to submitting a
written grievance, the grievant shall attempt to resolve the issue with the staff member involved
within two business days after becoming aware of a grievable issue . . . If the issue is not resolved,
the grievant may file a Step I grievance.”). While plaintiff attempted to resolve the issue with Sgt.
Fidler, it is clear from the language used in the grievance that “the issue” involved in the grievance
was CO Richmond’s use of the taser. See Grievance 2531. In addition, Sgt. Fidler’s interview also
involved CO Richmond’s use of the taser. 	See Grievance 2531 (Step I Grievance Response
Supplemental Form) (PageID.80). Neither the grievance nor the investigation process involved
plaintiff’s claim that Sgt. Fidler violated his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to take him to
healthcare after the taser incident. See Compl. at PageID.2-3. 	See Bell v. Konteh, 450 F.3d 651,
654 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The grievance must give fair notice of the misconduct or mistreatment as
measured against the claim alleged in the prisoner’s complaint.”).
Based on this record, plaintiff did not properly exhaust a grievance to support his
claim against Sgt. Fidler. 	See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93.
Accordingly, Sgt. Fidler’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.
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IV. 	Recommendation
For these reasons, I respectfully recommend that defendant Sgt. Fidler’s Motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED and that he be DISMISSED from this action.
If the Court adopts this report and recommendation, then this case should proceed on plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim against defendant CO Richmond.
Dated: January 23, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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