Jones #701358 v. Strickland et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARTELL JONES,
Case No. 1:24-cv-1101
Plaintiff,
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v.
CHARLES STRICKLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiff
Martell Jones, a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). The
incident occurred at the MDOC’s Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF). Plaintiff sued the following
ICF personnel in their official and personal capacities: Deputy Warden Dale Bonn; Lt. Bennett;
Sgt. Charles Strickland; and, Correctional Officers (COs) Michael Enderle, Rutgers, Eavey,
Rinckey, Ugboma, Henning, and Unknown Parties #1 and #2. Opinion (ECF No. 8, PageID.81).
The Court dismissed defendants Enderle and Bonn. 	This matter is now before the Court on
defendants Henning, Strickland, Bennett, Rutgers, Eavey, Rinckey, and Ugboma’s Motion for
summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff did not oppose the motion.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff’s claims are set forth in a 200-paragraph complaint. 	Plaintiff’s lawsuit
involves the following incidents which occurred in May 2023. Opinion (ECF No. 8, PageID.82).
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On May 23, 2023, former defendant Enderle and defendants Ugboma, Eavey,
Strickland, and Rutgers allegedly retaliated against plaintiff by depriving him of food. 	Id. at
PageID.82-83.
On May 24, 2023, plaintiff filed a grievance against former defendant Enderle, and
defendants Ugboma, Strickland and other officials for denying him a food tray. Id. at PageID.83.
That day. defendants Rutgers and Eavey threatened plaintiff for writing the grievance. 	Id. at
PageID.83. 	The threats included a “sham” cell extraction, false misconduct charges, criminal
charges, and a set up to get plaintiff “life in prison.” Id. Later, defendant Strickland threatened
plaintiff for filing the grievance, which included gassing plaintiff and putting him on paper
restriction so that he cannot write grievances or work on lawsuits. Id. at PageID.84.
Documents attached to plaintiff’s complaint indicate that the “cell extraction”
occurred on May 25, 2023. 	See Strickland Misconduct Report (ECF No. 1-2, PageID.48)
(referring to response team at plaintiff’s cell and that plaintiff disobeyed a direct order to uncover
his window); Rutgers Misconduct Report (ECF No. 1-5, PageID.55) (plaintiff disobeyed a direct
order to come out of his cell for a cell shake down, stating “there is no way in hell that I am coming
out”). 	The response team consisted of defendants Strickland, Rutgers, Eavey, Rinckey, Doe
[Unknown Party] #1 and Doe [Unknown Party] #2. Compl. (ECF No. 1, PageID.13). 	When they
arrived, Strickland ordered plaintiff to remove the paper from his back window and applied a
chemical agent into plaintiff’s cell. 	Rutgers yanked plaintiff’s hands and arms through the slot
while placing restraints on him. 	Opinion at PageID.84-86. 	Strickland, Eavey, Rinckey, and
Unknown Parties #1 and #2 failed to intervene in the use of force. Id. at PageID.86.
Then, Strickland, Rutgers, Eavey, Rinckey, and Unknown Parties #1 and #2
escorted plaintiff to a shower area, placed him in a cage, denied him medical attention, turned off
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the water, and provided him with clothes contaminated with chemical agent from the cell
extraction. Id. Defendants Bennett, Strickland, Rutgers, Eavey, Rinckey, Ugboma, Henning, and
Unknown Parties #1 and #2 were aware that his cell was contaminated and “made no reasonable
effort to decontaminate” plaintiff or his cell. Id. at PageID.87.
Plaintiff also alleged that defendants Strickland and Rutgers retaliated against him
by issuing “falsified” misconduct tickets. Defendants Strickland and Rutgers issued plaintiff class
II tickets for disobeying a direct order (see ECF No. 1-2 (Strickland) and ECF Nos. 1-3 and 1-5
(Rutgers)). In addition, CO Rutgers issued plaintiff a class I ticket for possession of dangerous
contraband (ECF Nos. 1-6 and 1-7). These claims are summarized as follows:
Subsequently, Defendant Strickland falsified a misconduct report and
charged Plaintiff with disobeying a direct order. ([Compl.], PageID.23.) Plaintiff
alleges that in the misconduct report, Defendant Strickland falsely stated that
Plaintiff “refused to comply with orders to remove paper from his back window.”
(Id.) As a result, Plaintiff “received fifteen (15) days loss of privileges and an
increase in security classification points.” (Id.)
Defendant Strickland also filed a Restriction of Segregation Property and
Privileges. (Id.) 	He falsely stated that Plaintiff “had paper covering his back
window as pretext to impose a paper restriction against [Plaintiff].” (Id.) Plaintiff’s
personal property, legal papers, and writing materials were confiscated, and
Plaintiff was placed on a 30-day paper restriction as a result. (Id., PageID.24.)
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bonn was responsible for imposing the paper
restriction. (Id.)
Defendant Rutgers also issued a false misconduct report charging Plaintiff
with disobeying a direct order. (Id.) Defendant Rutgers falsely stated that Plaintiff
“refused to comply with orders to come out of his cell for a cell search.” (Id.) As a
result, Plaintiff received loss of privileges and an increase in his security
classification points. (Id., PageID.24–25.)
Defendant Rutgers also issued a false misconduct report charging Plaintiff
with possession of dangerous contraband. (Id., PageID.25.) In the report, Defendant
Rutgers falsely stated that “he found sixteen (16) cups of fluid inside [Plaintiff’s]
cell that appeared to be urine as pretext to impose sanctions against [Plaintiff].”
(Id.) Plaintiff claims that the fluid was water that he was saving because of officials
“depriving him of food and threatening to turn off his water.” (Id.) Nonparty
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Hearing Officer S. Morris found Plaintiff not guilty of the possession of dangerous
contraband misconduct report. (Id.)
PageID.87-88.
In addition, CO Rutgers allegedly retaliated against plaintiff by taking his property
and giving it to another prisoner:
Plaintiff goes on to allege that Defendant Rutgers told him, “I’m gonna give
some of your property away! . . . The more you talk the more will be missing and
the less you will have! . . . I’ll be here all week! . . . Your property will be f***ed
by the time you get it back!” (Id., PageID.26.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant
Rutgers took some of his books, magazines, and legal documents, and placed them
in another prisoner’s duffel bag. (Id.) The duffel bag was given to another prisoner.
(Id.)
PageID.88-89.
On initial screening, the Court dismissed defendants Enderle and Bonn, as well as
many of plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants. 	See Order (ECF No. 9). 	The
remaining claims involve violations of the First and Eighth Amendment.
The First Amendment retaliation claims are as follows: Bennett (authorized a sham
cell extraction); Strickland (used excessive force during cell extraction); Rutgers (used excessive
force during cell extraction); Strickland (issued false misconduct); and, Rutgers (issued false
misconducts). Opinion at PageID.97, 105.
The Eighth Amendment claims are against Bennett, Strickland, Rutgers, Eavey,
Rinckey, Henning, Ugboma, and Unknown Parties #1 and #2 “premised upon the May 25, 2023
cell extraction, use of excessive force, failure to intervene in the use of force, and the subsequent
failure to allow Plaintiff to shower and decontaminate his cell to remove the chemical agent.” Id.
at PageID.105.
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II. 	Summary Judgment
A. 	Legal standard
The remaining defendants have moved for summary judgment for lack of
exhaustion. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies and
included a “declaration of verification” at the end of his complaint. 	See Compl. (ECF No. 1,
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PageID.27-31, 36). 	Presumably, plaintiff added the verification so that his lengthy “verified
complaint” could support his response to a future motion for summary judgment. See Lavado v.
Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1993) (a verified complaint has the same force and effect as
an affidavit for purposes of responding to a motion for summary judgment).
However, plaintiff did not file a response to defendants’ motion as required by
W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(c), which states that “any party opposing a dispositive motion shall, within
twenty-eight (28) days after service of the motion, file a responsive brief and any supporting
materials”. 	Assuming that plaintiff alleged facts in his verified complaint which addressed the
general issue of exhaustion, it is not the function of this Court to assemble those facts in a coherent
manner and assemble legal arguments for plaintiff to respond to defendants’ motion. “The Court’s
role is adjudicatory; it is not an advocate.” Burley v. Miller, 241 F. Supp. 3d 828, 840 (E.D. Mich.
2017). See generally, Springer v. Best, 264 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1959) ( “It is not the function of
this Court to supervise laymen in the practice of law.”).
“The fact that there has been no response to a summary judgment motion does not,
of course, mean that the motion is to be granted automatically.” Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483,
486 (2d Cir. 1996). The trial court is required to “intelligently and carefully review the legitimacy
of such unresponded-to motion” and cannot “blithely accept the conclusions argued in the motion.”
Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 1992). However, when a
motion for summary judgment is unopposed, “[n]othing in either the Rules or case law supports
an argument that the trial court must conduct its own probing investigation of the record” to
demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 405.
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B. 	Lack of Exhaustion
1. 	Exhaustion requirement
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner bringing an
action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust available
administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731 (2001). A prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may
not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. See
Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. 	One reason for creating prisoner grievance
procedures under the PLRA was to create an administrative record for the court.
Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court. This
has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the
quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).
In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural
rules. Id. at 218; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “Compliance with prison grievance
procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S.
at 218.
2. 	MDOC Grievance process
The MDOC requires prisoners to follow a three-step process to exhaust grievances.
See MDOC Policy Directive (“PD”) 03.02.130 (effective March 18, 2019). A prisoner must first
attempt to resolve a problem with the staff member within two business days of becoming aware
of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. Id. at ¶ Q. If
the issue is not resolved, then the grievant may file a Step I grievance on the prescribed form within
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five business days after the grievant attempted to resolve the issue with appropriate staff. Id. at ¶¶
Q and S. The Policy Directive provides the following directions for completing grievance forms:
The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. 	Information provided is to be
limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where,
why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being
grieved are to be included.
Id. at ¶ S (emphasis in original). The prisoner must send the Step I grievance to the appropriate
grievance coordinator. Id. at ¶ W. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does
not receive a timely response, he must request the appropriate form and send it to the Step II
Grievance Coordinator. Id. at ¶ DD. Finally, if a prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step II response,
or does not receive a timely response, he must send a completed Step III grievance, using the
appropriate form, to the Grievance and Appeals Section. Id. at ¶ HH.
3. 	Discussion
1. 	Grievance ICF-23-05-0540-28c
Defendants identified one grievance which could be related to the claims alleged in
this lawsuit, i.e., Grievance ICF-23-05-0540-28c (“540”) (ECF No. 18-3, PageID.188). Grievance
540 involved an incident date of May 23, 2023. See Defendants’ Brief (ECF No. 18, PageID.143).
On that date, plaintiff stated that defendants Ugboma, Eavey, and Strickland; former defendant
Enderle; and non-parties Jenkins, Reynolds and Gage retaliated against him. 	Grievance 540 at
PageID.188. The grievance involved alleged “food deprivation” (in plaintiff’s words):
Officers at ICF have a practice of using food deprivation as corporal
punishment against prisoners. I have filed multiple grievance and a lawsuit (case
no. 1:23-cv-00410) against officers and administration at ICF. 	In retaliation,
Officers Ugboma, Enderle, Eavey, Jenkins, Reynolds and Gage, and Sgt. Strickland
colluded and conspired in depriving me of food. On 5/23/2023, between 5:00-5:30
P.M., while occupying A-Wing, Enderle state to officers “Jones filed a lawsuit
against us! 	Don’t feed him!” 	Eavey then stopped near my cell and stated to
officers, “We’re going to starve you to death for filing that lawsuit!” 	Moments
later, Ugboma attached a cart with a food tray placed on top, to the slot of my cell
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door. 	As Ugboma proceeded to lift the lid of the tray, Eavey stood near A-Base
and stated to Ugboma, “We told you not to feed him! Leave the tray and walk
away!” 	Ugboma responded, “Huh? OK!” 	When I requested to be fed, Ugboma
became irate and verbally abusive towards me. He then walked away and refused
to serve me said tray. 	Later, I was harassed and threatened by officers: at about
6:17 P.M., I was harassed and threatened by Ugboma; at about 6:30 P.M., I was
harassed and threatened by Enderle, Ugboma, and Reynolds; and at around 6:50-
7:00 P.M., I was called a “nigger” by Gage and told to spell his name right as he
pointed to his name tag, and told by Eavey to “starve nigger” as he walked pass my
cell. Strickland and Jenkins were aware of their misconduct and condoned it.
PageID.188. The grievance was rejected for violating PD 03.02.130 which states that “you must
limit your grievance to one (1) issue per grievance.” PageID.189. The grievance was denied at
Step II and the rejection was upheld at Step III. PageID.185-187. Based on this record, plaintiff
did not properly exhaust Grievance 540.
However, Grievance 540 is not relevant. This grievance relates to plaintiff’s claim
that on May 23, 2023, former defendant Enderle and defendants Eavey and Ugboma denied him a
meal tray in violation of the First and Eighth Amendments. The Court dismissed this claim. See
Opinion at PageID.95 (dismissing First Amendment retaliation claims because the denial of one
meal does not rise to the level of adverse action); PageID.99-100 (dismissing Eighth Amendment
claims premised upon the deprivation of one meal tray).
2. 	Eighth Amendment claim related to cell extraction
Plaintiff did not file any grievances related to the Eighth Amendment claims against
defendants Bennett, Strickland, Rutgers, Eavey, Rinckey, Henning, Ugboma, and Unknown
Parties #1 and #2 premised upon the May 25, 2023 cell extraction, use of excessive force, failure
to intervene in the use of force, and the subsequent failure to allow plaintiff to shower and
decontaminate his cell to remove the chemical agent. Based on this record, plaintiff did not
properly exhaust a grievance to support these claims. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19; Woodford,
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548 U.S. at 90-93. 	Accordingly, defendants Bennett, Strickland, Rutgers, Eavey, Rinckey,
Henning, and Ugboma’s motion for summary judgment should be granted as to these claims.
3. 	First Amendment claims
a. 	Retaliation claims related to cell extraction
Plaintiff did not file a grievance related to alleged retaliation against Bennett for
authorizing a “sham” cell extraction. Similarly, plaintiff did not file a grievance against Strickland
or Rutgers for using excessive force against him during the extraction. 	Based on this record,
plaintiff did not properly exhaust a grievance to support these claims. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-
19; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93. 	Accordingly, defendants Bennett, Strickland, and Rutgers’
motion for summary judgment should be granted as to these retaliation claims.
b. 	Retaliation claims against defendants Strickland and Rutgers
The next issue is whether plaintiff exhausted his First Amendment retaliation
claims against Strickland and Rutgers related to the misconduct tickets. Under the relevant policy
directive, “[t]he Sixth Circuit has stated that ‘the only avenue’ for exhausting a claim alleging a
retaliatory misconduct charge is through the misconduct hearing process. 	Siggers v. Campbell,
652 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2011).” Martin v. Halstead, No. 1:21-cv-465, 2023 WL 2042180 at
*1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2023).1 	Here, plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims against Rutgers.
Defendants point out that plaintiff refused to attend the misconduct ticket hearings on two of the
misconduct tickets and therefore could not allege retaliation to satisfy the first step of the Siggers
process. See ECF No. 1-3 (plaintiff refused to participate in hearing on Rutgers misconduct for
disobeying a direct order); ECF No. 1-7 (plaintiff refused to participate in hearing on Rutgers’
1 The Court notes that the 2019 policy, PD 03.02.130 ¶ J.9 was revised in PD 03.02.130 ¶ P.9 (effective September
25, 2023). As revised, prisoners must grieve retaliation related to misconducts stating in part, “However, if the
prisoner wishes to pursue a claim that retaliation is the basis for a Class I misconduct, they must file a grievance on
the sole issue of retaliation and it shall not be rejected as a grievance on the hearing decision.”
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misconduct for possession of dangerous contraband). Plaintiff’s failure to attend the misconduct
ticket hearings on the Rutgers’ tickets amounts to a forfeiture of any claims of retaliation. In short,
plaintiff’s claims against Rutgers 	arising from the May 25, 2023, misconduct tickets are not
properly exhausted. 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93. 	Accordingly,
defendant Rutgers’ motion for summary judgment should be granted.
With respect to Strickland, defendants refer to plaintiff’s exhibits ECF Nos. 1-1
through 1-7 to establish that he failed to appear for the hearing on Strickland’s misconduct report
for failing to obey a direct order to uncover the cell window. 	One of these exhibits includes
Strickland’s misconduct report (ECF No. 1-2). 	However, there is no copy of the related
misconduct hearing report which was scheduled for May 31, 2023. While the record includes a
“paper” restriction (ECF No. 1-4), this was issued on May 30, 2023, before the hearing date.
Based on this record, defendants have not presented evidence to demonstrate that plaintiff failed
to exhaust this retaliation claim. Strickland has not met his burden to show lack of exhaustion on
this misconduct report. Accordingly, defendant Strickland’s motion for summary judgment should
be denied as to this retaliation claim.
IV. 	Recommendation
For these reasons, I respectfully recommend that defendants Henning, Strickland,
Bennett, Rutgers, Eavey, Rinckey, and Ugboma’s Motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17)
be GRANTED as to all claims EXCEPT the retaliation claim against defendant Strickland arising
from the May 25, 2023 misconduct report issued to plaintiff for disobeying a direct order.
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Dated: January 14, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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