Wilson #717304 v. Kelley et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ERIC WILSON #717304,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-01094
UNKNOWN KELLEY, et al.,
Defendants.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 48). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Defendants’ motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm
County, Michigan, but the alleged events at issue occurred at the Ionia Correctional
Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff initiated this action against
four ICF employees. (ECF No. 1). The Court screened out one Defendant and several
claims. (ECF Nos. 11, 12). At this juncture, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation
claims, as set forth in Plaintiff’s self-identified “First Cause of Action,” “Second Cause of
Action,” and “Third Cause of Action,” against Defendants Rykes and Wood remain in the
case. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, as set forth in
Plaintiff’s “Eighth Cause of Action,” against Defendant Mahalic remains in the case. In
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his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following regarding his claims against Defendants
Rykes and Wood. (ECF No. 1).
I. First Cause of Action
On an unspecified date, “Plaintiff filed a grievance on Defendant Wood,” and after,
Defendant Rykes stopped Plaintiff in the yard, stating “I am getting tired of you having
problems with my officers, if you do not sign off on her grievance, I will get you’re a**
[whether] in the hole or elsewhere.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3). Plaintiff refused to sign off,
and Defendant Rykes “found [Plaintiff] guilty” of “an arbitrary misconduct.” (ECF
No. 1, PageID.7-8).
II. Second Cause of Action
In September 2023, “another prisoner called Defendant Wood a b****,” but
“[Defendant Wood] told Plaintiff Wilson [that] she knows he did it,” “threaten[ing] to get
him for it in front of other officers and prisoners [whether] he did it or not.” (ECF No.
1, PageID.3). “On or about September 29, 2023, Defendant Wood . . . issued Plaintiff a
misconduct for having an altered sewed state coat.” (Id.). Plaintiff responded that he
was issued the coat “in the same condition it’s in now,” meaning that it was “machine
sewn” and that he could “not do it like that by hand.” (Id.). Defendant Wood
“retaliated by . . . writing a fabricated sewed coat misconduct against him.” (ECF No. 1,
PageID.8).
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III. Third Cause of Action
At the October 9, 2023, misconduct hearing for his ticket about his coat, Plaintiff
“made a verbal grievance” to Defendant Rykes, stating that he and Defendants Wood
and Mahalic “were harassing [Plaintiff] and [that] they are trying to retaliate against
him.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). Plaintiff told Defendant Rykes that, “if he did not do
anything about it, [Plaintiff] would be forced to file a grievance and a lawsuit on
everyone.” (Id.). Defendant Rykes responded by finding Plaintiff guilty “of
‘Destruction or Misuse of State Property’ ” for “not signing off on that grievance” against
Defendant Wood. (Id.).
Defendants Wood and Rykse now move for summary judgment on exhaustion
grounds. (ECF Nos. 48, 49). Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ motion. (ECF
No. 54). The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. MICH.
LCIVR 7.2(d).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on “whether
its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman, 993 F.3d 465,
474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
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evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the non-
moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence,
which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350,
357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the non-
moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730,
734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-moving
party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present “significant
probative evidence,” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack v.
Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party
cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a
jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings
Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d
at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a
sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether
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the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law.”
Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the
opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof
faces a “substantially higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002).
Where the moving party has the burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to
hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.”
Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof “is inappropriate when the
evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.”
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner asserting an action regarding prison
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust his administrative remedies. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). This obligation only extends, however, to
such administrative remedies as are available. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016)
(a prisoner “must exhaust available remedies but need not exhaust unavailable ones”).
Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is “an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which the defendant bears the
burden of establishing. Ibid.
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With respect to what constitutes proper exhaustion, the Supreme Court has stated
that the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” defined as
“compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). In Bock, the Court reiterated that
Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all
that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’ The level
of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim,
but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.
Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 articulates the applicable grievance procedures
for prisoners in MDOC custody. Prior to submitting a grievance, a prisoner must
attempt to resolve the issue with staff, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his
control, or the issue falls within the jurisdiction of Internal Affairs. MDOC Policy
Directive 03.02.130 ¶ Q (Mar. 18, 2019); ¶ W (Sept. 25, 2023).1 The prisoner must
attempt to resolve the matter within two days of becoming aware that there exists a
grievable issue. (Id.).
If this attempt is unsuccessful (or such is inapplicable), the prisoner may submit
a Step I grievance, but such must be submitted within five business days after
attempting to resolve the matter with staff. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ W
1 It is unclear which date of Policy Directive 03.02.130 applies to Plaintiff’s First Cause
of Action: the March 18, 2019 version or the September 25, 2023 version. Plaintiff’s
Second and Third Causes of Action fall under the September 25, 2023 version.
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(Mar. 18, 2019); ¶ CC (Sept. 25, 2023). The issues asserted in a grievance “should be
stated briefly but concisely” and the “[d]ates, times, places, and names of all those
involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” MDOC Policy Directive
03.02.130 ¶ S (Mar. 18, 2019); ¶ Y (Sept. 25, 2023).
If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely
response, he may appeal to Step II within ten business days of the response, or if no
response was received, within ten business days after the response was due. MDOC
Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ DD (Mar. 18, 2019); ¶ JJ (Sept. 25, 2023). If the prisoner
is dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he
may appeal the matter to Step III. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ HH (Mar. 18,
2019); ¶ NN (Sept. 25, 2023).
Claims directly related to the misconduct hearing process are non-grievable, and
a prisoner must exhaust those claims via the appeal processes set forth in MDOC Policy
Directive 03.03.105. See MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 at ¶ P(9), (11) (Sept. 25,
2023). Previously, this included claims that a prison official issued a retaliatory
misconduct ticket. See Siggers v. Campbell, 652 F.3d 681, 693-94 (6th Cir. 2011).
However, MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130’s September 25, 2023, amendment changed
the proper exhaustion forum for these specific claims: prisoners pursuing claims that
retaliation was the basis for their misconduct ticket “must file a grievance on the sole
issue of retaliation, and it shall not be rejected as a grievance on the hearing decision.”
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 at ¶ P(9), (11) (Sept. 25, 2023).
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Here, Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action alleges that Defendant Rykes “arbitrarily
retaliated and found [Plaintiff] guilty of misuse or destruction of state property.” (ECF
No. 1, PageID.8). Defendants submitted as evidence the pertinent misconduct report,
which states that the ticket was issued on September 28, 2023. (ECF No. 49-6,
PageID.306). Accordingly, the proper exhaustion forum for this claim is through the
grievance process.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Rykse and Wood
provide evidence that Plaintiff pursued seven grievances through Step III while at ICF
since the alleged events at issue began. (ECF No. 49-4, PageID.218-80). Plaintiff has
presented no evidence that he filed any additional grievances regarding the allegations
in his complaint.
Plaintiff’s grievances do not establish that he has properly exhausted his
remaining claims against Defendants Wood and Ryske. Grievances ICF-2311-1234-
27A, ICF-24-02-0138-26I, and ICF-24-02-0218-17A name Defendants Ryske or Wood,
but the allegations in these grievances do not match any of the remaining claims in this
matter. See Smith v. Washington, No. 24-12652, 2025 WL 2947014, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025) (“To exhaust a claim under the PLRA, an incarcerated person’s grievance
claim must match the issue(s) found in the individual’s § 1983 complaint.”). Grievance
ICF-2311-1234-27A alleges that, in November 2023, Defendant Rykse did not call
Plaintiff out for his rehearing on his misconduct ticket from Defendant Wood about his
coat and he was again found guilty (ECF No. 49-4, PageID.274), which correlates to his
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previously screened Fourth Cause of Action (ECF No. 11, PageID.23-24, 35-36; ECF
No. 12, PageID.37). Grievance ICF-24-02-0138-26I alleges that, in February 2024,
Defendant Ryske threatened “to get” Plaintiff, stating that Plaintiff would “be in the hole
soon.” (ECF No. 49-4, PageID.265). Grievance ICF-24-02-0218-17A alleges that
Defendant Wood found Plaintiff’s I.D. card on the floor in February 2024 and refused to
return it to him, claiming it was broken. (ECF No. 49-4, PageID.260).
Further, Grievances ICF-24-05-0580-28I, ICF-24-05-0510-28B, ICF-24-05-0500-
17B, and ICF-24-05-0547-28E are ineffective as they do not name Defendant Wood or
Defendant Ryske. (ECF No. 49-4, PageID.234, 248, 225, 241). See Rosencrantz v.
Schmalbach, No. 1:24-CV-886, 2025 WL 4082253, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025) (“It
is well understood that if a prisoner identifies by name a specific individual in a Step I
grievance, that grievance can serve to exhaust claims only as to the individual named in
the Step I grievance.”).
For the reasons articulated above, the undersigned finds that Defendants Wood
and Ryske have satisfied their burden to show that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust
his claims against them. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’
motion be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 48) be granted. All of Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants Wood and Ryske should be dismissed. Plaintiff’s First Amendment
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retaliation claim arising out of his Eighth Cause of Action against Defendant Mahalic
would remain. The undersigned further recommends that appeal of this matter would
not be taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: February 25, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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