Gentry #132047 v. Grand Prairie Healthcare Services, P.C. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD CHARLES GENTRY #132047,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-240
GRAND PRAIRIE HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, P.C., et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before me are Defendant Rickey Coleman D.O.’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim (ECF No. 109) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant
Coleman. (ECF No. 118.) On January 22, 2026, I notified the parties of my intention to recommend
summary judgment for Defendant Coleman pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(1)
and afforded them an opportunity to submit any additional materials they wished to be considered.
(ECF No. 130.) Per that order, Plaintiff submitted additional materials on February 9, 2026. (ECF
No. 132.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment, GRANT Defendant Coleman summary judgment, and DENY
Defendant Coleman’s motion to dismiss as moot.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff Richard Gentry, a prisoner incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC), sued several MDOC employees and contractors pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
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1983 alleging that they violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment due to deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, namely his back, leg, and foot pain and numbness. The
sole remaining Defendant is Rickey Coleman, D.O.
I briefly summarized Gentry’s history of pain-causing spinal issues in my January 26, 2026
Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 131) as follows:
Gentry, who is 71 years old, has a history of back, leg, and foot pain due to
degenerative spine issues, for which he has received treatment while incarcerated
with the MDOC. As of December 2018, Gentry had acute radiculopathy bilaterally
with low back pain and numbness. (ECF No. 123-2 at PageID.1027.) During an
August 22, 2018 visit with a neurologist, Gentry reported symptoms of paresthesia
and difficulty walking. The doctor diagnosed radiculopathy of the lumbosacral
region and polyneuropathy. (Id. at PageID.1030–31.) In September 2019, Gentry
underwent an open laminectomy of L4-S1 with bilateral medial foraminotomy. (Id.
at PageID.1038.) Still, he continued to experience back pain with radicular pain.
(Id.)
(Id. at PageID.1092–93.)
In his complaint, Gentry alleged:
Doctor Colemans’ [sic] complicity to the “pattern” of “delaying” was, extremely,
detrimental. He extended the “delay” to where it seemed it would be indefinite.
This doctor I had never seen, or heard of, not before or after his “denial.” He made
an “conscientious” [sic] decision to interrupt a prescribed “treatment plan” for non-
medical reasons. He disagreed with a “qualified health professional,” who had been
my “primary” medical provider for years; directly participating in a constitutional
violation. His action was egregious, deliberate, “grossly” negligent, and possibly
irreparable. The future, ramifications of his action is yet to be determined, but the
immediate 	effect 	was 	unconscionable, 	and 	devastating. 	He 	forced, 	further,
continuance [sic] endurance of intense discomfort, and pains; anxiety, and
emotional distress. It is my contention, and opinion that any defendant that had
authority to remedy this wrong and didn’t, is “directly” culpable.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID.8–9.)
The Court provided a more focused summary of Gentry’s claim: Gentry’s medical
provider, Margaret Ouellette, P.A., performed an assessment of Gentry’s symptoms and
determined that the “protocol” required that she begin with x-rays, physical therapy, and an EMG.
Although Gentry received the x-rays, Dr. Coleman denied P.A. Ouellette’s request for an EMG
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without independent examination or assessment. (ECF No. 6 at PageID.50.) Gentry’s medical
records, some of which he attaches as an exhibit to his motion, show that on October 24, 2022, Dr.
Coleman recommended an alternative treatment plan (ATP) to the EMG as follows:
ATP: Please try conservative management, including NSAIDS and activity
modifications. If no improvement or worsening after this, consider HEP. It appears
this condition is not significantly interfering with his required ADLs in the
correctional setting, (his ability to eat, go to the toilet, shower or dress self). Per Dr.
Coleman.
(ECF No. 118-1 at PageID.726.)
Despite activity modification and HEP stretches, Gentry continued to experience back pain
and radicular pain in his lower extremities. As previously summarized, he underwent additional
treatment for his symptoms:
In early February 2024, Gentry was seen at the Henry Ford Hospital pain clinic for
back pain and radicular pain. (Id. at PageID.1038.) Following the visit, Gentry’s
medical provider, Suzanne Groff, NP, established a plan of care (POC). NP Groff
noted that Plaintiff had a history of chronic low back pain and expressed
“complaints of continued low back pain down his posterior thighs,” “occasional
sharp shooting/burning pains with movement,” “numbness/tingling down his legs
into his feet,” “difficulty getting of bed in the morning,” and a need to stop and rest
frequently due to pain. (Id.) NP Groff also noted that a lower extremity EMG study
conducted in October 2023 indicated advanced acute radiculopathy bilaterally, and
a December 2023 MRI study of the lumbar spine indicated that Gentry had
multilevel degenerative changes and lumbar spondylosis. (Id.)
The pain clinic visit resulted in a recommendation for a trial of Caudal ESI (epidural
steroid injection), which required MDOC staff approval. (Id.) By February 6, 2024,
Caudal ESI had been approved and was pending scheduling. (Id. at PageID.1040.)
NP Groff prescribed Gentry Naproxen 375 mg twice per day as needed and
encouraged him to continue with activity modifications, HEP (home exercise
program) stretches, and over-the-counter medications as needed. (Id. at 1040,
1043.) Gentry received the Caudal ESI on March 19, 2024. (Id. at PageID.1047.)
(ECF No. 131 at PageID.1093.)
II. 	Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
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are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the opponent cannot
sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially higher
hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the
burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could
find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.
1986). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof “must show that
the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so
powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561.
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion “is
inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier
of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
III. 	Discussion
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies not
only to punishment imposed by the state, but also to deprivations that occur during imprisonment
and are not part of the sentence imposed. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1976). Punishment that is without penological justification or
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involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain also violates the Eighth Amendment’s
proscriptions. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). In other words, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits “the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976).
The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain encompasses “deliberate indifference” to an
inmate’s “serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06; Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d
739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001). Determining whether denial of medical care amounts to an Eighth
Amendment violation involves two steps. First, the court must determine, objectively, whether the
alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious. A “serious medical need” sufficient to implicate the
Eighth Amendment is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, the objective component is
satisfied where a prisoner receives no treatment for a serious medical need. See Rhinehart v. Scutt,
894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir. 2018). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure
to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-
obvious,” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff must
“place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in
medical treatment.” Napier, 238 F.3d at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted).
If the plaintiff satisfies the objective component, he must then demonstrate that the
defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind:
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In other words, the plaintiff “must present evidence from which a trier
of fact could conclude ‘that the official was subjectively aware of the risk’ and ‘disregard[ed] that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th
Cir. 2004) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 847). To satisfy this part of the analysis, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant acted with “deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish.”
Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 813 (6th Cir. 2005).
A. 	Objective Component
Gentry has not presented evidence necessary to establish the objective component of his
claim. The medical evidence of record shows that Gentry’s degenerative spine issues that caused
pain in his back, legs, and feet were a chronic condition that the MDOC had treated for years. This
was not a condition requiring emergent care. Rather, Gentry’s claim against Dr. Coleman is based
on delay in obtaining an EMG—a diagnostic test to measure the health and function of his nerves
and muscles—which he ultimately received in October 2023.
To prevail on a claim of this nature, Gentry must “place verifying medical evidence in the
record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Johnson v. Karnes,
398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Generally, the required medical evidence
must be in the form of expert testimony. Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021).
Because Gentry presents no expert testimony, his claim fails. While Gentry relies on his own
analysis of changes in his spinal condition demonstrated by his comparison of the December 2023
MRI study with the 2018 MRI study (ECF No. 132 at PageID.1104–06; ECF No. 132-1; ECF No.
132-2), his lay opinion is not an adequate substitute for the type of evidence that Phillips requires.
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B. 	Subjective Component
As for the subjective component, Gentry “must present evidence from which a trier of fact
could conclude ‘that [Dr. Coleman] was subjectively aware of the risk’ and ‘disregard[ed] that risk
by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Greene, 361 F.3d at 294 (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 829, 847). Here, the only evidence pertaining to Dr. Coleman’s recommendation shows
that in formulating an ATP, he was exercising his medical judgment that conservative treatment
should be pursued before obtaining more diagnostic studies, particularly given Gentry’s apparent
ability to perform his activities of daily living in the prison setting. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107
(“[T]he question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is
indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. A medical decision not to order
an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.”). Use of medical
judgment is not a basis for an Eighth Amendment claim unless a plaintiff can show that that
judgment was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). As noted above, Gentry has
not done so here.
While it is clear that Gentry disagrees with Dr. Coleman’s decision to hold off on the EMG
pending conservative measures, “a patient’s disagreement with his physician[] over the proper
course of treatment [is], at most, a medical-malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under §
1983.” Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Mitchell
v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A] desire for additional or different treatment
does not suffice by itself to support an Eighth Amendment claim.” (citations omitted)). Moreover,
Dr. Coleman’s and P.A. Oullette’s difference of opinion about the timing of an EMG is no basis
for an Eighth Amendment claim. See Carter v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrs., No. 12-cv-12621, 2013
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WL 5291567, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2013) (“A difference of opinion between medical
professionals concerning the appropriate course of treatment generally does not amount to
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”) (quoting Acosta v. Naphcare, No. 09-cv-1998,
2010 WL 3522356, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2010)).
In short, Gentry has failed to show that his “evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury
would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561. He cannot establish either the objective or
subject prong of his claim. Rather, the record evidence shows that Dr. Coleman is entitled to
summary judgment on Gentry’s claim.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court DENY Gentry’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 118), GRANT Defendant Coleman summary judgment, and DENY
Defendant Coleman’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 109) as moot.
Dated: March 19, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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