Tinsley #360973 v. Washington et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHOYA TINSLEY,
Case No. 1:24-cv-4
Plaintiff,
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v.
HEIDI WASHINGTON,
et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Choya
Tinsley, a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). 	The
alleged incidents occurred at the MDOC’s Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF). 	The
only remaining defendant in this action is Corrections Officer (CO) Dominic Vela. This matter is
now before the Court on defendant Vela’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 38).
I. 	The Complaint
The Court summarized plaintiff’s claims in his original complaint as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that at some point, Defendant Vela called him a “rat” in front of
other inmates, which resulted in him being bullied and called names. Plaintiff states
that other inmates overheard him being called a “rat” and subjected him to abuse
when he attempted to use the phone. Plaintiff asserts that these inmates also stole
and/or took thousands of dollars of store or commissary from him under threat of
physical violence.
Opinion (ECF No. 10, PageID.67). 	In addition, plaintiff alleged “that he engaged in protected
conduct by filing unspecified grievances.” PageID.71. Plaintiff appears to claim that Vela violated
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his rights under the First Amendment (retaliation) and the Eighth Amendment (failure to protect).
PageID.67. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. PageID.67, 73.
After the Court dismissed most of the defendants on initial screening, plaintiff filed
an amended complaint against defendant CO Vela alleging in relevant part:
7. On or about January 2023, Plaintiff sent a correspondence to Inspector via J-Pay
regarding fear that Defendant would act in an unprofessional manner after being
abreasted of an investigation regarding Defendant claiming Plaintiff had a weapon
in Plaintiffs cell. If this information made its way back to Defendant, via
investigation by the Inspector Plaintiff felt that Defendant would take retaliation
actions against Plaintiff.
8. On May 2, 2023, on second shift Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by a cell
search of plaintiffs cell (B-Unit 42) upon returning to plaintiffs cell it looked like a
tornado went through the cell. Plaintiff inquired of Defendant as to why he did the
cell like that? Defendant replied “you remember who I am, you are a rat.” Then
Defendant smiled and walked away. While restoring order in Plaintiffs cell,
Plaintiff observed legal papers and pictures that had been destroyed by Defendant.
9. This reply was issued in the presence of other prisoners with the sole purpose of
causing problems between plaintiff and other prisoners. It is a well-known fact that
prisoners that are rats get picked on and assaulted by other prisoners.
Amend. Compl. (ECF No. 23, PageID.96).
In the amended complaint, plaintiff apparently shifted his alleged “protected
conduct” from filing unidentified grievances to sending an email sent to an MDOC Inspector.
Plaintiff alleged that, “Defendant singled plaintiff out because plaintiff told the Inspector that
Defendant planted a weapon in plaintiff [sic] footlocker in January 2023, which amounted to
retaliation in violation of Plaintiff’s first amendment right.” PageID.96. Plaintiff also alleged that,
“[a]s a result of Defendant’s actions [in calling him a rat] Plaintiff has been jumped on for his store
items and being bullied [sic] in relation to the use of the phone which sometime ended in a
fight/assault.” PageID.97. Plaintiff wants damages and “immediate termination” of defendant’s
employment at the MDOC. Id.
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II. 	Legal Standard
A. 	Summary Judgment
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
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B. 	First Amendment Claim
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a civil cause of
action for individuals who are deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or federal laws by those acting under color of state law.” 	Smith v. City of Salem,
Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). 	To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
(2) that the defendant deprived him of this federal right under color of law. Jones v. Duncan, 840
F.2d 359, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights
violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir.
1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff
must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an
adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness
from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in
part, by the protected conduct. Id.
Opinion at PageID.71. To satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
retaliatory motive was “a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff
would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 399
(2019). At a minimum, to establish the retaliatory motive, a plaintiff must allege a chronology of
events from which retaliation can plausibly be inferred. See Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413,
417-18 (6th Cir. 2004) (“temporal proximity alone may be significant enough to constitute indirect
evidence of a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, plaintiff contends: that the protected conduct was filing a grievance and
writing an email to the Inspector; that the adverse actions were damaging property during a cell
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search and calling him a rat; and, that defendant Vela’s adverse actions were motivated by plaintiff
engaging in the protected conduct.
As an initial matter, plaintiff has failed to establish that he was engaged in protected
conduct which motivated defendant to retaliate against him. 	As discussed, plaintiff’s original
complaint referred to filing a grievance as the protected conduct. However, this filing occurred on
September 22, 2020, years before the alleged retaliatory conduct on May 2, 2023. See Prisoner
Grievance Summary Report (ECF No. 39-10, PageID.278). Plaintiff’s protected conduct in 2020
was too distant in time to create a retaliatory motive. See, e.g., Robinson v. Amble, No. 18-2176,
2019 WL 5152775 at *3 (6th Cir. July 17, 2019) (stating that “[a]lthough a retaliatory motive may
be shown by temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse action”, a gap of
two months between the time a prisoner filed a grievance and an alleged retaliatory action does
not support a finding that the defendant acted with a retaliatory motive). In this regard, “an inmate
cannot immunize himself from adverse administrative action by prison officials merely by filing a
grievance or a lawsuit and then claiming that everything that happens to him is retaliatory”. Spies
v. Voinovich, 48 Fed. Appx. 520, 524-25 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his amended complaint, plaintiff referred to an email sent to an MDOC Inspector
in January 2023 regarding plaintiff’s fear that defendant Vela would retaliate against him due to
an investigation of Vela’s claim that plaintiff had a weapon in his cell. 	Amend. Compl. at
PageID.96. 	Plaintiff’s allegation is confusing. 	By way of background, defendant Vela issued
plaintiff a misconduct for possession of a weapon on January 6. 2023. 	See Misconduct Report
(ECF No. 39-3, PageID.190). A hearing was held on January 12, 2023 and plaintiff was found
guilty of possessing the knife on February 15, 2023. See Class I Misconduct Hearing Report (Feb.
15. 2023) (ECF No. 39-3, PageID.188-189). 	The only email in the record was from March 8,
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2023, about one month after plaintiff was found guilty of the misconduct. The email asked that
someone investigate defendant for lying about the location of the knife in his cell back on January
6, 2023, i.e., “Vella [sic] found a knife in my cell hidden in the light but lied and said it was in my
footlocker”. See Email (March 8, 2023) (ECF No. 39-4, PageID.198). Assuming that the email
sent to the Inspector is protected conduct, the alleged retaliation occurred almost two months after
plaintiff sent it. This nearly two-month gap was too distant in time to create a retaliative motive.
See Spies, 48 Fed. Appx. at 524-25; Robinson, 2019 WL 5152775 at *3. In summary, assuming
that plaintiff could demonstrate an adverse action1 , he has failed to demonstrate that the adverse
action was motivated, at least in part, by his exercise of protected conduct.
C. 	Eighth Amendment Claims
As the Court stated in its screening opinion,
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of
the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,”
nor may it contravene society's “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). Prison officials’ conduct that involves the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” is thus unlawful. Ivey v. Wilson, 832
F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346).
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the
Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison
staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984).
The Sixth Circuit has observed that identifying a prisoner as an informant
or snitch may constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate’s safety. See
Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 699 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001); LaFountain v. Martin,
334 F. App'x 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d
1 The Court notes that defendant contends that he did not commit an adverse action against plaintiff. Here, plaintiff
identified the adverse actions as damage to his property during the cell search and defendant calling plaintiff a rat.
The Court agrees that defendant’s cell search was not an adverse action. See Tate v. Campbell, 85 Fed. Appx. 413,
417 (6th Cir. 2003) (“the single search of a prison cubicle would not deter a person of ‘ordinary firmness’ from
pursuing constitutional grievances”). 	However, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendant
committed an adverse action by calling plaintiff a “rat.” Plaintiff stated that after the search, defendant responded to
his questions “by calling me a Rat in front of several other inmates.” Tinsley Decl. (ECF No. 43, PageID.301). Calling
a prisoner a snitch or a rat could make an inmate a target for prisoner attacks. See generally, Comstock v. McCrary,
273 F.3d 693, 699, n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (snitch); Rose v. Cope, No. 1:22-cv-891, 2025 WL 566319 at *4 (Jan. 22, 2025),
R&R adopted, 2025 WL 563928 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2025).
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1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that “labeling an inmate a snitch satisfies the
Farmer standard, and constitutes deliberate indifference to the safety of that
inmate”)). Under Farmer, to establish an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect
claim, a plaintiff must establish that he reasonably fears an attack. 511 U.S. at 834;
see also Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242-43 (6th Cir. 1994)
(noting that while the Sixth Circuit has held that a plaintiff asserting a personal
safety claim need not demonstrate that he was actually attacked, he must establish
that he reasonably feared such an attack).
Opinion at PageID.72-73.
“Labeling an inmate as [a rat] may constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate’s
safety.” See Clark v. Adams, No. 2:22-cv-104, 2022 WL 2301952 at *10 (W.D. Mich. June 27,
2022). See also, Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 699, n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging
that being labeled a snitch could make the inmate a target for prison attacks). However, even if a
plaintiff’s fears are legitimate, “it is the reasonably preventable assault itself, rather than any fear
of assault, that gives rise to a compensable claim under the Eighth Amendment.” 	Wilson v.
Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272 (7th
Cir.1996). Here, there is no evidence that other prisoners physically assaulted plaintiff for being
labeled a “rat”. 	To support his claim, plaintiff testified that people call him a rat and a snitch and
that he has trouble getting on the phone at the prison, i.e., when he gets to the front of the line to
use the phone somebody tells him to go to the back of the line and has to wait until there is no one
using the phone. Tinsley Dep. (ECF No. 39-8, PageID.252-253). The same issue arises when he
uses the JPay kiosk. 	Id. at PageID.253. 	This conduct does not rise to the level of an assault
compensable under the Eighth Amendment. 	See, e.g., Pharms v. Washington, No. 1:22-CV-9,
2022 WL 3754502 at *4-5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2022) (prisoner failed to demonstrate that he
reasonably feared a threat to his personal safety when he was verbally harassed by other prisoners,
but there was no suggestion that the harassment and teasing could escalate to violence).
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Plaintiff also testified that other prisoners stole food items, a television, a tablet, an
MP3 player and headphones from his cell. 	Tinsley Dep. at PageID.253. 	However, there is no
evidence that plaintiff took steps to address the alleged thefts. Plaintiff stated that he knows who
stole the items but that he does not “know names” and that he did not provide the names of the
inmates who took items in his grievance. PageID.253-254. Plaintiff did not report the thefts to
staff. PageID.254.
Finally, while plaintiff stated that he “wrote the inspector” in November 2023, he
did not provide names to the inspector. Tinsley Dep. at PageID.254-255.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional claim based
on the single incident of defendant calling him a rat. As the Court stated in Williams v. Gersbacker,
9 F.3d 111 (6th Cir. 1993),
Plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a pervasive risk of harm. A
pervasive risk of harm may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a single incident
or isolated incidents. Plaintiff alleges that defendant called him a “snitch” on only
one occasion. Moreover, in order to establish a pervasive risk of harm, a prisoner
must apprise prison officials of the problem. Plaintiff offered no proof that he made
the problem known to anyone. He offered no proof that he filed a prison grievance
against defendant or that he sought protective custody as a result of being at risk of
assault. Inasmuch as plaintiff cannot establish a pervasive risk of harm, he cannot
establish that defendant's purported comment constituted a reckless disregard of his
right to be free from attacks by other inmates. Therefore, plaintiff cannot establish
a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. No genuine issue of
material facts existed, and defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Williams, 9 F.3d 111 (internal citations omitted).2
2 The Court notes that defendant also seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
However, defendant’s two-paragraph argument merely re-states his motion for summary judgment on the merits, i.e.,
he is entitled to qualified immunity because there was no federal constitutional violation. See Defendant’s Brief (ECF
No. 39, PageID.181).
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III. 	Recommendation
For these reasons, I respectfully recommend that defendant Vela’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 38) be GRANTED and that this case be terminated.
Dated: January 12, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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