Velasco Rojas et al v. First Pick Farms, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FELICIANO VELASCO ROJAS,
et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
FIRST PICK FARMS LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
Case No. 1:23-cv-604
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
There are two motions to dismiss before the Court. 	The first one (ECF No. 64) is
from Defendants First Pick Farms, Grow Blue Farms Hourly, Grow Blue Farms Salary, and
Grow Blue Farms. 	The second one (ECF No. 67) is from Defendants First Pick Farms
Management and HB Hive and Company. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions
will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2017, Plaintiffs Feliciano Velasco Rojas and Luis Guzman Rojas entered the
United States from Mexico. Plaintiffs had a contract to work on a farm in North Carolina as
part of the H-2A visa program. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 52, ECF No. 63.) Under their contract,
they expected to receive free housing, an hourly wage, and reimbursement for the travel
expenses once the contract was complete. 	(
Id.) 	But their time in North Carolina was cut
short after only a few weeks. (
Id. ¶ 53.)
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One night, they were awakened by Antonio Sanchez. 	(
Id.) 	Sanchez told Plaintiffs
and about thirty other workers that they had only a few hours to pack their bags before they
boarded a bus to Michigan, where they would work on a blueberry farm. 	(
Id. ¶ 55.) 	He
threatened to call immigration if anyone complained to anybody else about moving to
Michigan. (
Id. ¶ 58.) So Plaintiffs packed their bags and let Sanchez take their pictures to
make fake identities for them to use at their new jobs. (
Id. ¶ 53.) Sanchez charged Plaintiffs
for these documents and for transportation. (
Id. ¶66-67.)
When they arrived in Michigan, Sanchez again threatened to call immigration if
anyone complained. 	(
Id. ¶ 85.) 	Plaintiffs used their fake identities to pass their new
employers’ screening process. (
Id. ¶ 72.) They moved into a 1,500-square foot house, which
they shared with about twenty-eight other workers. (
Id. ¶ 70.) The house was unfurnished
with only one kitchen and bathroom. (
Id. ¶ 114.) Their new employers charged them rent.
(
Id. ¶ 94.)
In June 2017, Plaintiffs started their job picking blueberries. (
Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiffs’
new employers assigned Plaintiff Guzman to transport the workers from the house to the
work site. (
Id. at ¶ 128.) Plaintiff Guzman did not have a U.S. driver’s license, and he was
never paid for his work as a driver. (
Id.) Sanchez charged the workers for the transportation
service. (
Id. ¶ 96.)
Plaintiffs worked twelve-hour days without breaks or days off. (
Id. ¶ 7.) They were
paid according to how much they picked. (
Id. ¶ 124.) Sanchez was one of their supervisors.
He gave them instructions and reviewed their work. (
Id. ¶ 120.) He continued to threaten
to call immigration if anyone complained about their working conditions, promising to alert
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the authorities about Plaintiffs’ use of fake identities. (
Id. ¶ 86.) 	Plaintiff Guzman left the
farm at the end of the season in September 2017. (
Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff Velasco left a month
later. (
Id. ¶ 16.)
In June 2023, Plaintiffs sued the companies that operate the blueberry farm:
Defendants First Pick Farms, First Pick Farms Management, HB Hive and Company, Grow
Blue Farms, Grow Blue Farms Hourly (GBF Hourly), and Grow Blue Farms Salary (GBF
Salary). They allege that all six Defendants are liable for violations of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act (AWPA).
Now, all six Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 64, 67). 1
In response, Plaintiffs argue that their complaint alleges enough facts to survive Defendants’
motions. (ECF Nos. 71-72.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party may assert a defense for “failure to state a claim” through a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss “is a test of the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated
in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.”
	Golden v. City of
Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005). 	To survive the motion, the plaintiff’s
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	A claim is plausible when it contains
1
Each motion deals with similar issues even though they were filed by different groups of Defendants. To keep things
simple, the Court will refer to them as a single motion and to Defendants as a single group.
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“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”
	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	If more
than one reasonable inference can be drawn from an allegation, the Court construes the facts
“in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
	Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528
F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008). 	That said, the Court must ignore any legal conclusions that are
unsupported by factual allegations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. GROUP PLEADING
At times, the Second Amended Complaint treats the six corporate Defendants as a
single group called “Defendant Enterprise.” There is no general rule against group pleading.
But Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint’s group pleading amounts to a
“shotgun pleading.”
The Sixth Circuit does not often use the term “shotgun pleading” outside of cases
involving constitutional claims.
	Arnold v. CooperSurgical, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 3d 803, 823
(S.D. Ohio 2023). 	In one case, the panel used the term to refer to a plaintiff’s failure to
“connect specific facts or events with the various causes of action she asserted.”
Lee v. Ohio
Educ. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 386, 393 (6th Cir. 2020). The panel held that this style of pleading
broke Rule 8(a)(2), which requires plaintiffs to give “adequate notice of the claims against
[defendants] and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”
Id. at 392-93;
see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of [each] claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief”).
Other courts in this circuit describe a “shotgun pleading” as one that makes it
“virtually impossible for a defendant to know which allegations of fact are intended to support
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which claims for relief.”
	K.O. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 728 F. Supp. 3d 624, 640 (E.D. Mich.
2024);
Arnold, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 823 (collecting cases). In this style of pleading, the goal is
to “overwhelm defendants with an unclear mass of allegations and make it difficult [or]
impossible for the defendants to make informed responses to the plaintiff’s allegations.”
K.O., 728 F. Supp. 3d at 640. So whether a “shotgun pleading” violates “Rule 8(a) is often
dependent on the facts and claims at issue.”
Igo v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 652 F.
Supp. 3d 929, 934 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (collecting cases). 	But in general, courts addressing
arguments about “shotgun pleading have . . . declined to dismiss the complaint on that basis
alone.”
K.O., 728 F. Supp. 3d at 641 (collecting cases).
When a plaintiff alleges that multiple defendants engaged in the same conduct, these
allegations give “adequate notice” if they “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence to support their claims.”
Faloba v. Ultium Cells LLC, No. 4:24-CV-01569,
2025 WL 1042699, at *19 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 2025) (collecting cases). 	In this case, it is
reasonable to expect that discovery will reveal the role that each Defendant played as part of
their blueberry-harvesting business. 	So Plaintiffs’ use of “Defendant Enterprise” is not
enough by itself to dismiss their complaint for failure to give adequate notice.
Aside from Plaintiffs’ allegations against “Defendant Enterprise,” Plaintiffs also allege
specific facts about how each Defendant relates to each other as part of their business.
Plaintiffs argue that these facts justify treating Defendants as a collective. In general, courts
treat multiple entities as a collective to implement a statute or to avoid some unjust outcome
that might result from defendants’ opaque corporate structure. 	At this stage, it is not
appropriate to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint given the nature of their claims and the fact that
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Defendants had an opportunity in their briefing to make an informed response to Plaintiffs’
arguments—which they did.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege facts specific to their employment, including how they were
recruited, what work they did, where they worked, where they lived, and what aliases they
used. 	From that, Defendants should be able to identify Plaintiffs (as compared to other
workers) and their employment relationship or lack thereof.
	K.O., 728 F. Supp. 3d at 641
(analyzing how broad allegations combined with facts that are specific to the plaintiffs’
relationship with each defendant satisfy Rule 8). 	Thus, Plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy Rule
8(a)(2).
IV. ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE
GBF Hourly and GBF Salary were created more than four years after the alleged
violations occurred.2
Plaintiffs argue that all six Defendants, including GBF Hourly and GBF
Salary, are still liable as alter egos of each other. In general, the law “recognizes the limitation
of liability that the adoption of a corporate form creates.”
N.L.R.B. v. Fullerton Transfer &
Storage Ltd., Inc., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990). 	But the law also recognizes certain
situations when one corporation may be held liable for the actions of another under the alter-
ego doctrine.
Courts first look at the statutes for guidance on alter-ego doctrine.
	Brown v. Astro
Holdings, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 519, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2005). If the statutes are silent as they
2
The Court takes judicial notice of GBF Hourly and GBF Salary’s articles of organization attached to Defendants’
motion to dismiss (Ex. A, ECF No. 64-1; Ex. B, ECF No. 64-2). The Court may take notice of government records at
this stage.
United States ex rel. Dingle v. BioPort Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971-72 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (collecting
cases).
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are here, courts refer to the common law. Because the TVPRA and the AWPA are federal
statutes, “any common law rule necessary to effectuate a private cause of action under [them]
is necessarily federal in character.”
	Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97
(1991).
Despite the federal character of the common law, courts generally apply state law as
the “federal rule of decision.”
	Id. at 98. 	Cases in which courts can engage in common
lawmaking are “few and far between.”
Rodriguez v. FDIC, 589 U.S. 132, 134 (2020). Courts
are allowed to apply the “federal common law” when it is “necessary to protect uniquely
federal interests,”
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981);
when Congress “give[s] the courts the power to develop substantive law,”
id.; when there is
a “distinct need for nationwide legal standards,”
Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98; when “express
provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily
applicable to the matter at hand,”
id.; when applying state law “would frustrate specific
objectives of the federal programs,”
id.; and when two states are parties, the United States is
a party, or admiralty law applies,
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640.
Plaintiffs argue for a mix of federal and state common law standards. 	Specifically,
they rely on the federal common law as it is applied in labor cases. 	The labor standard
extends liability from older entities that existed at the time of the breach to newer entities
that merely continue as “disguised continuance[s] of the old employer.”
Fullerton Transfer,
910 F.2d at 336. So in theory, this test could hold GBF Hourly and GBF Salary liable for
the actions of the other four Defendants.
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But Plaintiffs do not justify the use of either the labor standard or the traditional
federal common law standard. The purpose of the labor standard was to be a “more relaxed,
less exacting” version of the traditional standard to help agencies better “effectuate federal
labor policies.”
Id. Those policies are not part of this case, so the labor standard does not
apply.3
The traditional standard also does not apply here. The Sixth Circuit may apply this
standard to defendants that fail the threshold inquiry for the labor standard,
id. at 338, and
to defendants in ERISA cases,
PACE Indus. Union-Mgt. Pension Fund v. Dannex Mfg. Co.,
394 F. App’x 188, 198 (6th Cir. 2010). 	The use of the traditional standard is justified in
labor and ERISA cases based on a need for uniformity and a risk that state law would frustrate
federal law.
	See Jenkins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1418 (Tax
2021) (collecting cases). In the absence of this kind of reasoning, courts apply the alter-ego
doctrine under state law.
Id. (collecting cases).4
The parties dispute whether Defendants are alter egos of each other by referring to
Michigan law. One Defendant, Grow Blue Farms, is incorporated in Delaware, but neither
side argues for the use of Delaware law. So for this case, the Court applies Michigan law.
3
In at least one case, a court applied the labor standard to a non-labor case, but it did so without any justification.
See
Ickes v. Nexcare Health Sys., L.L.C., 178 F. Supp. 3d 578 (E.D. Mich. 2016). The Court declines to extend the test
beyond the boundaries of its use by the Sixth Circuit.
4
As an alternative to the alter-ego doctrine, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants should be treated as a single entity under the
federal common law’s “integrated enterprise” or “single employer” test. But this test does not apply to statutes like the
AWPA that offer separate guidance on how to construe multiple entities acting as one. Courts do apply common law
tests in TVPRA cases, however, to treat multiple entities as a given employee’s employer. 	The Court analyzes
Defendants as a “single employer” in Part V.A.2(a).
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Michigan law presumes that a corporate entity is distinct from its owner absent “some
abuse of corporate form.”
	Green v. Ziegelman, 873 N.W.2d 794, 803 (Mich. App. 2015).
When corporate form is used to “subvert justice,” the corporate form is “ignored by the
courts” to better “avoid [that] fraud or injustice.”
Id. To hold the owner liable for its entity’s
wrongdoing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the entity was the mere instrumentality of the
owner, (2) that the owner used the entity to commit a fraud or wrong, and (3) that the fraud
or wrong resulted in an unjust loss or injury.
	Id. at 806. 	The Court first assesses whether
the actions of the four Defendants in existence during the 2017 blueberry season are
attributable to the two Defendants created years later.
A. Grow Blue Farms Salary and Grow Blue Farms Hourly
Plaintiffs argue that the other four Defendants were alter egos of GBF Hourly and
GBF Salary. Plaintiffs allege that GBF Hourly and GBF Salary are wholly owned subsidiaries
of Grow Blue Farms. They also allege that the other Defendants are or were owned, in some
combination, by Defendant Grow Blue Farms, non-party GBF Corporation, or non-party
Tom Mitchell. Tom Mitchell, in turn, also owns GBF Corporation and Grow Blue Farms.
In general, Michigan courts apply the alter-ego doctrine when one entity owns
another.
Green, 873 N.W.2d at 803;
see also Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 224
(Mich. 1995) (“Michigan courts have generally required that a
subsidiary must become a
mere 	instrumentality 	of 	the
	parent 	before 	its 	separate 	corporate 	existence 	will 	be
disregarded.”) (emphasis added) (citation modified). The only ownership relationship that
Plaintiffs allege regarding GBF Hourly and GBF Salary is with Grow Blue Farms. Neither
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GBF Hourly nor GBF Salary have an ownership relationship with FPF Management, HB
Hive, or First Pick Farms.
In addition, Michigan courts typically apply the alter-ego doctrine to hold
owners
responsible for the actions of the corporations
that they own.
	Green, 873 N.W.2d at 803.
In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that two subsidiaries should be held liable for the actions of their
parent. 	The Michigan Court of Appeals has expressed skepticism of this idea.
	Lawton v.
Gorman Furniture Corp., 282 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Mich. App. 1979) (“[T]o support the trial
court’s conclusion that a dominated and wholly owned subsidiary corporation is chargeable
with the actions of its parent is to stand the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil ‘on its
head’ . . . .”).
Michigan law by itself does not require an ownership relationship or a unidirectional
subsidiary-to-parent transfer of liability. 	Some federal courts interpreting state law have
applied alter-ego doctrine in a way where ownership was not required.
	See Innovation
Ventures, L.L.C. v. Custom Nutrition Laboratories, L.L.C., No. 4:12-CV-13850-TGB-MJH,
2021 WL 12255004, at *28 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2021) (discussing
Scarff Bros., Inc. v.
Bischer Farms, Inc., 386 F. App’x 518 (6th Cir. 2010)). But other federal courts interpreting
the same state law have declined to expand alter-ego liability beyond the typical case without
justification from the parties to do so.
	See Gering v. Fraunhofer USA, Inc., No. 05-73458,
2009 WL 2877414, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2009). 	Here, Plaintiffs do not provide any
justification to extend alter-ego liability outside the typical case. The Court declines to come
up with its own reasoning to do so for them.
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Even if the Court decided to hold a subsidiary liable for the acts of its parents or other
entities that share a common owner, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to pass the test
under Michigan law. As mentioned above, GBF Hourly and GBF Salary did not exist until
years after the alleged violations. There is no general rule that entities created after a violation
are excluded from alter-ego liability. Still, the post-violation entity must be “used to commit
fraud or a wrong” against the plaintiff.
Green, 873 N.W.2d at 806.
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “used their diffuse corporate structure”
to “confuse Plaintiffs about where to seek redress for labor and housing violations.”
(Response 17-18, ECF No. 71; Response 17-18, ECF No. 72.) It is unclear whether Plaintiffs
are referring to their confusion seeking redress at the time of the alleged violations or at the
time of filing their lawsuit. If it is at the time of the lawsuit, there are no allegations that this
confusion led to an “unjust injury or loss.”
Green, 873 N.W.2d at 806. If it is at the time of
the violations, alter-ego liability would be impossible because GBF Hourly and GBF Salary
did not exist until years later. As a result, the Court declines to extend alter-ego liability to
GBF Hourly and GBF Salary as alter egos of the other four defendants. And because GBF
Hourly and GBF Salary were not in existence at the time of statutory violations, they are not
independently responsible for those violations either.
B. First Pick Farms, FPF Management, HB Hive and Company, and Grow Blue
Farms
As described above, Plaintiffs failed to provide any justification to extend the typical
application of Michigan law without some kind of ownership relationship. Plaintiffs do not
allege an ownership relationship among any of the remaining Defendants except between
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First Pick Farms and Grow Blue Farms. 	Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts about this
relationship to infer that First Pick Farms was an alter ego of Grow Blue Farms. 	In their
response Plaintiffs argue that the complaint alleges a wrong committed as a result of the
Defendants’ entire “corporate structure.” (Response 17-18, ECF No. 71; Response 17-18,
ECF No. 72.) But there are no facts in the complaint to infer that Grow Blue Farms used
First Pick Farms to commit a wrong. As a result, none of the four remaining Defendants are
alter egos of each other.
V. TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT (TVPRA)
The TVPRA defines a set of certain crimes and allows victims of those crimes to sue
those that played a role in committing them. 	Under the TVPRA, forced labor is a crime.
Section 1589(a) outlaws labor provided or obtained through any combination of the
following:
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical
restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or
another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;5
or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to
believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person
or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint . . . .
It is also a crime to either benefit from forced labor or traffic forced laborers. Section
1589(b) punishes anyone who “knowingly benefits” from “participation in a venture”
5
“The term ‘abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process’ means the use or threatened use of a law or legal process,
whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order
to exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.” 18
U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1).
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that violates § 1589(a) and who knows of or recklessly disregards the venture’s
violation. 	Section 1590(a) outlaws trafficking by “[w]hoever knowingly recruits,
harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or
services in violation of this statute.” 	And § 1594(a) outlaws any attempts to violate
certain parts of the TVPRA, including the forced labor and trafficking provisions.
Victims of these crimes may sue those that played a role in committing them.
Section 1595(a) allows
[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter [to] bring a civil
action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or
conspires to benefit,6
financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court
of the United States and [to] recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
So victims can sue both those who committed the crime against them (perpetrator liability)
and those who benefited from it (participatory or beneficiary liability). Those who benefited
from a crime may be liable for either their own actions, omissions, and state of mind (direct
liability) or their agent’s or employee’s (indirect or vicarious liability).
	H.G. v. Inter-Cont’l
Hotels Corp., 489 F. Supp. 3d 697, 704 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that they were victims of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589,
1590, and 1594.
	See K.L. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-3769, 2024 WL 1332225,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2024) (explaining that a plaintiff’s allegation of victimhood of a
crime under the TVPRA is enough to survive a motion to dismiss). 	They also allege that
Defendants either committed these crimes as perpetrators, (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 147, 153,
6
The language “or attempts or conspires to benefit” was not effective until January 2023, six years after the alleged
violations. Thus, the Court ignores this language in its analysis.
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159, 170), or benefited from the alleged crimes as performed “through [their] employees,”
(
Id. ¶¶ 145, 146, 148, 154, 161, 163, 165). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants benefited from
their employees’ actions both directly and indirectly. Each theory is assessed below.
A. Beneficiary Liability
To plead beneficiary liability, a plaintiff must allege that someone committed a crime
under the TVPRA, and that the person who committed the crime had some kind of
relationship with the defendants. In this case, Plaintiffs allege facts to support that Sanchez
violated §§ 1589(a), 1589(b), 1590(a), and 1594(a). 	Defendants do not contest these
allegations. 	They only argue that Defendants did not have the required relationship with
Sanchez to be held liable. This argument is the focus of the Court’s analysis.
1. Direct Liability
Under the civil remedy provision of the TVPRA, victims of a crime must allege (1)
that the defendants participated in the venture, (2) that the defendants knowingly benefited
or received something of value from their participation in the venture, and (3) that the
defendants knew or should have known that the venture committed crimes under the
TVPRA.
See Reyes-Trujillo v. Four Star Greenhouse, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 761, 793 (E.D.
Mich. 2021) (applying a similar test);
see also H.G., 2020 WL 5653304, at *4 (same).
(a) Participated in a Venture
Section 1595 does not define “participation in a venture.” 	Defendants argue that
“participation in a venture” under § 1595 should be read the same way as “participation in a
venture” under § 1591, which criminalizes sex-trafficking. In
United States v. Afyare, 632 F.
App’x 272 (6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth Circuit defined “participation in a venture” under §
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1591 to mean “that a defendant actually participate[d] and commit[ted] some ‘overt act’ that
further[ed] the sex trafficking aspect of the venture.”
Id. at 286. There are two key aspects
of this definition: (1) that participation requires a defendant to “engage[] is some aspect of”
the crime and (2) that the venture must be a venture to commit a specific crime.
Id. If this
definition applied to § 1595, Plaintiffs here would need to allege that Defendants overtly
acted to advance, or in an attempt to advance, a venture to obtain forced labor or traffic
laborers.
But unlike § 1591, “participation in a venture” under § 1595 is “liberally construed”
as part of a remedial scheme.
M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (citing
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54, 65 (1968)). And unlike § 1595, “participation” under § 1591 requires actual knowledge
or reckless disregard of the venture’s crimes.
Id. at 969-70. If “participation” were the same
under § 1595, it would undermine that section’s constructive knowledge element, which
creates liability when a beneficiary merely “should have known” about the venture’s crimes.
Id. at 970. 	Both circuit courts and most district courts facing this issue have declined to
import § 1591’s definition of “participation in a venture” into § 1595 for similar reasons.
See
Doe 	#1 	v. 	Red 	Roof 	Inns, 	Inc., 	21 	F.4th 	714, 	724-26 	(11th 	Cir. 	2021);
	G.G. 	v.
Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 553-54, 554 n.8 (7th Cir. 2023) (collecting cases);
see also
K.L., 2024 WL 1332225, at *4 (collecting cases).
Without a definition in § 1595, “participation in a venture” should be understood
according to its plain meaning.
See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427,
433-34 (2019) (supporting the use of dictionaries to determine the plain meaning of words
in a statute). In its plain-meaning analysis of the TVPRA, the Eleventh Circuit determined
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that defendants “participat[e] in a venture” when they participate, meaning “take part in or
share with others in common or in an association,” in a venture, meaning an “undertaking
or enterprise involving risk and potential profit.”
	Doe #1, 21 F.4th at 724 (citing 2019 and
1989 editions of Black’s Law Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary). In other words,
the venture “can be a commercial venture, like running or expanding a business.”
G.G., 76
F.4th 544, 554 (citation modified). This definition is consistent with others used by district
courts in the Sixth Circuit.
	See M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (requiring “at least a showing
of a continuous business relationship between the trafficker and the [beneficiaries] such that
it would appear that [they] have established a pattern of conduct or could be said to have a
tacit agreement”).
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants together ran a
business for the harvesting and sale of blueberries. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 50.) Specifically, they
allege that First Pick Farms Management, HB Hive, First Pick Farms, and Grow Blue Farms
all did business under the name “First Pick Farms.” (
Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 26-32.) Under that name,
those Defendants operated a farm that cultivated and harvested roughly 2,200 acres of
blueberries. 	(
Id. ¶ 23.) 	They marketed and sold blueberries while employing several
hundred workers. 	(
Id.) 	Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants hired Sanchez, who, as their
employee and agent, “obtained a labor force for the picking of the blueberry harvest.” (
Id.
¶ 92.)
In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that the fact that they alleged that Sanchez was
Defendants’ employee is enough to allege “participation in a venture.” Based on the plain-
meaning definition of that phrase, Plaintiffs seem to be right. 	But the Court declines to
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determine whether Sanchez was Defendants’ employee for the sake of this element because
it is not necessary.7
All that is required is that Defendants participated in the same venture
as Sanchez in running or operating the blueberry farm. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts
to infer that this was the case.
Still, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient because Sanchez
“initiated” the trafficking—not Defendants. 	(
Id. ¶ 92.) 	But Defendants’ reading of
“participation in the venture” is too narrow. 	Nowhere in the statute does it say that a
beneficiary must have started the trafficking. 	It is enough to allege that there was a
“continuous business relationship” between the beneficiary and the trafficker.
M.A., 425 F.
Supp. 3d at 970. And when the beneficiary provides “assistance, support, or facilitation” to
the trafficker through a “continuous business relationship,” a court may infer that there is a
“tacit agreement.”
	G.G., 76 F.4th at 559 (citing
M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 970-71). To that
end, Plaintiffs also allege that Sanchez enrolled them in the company payroll system and
supervised their work during the 2017 blueberry season. 	(
Id. ¶ 84.) 	Therefore, Plaintiffs
have met their burden with respect to “participation in a venture.”
(b) Knowingly Benefited or Received Something of Value
This element “merely requires that the defendant knowingly receive a financial
benefit.”
Reyes-Trujillo, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 793 (citation modified). A plaintiff only needs
to allege that the defendant was aware that it was benefiting in some way from its participation
7
Courts have held that “participation in a venture” is satisfied through all kinds of relationships.
E.g.,
G.G., 76 F.4th at
558 (holding that a consulting company participated in a venture with its client);
Reyes-Trujillo, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 793
(holding that a business participated in a venture with its labor contractor);
M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 969-70 (holding
that hotel franchisors and their franchisees participated in a venture with sex traffickers).
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in the venture.
G.G., 76 F.4th at 564. The venture itself does not need to come from profits
that are specific to the violation of the TVPRA.
Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to support this element with factual allegations.
They argue that Plaintiffs only alleged that Defendants benefited from Plaintiffs’ labor, not
that they benefited from participating in a forced labor venture. The Court already rejected
Defendants’ argument that a “venture” under § 1595 must be a venture to break the law.
There is nothing in the statute that requires more. So the only “venture” that matters for this
element is Defendants’ business in harvesting and selling blueberries. Plaintiffs’ work for the
Defendants was part of that venture. With that in mind, Plaintiffs also allege that
• 	Sanchez’s provision of labor benefited Defendants, (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 78);
• 	Defendants benefited from a larger workforce, (
Id. ¶ 93);
• 	Defendants benefited from Plaintiffs’ work, (
Id. ¶ 154);
• 	Defendants benefited by deducting rent from Plaintiffs’ wages, (
Id. ¶ 94); and
• 	Defendants benefited from charging workers for daily transportation, (
Id. ¶
96).
Given these allegations, Plaintiffs’ burden is satisfied.
(c) Knew or Should Have Known Venture Violated TVPRA
To state a claim under § 1595, a plaintiff must allege that the beneficiary of a venture’s
violation “knew or should have known” about that violation. 	Whenever a plaintiff must
allege knowledge, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 allows them to do so “generally.” But
the plaintiff must also “plead facts about the defendant’s mental state, which, accepted as
true, make the state-of-mind allegation plausible on its face.”
	Reyes-Trujillo, 513 F. Supp.
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3d at 794 n.21 (quoting
Katoula v. Detroit Ent., LLC, 557 F. App’x 496, 498 (6th Cir. 2014)).
So here, Plaintiffs must allege facts to show that Defendants had either actual knowledge
(“knew”) or constructive knowledge (“should have known”) about the venture’s violations of
the TVPRA.
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	Defendants 	had 	constructive 	knowledge 	of 	the 	venture’s
violations.8
Constructive knowledge is “knowledge that one using reasonable care or
diligence should have, and therefore that is attributable by law to a given person.”
Constructive Knowledge,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 	So under the TVPRA,
knowledge of a venture’s violation is attributable to a beneficiary when that beneficiary “acted
negligently or in reckless disregard of the venture’s violations.”
Reyes-Trujillo, 513 F. Supp.
3d at 793;
see also Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1177 (9th Cir. 2022)
(applying a negligence standard to “knew or should have known”). 	A beneficiary may act
negligently by “fail[ing] to implement policies sufficient to combat a known problem,” like
forced labor, within its operations.
M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 968.
A beneficiary’s constructive knowledge of any TVPRA violation must be tied to “the
particular venture in which [it] allegedly participated.”
	H.G., 489 F. Supp. 3d at 704-05
(emphasis omitted). 	The beneficiary’s “knowledge or willful blindness of a
general . . .
trafficking problem [across an industry]” is not enough.
S.J. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 473
F. Supp. 3d 147, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (emphasis added). At the same time, a beneficiary
8
Plaintiffs do not foreclose the possibility of actual knowledge.
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does not need to know the specific victim’s identity to be aware of the venture’s potential
TVPRA violations.
G.G., 76 F.4th at 556-58.
As described earlier, Plaintiffs allege facts sufficient to support an inference that
Defendants’ venture violated §§ 1589(a), 1590(a), and 1594(a). The question now is whether
Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support an inference that (1) the venture’s violations were
a “known problem” to Defendants, and (2) Defendants failed to implement policies
“sufficient to combat” the violations.
i. 	Forced Labor Violation (Perpetrator) – 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “should have known” that their venture obtained
forced labor in violation of § 1589(a). To support this claim, Plaintiffs must allege enough
facts to infer that forced labor in the venture was a “known problem” among the Defendants
and that Defendants failed to “implement policies sufficient to combat” the problem of
forced labor. 9
See M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 968.
Plaintiffs argue that their work schedule and housing conditions were signs of a forced
labor problem. “[L]ong hours” and “grueling work” can be signs of forced labor when paired
with “intentional[] inflict[ions] or threat[s]” of harm.
Salem v. Mich. State U., No. 1:19-CV-
220, 2021 WL 1381149, at *5-6 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2021). And while long hours do not
outright imply forced labor, courts have routinely found that laborers working in excess of
sixty hours per week may be compelled to do so as result of defendant’s threats.
	United
9
To show that a problem was a “known problem,” it is not necessary to allege that Defendants knew about every threat,
harm, abuse, scheme, plan, pattern, or use of force alleged by Plaintiff. Instead, § 1589(a) makes it a crime to employ
“any combination” of these methods, and § 1595 only requires that Defendants “should have known” about the venture’s
use of the combined methods when considered together.
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States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2014). Similarly, “squalid living conditions”
can also be a sign of forced labor when paired with “extreme isolation, threat[s] of legal
process, and violence.”
United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 620 (6th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiffs allege that their housing conditions were “substandard.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶
94.) Specifically, they allege that
• 	Plaintiffs shared a house with thirty other workers, (
Id. ¶ 69);
• 	Plaintiffs were not provided with any alternative housing options, (
Id. ¶ 113);
• 	Plaintiffs shared fewer than 1,500 square feet of floor space in an unfurnished
home that lacked beds, (
Id. ¶ 114);
• 	Two female workers shared the bedroom while twenty men slept on the floor,
(
Id.); and
• 	All thirty workers shared a single toilet and kitchen, (
Id.).
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	Defendants 	were 	aware 	that 	housing 	conditions 	were
“substandard.” They allege that
• 	Defendant Grow Blue Farms owns, operates, controls and/or contracts for
migrant housing in Van Buren, Oceana, Berrien, Kent, and Ottawa counties
in Michigan for its workforce, (
Id. ¶ 44);
• 	Defendants controlled Plaintiffs’ housing in Michigan, (
Id. ¶ 70); and
• 	Defendants sent an inspector, Scott Walker, to inspect Plaintiffs’ housing
conditions, (
Id. ¶ 71).
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In their response, Plaintiffs argue that the fact that Defendants hired Walker to
inspect Plaintiffs’ housing can support one of two inferences: either Walker “failed to report”
the conditions or, assuming he did report these conditions, Defendants “purposely ignored”
him. 	(Response 33, ECF No. 71; Response 34, ECF No. 72.) 	Both inferences are
reasonable, but the second one is most favorable to Plaintiffs, so the Court adopts that one.
Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs alleged Sanchez provided the housing,
Defendants were not liable to know about the substandard conditions. 	But Plaintiffs
provided other reasons in their complaint to allege a “known problem,” including Walker’s
inspections and Defendants’ control over the property.
In addition to Defendants’ knowledge of substandard housing, Plaintiffs also argue
that Defendants were aware of their “grueling” schedule. 	(Response 32, ECF No. 71;
Response 33, ECF No. 72.) Plaintiffs allege that they worked “for as many as twelve hours
per day without breaks, seven days per week.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) They also allege other
facts to support that Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs’ schedule, including that Defendants
“controlled all aspects of [Plaintiffs’] work, including wages [and] hours.” 	(
Id. ¶ 81.) 	And
Defendants “failed to include the number of hours worked by each Plaintiff in each paystub.”
(
Id. ¶ 132.) 	In their response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “purposely omitted” the
number of hours Plaintiffs had worked from their paystubs in an attempt to conceal long
hours. 	(Response 32, ECF No. 71; Response 33, ECF No. 72.) 	Defendants point out in
their reply that Plaintiffs did not allege any purposeful omission. But Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to support an inference that this was the case.
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Defendants also argue in their reply that because Plaintiffs alleged that HB Hive
administered paychecks, then other Defendants cannot be liable for knowing about the long
hours Plaintiffs worked. But there are other allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint to support an
inference that all Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs’ long hours.
Taken together, Plaintiffs’ allegations of long hours and poor living conditions are
enough to support a reasonable inference that forced labor was a “known problem” to
Defendants. 	The next question is whether Defendants failed to “implement policies
sufficient to combat” this problem.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ hiring policies were not sufficient to prevent the
hiring of a supervisor like Sanchez, who has a “history of labor violations for which he was
sanctioned by federal authorities.” (
Id. ¶ 76.) 	Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ policy
of screening its workers failed to prevent those compelled to work from other countries from
using fake identities. Plaintiffs allege that Sanchez provided them with fake identities before
bringing them to Michigan. 	(
Id. ¶ 59.) 	When they arrived in Michigan, Defendants’
administrative staff used the fake identities to complete the workers’ employment forms. (
Id.
¶ 117.) 	If the administrative staff rejected a fake identity, then Defendants allowed the
workers to meet with Sanchez for another fake identity and to try again. (
Id. ¶ 118.) Plaintiffs
argue that this amounts to a policy by Defendants that allowed workers to bypass their own
screening system, permitting forced labor in the process.
In response to Plaintiffs’ arguments, Defendants invoke
Iqbal to argue that these
alleged failures to implement a policy “are ‘merely consistent with’” their liability and “stop[]
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
See Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 678. It is true that Defendants’ alleged failures to implement a policy are consistent
with liability under the TVPRA. 	But the facts alleged also create more than a “sheer
possibility” that Defendants “acted unlawfully.”
	See id. 	This is especially true given that
Plaintiffs’ allegations about Defendants’ screening process amount to a separate crime under
the TVPRA.10
In light of this unlawful behavior, Plaintiffs have satisfied their pleading
burden with respect to Defendants’ knowledge of the venture’s violation of § 1589(a).
ii. 	Forced Labor Violation (Beneficiary) – 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b)
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants should have known of a forced labor violation
as it pertains to § 1589(b). The language in § 1589(b) mirrors the language in § 1595(a) for
beneficiary liability, requiring a “knowing benefit” and “participation in a venture.” 	But
§ 1589(b) requires “providing or obtaining of labor or services by any means described in
[§ 1589(a)]” instead of “an act in violation of this chapter” under § 1595. More importantly,
§ 1589(b) also has a higher knowledge requirement (“knowing or in reckless disregard”) than
§ 1595(a), which requires at least negligence.
It does not make sense to read §§ 1595(a) and 1589(b) together literally.11
And if the
Court were to give full effect to Congress’s inclusion of the lesser knowledge requirement of
negligence in § 1595(a), the analysis of direct beneficiary liability under § 1589(b) would
functionally be the same as the analysis of direct beneficiary liability under § 1589(a). 	For
10
Section 1592(a) outlaws the knowing destruction, concealment, removal, confiscation, or possession of another
person’s passport, immigration document, or government identification while in the course of a violation of § 1589.
11
Reading these sections together would require a plaintiff to allege that a defendant participated in a venture, knowingly
benefited from its participation, and that the defendant should have known that the venture itself participated in a
venture, which knowingly benefited the first venture and violated § 1589(a), and the first venture knew or recklessly
disregarded that fact.
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that reason, the Court declines to perform a separate analysis of § 1589(b) under a theory of
direct beneficiary liability.12
The Court will address claims relating to violations of § 1589(b)
under the theory of perpetrator liability in this case instead.
iii. 	Trafficking Violation – 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a)
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants should have known that the venture violated
§ 1590, which deals with trafficking. 	Defendants argue that Plaintiffs only alleged legal
conclusions and failed to allege facts as to this claim. But as described earlier, Plaintiffs allege
sufficient facts to show that Defendants should have known that the venture at least harbored
Plaintiffs in violation of § 1589(a) by providing them with housing. Thus, Plaintiffs’ burden
is met with respect to § 1590.
iv. 	Attempted Violation – 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a)
Under § 1594(a), “[w]hoever attempts to violate section[s] . . . 1589 [or] 1590 . . . shall
be punishable in the same manner as a completed violation of that section.” The question
is whether Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support an inference that Defendants should
have known that the venture attempted to violate the forced labor provision or trafficking
provision.
“Criminal attempt” requires defendants to act with an intent to commit the underlying
crime and to take a “substantial step” toward the completion of that crime.
See, e.g.,
United
States v. Brown, 125 F.4th 1043 (11th Cir. 2025);
United States v. Larive, 794 F.3d 1016 (8th
Cir. 2015);
United States v. Ferguson, 65 F.4th 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2023). But when courts
12
The Court also declines to analyze § 1589(b) under a theory of indirect beneficiary liability. Because Plaintiffs allege
a venture between Defendants and Sanchez where Sanchez himself also violated § 1589(a), this analysis would be mostly
repetitive of Plaintiffs’ § 1589(a) claim under direct beneficiary liability.
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apply “attempt” in a civil case as part of a claim under § 1595(a), they do so in a broader
sense, in particular when a plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to show that a defendant is liable
to coerce a plaintiff even if they are unsuccessful in doing so.
	See Saraswat v. Jayaraman,
No. 15-CV-4680 (PKC) (LB), 2016 WL 5408115, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (noting
that the plaintiff alleged at least enough facts to show that the defendant tried to force him to
work even if the plaintiff had not in fact “labored”). This application is more fitting with a
plain-language understanding of “attempt” as an “act or an instance of making an effort to
accomplish something, especially without success,”
Attempt,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th
ed. 2024), or “to make an effort, to try,”
Attempt,
Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989).
As discussed above, Plaintiffs successfully alleged that Defendants should have known
that the venture violated §§ 1589(a) and 1590(a). 	In doing so, they have also successfully
alleged facts to support a conclusion that Defendants should have known that the venture at
least attempted to violate the forced labor provision.
2. Indirect Liability
“A plaintiff can also satisfy the elements of § 1595’s beneficiary theory by imputing
‘to the defendant the acts, omissions, and state of mind of an agent of the defendant’ through
indirect or vicarious liability.”
K.L., 2024 WL 1332225, at *8 (quoting
J.L. v. Best W. Int’l,
Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1060 (D. Colo. 2021)). 	Because the TVPRA itself does not
address indirect liability, courts have used the common law to fill in the gaps.
	K.L., 2024
WL 1332225, at *8 (collecting cases).
Under the common law, there are at least two ways that courts can impute an
employee’s acts, omissions, or state of mind to their employer. 	One is through the
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defendant’s status as a joint or single employer.
M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 972. The other is
through defendant’s status as a principal of the agent.
Id. at 971.
Courts typically draw on the federal common law to assess a defendant’s status as a
joint or single employer. This makes sense given the need for uniform federal standards and
the risk that state law could frustrate the TVPRA’s objectives. For these reasons, the Court
chooses to apply the federal common law with reference to federal rules to determine
Defendants’ status as Sanchez’s single employer and principal.
As mentioned earlier, Plaintiffs allege facts sufficient to support an inference that
Sanchez violated §§ 1589(a), 1589(b), 1590(a), and 1594(a) as part of a venture with
Defendants.13
Plaintiffs now argue that Sanchez was an agent of Defendants, and his “acts,
omissions, or state of mind” for violations of each statute can be imputed to them. The basis
of Plaintiffs’ theories are assessed below.
(a) Single-Employer Status
Both the single- and joint-employer tests may treat “an entity that is not the plaintiff’s
formal employer . . . as if it were the employer.”
Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor,
Inc., 449 F. App’x 488, 491 (6th Cir. 2011). 	While the joint-employer test maintains the
independence of each employing entity, the single-employer test allows a plaintiff to treat
“two nominally separate entities” as “part of a single integrated enterprise.”
Arculeo v. On-
Site Sales & Mktg., LLC, 425 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). The single-employer test is so
broad 	as 	to 	treat 	“parent 	and 	wholly-owned 	subsidiary 	corporations” 	or 	“separate
13
For the reasons described in footnote 12, the Court declines to analyze whether Sanchez’s alleged violation of § 1589(b)
can be imputed to Defendants.
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corporations under common ownership and management” as part of a single, integrated
enterprise.
Id.
Many courts apply the joint-employment test in TVPRA cases to assess whether the
knowledge, actions, or omissions of a franchisee’s employees can be imputed to the
franchisor.
	E.g.,
K.L., 2024 WL 1332225, at *9;
B.D.G. v. Choice Hotels Int’l,
Inc., No.
2:22-CV-3202, 2023 WL 5935646, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2023). Unlike those cases, it
is unclear here which Defendant was Sanchez’s formal employer. 	To resolve this issue,
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are a single employer.14
To allege that Defendants were a single employer of Sanchez, Plaintiffs must allege
facts sufficient to show the following four factors: “(1) interrelation of operations,
i.e.,
common offices, common record keeping, shared bank accounts and equipment; (2)
common management, common directors and boards; (3) centralized control of labor
relations and personnel; and (4) common ownership and financial control.”
	Swallows v.
Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1997). “None of these factors
is conclusive, and all four need not be met in every case.”
Id. Control over labor relations
among each entity “is a central concern.”
Id.
With respect to Defendants’ “interrelation of operations,” Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants shared an office at 14786 Winans St. in West Olive, Michigan. (2d Am. Compl.
¶¶ 25, 30, 33, 34, 36, 39, 43.) They also allege that all four Defendants in 2017 did business
14
Plaintiffs’ response does not specify who—Sanchez or Plaintiffs—Defendants are a single employer of. This is likely
because Plaintiffs wanted to justify treating all Defendants as a single employer for the purposes of both their TVPRA
and AWPA claims. The Court already rejected this argument for the reasons listed in footnote 4. At any rate, it only
makes sense under the TVPRA to analyze Sanchez as Defendants’ employee, which is what the Court does here.
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under the name “First Pick Farms.” 	(
Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 30, 32.) 	And under that name,
Defendants marketed and sold blueberries and operated a packing facility. (
Id. ¶ 23.)
Plaintiffs also allege facts to support that Defendants shared common ownership,
management, directors, and boards. 	In particular, they allege that Defendants “share the
same officers and directors, including Registered Agent Jennifer Crawford and President
Scott Nagelvoort.” (
Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiffs also allege that all four Defendants are owned—either
directly or indirectly—by Tom Mitchell. (
Id. ¶ 31, 37.)
Lastly, Plaintiffs allege facts to support that Defendants exercised central control over
Sanchez. 	They allege that Defendants, while all operating under the name “First Pick
Farms,” employed several hundred workers, including Sanchez. 	(
Id. ¶ 4, 23.) 	They also
allege that Defendants “directed” Sanchez to hire and transport part of its workforce to
Michigan, (
Id. ¶ 73), and that Defendants paid Sanchez directly, (
Id. ¶ 77). Most importantly,
they allege that Defendants determined Sanchez’s “wages, hours, and discipline.” (
Id. ¶ 21.)
Taking these factors together, Plaintiffs have alleged enough facts to support a theory
that Defendants acted as a single employer of Sanchez.
(b) Principal-Agent Status
For the reasons mentioned earlier, the Court will apply the federal common law’s test
to determine Defendants’ status as a principal to Sanchez’s role as an agent. This approach
is consistent with other courts in TVPRA cases.
	See K.L., 2024 WL 1332225, at *8. The
federal common law’s test is similar to the standard under Michigan law, so it is likely the
decision to apply federal law will not make much of a difference here.
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Federal law holds a principal to account for its agent’s actions when that agent acts
with actual authority. An agent acts with actual authority when “at the time of taking action
that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance
with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”
Keating v. Peterson’s Nelnet, LLC, 615 F. App’x 365, 373 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01 (A.L.I. 2006)).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “hired and supervised Sanchez during the 2017
blueberry season” to “act as a recruiter and field supervisor.” 	(2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75-76.)
In their response, Plaintiffs argue that Sanchez’s decision to traffic workers from North
Carolina to Michigan was consistent with Defendants’ orders to recruit workers. Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants authorized Sanchez to do anything that
would violate the forced labor or trafficking provisions of the TVPRA. But Plaintiffs do not
need to allege this kind of authority; they only need to allege facts to support that Sanchez
had a reasonable belief that the Defendants wished him to act in the ways he did. Taking all
of Plaintiffs’ allegations together, they have satisfied this threshold.
B. Perpetrator Liability
Unlike Plaintiffs’ claims under beneficiary liability, perpetrator liability requires
Plaintiffs to allege sufficient facts to support actual, direct violations of the TVPRA’s criminal
sections by Defendants—independent of Sanchez. Each violation is considered in turn.
1. Forced Labor Violation (Perpetrator) – 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)
To establish the
actus reus for a violation of § 1589(a), a plaintiff must allege that a
defendant “obtained or provided labor or services” through at least one of the methods
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enumerated in the statute. To satisfy the
mens rea requirement, a plaintiff must allege that
the providing or obtaining of forced labor was done “knowingly.” 	This “element requires
proof that the defendant knew (1) that the enumerated ‘circumstance existed’ and (2) that
the defendant was obtaining the labor in question as a result.”
Martinez-Rodriguez v. Giles,
31 F.4th 1139, 1156 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing
United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 711 (7th
Cir. 2008)).
In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting an
inference that Defendants had actual knowledge of Sanchez’s use of the prohibited methods
under the statute. 	Specifically, they argue that they were never notified, informed, or
overheard of any alleged threats made by Sanchez.
Defendants are right. 	Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support an inference that
Defendants knew that any of the alleged circumstances under § 1589(a) existed. 	In their
complaint, Plaintiffs allege that 	Defendants 	knew about 	their grueling schedule and
substandard housing. And although Defendants’ knowledge of these problems supports an
inference that Defendants should have known of a potential violation for the purposes of
beneficiary liability, these facts do not support an inference that Defendants had actual
knowledge for the purposes of perpetrator liability. In addition, it is unclear from Plaintiffs
which method enumerated under the statute—if any—Defendants are alleged to have
committed independent of their relationship with Sanchez, so the
actus reus is also not
satisfied. Thus, Defendants’ motion is granted with respect to this claim under this theory
of liability.
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2. Forced Labor Violation (Beneficiary) – 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b)
Similar to § 1595(a), a defendant violates § 1589(b) when they “knowingly benefit”
from “participation in a venture” and that venture violates the TVPRA, specifically § 1589(a).
These three elements are at least interpreted as consistent with the requirements of § 1595(a).
See Gilbert v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 423 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (D. Colo. 2019). 	But unlike
§ 1595(a), a defendant must at least
recklessly disregard the venture’s violation. 	In other
words, constructive knowledge is not enough. Defendants argue—without elaboration—that
Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support an inference that Defendants recklessly disregarded
the venture’s violation of subsection (a).
In the direct beneficiary analysis above, the Court concluded that Defendants were
negligent with respect to the venture’s violations of § 1589(a) because there was a known
forced labor problem and Defendants failed to implement sufficient policies to combat the
problem. 	But is this enough to say that Defendants at least recklessly disregarded the
venture’s violation of § 1589(a)?
Whether a defendant recklessly disregarded a venture’s violation depends on them
“ignor[ing]” it or “treat[ing]” it “without proper respect and consideration.”
	Disregard,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 	Courts analyzing whether Defendants had
knowledge or were in reckless disregard of a venture’s violations tend to require that a
defendant was aware of the venture’s actual violations and chose to do nothing about it. For
instance, in one case, the plaintiff, Ricchio, alleged that a hotel-owning couple, the Patels,
actually saw a member of their venture, McLean, violate § 1589(a). 	The Patels chose to
ignore these violations:
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McLean and Mr. Patel enthusiastically expressed this intent by exchanging
high-fives in the motel’s parking lot while speaking about “getting this thing
going again,” in circumstances in which McLean’s coercive and abusive
treatment of Ricchio as a sex slave had become apparent to the Patels. Ms.
Patel had not only nonchalantly ignored Ricchio’s plea for help in escaping
from McLean’s custody at the motel but, when visiting the rented quarters to
demand further payment, had shown indifference to Ricchio’s obvious
physical deterioration. And in plain daylight view of the front office of the
motel, either of the Patels on duty there would have seen McLean grab
Ricchio, kick her, and force her back toward the rented quarters when she had
tried to escape.
Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that the defendants were “at
the least, in reckless disregard”). In another case, a court inferred that a defendant had actual
knowledge of a venture’s violations for similar reasons as the Patels. There, the defendant
had “general knowledge” of the venture’s violations as well as a role overseeing health and
safety issues in the venture’s labor supply chain.
	F.C. v. Jacobs Sols. Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d
1158, 1193-94 (D. Colo. 2025). Given these two examples, it is difficult to determine where
reckless disregard ends and actual knowledge begins. But in this case, it is enough to say that
Defendants must be at least aware of the venture’s actual violations and fail to do anything
about it.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that they had a grueling schedule and poor housing conditions.
They also argue that Defendants’ decision to hire Sanchez was in reckless disregard of his
past labor violations. While these may be enough for constructive knowledge, Plaintiffs do
not allege sufficient facts to infer that Defendants were acting in reckless disregard for the
venture’s violations. As a result, this claim fails with respect to perpetrator liability.
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3. Trafficking Violation – 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a)
Section 1590 requires that a defendant “knowingly” recruit, harbor, transport,
provide, or obtain labor or services in violation of this chapter. 	Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants—independent of Sanchez—at least harbored and obtained Plaintiffs’ labor. But
Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to support an inference that Defendants did so knowing
that it violated another part of the TVPRA. And so this claim under a theory of perpetrator
liability is dismissed.
4. Attempted Violation – 18 U.S.C. §1594(a)
The Court previously examined whether Defendants should have known that the
venture violated § 1594(a) when it attempted to violate §§ 1589 and 1590. 	But under
perpetrator liability, the question is whether Defendants independently attempted to violate
§§ 1589 or 1590. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not establish an attempt to violate any
section of the TVPRA.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated the TVPRA when they gave
license to their agents, both Sanchez and Scott Walker, to “facilitate housing [their]
workforce in particularly egregious housing.” 	(Response 39, ECF No. 72.) 	Plaintiffs are
confused about what is required under perpetrator liability and indirect beneficiary liability.
This confusion is understandable because if an agent or employee’s knowledge, actions, and
omissions can be attributed to a defendant, then that defendant may be liable for any crime
that the employee or agent commits. But the difference under perpetrator liability is that the
agent or employee’s actions are not considered at all.
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Regardless of that confusion, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were Sanchez’s
employer, that Sanchez moved Plaintiffs to Michigan to work on Defendants’ farm, and that
Defendants provided Plaintiffs with housing. These facts together are enough to infer that
Defendants attempted to obtain forced labor as described under § 1589(a) and harbored
forced laborers as part of that attempt in violation of § 1590(a). Thus, this claim also survives
at this stage under a theory of perpetrator liability.
VI. MIGRANT AND SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS PROTECTION
ACT (AWPA)
The AWPA’s purpose is to “assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal
agricultural 	workers.” 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1801. 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	that 	Defendants
misrepresented the terms and conditions of their employment under § 1821(f), failed to
disclose the terms of employment under § 1821(a)(1-7), failed to keep records under §
1821(d), failed to comply with the transportation requirements of § 1841(b)(1), did not pay
all wages when due under § 1822(a), did not comply with housing requirements under §
1823, violated the posting requirements of § 1821(b), and did not comply with the terms of
the working arrangement as described under § 1822.
Defendants do not challenge whether Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support these
causes of action. 	Instead, they argue that Plaintiffs do not qualify for AWPA protections
because they were part of the H-2A visa program. And even if Plaintiffs did qualify for these
protections, they argue, Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants were
their joint employers. Each question is considered in turn.
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A. Plaintiffs’ Status as “Migrant Agricultural Workers”
The AWPA protections cover migrant agricultural workers.
	See id. §§ 1821-23,
1841-44. 	The statute defines these workers as “individual[s] who [are] employed in
agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature, and who [are] required to
be absent overnight from [their] permanent place of residence.”
	Id. § 1802(8)(A). 	This
definition explicitly excludes “any temporary nonimmigrant alien who is authorized to work
in agricultural employment in the United States under sections 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a),” which
is also known as the H-2A program.
Id. § 1802(8)(B)(3);
see also Montize v. Pittman Props.
Ltd. Partn. No. 1, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (W.D. Ark. 2010).
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they entered the United
States from their permanent residence of Mexico as part of the H-2A program to work in
North Carolina. 	(2d Am. Compl ¶ 18.) 	Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ status as H-2A
workers excludes them from AWPA’s protections. 	Plaintiffs argue that their H-2A status
expired when they left for Michigan. 	They also allege that they violated their H-2A
agreement when they left their old employer in North Carolina. (
Id. ¶ 87.) But Defendants
say that Plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts to explain how their H-2A status could have
expired.
Whether a worker falls under an exception to the AWPA’s definition of “migrant
agricultural worker” is an affirmative defense, and as a result, it is Defendants’ burden to
demonstrate that the H-2A exception applies.
See Soliz v. Plunkett, 615 F.2d 272, 275 (5th
Cir. 1980). An H-2A worker is considered to have “abandoned” their job after they “fail[]
to report to work at the regularly scheduled time for 5 consecutive working days without the
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consent of the employer.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(n)(3). Plaintiffs here have alleged that they
left North Carolina for more than five days. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that their H-2A
status expired, and the AWPA protections applied to them while in Michigan.
	See Reyes-
Trujillo, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 790 n.18. Defendants do not allege facts to support an inference
otherwise.
B. Defendants’ Status as Joint Employers
Under the AWPA, whether a worker is “employed” by an entity is assessed the same
way as whether a worker is “employed” by an entity under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(5).
The FLSA defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit to work.”
	Id. at § 203(g). The FLSA
defines “employer” as including “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee.”
Id. at § 203(d). This definition is broader than how
it “would be interpreted in traditional common law applications” given “[t]he remedial
purposes of the FLSA.”
	Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.
1991) (quoting
McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)).
Indeed, the definition of employer defies “common law categories” and “classifications
under other statutes.”
	Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, 689 F.3d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting
Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 528 (1950)).
Given the FLSA’s broad definition of “employer,” courts have interpreted the statute
to also include joint employers. Under the AWPA regulation, “joint employment” is defined
as “a condition in which a single individual stands in the relation of an employee to two or
more persons at the same time.” 	29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5). 	The question of joint
employment under the AWPA is determined by answering whether multiple employers are
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“completely disassociated.”
	Id. 	Again, the AWPA defines “joint employment” with
reference to how the term is applied in FLSA cases. 	And “[a]ny factor” under the FLSA
“that is relevant to whether an entity is an employer is also relevant to whether the entity is a
joint employer.”
Reyes-Trujillo, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
The factors applied by the Sixth Circuit in FLSA cases are meant to determine the
“economic reality” of the worker’s arrangement, setting aside any labels that the employers
themselves use.
Acosta v. Off Duty Police Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 2019).
To that end, a court must examine:
(1) the permanency of the relationship between the parties;
(2) the degree of skill required for the rendering of the services;
(3) the worker’s investment in equipment or materials for the task;
(4) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, depending upon his skill;
(5) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which
the work is performed; and
(6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s
business.
Id. (citation modified). 	The Sixth Circuit has also considered “whether the business had
‘authority to hire or fire the plaintiff,’ and whether the defendant-company ‘maintains the
plaintiff’s employment records.’”
Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 807 (6th
Cir. 2015). “None of these factors is determinative on its own, and each must be considered
‘with an eye toward the ultimate question—[the worker’s] economic dependence on or
independence from’ the alleged employer.”
Acosta, 915 F.3d at 1055.
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In addition to the Sixth Circuit’s FLSA factors, the AWPA regulations also include a
separate but overlapping set of considerations. Like the FLSA factors, the ultimate question
of employment under AWPA is determined by economic reality—“whether the worker is so
economically dependent upon the agricultural employer/association as to be considered its
employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iii). To determine “economic reality” the regulation
guides courts to consider:
(A) Whether the agricultural employer . . . has the power, either alone or
through control of the farm labor contractor to direct, control, or supervise the
worker(s) or the work performed . . . ;
(B) Whether the agricultural employer . . . has the power, either alone or in
addition to another employer, directly or indirectly, to hire or fire, modify the
employment conditions, or determine the pay rates or the methods of wage
payment for the worker(s);
(C) The degree of permanency and duration of the relationship of the parties,
in the context of the agricultural activity at issue;
(D) The extent to which the services rendered by the worker(s) are repetitive,
rote tasks requiring skills which are acquired with relatively little training;
(E) Whether the activities performed by the worker(s) are an integral part of
the overall business operation of the agricultural employer/association;
(F) Whether the work is performed on the agricultural employer/association’s
premises, rather than on premises owned or controlled by another business
entity; and
(G) Whether the agricultural employer/association undertakes responsibilities
in relation to the worker(s) which are commonly performed by employers,
such as preparing and/or making payroll records, preparing and/or issuing pay
checks, paying FICA taxes, providing workers’ compensation insurance,
providing field sanitation facilities, housing or transportation, or providing
tools and equipment or materials required for the job (taking into account the
amount of the investment).
Id. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv). 	Like the FLSA factors, the AWPA regulation factors are also not
exhaustive.
	See Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1997). No single factor
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is dispositive, and not all factors—or even most factors—need to be found for a joint
employment relationship to exist.
	Id. 	The Court considers both the FLSA factors as
described in
Acosta and the AWPA regulation factors below.
1. The FLSA Factors
(a) Permanency of the Relationship
This factor considers the “length and regularity of the working relationship between
the parties.”
Keller, 781 F.3d at 807. “[E]ven short, exclusive relationships” may satisfy this
factor.
Id. For example, in agricultural harvesting, “an exclusive season-long relationship is
indicative of permanency.”
Perez v. Howes, 7 F. Supp. 3d 715, 723 (W.D. Mich. 2014).
Plaintiffs allege that they worked for Defendants for the duration of the blueberry
season. 	Specifically, they allege that they started picking blueberries in June 2017, and
Plaintiff Guzman continued through August 2017 while Plaintiff Velasco continued through
September 2017. 	(2d Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) 	They worked twelve-hour days and seven-day
weeks. (
Id. ¶ 90.) Plaintiffs do not specify whether this work was their only source of income,
but given such a demanding schedule, they are entitled to the inference that it was. 	Thus,
this factor weighs in favor of joint employment.
(b) Degree of Skill Required
The question here is whether Defendants’ profits increased because of Plaintiffs’
“initiative or foresight” or whether Plaintiffs’ work was “more like piecework.”
	Keller, 781
F.3d at 809. 	This question is answered “with reference to the task[s] being performed.”
Acosta, 915 F.3d at 1055. Plaintiffs harvested blueberries for Defendants. They were paid
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according to the weight of the berries they picked, which is piecework. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶
124-25.) Thus, this factor weighs in favor of joint employment.
(c) Workers’ Investment in Equipment or Materials
“[C]ourts must compare the worker’s investment in the equipment to perform his job
with the company’s total investment, including office rental space, advertising, software,
phone systems, or insurance.”
	Keller, 781 F.3d at 810. 	Plaintiffs do not allege that they
invested anything into Defendants’ business. Instead, they allege that Defendants “provided
all equipment, such as buckets for the workers, bins for the weighed blueberries, and weigh
stations.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 122.) Without an affirmative allegation that Plaintiffs did not
themselves invest any of their own capital into a business, this factor does not weigh for or
against joint employment.
(d) Workers’ Opportunity for Profit or Loss
This factor measures the extent that a worker’s opportunity for profit depends on
their managerial or technical skills.
	Acosta, 915 F.3d at 1059. In other words, if a worker
further “hone[d] their managerial skill,” would it lead to greater pay?
Id. The answer here
is no. As mentioned above, Plaintiffs were paid according to the weight of the blueberries
they picked, not their managerial or technical skill. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of joint
employment.
(e) Employers’ Right to Control the Manner in Which the Work is
Performed
What matters for this factor is “whether the company ‘retains the right to dictate the
manner’ of the worker’s performance.”
	Acosta, 915 F.3d at 1060. 	Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants “assigned [them] and the other blueberry workers their work schedules including
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their stop and start times.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 123.) They allege that Defendants told them
which crop to harvest, which row to work in, and which specific tasks they would complete.
(
Id. ¶ 121.) Defendants’ employee, Sanchez, also supervised their work. (
Id. ¶ 57.) In light
of these circumstances, this factor weighs in favor of joint employment.
(f) Service is Rendered as an Integral Part of the Employers’ Business
“The more integral the worker’s services are to the business, then the more likely it
is that the parties have an employer-employee relationship.”
	Keller, 781 F.3d at 815.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants operate a blueberry farm and that Plaintiffs picked
blueberries on that farm. Defendants’ business could not function without the services that
Plaintiffs provided.
	See Acosta, 915 F.3d at 1055. This factor thus weighs in favor of joint
employment.
(g) Balancing the Factors
Five of the factors weigh in favor of joint employment while one is neutral. 	Thus,
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support that Defendants were their joint employers.
2. The AWPA Regulation Factors
The analysis of the AWPA regulation factors is less difficult because Defendants were
Plaintiffs’ joint employers under the FLSA. 	As mentioned above, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants supervised and instructed Plaintiffs in doing their work. 	They allege that
Defendants determined their pay rate based on the weight of the berries picked. They allege
facts sufficient to show that they had a sufficiently permanent relationship with Defendants
in the context of their agricultural work. 	The job they were paid to do—pick blueberries—
was repetitive and did not require much skill. Their job was integral to Defendants’ business.
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Plaintiffs allege that they worked on a farm that was operated by Defendants. And they allege
that Defendants completed Plaintiffs’ paperwork using false identities, provided Plaintiffs
housing, transportation, tools, and equipment required to do their job.
Considering 	both 	the 	FLSA 	test 	and 	the 	AWPA 	regulations 	regarding 	joint
employment together, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendants were
their joint employers for the sake of the AWPA. 	Thus, their AWPA claims survive
dismissal.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’
motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 64, 67).
All claims against Defendants Grow Blue Farms Hourly and Grow Blue Farms Salary
will be dismissed. 	Plaintiffs’ Count II for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) against all
remaining Defendants will be dismissed.
The Court will enter an order in accordance with this Opinion.
Dated: January 2, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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