Smith #225908 v. Bush et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN ROBERT SMITH,
Case No. 1:23-cv-579
Plaintiff,
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v.
JEREMY BUSH and
RANDEE REWERTS,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff John Robert Smith is a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department
of Corrections (MDOC). Plaintiff filed this prisoner civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The alleged incidents occurred at the MDOC’s Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF).
Plaintiff sued Randee Rewerts, DRF’s warden, and Jeremy Bush, the Deputy Director of the
MDOC’s Correctional Facilities Administration (CFA) in their official and personal capacities.
The Court dismissed Warden Rewerts. This matter is now before the Court on Deputy Director
Bush’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 33).
I. 	Procedural background
After conducting the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, this
Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). 	See Opinion (ECF No. 5); Judgment (ECF No. 6).
Plaintiff appealed. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the
case. 	See Smith v. Bush, No. 23-1644 (Judgment) (6th Cir. Jan. 19, 2024) (ECF No. 12). 	The
Sixth Circuit summarized plaintiff’s claims as follows:
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 1
of 11

2
Smith alleged that, after the zipper on his state-issued winter coat broke, he
exchanged that coat for a new one on October 19, 2022. According to Smith, the
new winter coat, unlike his old coat, “lacked an outer shell that would afford the
minimum protection from the cold, rain and wind.” Smith further alleged that, from
October 2022 through April 2023, Carson City “experience[d] weather consisting
of extreme cold temperatures, freezing rain and high winds”; that “the new coats
did 	not 	afford 	the 	minimum 	protection 	from 	those 	days 	of 	extreme 	cold
temperatures, freezing rain and high winds”; and that he “was forced to stand in the
extreme cold temperature[s], freezing rain and high winds for long periods of time
(15-30 minutes) because of having mandatory daily callouts to the medication lines
as well as other activities that required [him] to be outside” for meal lines and
recreation time.
Beginning in October 2022, Smith sent letters complaining about the new
winter coats to Warden Rewerts and Deputy Director Bush and then filed a
grievance against them, which was rejected. Warden Rewerts later responded to
Smith, writing that “winter coats can be purchased thru approved vendors” and that
he had “reached out to MSI [Michigan State Industries] superintendent regarding
the matter [and] was informed the winter coats are created [and] approved
according to MDOC specification.” After appealing the rejection of his grievance
through Step III of the grievance process, Smith sent another letter to Deputy
Director Bush about the allegedly inadequate new winter coats. Smith then filed
another grievance against Deputy Director Bush as “the sole person responsible for
determining the material used in all clothing manufactured by MSI, and MSI being
the sole provider of state issued MSI winter coats to inmates housed by the
MDOC.” This grievance was also rejected.
According to Smith, Deputy Director Bush and Warden Rewerts were “both
aware of the need for a more suitable new coat to be issued to inmates housed by
the MDOC” and had “chosen purposefully to ignore the deficiency of the new coat
. . . by directing MSI to manufacture an inferior winter coat to be issued to
inmate[s], while allowing MSI to manufacture and sell a winter coat, that is
adequate for the severe Michigan winter, to inmates.” Smith claimed that “the
inadequacy of the new coat is such that it disregards basic human decency thereby
violating [his] right to be free from the unnecessary infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment as an incarcerated person.”
Smith, No. 23-1644 (Order) (Jan. 19, 2024) (ECF No. 11, PageID.55-56).
The Sixth Circuit addressed plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims in relevant part
as follows:
The 	Eighth 	Amendment’s 	prohibition 	against 	“cruel 	and 	unusual
punishments” imposes a duty on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of
confinement”—that is, “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 2
of 11

3
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). “A prison official’s
‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates
the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828. A deliberate-indifference claim under the
Eighth Amendment “includes both an objective and subjective prong.” Wilson v.
Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 2020). “First, the deprivation alleged must
be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’; a prison official’s act or omission must result
in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834 (first quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); and then
quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). With respect to the
subjective prong, a prison official cannot be held liable “under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at
837.
On the objective prong, Smith alleged that the new state-issued winter coats
“lacked an outer shell that would afford the minimum protection from the cold, rain
and wind”; that he was forced to stand outside in extreme weather conditions for
long periods of time; and that his new coat was inadequate to protect him from these
conditions.
The magistrate judge determined that Smith’s allegations merely suggested
“the usual discomforts of winter” and were therefore insufficient to rise to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation. To be sure, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience
a 	prisoner 	might 	endure 	while 	incarcerated 	constitutes 	cruel 	and 	unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832
F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987). But “exposure to Michigan winters without adequate
clothing can obviously inflict pain,” Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012-13 (6th
Cir. 1992), and such conditions can rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment,
see id; see also Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated
on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); cf. Gordon v. Faber, 973
F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming an Eighth Amendment violation where prison
official forced inmates outside in subfreezing temperatures and refused to provide
hats and gloves). It is reasonable to infer that a coat lacking an outer shell is likely
to permit water and wind to penetrate through to the wearer’s skin, and that
combining that wetness and wind with northern Michigan’s “extreme cold” for up
to 30 minutes at a time presents a risk of physical harm beyond mere inconvenience.
That said, Smith’s complaint is at least “plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Id. at PageID.56-57. The court concluded “construed liberally and accepted as true . . . Smith’s
allegations satisfy the objective component at this early stage.” Id. at PageID.58.
The court continued:
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 3
of 11

4
Smith also alleged facts satisfying the subjective component—that the
defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Smith alleged that the
defendants were aware that the new coats were inadequate to protect inmates from
the severe Michigan winters and chose to ignore the new coats’ deficiencies.
According to Smith, the defendants “direct[ed] MSI to manufacture an inferior
winter coat to be issued to inmate[s], while allowing MSI to manufacture and sell”
a more suitable winter coat to inmates.
The magistrate judge determined that the defendants could not be held liable
under § 1983 for their handling of Smith’s grievances or for the actions of their
subordinates. But Smith based his complaint on the defendants’ own actions in
making decisions involving the manufacture and distribution of state-issued prison
clothing. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”); see, e.g., R.1 at 6 (alleging that Deputy Director Bush
“is the sole person responsible for determining the material used in all clothing
manufactured by MSI, . . . the sole provider of state issued MSI winter coats to
inmates housed by the MDOC”).
“The evidence may confirm the allegations in [Smith’s] pro se complaint.
Or it may resoundingly disprove them.” Rudd v. City of Norton Shores, 977 F.3d
503, 507 (6th Cir. 2020) (partially reversing a 12(b)(6) dismissal). Should this case
return 	to 	our 	court 	in 	summary 	judgment’s 	“more 	demanding 	procedural
framework,” we will assess whether he has been able to 	produce evidence that
would allow a rational jury to rule in his favor.” See Rudd v. City of Norton Shores,
No. 22-1229, 2023 WL 3886404, at *6 (6th Cir. June 8, 2023) (affirming grant of
summary judgment to defendants).
Id. at PageID.58-59. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated this Court’s judgment and remanded
for further proceedings. Id. at PageID.59.
On remand, this Court dismissed Warden Rewerts because plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks
injunctive relief and he is no longer at DRF. See Opinion (ECF No. 15, PageID.74). Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claims against Deputy Director Bush remain.
II. 	Defendant Bush’s motion for summary judgment
A. 	Legal standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 4
of 11

5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
B. 	Eighth Amendment claim
1. 	Legal standard
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a civil cause of
action for individuals who are deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or federal laws by those acting under color of state law.” 	Smith v. City of Salem,
Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). 	To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 5
of 11

6
(2) that the defendant deprived him of this federal right under color of law. Jones v. Duncan, 840
F.2d 359, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, the Sixth Circuit’s Order sets out the
legal standard for plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
2. 	Individual capacity claim
As an initial matter, plaintiff sued defendant Bush in both his official and individual
capacity. See Compl. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2). However, the complaint seeks only injunctive relief:
Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court enters an Order: Declaring that
defendant’s [sic] have acted in violation of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff
requests Prospective Relief compelling the defendant’s [sic] to provide inmates
with an adequate winter coat. Plaintiff requests any other relief that this Court may
deem just and proper.
Id. at PageID.9. During his deposition, plaintiff reiterated that that he seeks injunctive relief:
Q. 	Okay. So you’re seeking only injunctive relief?
A. 	That’s correct. And whatever relief that the Court may grant, filing fees and
such things of that nature.
Smith Dep. (ECF No. 34-2, PageID.145).
Defendant contends that plaintiff’s individual capacity claim should be dismissed
because he is seeking injunctive relief. The Court agrees.
Just as a plaintiff cannot sue a defendant in his official capacity for money damages,
a plaintiff should not be able to sue a defendant in his individual capacity for an
injunction in situations in which the injunction relates only to the official’s job, i.e.,
his official capacity. The Supreme Court, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct.
358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), explained that the difference between official
capacity suits and personal capacity suits derives not from the capacity in which the
state official acted at the time of the alleged violation, but rather from the capacity
in which the official is sued. 502 U.S. at 27, 112 S.Ct. 358.
Community Mental Health Services of Belmont v. Mental Health & Recovery Board Serving
Belmont, Harrison & Monroe Counties, 150 Fed. Appx. 389, 401 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly,
defendant Bush should be granted summary judgment on the individual capacity claim.
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 6
of 11

7
3. 	Discussion
To meet the objective prong, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Smith, No. 23-1644 at PageID.56-
57. 	“[E]xposure to Michigan winters without adequate clothing can obviously inflict pain and
such conditions can rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at PageID.57. As discussed,
the facts alleged in the complaint could result in an Eighth Amendment claim, i.e.:
It is reasonable to infer that a coat lacking an outer shell is likely to permit water
and wind to penetrate through to the wearer’s skin, and that combining that wetness
and wind with northern Michigan’s “extreme cold” for up to 30 minutes at a time
presents a risk of physical harm beyond mere inconvenience.
Id.
Bush contends that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the new coat issued to
him was inadequate to protect him from Michigan winters. Plaintiff contends that the new coat
does not have minimum protection from the cold weather, which he defined as “from being soaked
during the wind and the rain.” 	Smith Dep. (ECF No. 34-2, PageID.142-143). 	According to
plaintiff,
When it rains out, the coat hasn’t -- affords little to no, lack of better word,
protection from the white rain, because it soaks through the cold just walking to the
chow hall. And that's how I came up with the conclusion that it’s not adequate to
experience.
Id. at PageID.143. 	Plaintiff acknowledged that he had no objective measure for the new coat’s
“minimum protections”; rather his claim was based on his subjective experience with the coat. Id.
The MDOC issued plaintiff both the old coat and the new coat. Bush faults plaintiff
for having deficient knowledge of both coats, pointing out that “Smith was not involved in the
construction of either coat” (presumably to establish that plaintiff did not construct the coats at an
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 7
of 11

8
MSI facility).1 Defendant’s Brief (ECF No. 34, PageID.121). Plaintiff testified that the outer shell
of the old coat was denim. 	Smith Dep. at PageID.138-139. 	During the deposition defendant’s
counsel established that plaintiff had no knowledge of the old coat’s construction or rating such
as: the gram weight of the outer material; the density of the outer material; the wind rating of the
coat; or the insulation in the coat. See id. Plaintiff guessed that the inner liner was “probably made
of cotton” and that the outer shell was either polyester or nylon. Id. Similarly, counsel established
that plaintiff had no knowledge of the construction or ratings of the new coat. With respect to the
new coat, plaintiff testified that it was not a “denim-like material”. Id. at PageID.140. Plaintiff
believed that the new coat was “made out of nylon” but he did not know the gram weight of the
nylon. Id. While plaintiff stated that the new coat had insulation, he did not know if it had a wind
rating or insulation rating, or the gram weight of the insulation. Id.
In addition, plaintiff has suffered no damages from the new coat other than
discomfort. Id. at PageID.145. When asked if he got frostbite or pneumonia (due to wearing the
new coat) plaintiff stated:
I suffered the common cold, but I can’t – I can’t say definitively that it’s
because of the coat. That would be unfair.
Id. 	For his relief, plaintiff testified that he wants the Court to award him a “suitable coat”, which
he defined as “suitable for Michigan winters, that will protect us from the wind, from the rain,
from the freezing rain.” Id. at PageID.144-145.
Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot prove that his coat is inadequate because
he did not construct the coat and has no idea of its rating for use during different types of weather
conditions. 	As discussed, plaintiff could not identify the technical specifications of either coat
1 MSI (Michigan State Industries) is “a bureau of the Michigan Department of Corrections . . . [that] operates about
39 factories in Michigan prisons.” Holt v. Michigan Department of Corrections, Michigan State Industries, 974 F.2d
771, 772 (6th Cir. 1992).
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 8
of 11

9
during his deposition (e.g., gram weight of the outer material or wind rating). However, while
defendant Bush points out plaintiff’s lack of knowledge regarding the specifications, Bush has not
explained the relevance of these specifications. 	In this regard, plaintiff points out that Bush is
unaware of any specifications sent to the MSI for designing the coats “beyond those relating to
facility safety and security” and that “[t]he purpose of those specifications are to ensure visibility
of individuals wearing coats and prevent those individuals from using coats to further escape
attempts or otherwise negatively impact the safety and security of MDOC facilities.” See Bush’s
Interrogatory Responses (ECF No. 44-1, PageID.210). In this regard, Bush stated, “I am not aware
of any studies, documents, manuals and/or other aides used in the process of designing the state-
issued winter coats.” Id. at PageID.211. Based on this record, neither party knows how the coats
were constructed or how the coats were rated for use in winter weather.
Plaintiff bases his claims on his experience in wearing the new coat, stating that
the new coat gets “soaked during the wind and the rain” and “affords little to no, lack of better
word, protection from the white rain, because it soaks through the cold just walking to the chow
hall.” Smith Dep. at PageID.142-143. It appears that plaintiff does not like the “new coat” and
that he considers it to be a worse coat when compared to his “old coat”. 	While not lengthy or
technical, plaintiff’s testimony is based on personal knowledge and presents a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his new coat is adequate for the weather conditions at DRF. In short,
whether this coat is adequate for a prisoner to wear during a Michigan winter is a question of fact
for the jury. 	Accordingly, plaintiff has met the objective component of his Eighth Amendment
claim.
To meet the subjective component, plaintiff must show that the defendant Bush
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Smith, No. 23-1644 at PageID.58. This means
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page 9
of 11

10
that “the official [Deputy Director Bush] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 	The question here is whether Bush knew that the
winter coats were inadequate for winter wear and disregarded that risk. In his response, plaintiff
submitted two letters addressed to Bush on this issue.
In a letter dated October 19, 2022, plaintiff refers to a letter he sent to Warden
Rewerts “concerning the New MSI winter coats” and “the procedure that is used to upgrade the
New MSI winter coats.” Letter (Oct. 19, 2022) (ECF No. 44-2, PageID.215). This letter does not
address plaintiff’s claims alleged in this lawsuit. In addition, plaintiff did not include the enclosed
letter to Warden Rewerts.
Plaintiff also filed a copy of a letter to Bush. This letter is difficult to decipher due
to its poor quality, with some of the language illegible. The letter appears to be dated March 2,
2023 and is Re: ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE A COMPLAINT. See Letter (March 2, 2023) (ECF
No. 44-3, PageID.217). 	Plaintiff stated in part:
The complaint that I am attempting to resolve is dealing with the New MSI
winter coats, specifically the fact that they are inadequate for the severe Michigan
winters, as the CFA Deputy Director [defendant Bush] is responsible for the
material used in manufacturing the clothing for the Michigan Department of
Corrections, see PD 04.07.110 section C.
Id. Plaintiff’s submission, in and of itself, does not establish that Bush acted with a culpable state
of mind. There is no evidence that this letter was sent to, or received by, Bush. In addition, neither
letter advises Bush of how the coats are “inadequate”. Based on this record, the Court concludes
that plaintiff has failed to establish the subjective prong of his Eighth Amendment claims against
Bush. Accordingly, defendant Bush’s motion for summary judgment should be granted. 2
2 The Court notes that defendant also seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
However, defendant’s brief argument merely re-states his motion for summary judgment on the merits, i.e., he is
entitled to qualified immunity because there was no federal constitutional violation. See Defendant’s Brief (ECF No.
34, PageID.126-128).
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page
10 of 11

11
III. 	Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that defendant Bush’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 33) be GRANTED and that this action be DISMISSED.
Dated: January 20, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case 1:23-cv-00579-PLM-RSK ECF No. 47, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/20/26 Page
11 of 11