Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FRANKLIN EZEQUIEL SALGADO BUSTOS,
Petitioner, 	No. 25-13202
v. 	Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Detroit Field Office,
Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; KRISTI
NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI,
U.S. Attorney General,
Respondents.
______________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [1]
Petitioner Franklin Ezequiel Salgado Bustos (Salgado Bustos) filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) Salgado Bustos asserts
that Respondents have detained him in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) and that his continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
Salgado Bustos, a Nicaraguan citizen, is being held at North Lake Correctional Facility in
Baldwin, Michigan pending immigration proceedings to remove him from the United
States and for determination of his asylum application.
The Court held a hearing on Salgado Bustos’ Petition for Writ Habeas Corpus on
October 27, 2025. For the reasons below, the Court finds that Salgado Bustos’ mandatory
detention is unlawful and a violation of his due process rights and orders his immediate
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release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. In addition, the
Court will dismiss all Respondents except for Salgado Bustos’ immediate custodian,
Acting ICE Field Office Director Kevin Raycraft.
I. 	Background
Mr. Salgado Bustos is a Nicaraguan citizen who unlawfully entered the United
States without inspection or admission near Calexico, California, on November 20, 2022.
A Customs and Border Patrol (CPB) official encountered and arrested Salgado Bustos at
the border. An immigration officer determined Salgado Bustos entered the United States
unlawfully, lacking valid immigration documents, which rendered him inadmissible under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6) and (a)(7). During his detention, Salgado Bustos claimed that he
feared persecution if he was returned to Nicaragua.
On November 22, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) granted
Salgado Bustos temporary parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and released him into
the United States. DHS issued Salgado Bustos a Form I-385 Notice to Report, which
required him to report to a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office near
his final destination within 60 days. Salgado Bustos reported to the ICE Detroit office as
directed on January 20, 2023. At the check in, he received a DHS Form G-56 Call-In
Letter, which required him to present himself to the Detroit ICE office on March 26, 2025,
for “processing and issue NTA [Notice to Appear].”
Salgado Bustos reported to the Detroit ICE office on March 26, 2025. By this time,
he had been living continuously in Ann Arbor, Michigan for over two years. He had a
pending asylum application with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) since November 20, 2023. USCIS issued him a work permit on May 18, 2024.
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Salgado Bustos’s parole expired in 2023, but he had not re-detained. On March 26, 2025,
ICE did not issue Salgado Bustos a Notice to Appear (NTA) or an order of expedited
removal. Rather, ICE officers instructed him to return for a follow-up check-in with all of
his immigration documentation on September 28, 2025.
Salgado Bustos went to the ICE Detroit office on Sunday, September 28, 2025, but
the office was closed. Salgado returned on September 29 and showed the ICE officer his
asylum application, a photo of his work permit, which was valid through 2029, and his
passport. The ICE officer arrested Salgado Bustos and entered an order of expedited
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). (ECF No. 5-4, PageID.65-66.) Salgado
Bustos told the officer he feared persecution if returned to Nicaragua (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.59; Walker Decl., ¶ 10). The officer took Salgado Bustos’ documents described
above as well as his driver’s license, social security card, car title, loan documents,
paystubs, and wallet.
An ICE official gave Salgado Bustos a document which the interpreter said was for
him to pursue his asylum case while in detention. (ECF No. 8-2, PageID.94; Salgado
Bustos Decl. at ¶21.) Salgado signed the document, which was in fact an expedited
removal order. (Id.)
Since Salgado Bustos filed his habeas petition, USCIS scheduled a credible fear
interview (CFI), which was conducted telephonically on October 14, 2025. (Daniel Decl.
¶¶ 4-9.) Salgado Bustos’ immigration attorney attended the CFI. Following the CFI,
Salgado Bustos’s asylum application was administratively closed. (Walker Decl., ¶7, ECF
No. 5-2, PageID.58; Marin Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) On October 17, 2025, Respondents informed
Salgado Bustos that he had not passed his CFI. (Marin Decl., ¶ 3.) Salgado Bustos
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invoked his right to have an Immigration Judge review the denial of his CFI. Id. On
October 21, 2025, ICE docketed Salgado Bustos’ request for an Immigration Judge’s
review of the CFI determination, and he is scheduled to appear before an Immigration
Judge in Detroit following a decision by this Court on his habeas petition.
In his habeas petition, Salgado Bustos challenges Respondents’ application of the
expedited removal procedures and mandatory detention provisions under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1). He does not challenge the decisions made by USCIS during his CFI or his
underlying affirmative asylum application. Salgado Bustos maintains that Respondents
are holding him in physical custody without following the INA and its regulations, and in
violation of his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. As relief, Salgado Bustos
argues this Court should order his immediate release. Salgado Bustos also asks the Court
to rescind the expedited removal order issued on September 29, 2025; require the
government to issue a Notice to Appear which would place him in Section 240 removal
proceedings; and require the reopening of his asylum application with USCIS.
II. 	Respondents other than the ICE Field Office Director will be dismissed
A writ of habeas corpus may only be issued “to the person having custody of the
person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Courts interpret a detained noncitizen’s immediate
custodian as “the person exercising daily control over his affairs,” such as “the warden of
the facility where the alien is detained or the INS District Director of the district where the
alien is being detained.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003).
Respondents in this case include the Acting Director of the Detroit Field Office of
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Enforcement and Removal Operations
division Kevin Raycraft; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Secretary of
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DHS Kristi Noem; and United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi. Salgado Bustos
names the individual defendants in their official capacities.
Salgado Bustos acknowledges that Acting ICE Field Office Director Raycraft is his
immediate custodian. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Therefore, Respondents ask the Court to
dismiss the petition against all of them except Raycraft. Salgado Bustos argues that DHS,
the Attorney 	General, 	and 	the 	Secretary 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	are 	also 	proper
respondents because this agency and these individuals have ultimate authority over
immigration enforcement and adjudication and keeping them in the litigation will ensure
any order issued by the court will be complied with by the relevant agencies. Courts have
allowed a petitioner to name respondents other than the immediate custodian in
extraordinary or unusual circumstances. Roman, 340 F.3d at 324-25. For example, the
Attorney General has been permitted to be named as a respondent in a noncitizen’s
habeas corpus petition where the location of the petitioner is unknown or there is fear he
may be transferred to another INS facility in another state. See id. at 325-26 (citing cases).
This concern does not exist here because the Court ordered that “Respondents are
enjoined from transferring, relocating, or removing Petitioner from the Eastern District of
Michigan without further order of this Court and pending final resolution of this matter.”
(ECF No. 3, PageID.28.)
The Court finds that Acting ICE Field Office Director Raycraft is the proper
Respondent and will dismiss all others from the petition.
III. 	Jurisdiction Over Petitioner’s Challenge
Salgado Bustos asserts an as-applied challenge of Respondent’s detention of him
based on an allegedly unlawful application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). The parties agree
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that a request for release from detention is proper habeas relief. However, Respondents
argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review removal orders under § 1225(b)(1). See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A). The INA does bar most judicial review unless a petitioner’s claim
falls under the exceptions in § 1252(e). Section 1252(e)(2) preserves judicial review, in
the form of a habeas corpus proceeding, of individual expedited removal orders issued
under § 1225(b)(1) as to determinations of: (A) whether the petitioner is a noncitizen, (B)
whether the petitioner was ordered removed under the expedited removal statute, and
(C) whether the petitioner has been lawfully admitted or granted asylum.
Section 1252(e)(5) provides that “[i]n determining whether an alien has been
ordered removed under section 1225(b)(1) of this title, the court’s inquiry shall be limited
to whether such an order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the petitioner.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5). This language in turn has been interpreted as requiring that the
expedited removal statute is lawfully applied to petitioner. Federal courts have jurisdiction
to determine “whether the expedited removal procedure ‘relates to’ petitioners in the
sense that it lawfully applies to them. If the statute has not been lawfully applied, the
question 	then 	becomes 	whether 	the 	unlawful 	application 	has 	violated 	petitioners'
constitutional rights.” Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d
650, 663 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Here, Respondents acknowledge that they did not issue Salgado Bustos an
expedited removal order when he crossed the border in November 2022 or when his
parole expired. In his petition, Salgado Bustos contends the government did not have the
lawful authority to initiate § 1225(b)(1)’s expedited removal process against him after he
had been paroled into the United States and has lived in the country continuously for over
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two years. Salgado Bustos does not argue the constitutionality of the expedited removal
process itself, but the government’s implementation of the process to order mandatory
detention under the circumstances of his case. See E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069,
2025 WL 2938594, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (finding the court had jurisdiction to
assess petitioner’s detention-based claims separate from constitutionality of expedited
removal order).
Respondents rely on Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 112-
13 (2020), where the Supreme Court held that U.S. district courts lack jurisdiction to hear
challenges to the implementation of an expedited removal order under the federal habeas
statute. Here, Salgado Bustos challenges whether his detention was imposed on him
under the proper authority, as opposed to challenging an expedited removal order or the
wholesale constitutionality of the procedures contained in § 1225(b)(1). Cf. Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (Section 1226(e) precludes a noncitizen from
challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary detention decisions, but “‘does not
preclude’ challenges to the statutory framework that permits the alien’s detention without
bail.”).
The Court concludes that § 1225 does not strip the Court’s power to review
Salgado Bustos’ narrow claims and to grant appropriate relief. The Court finds that it has
jurisdiction 	over 	Salgado 	Bustos’ 	habeas 	petition 	which 	challenges 	Respondents’
authority to detain him under § 1225(b) where at the time of his arrest he had been
admitted or paroled into the United States, had lived continuously in the country for over
two years, and was not at a port of entry.
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IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents contend that Salgado Bustos must exhaust his administrative
remedies before he may proceed with his habeas petition. “Where Congress specifically
mandates, exhaustion is required.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
The INA requires exhaustion for appeals on final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). But here, there has not been a final order of removal and Salgado Bustos
challenges his detention. When neither a statute nor rule mandates exhaustion, it is within
the Court's “sound judicial discretion” whether to require exhaustion. Shearson v. Holder,
725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013). This is also known as “prudential exhaustion.” The
Sixth Circuit has not decided whether courts should apply prudential exhaustion in the
context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention. See Pizarro
Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025)
(citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25CV01621, 2025 WL 2444114,
at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)).
However, even assuming that exhaustion is required in this context, a court can
waive exhaustion requirements in circumstances where (1) the legal question is “fit” for
resolution and delay means hardship, or (2) when exhaustion would prove “futile.” Shalala
v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000). Both scenarios exist
here, 	so 	this 	Court 	finds 	that 	waiving 	any 	prudential 	exhaustion 	requirements 	is
appropriate. In addition, the Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as
the one raised by Salgado Bustos, generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA
cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006).
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For the reasons given, Salgado Bustos's challenge to his detention does not
require exhaustion.
V. 	Statutory Framework
In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRAIRA), Congress established two main processes for removing noncitizens deemed
ineligible to enter or remain in the United States. In Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts.
v. Noem, No. 25-CV-872, 2025 WL 2192986, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025), the D.C. District
Court provided a description of the two avenues of removal. Section 240 proceedings are
the standard mechanism for removing inadmissible noncitizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Such
proceedings take place before an Immigration Judge who has the duty to develop the
record. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1). The hearing is adversarial, is recorded, and is subject to
review. When it was enacted, Congress described Section 240’s framework as a “single
form of removal proceeding” “[f]or illegal aliens already present in the U.S.” H.R. Rep.
104-469, at 12, 107–08 (1996).
The second process is referred to as expedited removal. Under this scheme, an
immigration officer conducts initial fact-finding by asking a series of questions and
determines if the noncitizen is admissible. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i). If the noncitizen is
inadmissible and does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, the inspecting officer
issues a notice and order of expedited removal. Once a supervising officer reviews and
signs off on the determination, the noncitizen is ordered removed. Id.
If the noncitizen asserts an intention to apply for asylum, they are referred to a
“credible fear interview,” conducted by an asylum officer. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4). If the
asylum officer finds the noncitizen to have a credible fear of persecution, the noncitizen
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will be moved either to full Section 240 removal proceedings or to USCIS administrative
asylum proceedings. Id. § 208.30(f). But if the officer makes a negative credible fear
determination, a supervisory officer will review the determination. Id. § 208.30(e)(8). If the
supervisor agrees, the noncitizen can request review by an IJ. Id. § 208.30(g). The IJ's
review “is meant to conclude within 24 hours” and is final. Make The Rd. New York v.
Wolf, 	962 	F.3d 	612, 	619 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	2020). 	With 	narrow 	exceptions, 	no 	further
administrative or judicial review is available. Id.; Coalition, 2025 WL 2192986, at *3.
VI. 	Petitioner’s Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)
Here, Respondents are proceeding under the expedited removal process. Section
1225 controls the Government's determination of the admissibility of noncitizens seeking
to enter the country, which “generally begins at the Nation's borders and ports of entry.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. In addition to affording the government the ability to quickly
deport an individual, the process of expedited removal requires detention during the
administrative proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). This clause states that any
applicant for admission who claims asylum “shall be detained” pending a determination
of a credible fear of persecution or “until removed,” as applicable. Id. Here, Salgado
Bustos claimed asylum, but due to a lack of detention capacity he was granted parole into
the United States.
When interpreting a statute, a court’s “inquiry begins with the statutory text, and
ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541
U.S. 176, 183 (2004). In many cases, the meaning of “of certain words or phrases may
only become evident when placed in context.” In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940,
947 (6th Cir. 2022). “It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that a ‘statute ought,
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upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001) (citation omitted).
Section 1225(b)(1)(A) describes screening procedures for aliens arriving in the
United States and “certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled.” Another
court in this district recently analyzed the title of § 1225 – “Inspection by immigration
officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing” – and
determined that “[t]he use of “arriving” to describe noncitizens strongly indicates that the
statute governs the entrance of noncitizens to the United States. This reading is bolstered
by the fact that § 1225 clearly establishes an inspection scheme for when to let
noncitizens into the country.” See Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (emphasis
added).
When Salgado Bustos arrived at the United States’ southern border in November
2022, he was deemed inadmissible under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). That determination is not
disputed here. Salgado Bustos’ habeas petition relates to his mandatory detention issued
on September 29, 2025. At that time, Salgado Bustos had been living in the United States,
far from the southern border, for almost three years and maintains he was no longer an
“arriving alien” for purposes of § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). The Court agrees. However, §
1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) describes “certain other aliens” who are also subject to the statute’s
expedited removal and mandatory detention:
An alien described in this clause is an alien who is not described in
subparagraph (F), who has not been admitted or paroled into the United
States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an
immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United
States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of
the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.
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8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).
The first requirement of § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) is that the noncitizen “has not been
admitted or paroled into the United States.” The parties agree Salgado Bustos was not
admitted into the United States as that term is used in the INA. However, he was paroled
into the country on November 22, 2022. (ECF No. 5-3, PageID.62.) Respondents note
that Salgado Bustos’ parole has since expired and cite to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) to argue
that the termination of parole requires his return to detention and that the expired parole
has no effect on the original charges of removability against him. That statutory provision
states, in relevant part, that “such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an
admission of the alien” and “when the purposes of such parole shall . . . have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.” § 1182(d)(5)A). Numerous courts have
rejected Respondents’ interpretation of the statute. In Coalition, 2025 WL 2192986, at
*39, “the court determined that the statute forbids the expedited removal of noncitizens
who have been, at any time, paroled into the United States.” See E.V., 2025 WL 2938594,
at *3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In so doing, the court explicitly
rejected the argument that under § 1182(d)(5)(A), “parolees return, upon the termination
or expiration of their parole, to the position of an applicant for admission standing at the
threshold of entry.” See Coalition, 2025 WL 2192986, at *24. After conducting a lengthy
analysis, the court found that parolees do not fall under either provision of § 1225(b)(1),
reasoning 	that 	“[a]ny 	other 	result 	conflicts 	with 	other 	aspects 	of 	the 	statute 	and
regulations, Congress’s evident purpose, and the ordinary meaning of the statute’s
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words.” Id. at *30. For example, the court noted that under 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(3), a
noncitizen who “was paroled” remains eligible for adjustment of status, indicating that at
least for some purposes, parole has ongoing legal effect even after it expires or is
terminated. Id. at *23.
Respondents argue that this interpretation of the statute conflicts with the only
published court of appeals decision addressing this issue, Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272
(1st Cir. 2025). But that court simply found both readings of the statute “plausible.” See
id. at 288. In fact, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs and the district court
reasonably read the language in § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) to mean that no prior recipient of
parole can be subject to expedited removal proceedings and noted that there are
regulations supporting this interpretation. See id. at 288-89 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(6),
which gives “a person an opportunity to establish that they were admitted or paroled into
the United States following inspection at a port-of-entry before being subject to expedited
removal”). To the extent the Doe court also found Respondents’ interpretation reasonable,
the Court declines to adopt that reading for the reasons aptly set forth in Coalition. Thus,
the Court joins the “numerous district courts” that have held that neither § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)
nor § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) authorize expedited removal of noncitizens who have been
paroled into the United States, regardless of the status of that parole. See E.V., 2025 WL
2938594, at *4 (listing cases).
Because the Court finds Respondents’ reliance on the expedited removal process
here improper due to Salgado Bustos’ prior parole status, there is no need to address the
second prong of 18 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), which states that the alien “has not
affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been
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physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately
prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.” The
Court notes, however, that Salgado Bustos has been continuously living in the United
States for almost three years. His immigration documentation, including his work permit
and record of reporting, should be sufficient to satisfy this showing.
VII. 	Lawfulness of Detention under Due Process Clause
The government may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that
the Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Due Process
Clause extends to all persons regardless of status, including noncitizens. A.A.R.P. v.
Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the process due under the
constitution is coextensive with the administrative immigration procedures provided by
Congress. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 138-40. However, because Salgado Bustos
challenges whether Respondent has applied the proper procedures, the Court will
consider whether Salgado Bustos’ due process rights have been violated.
To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights,
courts apply the three-part balancing test set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). The Court must weigh: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and (3) the United States' interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
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administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. Id. at 335.
Salgado Bustos has a significant private interest in not being detained. See Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). In November 2022, when Respondent released
Salgado Bustos at the border and granted him parole, Respondent determined that
Salgado Bustos was not a flight risk or danger. At that time, Respondent indicated an
intention not to fast-track Salgado Bustos’s removal and to proceed with the standard
removal process under Section 240. See ECF No. 8-4, PageID.104 (Call in Letter stating
the reason for March 26, 2025 appointment was to “issue NTA” which is the document
that begins the § 1229a proceeding; 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1(a).) In the years since that
determination was made, Salgado Bustos has established ties in Michigan, attended
every ICE check in, applied for asylum, and obtained a work permit.
The second factor concerns the risk of the erroneous deprivation of Salgado
Bustos’ liberty interest. Detention without an individualized assessment carries a high risk
of erroneous determination. Here, if Respondents had conducted an assessment, they
would have reviewed the documentation Salgado Bustos brought with him to his
September 29, 2025 ICE check in, which established his continuous presence in the
United States for over two years and the fact that he had a pending asylum application.
As for the United States’ interest, the Court recognizes it has a strong interest in
ensuring noncitizens do not harm their community and that they appear for future
immigration proceedings. Salgado Bustos has no known criminal history and has
attended 	all 	immigration 	hearings 	as 	required 	after 	being 	released 	on 	his 	own
recognizance in November 2022.
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The Court finds that all three Matthews factors favor Salgado Bustos and, on that
basis, finds that his mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) violates
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
VIII. 	Conclusion
The Court finds that the mandatory detention of Salgado Bustos is in violation of
both the INA and the Due Process Clause. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Salgado Bustos’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(ECF No 1) is GRANTED. Respondent is HEREBY ORDERED to immediately release
Salgado Bustos under the same conditions that existed before his detention and to return
all his personal belongings.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall file a Status Report
with this Court on or before November 3, 2025 to certify compliance with this Order.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of Salgado Bustos’
requested relief is DENIED as beyond the scope of the Petition.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that DHS, the Secretary of DHS Kristi
Noem, and the United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi are DISMISSED from the
Petition.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 29, 2025
s/ Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-13202-NGE-CI ECF No. 9, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/29/25 Page 16 of 17

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on October 29, 2025, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/ Marlena Williams
Case Manager
Case 2:25-cv-13202-NGE-CI ECF No. 9, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/29/25 Page 17 of 17