Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MATÍAS DE JESÚS JIMÉNEZ GARCÍA,
Petitioner, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-13086
v. 	Honorable Susan K. DeClercq
United States District Judge
MARTY C. RAYBON, in his official
Capacity as Michigan Field Office
Director for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, et al.,
Respondents.
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING RESPONDENTS NOEM AND
BONDI, GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1), DIRECTING RESPONDENT RAYBON TO PROVIDE
PETITIONER A BOND HEARING OR OTHERWISE RELEASE HIM,
AND DIRECTING RESPONDENT RAYBON TO FILE STATUS REPORT
Petitioner Matías de Jesús Jiménez García seeks a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Jiménez García alleges that Respondents have detained him
without a bond hearing in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
and 	that 	his 	continued 	detention 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing 	violates 	his 	Fifth
Amendment right to due process.
As explained below, because Jiménez García is being held in violation of
federal law, his habeas petition will be granted, and Respondent Marty C. Raybon
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will be directed to provide Jiménez García with a bond determination hearing on or
before October 27, 2025, or otherwise release Jiménez García.
I. BACKGROUND
Jiménez García is a native and citizen of Guatemala who has resided
continuously in the United States for nearly 25 years. See ECF No. 1 at PageID.13.
On August 16, 2025, Immigration officials arrested Jiménez García and charged him
with inadmissibility under INA § 8 U.S.C. 212(a)(6)(A)(i) because he did not
lawfully enter the United States. See ECF No. 4-2 at PageID.125.
Nine days after his arrest, Jiménez García requested a bond hearing in
immigration court. ECF No. 1 at PageID.13. But on September 8, 2025, the
immigration court denied Jiménez García’s request to be released on bond for lack
of jurisdiction. Id.; see also ECF No. 4 at PageID.99. According to the immigration
court, because Jiménez García was detained under § 1225(b)(2), he was subject to
mandatory detention.1 ECF No. 4 at PageID.99. One week later, Jiménez García
1 In its response, ECF No. 4, the Government suggests that the immigration court’s
denial of Jiménez García’s request for a bond hearing was based upon the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ recent holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to inadmissible
noncitizens like Jiménez García, who lived unlawfully in the United States for more
than two years without apprehension. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.
216, 216 (BIA 2025). But according to recent Supreme Court guidance, this Court
is not bound by the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (“courts need not and under the APA
may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is
ambiguous.”); see also Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL
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appealed the immigration court’s bond denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
See ECF No. 1 at PageID.13.
On September 22, 2025, Jiménez García appeared with counsel for his initial
hearing in immigration court and he denied the charges of removability. ECF No. 4
at PageID.100. A merits hearing was scheduled for October 14, 2025.2 Id.
On September 30, 2025, Jiménez García, through counsel, filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 1. In his petition, Jiménez García alleges four
counts as follows:
Count 	Claim
I 	Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and Associated Regulations
II 	Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process (failure to provide
bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a))
III 	Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process (failure to provide
an individualized hearing for domestic civil detention)
IV 	Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process (substantive due
process)
See ECF No. 1 at PageID.28–30.
2609425, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Loper Bright and noting that
district courts are not bound by the BIA’s interpretation of the relevant statute).
2 No Party has provided an update regarding the outcome of Jiménez García’s
October 14, 2025, merits hearing. However, on October 14, 2025, Jiménez García’s
attorney filed a reply brief in which he noted that if Jiménez García is ordered
removed at the merits hearing, “his detention will continue to be governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226 during his administrative appeal because the removal order will not
be final.” ECF No. 5 at PageID.170 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1). Jiménez García’s
counsel is correct. Thus, this Court will proceed to analyze the legality of Jiménez
García’s continued detention.
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Respondents were ordered to respond to the petition on an expedited basis and
filed their response on October 8, 2025. See ECF No. 4. Jiménez García filed a reply
on October 14, 2025, the same day his immigration merits hearing was scheduled to
occur.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a petitioner is in federal
custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. If a district
court entertains a habeas petition, then it must either award the writ or order the
respondent to show cause as to why the writ should not be granted, unless it is
apparent from the application that the petitioner is not entitled to the requested relief.
28 U.S.C. § 2243.
III. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, this Court will dismiss Respondents Bondi and Noem, as
only a petitioner’s immediate custodian—in this case, Michigan ICE Field Office
Director Marty Raybon—is the proper respondent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (instructing
that a writ of habeas corpus “shall be directed to the person having custody of the
person detained.”). Indeed, Jiménez García concedes as much and does not object to
the dismissal of these respondents. See ECF No. 5 at PageID.154. Accordingly, this
Court’s analysis will proceed only as to Respondent Raybon.
A. Administrative Exhaustion
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Next, this Court will address whether Jiménez García has exhausted his
administrative remedies.
There is no applicable statute or rule that mandates administrative exhaustion
under these circumstances. Thus, as recently explained by Judge Robert J. White of
this Court:
Whether to require exhaustion is thus within the district court’s “sound
judicial discretion.” Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir.
2013) 	(citation 	omitted). 	Otherwise 	referred 	to 	as 	“prudential”
exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th
Cir. 2019), a court-made exhaustion rule must comport with the
statutory scheme and congressional intent. Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–
94. The Sixth Circuit has not decided whether courts should impose
administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas
petition for unlawful mandatory detention. Hernandez v. U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:25CV01621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 25, 2025). As a result, some courts in this circuit apply Ninth
Circuit precedent, but are split on the outcome. See Lopez-Campos v.
Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025); Villalta v. Greene, No. 4:25-cv-01594, 2025 WL
2472886, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025); Hernandez, 2025 WL
2444114, at *8–10.
But even if a court would ordinarily enforce prudential exhaustion, it
may still choose to waive such exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025
WL 2496379, at *4. For example, when the “legal question is fit for
resolution and delay means hardship,” a court may choose to decide the
issues itself. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S.
1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also excuse exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.”
Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 9, 2025).
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Here, Jiménez García asks the Court to waive the exhaustion requirement. See
ECF Nos. 1 at PageID.13; 5 at PageID.168–70. And—importantly—Respondents
themselves appear to acknowledge that Jiménez García’s “pursuit of administrative
remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted);
see ECF No. 4 at PageID.104 (“However, the agency acknowledges that Jimenez
Garcia is unlikely to ultimately obtain the relief he seeks through the administrative
process based on” the BIA’s recent decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado.).
Thus, because any pursuit of administrative remedies by Jiménez García
would be futile in light of Yajure Hurtado, this Court will waive the exhaustion
requirement. See Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem et al., No. 1:25-CV-1090, 2025 WL
2942648, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025) (finding that because “[i]t is unlikely
that any administrative review by the BIA would lead to the Government changing
its position” regarding the question of which statutory framework applies to the
petitioner, exhaustion was not required).
Moreover, the waiver of exhaustion here is warranted because bond denial
appeals “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wa. 2025). And such a timeline for an
administrative remedy is unreasonable or indefinite such that courts may waive the
exhaustion requirement. See Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (citing United
States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 2020)). Indeed, the “delays inherent” in
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the BIA’s administrative process “would result in the very harm that the bond
hearing was designed to prevent[:]” prolonged detention without due process.
Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 237 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (citation
omitted).
Finally, requiring Jiménez García to exhaust his administrative remedies
would hinder his ability to prepare his case on appeal, as he has limited access to
attorneys, witnesses, evidence, interpreters, and technology while detained. See
Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4.
At bottom, if this Court were to require Jiménez García to exhaust his
administrative remedies through a BIA appeal, Jimenez Garcia would face “not only
more, potentially unnecessary, months in prison, but also harm to his ability to mount
a successful case [and appeal] against his removal.” Id. Thus, this Court will waive
Jiménez García’s exhaustion requirement and proceed to the merits of his habeas
petition.
B. Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (Count I)
Jiménez García alleges that his continuing detention is unlawful because he
was not released or provided with a bond hearing, as required under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). ECF No. 1 at PageID.28. Respondents argue that § 1226(a) does not apply
to Jiménez García, and that he is instead properly detained under § 1225(b)(2). See
ECF No. 4 at PageID.105–21.
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Jiménez García is correct that the relevant provision governing his detention
is § 1226(a). Indeed, “[a]t least a dozen federal courts,” have reached the same
conclusion upon reviewing the statutory text, statutory history, congressional intent,
and statutory application for the last three decades. Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL
2609425, at *3 (collecting cases); see also Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d
1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Martinez v. Hyde, 1:25-cv-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 208438
(D. Mass. July 24, 2025); Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D.
Cal. July 28, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa et al., No. 2:25-cv-02157-DLR, 2025 WL
2337099 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis et al., No. 1:25-cv-
05937-DEH, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Gonzalez et al. v. Noem
et al., No. 5:25-cv-02054-ODW-BFM (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2025); dos Santos v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12052-JEK, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025);
Maldonado v. Olson, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE, 2025 WL 2374411 (D. Minn.
Aug. 15, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, et al., No. 1:25-cv-11631-BEM, 2025 WL
2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Benitez et al. v. Noem et al., No. 5:25-cv-02190-
RGK-AS (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025); Kostak v. Trump et al., No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-
KDM, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,
No. 2:25-CV-12486, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Barrera v.
Tindall, No. 3:25-CV-541-RGJ, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025);
Aguilar Merino v. Ripa et al., No. 25-23845-CIV, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (S.D.
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Fla. Oct. 15, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem et al., No. 1:25-CV-1090, 2025 WL
2942648 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).
As numerous other district courts have explained, § 1225(b)(2)(A) “applies to
aliens undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at the United States’ border,
when they are seeking lawful entry into the United States.” Sanchez Alvarez, 2025
WL 2942648, at *5. In contrast, looking to the plain language of the statute, §
1226(a) “applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for [many] years
and was already within the United States when apprehended and arrested,” as
opposed to being apprehended upon arrival at the border. Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL
2496379, at *8.
To 	this 	Court, 	there 	is 	simply 	no 	question 	that 	§ 	1226(a)—not 	§
1225(b)(2)(A)—applies to noncitizens such as Jiménez García who have resided in
the United States for many years and were not apprehended while arriving at the
border. And ICE’s decision to upend 30 years of reasoned statutory interpretation is
not persuasive otherwise. Thus, under § 1226(a), Jiménez García is entitled to a
discretionary bond determination hearing. And because Jiménez García has been
detained without having received such a bond determination hearing, he is in federal
custody in violation of federal law. Thus, his habeas petition will be granted, and
Respondent Raybon will be directed to provide Jiménez García with a bond hearing
under § 1226(a) on or before October 27, 2025, or otherwise release him.
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C. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claims (Counts II, III, and IV)
This Court will decline to decide the merits of Jiménez García’s due process
claims given that this Court is granting the relief Jiménez García requests based on
its interpretation of the applicability of § 1226(a). If Respondents do not provide
Jiménez García with a bond determination hearing or release him by October 27,
2025, Jiménez García may renew his Fifth Amendment Due Process claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Respondents Kristi Noem and Pamela
Bondi, are DISMISSED from the above-captioned case.
Further, it is ORDERED that Jiménez García’s Petition, ECF No. 1, is
GRANTED. To that end, it is ORDERED that:
1. Respondent Raybon is DIRECTED to provide Jiménez
García with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) on or before
October 27, 2025, or otherwise release him; and
2. Respondent Raybon is DIRECTED to file a status report
to 	certify 	compliance 	with 	this 	order 	on 	or 	before
October 29, 2025. The status report shall detail if and
when Jiménez García’s bond hearing occurred, if bond
was granted or denied, and—if bond was denied—the
reasons for the denial.
/s/Susan K. DeClercq
SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ
United States District Judge
Dated: October 21, 2025
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