Minchella v. Brantley

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAVID MINCHELLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
YVONNE BRANTLEY,
Defendant.
/
Case No. 2:24-cv-12680
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
OPINION AND ORDER SUSTAINING
OBJECTIONS TO THE SPECIAL MASTER’S
REPORT [14], GRANTING MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEES, [17], AND REALLOCATING SPECIAL MASTER FEES [18]
Plaintiff David Minchella, a state trooper, sued his supervisor Yvonne Brantley
for various constitutional violations related to his placement on a “Brady–Giglio list.”
ECF No. 1; ECF No. 10-1. Defendant Brantley did not appear, and the clerk entered
default against her. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff then moved for default judgment. ECF
No. 10. The Court granted the motion for default judgment in part and referred the
parties to a Special Master to make a recommendation on the amount of Plaintiff’s
damages. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff then objected to the Special Master’s report and
recommendation, moved for attorney fees, and moved for reallocation of the Special
Master fees. ECF Nos. 16–18. For the reasons below, the Court will sustain the
objections, award attorney’s fees, and reallocate the Special Master fees.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has worked for the Michigan State Police since 2017. ECF No. 1,
PageID.2. The Department posted Plaintiff in Flint and assigned Defendant Brantley
as his supervisor. Id. In May 2023, a State Police sergeant in Flint faced an internal
affairs investigation for allegedly sending pictures of his genitalia to a sheriff’s deputy
working in the Genesee County jail. Id. at PageID.3–4. Plaintiff discussed the
incident with a sheriff’s deputy while he was at the jail lodging a suspect. Id. at
PageID.3. 	When 	Plaintiff 	returned 	to 	his 	post, 	he 	reported 	the 	sergeant’s
inappropriate behavior. Id. at PageID.3. As a result, on June 8, 2023, Plaintiff was
questioned and interviewed by State Police Internal Affairs section about the
incident. Id. at PageID.3–4.
A few months later, Plaintiff discovered that he had been placed on Genesee
County’s Brady–Giglio list. Id. at PageID.4. The Brady–Giglio list tracks the names
of officers who have “sustained incidents of untruthfulness or lack of candor placing
their credibility into question and requiring that said information be disclosed to the
criminal defendant.” Id. at PageID.4. An officer whose name is on the list may often
be screened from serious cases, have charges declined by a prosecutor, or even lose
his job. Id. at PageID.4–5.
After 	learning 	that 	he 	was 	on 	the 	list, 	Plaintiff 	contacted 	his 	union
representative on September 8, 2023 to ask if they knew why he had been placed on
the list. Id. at PageID.5. He learned that Defendant Brantley reported him to the
prosecutor’s office along with the other troopers in retaliation for reporting the
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sergeant’s 	inappropriate 	behavior 	and 	participating 	in 	the 	internal 	affairs
investigation. Id. Later, on September 21, 2023, Defendant emailed Plaintiff and
others to inform them that they were removed from the list. Id. at PageID.6. Even
though he was taken off the list, having been on the list triggered heightened scrutiny
from prosecutors. ECF No. 10-1, PageID.56–57. And despite Brantley’s assertion that
Plaintiff was no longer on the list, he was informed that because of his placement on
the list he was no longer allowed to work at his detail on the “Secure Cities
Partnership” and would be transferred to Shiawassee County. Id. at PageID.56.
Because of the inclusion of his name on the list, Plaintiff suffered extreme
stress, anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation; was reassigned police details; and
lost overtime work from the Secure Cities Partnership. Id. at PageID.55–58; ECF
No. 14-1, PageID.113. Plaintiff has since had to fill out forms that require him to
disclose whether he has ever been on the list, and he may be subject to such disclosure
throughout his career. ECF No. 10-1, PageID.57; see ECF No.14-1, PageID.123
(explaining that being placed on the list will come up whenever Plaintiff testifies in
court). Because of those occurrences, that the Court accepted as true on a motion for
default judgment, the Court granted Plaintiff’s claim for First Amendment retaliation
and denied Plaintiff’s claims for violation of Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clause. ECF No. 11, PageID.66.
The Court referred the issue of damages to a Special Master. ECF No. 11,
PageID.67. Plaintiff submitted a supplemental brief to the Special Master on the
issue of damages. ECF No. 13. The Special Master held an evidentiary hearing with
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Plaintiff and his Counsel. ECF No. 14-1. Following the evidentiary hearing, the
Special Master issued a report recommending that the Court award Plaintiff $11,500
in compensatory damages for lost overtime and refrain from awarding punitive
damages. ECF No. 14, PageID.94. 	The Special Master found that Plaintiff proved
“actual injury resulting from Defendant’s actions” because he testified that he lost
$11,500 in overtime due to being placed on the Brady-Giglio list. Id. at PageID.92.
The Special Master, however, declined to award any further compensatory damages
because “plaintiff did not request any additional specific compensatory damages.” Id.
The Special Master also recommended that Plaintiff not be awarded punitive
damages because “there is insufficient evidence to show that Defendant’s actions
were driven by evil motive or intent, or that Defendant’s actions were reckless or
callously indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights.” Id. at PageID.93. In support, the Special
Master noted that “[t]he record is devoid of any admissible evidence supporting any
finding of evil motive or intent or recklessness.” Id.
Plaintiff 	objected 	to the Special 	Master’s 	recommendation 	of 	no 	further
compensatory damages beyond $11,500 in lost overtime and no punitive damages.
ECF No. 16. Plaintiff also filed, concurrently with his objections, motions for
attorney’s fees, costs and prejudgment interest, and reallocation of special master
fees. ECF Nos. 17, 18. The Court will address the objections to the Special Master’s
Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff’s motions below.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 sets forth the appropriate standard of
review for a district court in reviewing findings of fact and conclusions of law made
or recommended by a Special Master. The Court reviews de novo factual findings and
legal conclusions of the Special Master. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f). The Court may
“adopt or affirm, modify, wholly or partly reject or reverse, or resubmit to the master
with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Objections to the Special Master’s Report
Plaintiff argued that the Special Master erred in failing to consider and award
“emotional-based 	compensatory 	damages” 	and 	punitive 	damages. 	ECF 	No 	16,
PageID.155, 158.
A. Compensatory Damages
A plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for a § 1983 claim when the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were violated. King v. Zamiara,
788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015). But a plaintiff “is not entitled to compensatory
damages unless he can prove actual injury caused by the violation.” Id. (citing Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978)). In cases addressing damages for “an injury that
is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish” courts can award some form of
presumed damages. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310–11
(1986). “Compensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other
monetary harms, but also such injuries as impairment of reputation, personal
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humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.” Id. at 307 (citation modified); see
also Seymore v. Farmer, No. 16-13808, 2022 WL 18027629, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29,
2022). Compensatory damages are often difficult to calculate with precision, and
therefore, “[t]he amount is left to the sound discretion of the fact finder.” King, 788
F.3d at 215.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff “takes no issue with” the Special Master’s
recommendation to award Plaintiff $11,500 in compensatory damages for lost
overtime. ECF No. 16, PageID157. The Court finds that Plaintiff proved an actual
injury—namely lost overtime wages, reputational harm, and emotional harm from
possible negative career consequences—that resulted from Defendant’s conduct. The
Court will therefore adopt the Special Master’s recommendation in part and award
Plaintiff the $11,500 in compensatory damages for lost overtime.
Plaintiff did take issue with “the Special Master[‘s fail[ure] to consider and
determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to emotional distress damages.” Id. The
Special Master recommended that because “Plaintiff did not request any additional
specific 	compensatory 	damages” 	the 	Court 	should 	not 	award 	any 	additional
compensatory damages. ECF No. 14, PageID.92.
Plaintiff demonstrated and requested, albeit in an imprecise manner, non-
economic damages in his pleadings, in his brief on damages, and on the record in the
evidentiary hearing held by the Special Master. See ECF No. 1, PageID.10 (pleading
non-economic damages); ECF No. 10-1, PageID.55–56 (explaining emotional and
reputational 	damage 	from 	Defendant’s 	conduct); 	ECF 	No. 13, 	PageID.80–81
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(outlining anticipated testimony regarding non-economic damages); see generally
ECF No. 14-1 (testifying regarding non-economic damages); see also ECF No. 10,
PageID.51 (requesting default judgment “in the amount of $1,000,000.00 against
Defendant”).
What is more, the testimony elicited at the hearing clearly demonstrates that
Plaintiff was harmed emotionally and reputationally by Defendant’s conduct in the
past and in the future. See ECF No. 14-1, PageID.114–117, 119, 122–124 (testimony
regarding Plaintiff’s fear for losing his job, reputational damage from being placed on
Brady-Giglio list, and future harmful effects on ability to testify credibly in Court).
Outside of his complaint, Plaintiff did not give an exact dollar amount as to the
amount he suffered, but that fact does not preclude him from compensatory damages
for emotional and reputational harm. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310–11.
In sum, Plaintiff demonstrated that when Defendant caused him to be placed
on the Brady-Giglio list, Plaintiff feared he would lose his job. Plaintiff’s fear was
credible because the evidence in the record demonstrates that arrests made by
Plaintiff could not be charged because Plaintiff was on the Brady-Giglio list. ECF No.
14-1, PageID.109–110. Plaintiff demonstrated that he could not credibly testify in
Court because he would be asked and required to disclose that he was on a list that
called into question his honesty and integrity. Without being able to perform core
functions of a law enforcement officer, Plaintiff credibly feared he could lose his job.
His fear was substantiated by being removed from the Secure Cities Partnership.
What is more, Plaintiff demonstrated a reputational injury moving forward because,
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even though he was taken off the Brady-Giglio list, if asked, Plaintiff will still need
disclose that he was once on list, undermining his credibility. See ECF No. 14-1,
PageID.120 (Plaintiff describing having to testify in Court and explain in front of the
“victim’s family” that “my department thinks I’m a liar”).
As for the amount of non-economic damages, Plaintiff requested compensatory
“damages proportionate to that harm.” ECF No. 16, PageID.157. Plaintiff did not
provide any further analysis on an amount to which he believed he was entitled.
Because of the lack of evidence, and because the decision is in the Court’s discretion,
the Court will award additional compensatory damages in the amount of $5,000 for
emotional and reputational injuries. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(1) (allowing the Court to
modify the special master’s findings or recommendations). The Court bases the award
primarily on the stress suffered by Plaintiff during his brief time on the Brady-Giglio
list. See ECF No. 10-1, PageID.55–56. But the number also accounts for future non-
economic harms that Plaintiff will suffer due to his time on the list. Plaintiff’s
objection as to compensatory damages is therefore sustained, and the Court will
modify the award to add $5,000 for emotional and reputational injuries.
B. Punitive Damages
The Special Master recommended that the Court not award punitive damages
because there was “insufficient evidence to show . . . that Defendant’s actions were
reckless or callously indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights.” ECF No. 14, PageID.93. Plaintiff
objected on two bases. First, that Defendant admitted to having an evil motive when
a default was entered because, upon entry of default, the well-pleaded allegations are
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taken as true. ECF No. 16, PageID.158. Second, that the mere finding of a First
Amendment violation is “sufficient in and of itself to establish Plaintiff’s entitlement
to punitive damages.” Id. at PageID.159.
Punitive damages are never awarded as of right. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
52 (1983). “Punitive damages are appropriate in a § 1983 action ‘when the defendant’s
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless
or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” King, 788 F.3d at
216 (quoting Smith, 461 U.S. at 56). When considering punitive damages, the
factfinder’s discretionary moral judgment should be guided by the purpose of punitive
damages— “to punish the defendant for his willful or malicious conduct and to deter
others from similar behavior.” Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306 n.9; see King, 788 F.3d at
216–17.
In granting default judgment, the Court has already found that Plaintiff stated
a claim for retaliation. ECF No. 11, PageID.62–63. Retaliation on the basis of the
exercise of First Amendment rights necessarily requires that the defendant act “with
the purpose of infringing upon the plaintiff's federally protected rights.” King, 788
F.3d at 216 (noting that “a defendant who has been found liable for First Amendment
retaliation has engaged in conduct that warrants consideration of an award of
punitive damages”). In fact, an element of a First Amendment retaliation claim is
that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected
conduct. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). Here, the Court
must accept as true that Defendant had Plaintiff put on the Brady-Giglio list “in
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retaliation for his reporting of [police] sexual harassment.” ECF No. 1, PageID.6. The
Court already established that Defendant’s actions were motivated by Plaintiff’s
exercise of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 11, PageID.62–63. And she did the same
thing to other troopers who talked to investigators about a cop who sent unsolicited
photos of his genitalia. ECF No. 1, PageID.5–6; ECF No. 14-1, PageID.110. Defendant
thus intentionally retaliated against Plaintiff because of his speech.
That said, Plaintiff’s second argument—that a First Amendment violation
necessary establishes entitlement to punitive damages—is misguided. As noted
above, the finding that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights does
not entitle Plaintiff to punitive damages; it merely “warrants consideration” of
punitive damages. 	King, 788 F.3d at 216; Irving v. Carr, No. 2:16-cv-728, 2019 WL
4929044, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2019). The Court agrees with Plaintiff, however,
that, taking the well-pleaded allegations true and considering the testimony in the
evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. Accordingly, the Court
will sustain Plaintiff’s objection.
Here, the complaint is replete with evidence that Defendant was at least
reckless or callously indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights, and (more likely) that she acted
with an evil motive. The Court will summarize the pertinent facts, taken as true, that
warrant an award of punitive damages.
The relevant facts are quite basic. In sum, Defendant retaliated against
Plaintiff for reporting inappropriate behavior of Sgt. Chiros and for participating in
the 	ensuing 	investigation. 	After 	participating 	in 	the 	investigation, 	Plaintiff
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discovered that he was place on the Brady-Giglio list, causing many charges he filed
to be declined by the prosecutor. See ECF No.14-1, PageID.109–110 (explaining that,
because Plaintiff was on the list, “some pretty serious arrests where [his] subjects
were actually released and charges were declined”). Defendant placed Plaintiff (and
others) on the list in retaliation for participating in the investigation.
Plaintiff was moved out of the Secure Cities Partnership because of his name
on the list and lost overtime compensation. For the rest of his life, when asked,
Plaintiff must testify that he was once on the Brady-Giglio list, calling into question
his honesty and integrity. Being placed on the list caused Plaintiff emotional distress
and reputational damage into the future, plus lost overtime wages. Defendant caused
Plaintiff to be placed on a list that called into question his honesty and integrity solely
because Plaintiff reported inappropriate behavior and participated in an ensuing
investigation. In doing so, Defendant caused emotional distress, reputational harm,
and professional setbacks—not to mention endangering the safety of the community.
See ECF No.14-1, PageID.109–110 (Defendant’s conduct caused people Plaintiff
arrested to “walk[] free from some pretty serious felony charges.”). Defendant’s
conduct was reckless, callous and surely demonstrated an evil motive. Therefore, the
Court will exercise its discretion to award Plaintiff punitive damages in the amount
of $20,000. Plaintiff’s objection as to punitive damages is thus sustained, and the
Court will modify the amount accordingly.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Reallocation of Special Master Fees
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Plaintiff moved to reallocate the Special Master’s compensation of $1,000 to
Defendant. ECF No. 18. Defendant neither responded nor opposed the motion. The
Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion.
The Court previously noted in the Order appointing a special master that
“Plaintiff may move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g) for reallocation of the special master
payment, or the master may make such a recommendation.” ECF No. 11, PageID.67–
68. Plaintiff argued that “the imposition of such a fee against Plaintiff punishes him
for coming forward to vindicate his rights.” ECF No. 18, PageID.209. The Court
agrees. Taking the well-pleaded allegations as true, Defendant’s conduct caused
Plaintiff harm and thus necessitated the action in this court. Defendant never
appeared nor responded to any of the proceedings. The Court, therefore, granted
Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim.
ECF No. 11. The need for the Special Master was due to Defendant’s conduct. The
Court 	will 	thus 	impose 	the 	Special 	Master’s 	fees 	on 	Defendant 	as 	the 	party
responsible for the harm and these subsequent proceedings.
III. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees
Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees, asking the Court to award $12,112.50 in
reasonable 	attorney 	fees, 	$1,155.72 	in 	costs, 	and 	an 	additional 	amount 	in
prejudgment interest. ECF No. 17, PageID.170. Defendant neither responded nor
opposed the motion. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) permits courts to grant “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the
prevailing party” in a § 1983 action. Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear, 132 F.4th
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453, 455 (6th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 22, 2025) (25-96). A
“prevailing party” is one who succeeds on a significant issue “which achieves some of
the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109
(1992) 	(quotation 	omitted). 	A 	prevailing 	party 	in 	a 	civil 	rights 	action 	should
ordinarily, absent special circumstances, be awarded attorney fees. See Indep. Fed’n
of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 759 (1989), superseded by statute on other
grounds by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071. When a
federal court considers attorney’s fees, the “primary concern is that the fee awarded
be ‘reasonable.’ A reasonable fee is ‘adequately compensatory to attract competent
counsel yet avoids producing a windfall for lawyers.’” Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510
F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir.
1999) and Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004)) (citation modified).
The Court possesses substantial discretion to award fees, but “must provide a clear
and concise explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of
Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
When attorney’s fees are merited, “[t]he lodestar method of fee calculation is
the method by which federal courts should determine reasonable attorney’s fees
under federal statutes which provide for such fees.” In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337
(6th Cir. 1991). The lodestar method requires the Court to “multiply[] the attorney’s
reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
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The Court begins its attorneys’ fee award calculation by multiplying “the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation” by “a reasonable hourly rate.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The calculation provides the Court
with the “fee applicant’s ‘lodestar.’” Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 349 (citations omitted).
The Court may, “within limits, adjust the ‘lodestar’ to reflect relevant considerations
peculiar to the subject litigation.” Id. (citation omitted).
Twelve factors influence the Court’s adjustment of a fee award. Perry v.
AutoZone Stores, Inc., 624 F. App’x 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Johnson v. Ga.
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)). The twelve factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed
or 	contingent; 	(7) time 	limitations 	imposed 	by 	the 	client 	or 	the
circumstances; 	(8) the 	amount 	involved 	and 	the 	results 	obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. Taylor Inn Enterps., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965–
66 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (quotation omitted); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87,
94 (1989) (“The Johnson factors may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar amount,
but no one factor is a substitute for multiplying reasonable billing rates by a
reasonable estimation of the number of hours expended on the litigation.”). The
Court’s analysis may subsume many factors. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9
(recognizing that a court’s lodestar calculation may tacitly consider some of the
Johnson factors).
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A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
To determine a reasonable hourly rate, “courts should look to the hourly rates
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience, and reputation.” Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753, 762
(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)).
Plaintiff requests a $375 hourly rate for Attorney Kevin Kelly. ECF No. 17,
PageID.167. The rate is reasonable in light of Attorney Kelly’s fifteen years of
experience, ECF No. 17-3, PageID.203, the prevailing market rate for employment
and/or civil rights attorneys, and similar awards in other cases in the Sixth Circuit.
First, the State Bar of Michigan’s Economics of Law Practice Survey 2023
supports the reasonableness of Attorney Kelly’s hourly rate. ECF 17-2; see Hazzard
v. Schlee & Stillman, LLC, No. 13–10038, 2014 WL 117411, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
13, 2014) (noting that the Eastern District generally accepts the State Bar of
Michigan’s Economics of Law Practice Survey as its benchmark to determine
reasonable hourly rates for attorneys). In Michigan, the median rate for civil rights
attorneys is $350 per hour, and the median rate for plaintiff-side employment
attorneys is $400 per hour. ECF No.17-2, PageID.181. Attorney Kelly’s rate of $375
per hour is between the median rates, and it is in line with his experience and
expertise. Furthermore, courts in the Eastern District of Michigan have approved
prevailing market rates exceeding $375 per hour. See, e.g., Sevy v. Barach, No. 17-
13789, 2022 WL 4234951 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 2022) (awarding $500 per hour to an
attorney who practiced for fourteen years and had experience with civil rights cases);
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Kelmendi v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., No. 12-14949, 2017 WL 1502626 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
27, 2017) (awarding $400 per hour for a plaintiff-side employment lead attorney).
Accordingly, the Court will use the reasonable hourly rate of $375 to calculate
the fees award.
B. Reasonable Number of Hours
In total, Plaintiff’s Counsel spent 32.3 hours working on Plaintiff’s case. ECF
No. 17–3, PageID.203.
The “fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award
and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley,
461 U.S. at 437. To carry the burden, attorneys must maintain time records detailed
enough to enable courts to review the reasonableness of the hours expended.
Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990), abrogated
on other grounds by, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). Courts then review the billing claims and exclude
“[e]xcessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours.” Butcher v. Bryson, No.
3:12–00251, 2014 WL 4385876, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2014) (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434).
In the Court’s experience, thirty-two hours of work is reasonable for filing an
employment and/or civil rights claim, submitting a brief and attending a hearing on
damages with a special master, objecting to the special master’s report, and bringing
motions for attorney’s fees and reallocation of special master’s fees. And detailed time
entries indicate substantive legal work. See ECF No. 17-4. No notation shows that
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Plaintiff’s 	Counsel 	billed 	time 	for 	excessive, 	redundant, 	or 	unnecessary 	work.
Accordingly, the hours billed by Plaintiff’s Counsel are reasonable.
C. Lodestar Amount
Based on the hours and rates discussed above, the lodestar amount for
Plaintiff’s Counsel Kevin Kelly is $12,112.50 (32.30 hours multiplied by $375/hour).
D. Other Factors
The lodestar calculation subsumes several of the Johnson factors.1 Given the
unique default judgment posture, the only relevant factor that the Court will address
further is the amount involved and the results obtained. See Murphy v. Vaive Wood
Prods. Co., 802 Fed. Appx. 930, 936 (6th Cir. 2020). “Where recovery of private
damages is the purpose of . . . civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is
obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as
compared to the amount sought.” Id. (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114
(1992)).
Including the modifications detailed above, the Court will award Plaintiff
$36,500 in total damages. Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees for about half that amount –
more than a standard 33% contingency fee in many civil cases. But the attorney’s fees
need not be proportional to the damages amount. See Serv. Local 47 Cleaning
Contractors Pension Plan v. Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995)
1 For example, the reasonableness of hours worked and of hourly rates includes: “the
time and labor required”; “the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly”;
“the customary fee”; “time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances”;
“the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys”; and “the nature and length
of the professional relationship with the client.” Disabled Patriots, 424 F. Supp. 2d at
965–66.
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(“In the civil rights area, there is no requirement that the amount of an award of
attorneys’ fees be proportional to the amount of the underlying award of damages.”).
Considering the amount of the award and because Plaintiff's Counsel effectively
brought and managed the case toward a positive result, the Court will not adjust the
lodestar calculation based on the Johnson factors.
E. Expenses and Costs
Plaintiff requested an award of $1,155.72 in expenses. ECF No. 17, PageID.168.
Plaintiff’s invoice reflects the following costs: $405.00 filing fee, $10.72 in postage,
$75 in process server fees, and $665.00 in court reporter fees for the evidentiary
hearing. ECF No.17-4.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows district courts to award “those incidental and necessary
expenses incurred in furnishing effective and competent representation.” Waldo v.
Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 827 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation modified).
Recoverable expenses are those “incurred by the attorney which are normally charged
to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services.” Id. (citation modified).
The Court finds that the expenses requested by Plaintiff are reasonable and those
which are normally awarded to a client. Given that they are reasonable, the Court
will award Plaintiff $1,155.72 in costs and expenses.
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F. Prejudgment Interest
Finally, Plaintiff requested that the Court award prejudgment interest.2 ECF
No. 17, PageID.162. When there is no statutory provision prohibiting or granting
prejudgment interest, the general rule in the Sixth Circuit is that the award of
prejudgment interest is in the discretion of the court. Sevy v. Barach, No. 17-cv-13789,
2022 WL 4234951, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 2022) (citing EEOC v. Wooster Brush
Co. Emps. Relief Ass’n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Pucci v. Somers,
834 F. Supp. 2d 690, 705 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2011) (awarding prejudgment interest
for First Amendment retaliation claim because “the award of prejudgment interest
in cases of employment discrimination . . . also appl[ies] in [a retaliation] case”).
In considering prejudgment interest, courts look to “(i) the need to fully
compensate the wronged party for actual damages suffered, (ii) considerations of
fairness and the relative equities of the award, (iii) the remedial purpose of the
statute involved, and/or (iv) such other general principles as are deemed relevant by
the court.” In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 727 F.3d 473, 495 (6th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Wickham Contracting Co. v. Loc. Union No. 3, IBEW, AFL-CIO, 955 F.2d
831, 834 (2d Cir. 1992)). Prejudgment interest is compensatory and therefore “should
not be awarded if it would result in the overcompensation of the plaintiff.” Id.
Plaintiff 	requested 	prejudgment 	interest 	“on 	the 	amount 	of 	the 	final
judgment.” ECF No. 17, PageID.169. As discussed above, the final judgment will
2 Plaintiff did not request a specific amount in prejudgment interest in light of its
objections to the Special Master’s Report and uncertainty over the final amount. See
ECF No. 17, PageID.169.
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include $11,500 in compensatory damages for lost overtime, $5,000 in compensatory
damages for pain and suffering, and $20,000 in punitive damages.
The Court will award Plaintiff both economic and non-economic damages.
“Economic injuries are those that arise from damage to a financial interest, such as
a contract, accumulated medical bills, or property.” Gray v. Barnett, No. 2:20-cv-
02947, 2024 WL 4005091, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 30, 2024). By contrast, “[n]on-
economic injuries are those that arise from damage to non-financial interests, such
as awards for pain and suffering from bodily harm, violations of civil rights, and
diminished reputations.” Id. at *2. Here, Plaintiff’s reputational and emotional harm
are non-economic damages. The wages from lost overtime are economic damages.
First, the Court will award prejudgment interest on the $11,500 in Plaintiff’s
lost overtime wages. Prejudgment interest is part of complete compensation for past
lost wages. See Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d 718, 751 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that
the district court abused its discretion by not awarding prejudgment interest on back
pay). But for Defendant’s unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiff would have been paid
and able to use that money since the date of the injury. Prejudgment interest is
therefore appropriate here to make Plaintiff whole for the time value of his lost wages.
See In re ClassicStar, 727 F.3d at 495–96 (explaining that “prejudgment interest is
intended to make the plaintiff whole”); E.E.O.C. v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d
836, 	842 	(6th 	Cir. 	1994) 	(“Prejudgment 	interest 	helps 	to 	make 	victims 	of
discrimination whole and compensates them for the true cost of money damages they
incurred.”).
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Second, the Court will not award prejudgment interest on the compensatory
damages for emotional distress and reputational harm as prejudgment interest on
non-economic damages does not accord with the general purpose of prejudgment
interest. 	Westbrook v. Chattanooga Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 143226, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. June 26, 2025) (noting that the sole purpose of pre-
judgment interest is to compensate the plaintiff for the time value of money and the
effects of inflation) (quotations omitted); see also Macmaster v. Busacca, No. 2:21-cv-
11052, ECF No. 250, 	PageID.9364–9368 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2025) (Murphy, J.)
(collecting cases and declining to award prejudgment interest for non-economic
damages in § 1983 action, in part, because “courts in the Sixth Circuit generally do
not award prejudgment interest on non-economic damages”).
Third, because punitive damages are not meant to compensate a Plaintiff for
lost wages and because the vast majority of courts hold that prejudgment interest is
not applicable to punitive damages, the Court will not award Plaintiff prejudgment
interest on the punitive damages award. See Ortiz v. Bright, No. 2:98-cv-1031, 2006
WL 1133296, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2006) (collecting cases and noting that “[t]he
majority of courts, however, deny the collection of prejudgment interest on punitive
damages . . . because prejudgment interest has a compensatory purpose while
punitive damages are essentially meant to punish.”).
i. 	Method for Calculating Prejudgment Interest
Because 	Plaintiff 	will 	be 	awarded 	prejudgment 	interest 	on some 	of 	his
damages, 	the 	Court 	must 	determine 	the 	proper 	method 	for 	determining 	the
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prejudgment interest rate and accrual date. “[T]he determination of the prejudgment
interest rate [is] within the sound discretion of the district court.” Ford v. Uniroyal
Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1961 “is a reasonable method for calculating
prejudgment 	interest 	awards.” 	ECF 	No. 17, 	PageID.169. 	§ 1961(a) 	states 	that
“interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal
to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding
the date of the judgment.” The Sixth Circuit has held that “the statutory post-
judgment framework set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is a reasonable method for
calculating prejudgment interest awards.” Ford, 154 F.3d at 619. The Court agrees
and will therefore use § 1961 to calculate prejudgment interest.
ii. 	Date of Accrual
Prejudgment interest on the economic damages portion of the award, accrued
from the date the of the harm (being placed on the Brady-Giglio list in September
2023) until the date of the judgment (October 20, 2025) should be awarded to
adequately compensate Plaintiff for the wages lost. See In re Zelazny, 659 B.R. 544,
583 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2024) (“Federal courts have exercised broad discretion in
determining the time from which prejudgment interest should accrue . . . . [such as]
from the date an adversary complaint was filed.”). Interest accruing from the date of
the harm will more fully compensate Plaintiff for the time value of money lost by
having to bring this action to recover his damages he was entitled to because of
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Defendant’s actions. The interest will thus be calculated from the date of the harm,
September 1, 2023, until the date judgment is entered. See ECF No. 1, PageID.4
(stating that Plaintiff heard he was placed on the list in “early September 2023”).
iii. 	Prejudgment Interest Rate
Next, however, the Court must consider what the rate should be. Although the
Sixth Circuit has “upheld awards of pre-judgment interest calculated pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1961, a mechanical application of the rate at the time of the award amounts
to an abuse of discretion.” Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.,
751 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Ret.
Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d 675, 686 (6th Cir. 2013)).
The Sixth Circuit has instructed courts to consider case-specific factors when
determining the appropriate prejudgment interest rate. These factors include the
remedial goal of making the plaintiff whole, the prevention of unjust enrichment on
behalf of the wrongdoer, the lost interest value of money wrongly withheld, and the
rate of inflation. Schumacher, 711 F.3d at 687. Still, “district courts may fashion an
award in their sound discretion.” Id.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that a prejudgment interest rate
based on the date of the harm, 5.39% 3 , is appropriate to compensate Plaintiff for the
3 	Federal 	interest 	rates 	for 	civil 	judgments 	can 	be 	found 	at
https://jnet.ao.dcn/financial-management/accounting/post-judgment-interest-rates.
The interest rate applicable under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 to a judgment entered (or date of
harm) on September 1, 2023 is the interest rate for the preceding calendar week—
5.39%. The Court believes the interest rate from the date of the harm will more fairly
compensate Plaintiff than the interest rate on the day of judgment (3.65%).
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time value of money he lost by not receiving overtime with the Secure Cities
Partnership. See also Ashford v. Univ. of Michigan, No. 2:20-cv-10561, 2025 WL
984351, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2025) (awarding prejudgment interest from the
date of the complaint through the issuance of judgment in accordance with the rate
from 28 U.S.C. § 1961). The 5.39% rate is nearly the highest rate during the relevant
time period; however, interest rates remained at four to five percent for over another
year. As a result, the 5.39% rate neither overcompensates nor undercompensates
Plaintiff for his lost wages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will adopt the Special Master’s Report as
to economic, compensatory damages, and sustain Plaintiff’s objections to the Special
Master’s Report as to non-economic, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
Furthermore, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motions for attorney fees, costs, and
prejudgment interest as well as Plaintiff’s motion to reallocate the Special Master’s
fees.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to the
Special Master’s Report and Recommendation are SUSTAINED.
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED that Plaintiff is AWARDED $16,500 in
compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs
and prejudgment interest [17] is GRANTED. Plaintiff is therefore AWARDED
$12,112.50 in attorney’s fees and $1,155.72 in costs.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reallocation of special
master fees [18] is GRANTED. Defendant must PAY $1,000 to Special Master Mr.
Dane Lepola.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff is AWARDED prejudgment interest
on its economic damages for the period between September 1, 2023 through the date
of judgment October 20, 2025 at the rate of 5.39%.
This is a final order that closes the case.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: October 21, 2025
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