Cochrane v. Whitmer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
In Plaintiff Bradley Cochrane’s own words, “[t]his is not your ‘typical’ lawsuit.”
(ECF No. 2, PageID.962.)
In a barely coherent, nearly 800-page complaint (id. at PageID.187–965)—not
counting the hundreds of appended exhibits (see ECF Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)—, Cochrane,
on behalf of himself and his law firm, The Traveling Attorney, P.C1 sues Governor
Gretchen Whitmer and Attorney General Dana Nessel (the “State Defendants”) as
well as the Board of Governors of Wayne State University and several individuals
who are allegedly associated with the University (the “WSU Defendants”). (ECF No.
2.) Cochrane alleges that Defendants have engaged in a massive conspiracy to exploit
WSU students and commit other bad acts. The crux of Plaintiff’s argument seems to
1 According to the State Bar of Michigan directory, Cochrane is the only
attorney at this firm. See Member Directory Search Details: The Traveling Attorney,
P.C., State Bar of Mich., https://perma.cc/56AN-LP69. So the Court will refer to
Cochrane as the plaintiff throughout for clarity.
BRADLEY COCHRANE and THE
TRAVELING ATTORNEY, P.C.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GRETCHEN WHITMER et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-10648
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS [43, 44]
AND DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS [53]
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be that WSU was wrong to allow one of its professors to teach or “deceptively us[e]”
the “Theory of Constraints,” a “process improvement methodology.” (ECF No. 2,
PageID.234.) Cochrane also claims that, in teaching the methodology, Defendants
used students as “human research subjects” without their knowledge or consent. (Id.
at PageID.195.) He asserts constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
conspiracy 	under 	§ 1985. 	(Id. 	at 	PageID.187.) 	The 	Court 	declined 	to 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his numerous, unrelated state law claims. (ECF Nos.
11, 26.)
Now before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 43, 44.) They argue, for example, that
they are immune from suit, that the statute of limitations bars all claims, and that
no plausible claims can even be discerned. (ECF Nos. 43, 44.) The WSU Defendants
filed a separate motion for sanctions against Cochrane and his law firm for their
alleged misconduct in this litigation. (ECF No. 53.)
Because Cochrane did not comply with pleading requirements and fails to state
a claim, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss. But despite concerns
about Cochrane’s litigation behavior, the Court will DENY the WSU Defendants’
motion for sanctions.
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must set out “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Kensu v. Corizon, Inc., 5 F.4th 646, 649 (6th Cir. 2021).
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“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). This is
to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
When a complaint is “so convoluted that it is difficult or impossible to make
out intelligible legal claims,” it violates this rule. Miller v. Alco Mgmt., Inc., No. 22-
5825, 2023 WL 2607458, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023). The inquiry is whether “the
complaint is so ‘verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, is
well disguised.’” Kensu, 5 F.4th at 651 (citing Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d
426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969)). “The district court and defendants should not have to ‘fish
a gold coin from a bucket of mud’ to identify the allegations really at issue.” Id. (citing
U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Plaintiff’s complaint clearly violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It is
almost 800 pages of rambling and unintelligible prose. By Cochrane’s own admission,
his complaint “presents itself much like a Doctoral Thesis would.” (ECF No. 2,
PageID.962.) It raises 16 legal claims against 15 defendants. (Id. at PageID.187.)
Defendants call it “a labyrinth of irrelevant information” (ECF No. 43, PageID.5208),
“long-winded and confused” (ECF No. 44, PageID.5296).
Courts generally find that “[f]at in a complaint can be ignored” or dealt with
by “strik[ing] the surplusage,” and that “the appropriate remedy is rarely immediate
dismissal” for violating Rule 8. Kensu, 5 F.4th at 652–53 (alterations in original); see
also Miller, 2023 WL 2607458, at *2 (concluding it was improper to dismiss a pro se
complaint, 	despite 	“extraneous 	details,” 	because 	it 	told 	an 	“intelligible” 	and
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“chronological story” about the claims sufficient to “give the defendants notice”). But
here, 	no 	amount 	of 	surgery 	can 	save 	the 	patient. 	The 	complaint 	is 	entirely
unintelligible and replete with irrelevant information. The Court “need not have
infinite patience.” Kensu, 5 F.4th at 653.
This is also not a typical pro se lawsuit. While Plaintiff is representing himself,
he is an attorney. He knows, or should know, the requirements of Rule 8. Yet he failed
to adhere to them. This alone warrants dismissal of the complaint. But it is not the
only deficiency.
The complaint also fails to state a plausible legal claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
It is helpful to first set out the governing law. In deciding a motion to dismiss,
the Court “construes the complaint in the light most favorable” to the Plaintiff and
determines whether his “complaint ‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” See Heinrich v. Waiting
Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Detailed factual allegations are
not required to survive a motion to dismiss, HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d
608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012), but a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Determining plausibility is “a context-
specific task” requiring this Court “to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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Under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) they were deprived of a right secured
by the U.S. Constitution and (2) the deprivation was caused by a state actor. See
Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2015). But “conclusory allegations of
unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim
under section 1983. ‘Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the
pleadings.’” Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726–27 (6th Cir. 1996)
(internal citation omitted). Likewise, conspiracy claims “must be pled with some
specificity: vague and conclusory allegations that are unsupported by material facts
are not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim.” Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 599 (6th Cir.
2004) (citing Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987)).
To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege “that (1) a single plan
existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiffs
of their constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy that caused the injury.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In other words, he must plead “specific facts showing a
conspiracy 	to 	deprive 	him 	of 	his 	civil 	rights 	with 	racial 	or other 	class-based
discriminatory animus.” Stansberry v. Theater, No. 24-3543, 2024 WL 5135825, at *2
(6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2024).
In applying this law to the allegations, as best the Court can determine,
Cochrane is unhappy with how a certain theory, the “Theory of Constraints,” is
studied, researched, and implemented at WSU:
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NOW—understand that this reality ballooned quickly as I frantically
worked to understand these facts in “Effect-Cause-Effect Logic” to
determine (1) WHO was attacking me, and (2) WHAT was attacking me,
among other things. As my analysis grew, the research necessary to
support the objective truth involved required validation by objective
evidence too. Therefore, my objective research found that the “research
components” of the Theory of Constraints (“TOC”) are commingled on all
levels of the Defendants’ organization given the system-thinking focus
of TOC and the Defendants’ deliberate implementation of various
applications of this ideology throughout its’ ranks and organizational
design.
(ECF No. 2, PageID.234 (emphasis in original).) Cochrane says Defendants are
somehow impermissibly using this theory to “obtain unconstitutional value” (id. at
PageID.236), repeatedly claiming that students are used as human research subjects
in connection with this theory (id. at PageID.237, 241, 258, 316, 396, 401, 414, 434).
But 	the 	779-page 	complaint 	meanders 	through 	hard-to-follow 	musings,
including 	comments 	about 	the 	automotive 	industry 	(id. 	at 	PageID.385–409),
Cochrane’s life and education (id. at PageID.490–504), and the history of education,
starting from prehistoric times (id. at PageID.792–813). The claims are so disjointed
that they are hard to follow and even harder to find plausible. The Court thus finds
them factually frivolous. See Cassaday v. Verizon Media Inc., No. 25-10276, 2025 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16682, at *4 (6th Cir. July 8, 2025) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint did not
include sufficient intelligible factual assertions to state a plausible claim. He cited
numerous state and federal laws and generally asserted that the defendants harmed
him, but he asserted no concrete facts from which it could be inferred that the
defendants were liable for any unlawful conduct.”); see also Rodriguez v. City of
Parma Mun. Ct., No. 25-1367, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189846, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept.
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25, 2025) (dismissing as frivolous where “complaint (with nearly 250 pages of exhibits
attached) consist[ed] entirely of unclear and conclusory allegations and grievances”).
While voluminous, Cochrane’s complaint does not contain any specific facts
that plausibly plead a claim under § 1983 or § 1985(3). It “[m]erely lis[ts] names in
the caption of the complaint and alleg[es] constitutional violations in the body of the
complaint,” which is “not enough to sustain recovery under § 1983.” Gilmore v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Powell v. Washington, No.
22-12091, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99185, at *3–5 (E.D. Mich. June 7, 2023). And the
complaint contains no allegations that Cochrane was “deprived of any civil rights
because of racial or other relevant, discriminatory animus, nor that he was deprived
of his civil rights” under § 1985(3). Williams v. Massey, No. 24-12435, 2025 WL
2254526, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2025).
The Court has more than sufficient grounds to dismiss the complaint and need
not wade into Defendants’ additional arguments for dismissal.2 As such, the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Cochrane made no attempt to amend the
complaint after the Defendants filed their motions to dismiss. He did not move to
amend. And the Court cannot imagine a scenario in which an amendment would not
be futile. Thus, it will not permit amendment of the complaint. See, e.g., Pratt v.
Ventas, Inc., 365 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A ‘dismissal for failure to state a
2 None of those grounds, however, include standing. But the Court has an
independent obligation to police its own jurisdiction. See Burt v. Playtika, Ltd, 132
F.4th 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2025). And it certainly has concerns here. But given the
incoherence of his pleading, it may be that Cochrane is alleging some specific injury
caused by a defendant’s conduct that the Court can redress.
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claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a judgment on the merits’ and
is therefore done with prejudice.”) (citation omitted); Layer-Rosario v. Allied Mortg.
Capital Corp., No. 17-5468, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 554, at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2018).
In addition to dismissal, the WSU Defendants also want sanctions. (ECF No.
53.) The WSU Defendants request that Cochrane be ordered to pay their attorney’s
fees and be enjoined from filing any new complaint or motion against them without
leave of court. (Id.) They ask the Court to do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, 28 U.S.C § 1927, and the Court’s inherent powers. (Id. at PageID.8632–8633.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires that attorneys certify, to the
best of their knowledge and after a reasonable inquiry, that any pleading, written
motion, or other paper is “not presented for any improper purpose (e.g., to harass or
cause unnecessary delay); contains nonfrivolous claims, defenses, or legal arguments;
and is based on facts supported by evidence, or that will likely be supported by
evidence after discovery.” Turn v. Leslie, No. 21-12767, 2023 WL 9007800, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 2, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). If Rule 11(b) has been violated, “the
court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). In
considering 	sanctions, 	a 	court 	assesses 	“whether 	an 	individual’s 	conduct 	was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Union Planters Bank v. L & J Dev. Co., 115
F.3d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 1997).
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The Court may also impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against an
attorney 	“who 	so 	multiplies 	the 	proceedings 	in 	any 	case 	unreasonably 	and
vexatiously . . . to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. 	§ 1927. “[Section] 1927
sanctions 	require 	a showing 	of 	something 	less 	than 	subjective 	bad faith, 	but
something more than negligence or incompetence.” Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source
Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2006).
And lastly, the Court may also impose sanctions under its inherent authority.
“A court may assess attorney’s fees under its inherent powers ‘when a party has acted
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,’ or when the conduct is
‘tantamount to bad faith.’” Metz v. Unizan Bank, 655 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted). The Court need not make an “express finding of willfulness, bad
faith or recklessness,” but the record must “set forth sufficient evidence to support”
the decision. Ali v. IT People Corp., No. 25-10815, 2025 WL 2682622, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 19, 2025) (citing Metz, 655 F.3d at 489).
The WSU Defendants assert that sanctions are warranted because Cochrane
filed this lawsuit for an improper motive: as retaliation for WSU not “double
count[ing]” Cochrane’s academic credits and placing his academic record on hold for
lack of payment, among other grievances. (ECF No. 53, PageID.8643–8648.) And it
appears Cochrane has now initiated a retaliatory suit against the attorneys for the
WSU Defendants as well. (Id. at PageID.8650.)
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Further, they argue sanctions are justified because the “sprawling, conspiracy-
laden Complaint is not a proper legal pleading in any recognizable sense of the word”
and is “frivolous and devoid of legal merit.” (ECF No. 53, PageID.8641 (“The WSU
Defendants provide an extensive analysis of Cochrane’s Rule 8 violations in their
Motion to Dismiss (‘MTD’), which in the interest of efficiency, is not repeated here.”
(citing ECF No. 43, PageID.5212–5217)).) And they note that during this litigation,
Cochrane has twice filed a motion for sanctions against all Defendants (ECF Nos. 38,
47), which the Court denied as baseless (ECF No. 40).
The Court understands the WSU Defendants’ frustration. They have expended
significant time, resources, and money in a near futile attempt to discern and defend
against hundreds of pages of incomprehensible allegations. And they had to respond
to two unfounded motions for sanctions. But those motions were decided quickly, and
the case is being dismissed at its earliest stage. So while the Court shares Defendants’
concerns about this litigation behavior, it believes the better sanction is dismissal of
the lawsuit.
The Court cautions Cochrane, though, that further frivolous or vexatious
filings may result in the imposition of sanctions.
At this time, therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for sanctions.
(ECF No. 53.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: December 1, 2025
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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