Evans v. Rewerts

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARON MANDEL EVANS,
Petitioner, 	Case No. 19-cv-10760
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
v.
RANDEE REWERTS,
Respondent.
__________________________________________________________________/
ORDER (1) DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT
PETITION (ECF No. 33), (2) DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO RE-
OPEN CASE (ECF No. 37), AND (3) DENYING A
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
In 2014, Petitioner Daron Mandel Evans was convicted of three serious
controlled substances offenses in a Michigan state court and sentenced to serve a
term of up to 60 years in prison. 	Nine years later, United States District Judge
Victoria A. Roberts granted Evans relief from his sentence in habeas proceedings.
Judge Roberts ruled that Evans was entitled to that relief because the state trial court
determined his sentence based upon judge-found facts and sentenced him under
Michigan’s then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. 	Judge Roberts determined that
sentencing Evans under those circumstances violated the Sixth Amendment. 	She
ordered Respondent to release Evans from custody unless he was given a new
sentencing hearing within 120 days. 	The state trial court thereafter held a
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resentencing hearing within the 120-day period and resentenced Evans under
Michigan’s now-advisory sentencing guidelines.
Now before the Court are two motions that Evans has filed: (1) a motion to
amend or correct his petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 33) and (2) a
motion to re-open his case (ECF No. 37). In both motions, Evans asserts that he is
entitled 	to 	an 	unconditional 	grant 	of habeas 	relief because 	his 	resentencing
proceedings did not satisfy the requirements imposed by Judge Roberts’ grant of
habeas relief. Respondent counters that the resentencing of Evans under Michigan’s
now-advisory sentencing guidelines did comply with the grant of habeas relief. (See
Resp., ECF No. 35.) The Court agrees with Respondent. Therefore, for the reasons
explained below, the Court DENIES both motions. The Court also DENIES Evans
a certificate of appealability.
I
A
On January 27, 2014, a jury in the Oakland Circuit Court convicted Evans of
one count of delivery of a controlled substance causing death, MICH. COMP. L AWS §
750.317a, and two counts of delivery of a controlled substance of less than 50 grams,
M ICH. COMP. L AWS § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). (See 01/27/2014 Tr., ECF No. 9-18.) The
state trial court then sentenced Evans to 18-to-60 years’ imprisonment for the
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delivery causing death offense, and concurrent terms of 5-to-30 years’ imprisonment
for the two lesser offenses. (See St. Ct. Op., ECF No. 13, PageID.1207.)
At the time of Evans’ sentencing, Michigan’s sentencing guidelines were
mandatory, and the state trial court used those mandatory guidelines to calculate
Evans’ sentence. Relevant here, the state court assigned Evans 50 points for Offense
Variable 6 (“OV 6”) of the sentencing guidelines, which relates to the offender’s
intent to kill or injure. That offense variable provides that:
Offense variable 6 is the offender’s intent to kill or injure
another 	individual. 	Score 	offense 	variable 	6 	by
determining 	which 	of 	the 	following 	apply 	and 	by
assigning the number of points attributable to the one that
has the highest number of points:
(a) The offender had premeditated intent to kill or
the killing was committed while committing or
attempting 	to 	commit 	arson, 	criminal 	sexual
conduct in the first or third degree, child abuse in
the 	first 	degree, 	a 	major 	controlled 	substance
offense, 	robbery, 	breaking 	and 	entering 	of 	a
dwelling, home invasion in the first or second
degree, 	larceny 	of 	any 	kind, 	extortion, 	or
kidnapping or the killing was the murder of a peace
officer or a corrections officer … 50 points
MICH. COMP. L AWS § 777.36(1)(a) (emphasis added).
Evans appealed his convictions and sentence in the Michigan Court of
Appeals. 	Among other claims, Evans asserted that the state trial court had
incorrectly scored OV 6 of the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines at 50 points
because no evidence was presented showing that he intended to kill the decedent
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when he delivered the controlled substance. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied
relief and held that “the sentencing court properly scored OV 6.” People v. Evans,
2015 WL 4390604, at * 3-4 (Mich. Ct. App. July 16, 2015).
Following the conclusion of his direct appeals, Evans filed a motion for relief
from judgment in the state trial court. (See St. Ct. Mot., ECF No. 9-21.) 	In that
motion, Evans argued, among other things, that the state trial court’s scoring of OV
6 and two other offense variables violated Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99
(2013), because the sentencing guidelines were mandatory and the trial court relied
on facts not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury when it scored those
variables.1 (See id., PageID.1048-1051.) The state courts denied relief on the merits
and under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3). (See Orders, ECF Nos. 9-23, 9-24, 9-
25.)
1 In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that that any fact that increases a
mandatory minimum sentence is an “element” of the offense that must be submitted
to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111-12. Then,
in People v. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. 2015), the Michigan Supreme Court
held that under Alleyne, Michigan’s then-mandatory sentencing guidelines violated
the Sixth Amendment because the guidelines “require judicial fact-finding beyond
facts admitted by the defendant or found by the jury to score offense variables
that mandatorily increase 	the 	floor 	of 	the 	guidelines 	minimum 	sentence
range.” Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d at 506 (emphasis in original). The court’s remedy
was to make the guidelines advisory only. See id. at 520-21.
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B
On March 13, 2019, Evans filed his federal habeas petition in this Court under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Pet. ECF No. 1.) 	In the petition, Evans raised six claims
seeking relief from his convictions and sentence, including his Alleyne claim. After
several years of proceedings and appeals, Judge Roberts ruled that Evans was
entitled to “a full resentencing” based on his Alleyne claim because, contrary to the
rule in Alleyne, he was sentenced based upon judge-found facts under a mandatory
guidelines system. (Order, ECF No. 28, PageID.1410-1411, 1415.) Judge Roberts
conditionally granted Evans habeas relief on his Alleyne as follows:
The Court CONDITIONALLY GRANTS the petition for
writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	on 	Evans’ 	claim 	that 	his
constitutional rights were violated under Alleyne, and that
the error was not harmless. Unless the State of Michigan
takes action to resentence Evans in accordance with this
opinion within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the
date of this opinion, Evans may apply for a writ ordering
Respondent to release him from custody.
(Id., PageID.1416.)
C
On August 10, 2023, within the 120-day period described above, the state trial
court conducted a full resentencing proceeding. (See 08/10/2023 Sent. Tr., ECF 36-
5.) At that hearing, Evans argued that OV 6 should be scored at zero points based
on the same argument that he presented to the state courts on direct appeal – that he
did not intend to kill the decedent because “at the time of the delivery, not only had
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Mr. Evans not ever met Mr. Brown (the decedent), but Mr. Brown wasn’t part of
that delivery by Mr. Evans…. [H]e came into contact with that controlled substance
through another party….” (Id., PageID.1562-1563.)
The state trial court, noting that Evans’ argument had already been rejected
on direct appeal, held that it was bound by the Michigan Court of Appeals’
determination that OV 6 was properly scored at 50 points. (See id., PageID.1563-
1564.) 	Based on the reduction of the scores for three other offense variables that
were adjudicated at the resentencing, Evans’ new advisory guidelines range called
for a minimum term of 108-to-225 months’ imprisonment. (See id., PageID.1566.)
The state court then sentenced Evans in the middle of the advisory range to 14 years
(168 months) to 60 years imprisonment for the delivery causing death conviction.
(See id. PageID.1572.) The court left the lesser concurrent sentences unchanged at
5-to-30 years’ imprisonment. (See id.)
Evans appealed his new sentence, and the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence, including the scoring of 50 points for OV 6. See Evans, 2024
WL 3841696, at * 4-5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2024). In a passage worth quoting
at length, the Michigan Court of Appeals carefully explained why Judge Roberts’
grant of habeas relief did not preclude the state trial court from applying the law of
the case doctrine to the scoring of OV 6:
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Defendant argues that resentencing court erred when it
declined to revisit this Court’s prior decision regarding
OV 6, citing law of the case. We disagree and conclude
that both the resentencing court and this Court are bound
by law of the case.
[….]
It is undisputed that this Court considered and ruled on the
OV 6 issue in defendant’s appeal of right. Accordingly,
consistent with the law of the case doctrine, neither we nor
the resentencing court may revisit that question unless the
Sixth Circuit’s remand order requires us to do so.
Defendant argues that the Sixth Circuit’s use of the term
“full resentencing” requires the resentencing court to
consider all issues, even those on which this Court had
ruled. We disagree for two reasons. First, there was only
one issue before the Sixth Circuit - whether the sentencing
court had scored the guidelines based on judge-made
findings of fact rather than those necessarily determined
by the jury. Second, at least at the time the habeas petition
was granted, the law in the Sixth Circuit was that where
an Alleyne error had occurred, the federal district court
had discretion to remand for a Crosby hearing or for a full
resentencing. See, Morrell v Wardens, 12 F 4th 626, 634
(CA 6, 2021). The former procedure allows a trial court to
determine whether the scoring error would result in a
change in the sentence it imposed, and if not, it need not
hold a resentencing. The latter requires a resentencing
hearing at which defendant has the right to be present.
As noted above, defendant raised six issues in his habeas
petition, one of which was that the guidelines had been
scored improperly. The federal district court rejected all
six arguments and particularly noted that a habeas petition
cannot raise challenges based solely on state law, e.g. the
scoring 	of 	state 	sentencing 	guidelines 	absent 	a
constitutional issue. While the district court did issue a
certificate of appealability to the Sixth Circuit, it permitted
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an 	appeal 	only 	as 	to 	the Alleyne issue, 	i.e. 	whether
defendant’s OVs were scored on the basis of judge-found
facts. Evans II, unpub. op. at 9. Accordingly, whether OV
6 was properly scored under state law was never even
before the Sixth Circuit. In addition, although defendant
relies on the use of the phrase “full resentencing,” in the
remand order, defendant fails to consider language in the
remand order stating that the purpose of the remand was
to provide him with “a full opportunity to make any
arguments 	in 	support 	of 	a 	departure 	from 	the 	non-
mandatory 	and 	lower 	guidelines 	range,” 	i.e.
the Alleyne issue.
At resentencing, the circuit court noted that the parties
agreed OV 5 and OV 9 should each be assessed zero
points. Then the resentencing court heard defendant’s
arguments as to OV 3—the scoring of which had not been
challenged in his direct appeal—and agreed the sentencing
court had not clearly set forth its reasons for scoring it. It
therefore concluded that OV 3 should be analyzed “anew,”
and held that zero points should be assessed for OV 3
because “there is no evidence that the heroin caused a life
threatening or permanent incapacitating injury.”
Defendant 	challenged 	the 	scoring 	of 	OV 	6 	at 	the
resentencing, but did not argue that the scoring of OV 6
violated Alleyne. Defendant argued only that it had been
misscored under state law, the exact issue that had been
addressed by this Court in defendant’s appeal of right.
Given that the basis for scoring OV 6 had already been
considered and decided by this Court and that the issue of
whether the OV was properly scored under state law was
not even before the Sixth Circuit, we reject the argument
that the Sixth Circuit’s order required us to ignore the law
of the case doctrine and again consider whether OV 6 was
properly scored.
Our conclusion is further bolstered when one considers the
context in which the federal district court remanded for a
“full resentencing.” Defendant argues that this means that
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all sentencing issues were back on the table. We disagree.
As 	noted 	above, 	upon 	finding 	that 	there 	had 	been
an Alleyne error, the district court could order either of two
remedies; it could remand for a Crosby proceeding or for
“full resentencing,” the latter of which would require a full
hearing, the presence of the defendant and an opportunity
to argue why the trial court should impose a different
sentence. See Morrell v Wardens, 12 F 4th 626, 634 (CA
6, 2021). We conclude therefore that the use of the term
“full resentencing” was intended to require a resentencing
rather than a Crosby ruling. We do not read it as directing
us to override the law of the case as to issues already
determined by this Court that were never considered by
the Sixth Circuit.
Moreover, 	once 	the 	Michigan 	Supreme 	Court
decided Lockridge, 	any 	constitutional 	error
under Alleyne lay not in the scoring of the guidelines
(because the guidelines could be scored with judge-found
facts since the guidelines were now advisory rather than
mandatory). 	In Morrell, 	12 	F 	4th 	at 	634, 	the 	court
discussed both the purpose of the habeas remedy and the
advantages of ordering a resentencing:
The primary goal of a habeas remedy is to cure the
constitutional violation, Ewing [v Horton, 914 F3d
1027, 1032–33 (CA 6, 2019)], which in this appeal
was 	the 	application 	of 	mandatory 	sentencing
guidelines based in part on judicially found facts.
There are valid reasons why a court may decide that
a 	full 	resentencing 	hearing, 	which 	allows 	a
defendant 	to 	appear 	in 	court 	and 	make 	new
arguments based on the advisory guideline range,
more effectively cures the constitutional violation
than a more limited Crosby hearing.
Therefore, post-Lockridge, the constitutional violation to
be cured is a sentencing judge’s misapprehension that the
sentencing guidelines are mandatory rather than advisory,
rather than the fact that the guidelines were scored based
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upon judge-found facts. As for the Sixth Circuit’s apparent
preference 	for 	a 	resentencing 	rather 	than
a Crosby hearing, Morrell, 12 F 4th at 634, notes that a
resentencing hearing “allows a defendant to appear in
court and make new arguments based on the advisory
guideline range” and that a Crosby hearing would deprive
a defendant “of the chance to make an argument that the
court should depart from the guidelines under a sentencing
scheme 	where 	such 	departures 	were 	more 	likely.”
(Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)
Accordingly, 	because 	the Evans 	IV Court 	could 	not
consider whether the sentencing court correctly scored the
guidelines under Michigan law, the sentencing court’s
decision and this Court’s decision in Evans I concerning
the assessment of 50 points to OV 6 could not be second-
guessed by the federal district court and the circuit court
did not err when it declined to revisit OV 6 at the
resentencing 	absent 	allegations 	of 	an 	Alleyne 	error.
See Sanford v Yukins, 288 F3d 855, 860 (CA 6, 2002).
Id. at * 3-6 (internal footnotes removed).
The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied leave to appeal. People v.
Evans, 15 N.W.3d 596 (Mich. 2025) (Table).
D
On May 21, 2025, Evans returned to this Court and filed what he labeled as a
new petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See Pet., ECF No. 30.) 	Because it was
unclear whether Evans intended to commence a new action raising new claims or
whether he wished to assert that the State did not comply with the previous
conditional grant of habeas relief, the Court ordered Evans to clarify his pleading.
(See Order, ECF No. 32.)
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Evans responded to that order by filing his motion to amend or correct in
which he said that it was his intent to challenge the State’s compliance with the prior
conditional grant of habeas relief. (See Mot., ECF No. 33.) Respondent thereafter
filed both a supplemental brief responding to Evans’ arguments and the state court
record related to the resentencing and subsequent appeal. (See ECF Nos. 35, 36.)
Finally, Evans also filed a motion to re-open his case in which he again reiterated
his claim that the State did not comply with the terms of the previous conditional
grant of habeas relief. (See Mot., ECF No. 37.)
This Court retains jurisdiction to determine whether Respondent complied
with the terms of the conditional grant of relief, see Gentry v. Deuth, 456 F.3d 687,
692 (6th Cir. 2006), and it is now prepared to rule on Evans’ motions.
II
Evans asserts that the State failed to comply with the terms of the conditional
grant of habeas relief calling for a full resentencing proceeding because the state trial
court failed to entertain his challenge to the prior scoring of OV 6. 	The Court
disagrees.
As the conditional grant of habeas relief makes clear, Evans was granted
habeas relief because the original sentencing proceeding violated his rights “under
Alleyne.” (Order, ECF No. 28, PageID.1416.) And the violation of Alleyne occurred
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because the state trial court sentenced Evans under a mandatory guidelines system
based upon judge-found facts.
The resentencing of Evans fully complied with Alleyne – and thus cured the
error that tainted Evans’ original sentencing – because Evans was resentenced under
advisory guidelines. See Reign v. Gidley, 929 F.3d 777, 780-811 (6th Cir. 2019)
(holding that Michigan sentencing court cured Alleyne violation when it resentenced
defendant under advisory version of sentencing guidelines). 	And because the
resentencing complied with Alleyne, it satisfied the requirements of Judge Roberts’
grant of habeas relief.
Evans counters that his resentencing did not comply with Judge Roberts’ grant
of habeas relief because the state trial court applied the law of the case doctrine to
OV 6 and did not independently reconsider whether that variable was properly
scored at 50 points. But Judge Roberts’ grant of relief did not require the state trial
court to disregard the law of the case doctrine or to conduct a further review of OV
6. 	Instead, that grant of relief required the state trial court to give Evans a
resentencing proceeding that fully complied with the Sixth Amendment. 	And, as
explained above, the state trial court did just that when it resentenced Evans under
Michigan’s now-advisory guidelines.
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III
For all of the reasons explained above, by providing Evans a resentencing
proceeding at which he was resentenced under advisory sentencing guidelines, the
State fully complied with Judge Roberts’ conditional grant of habeas relief. Evans’
motions seeking relief (ECF Nos. 33, 37) are therefore DENIED.
In addition, the Court DENIES Evans a certificate of appealability because
reasonable jurists would not disagree with the Court’s disposition of the pending
motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 12, 2025
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on November 12, 2025, by electronic means
and/or ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Ryan
Case Manager
(313) 234-5126
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