USA v. BISHOP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
v. 	) 	1:26-cr-00043-JAW
)
DEVIN AUSTIN BISHOP 	)
)
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL
The 	court 	dismisses 	without 	prejudice 	a 	defendant’s 	motion 	to 	compel
production of a complete and unredacted copy of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection agency’s policies and procedures because that document would not be
relevant to the prosecution or defense of the charge of assault on a federal officer, an
alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a).
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2026, a federal grand jury for the District of Maine indicted Devin
Austin Bishop for failing to report arrival and present for inspection, an alleged
violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1433, and assault on a federal officer, an alleged violation of
18 U.S.C. § 111(a). Indictment (ECF No. 34). The case is set for trial in the November
term of court with jury selection to take place on November 4, 2026 and trial to
commence on November 9, 2026. Final Pretrial Order (ECF No. 79).
On September 2, 2026, Mr. Bishop filed a motion to compel the “training
records for Customs and Border Patrol1 Agent Christopher Cecardi concerning
1 	Mr. Bishop incorrectly refers to the “Customs and Border Patrol.” The U.S. Border Patrol is a
federal law enforcement agency under U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In general, Border Patrol
agents patrol areas between ports of entry, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents enforce
compliance with trade and immigration laws at ports of entry. See generally U.S. Customs & Border
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operation of emergency lights on this Customs and Border Patrol vehicle, pursuit of
vehicles in his capacity as a Customs and Border Patrol agent, and use of force” and
“all training materials covering the same topics that were used at Customs and
Border Patrol during Cecardi’s employment at Customs and Border Protection.”
Def.’s Mot. to Compel (ECF No. 71) (Def.’s Mot.); Id., Attach. 1, Subpoena to Produce
Docs., Information, or Objects in a Crim. Case (Subpoena). On September 23, 2026,
the Government filed its opposition to the motion to compel. Gov’t’s Resp. in Opp’n to
Def.’s Mot. to Compel (ECF No. 83) (Gov’t’s Opp’n). 	On October 6, 2026, Mr. Bishop
filed his reply. 	Def.’s Reply to Gov’t’s Opp’n to Mot. to Compel (ECF No. 92) (Def.’s
Reply).
II. 	POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. 	Devin Austin Bishop’s Motion
Devin Austin Bishop’s motion relates to the allegation that he assaulted a
federal officer. Def.’s Mot. at 1. Mr. Bishop represents that evidence produced during
discovery shows “that the. . . agent named as the victim in this matter failed to use
his emergency lights when pursuing and stopping Defendant’s vehicle.” 	Id. 	Mr.
Bishop says that he believes that “other policies and procedures regarding the use of
force and pursuit may have been violated by the . . . agent.” 	Id. 	Mr. Bishop seeks
“unredacted copies of the Customs and Border Protection Policies and Procedure that
were subpoenaed in this matter.” Id.
Prot., Border Security, https://cbp.gov/border-security (last visited Oct. 14, 2026). The parties have
used the common abbreviation CBP to refer to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and CBPO to
refer to the Customs and Border Protection Officer, which the Court accepts.
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Mr. Bishop points out that a defendant’s knowledge that the alleged victim was
a federal officer is an element of the offense, and in his view, the agent’s failure to
follow official customs and policies would be relevant to determine whether an
objective person would have understood him to be acting as a federal officer at the
time of the alleged assault. Id. at 1-2. Mr. Bishop stresses that he has been willing
to enter into a protective order to make certain that the records would not be shared
or used outside this case, but the Government has declined to provide the records in
unredacted form. Id. at 2.
B. 	The Government’s Opposition
The Government responds that it has “already produced all responsive, non-
privileged 	documents, 	and 	because 	law 	enforcement 	privilege 	supports 	the
application of the limited redactions that were made, the Agency requests that the
motion be denied.” 	Gov’t’s Opp’n at 1. 	The Government represents that after it
received 	Mr. 	Bishop’s 	subpoena, 	it 	compiled 	“all 	responsive, 	non-privileged
documents and produced these items to the Defendant on June 29, 2026, making
limited redactions to non-relevant, personal identifying information and fields where
law enforcement methods, tactics, or techniques would otherwise be revealed and the
Agency’s law enforcement privilege protected their disclosure.” Id. at 2.
C. 	Devin Austin Bishop’s Reply
In his reply, Mr. Bishop maintains that to demonstrate that it was reasonable
for him to believe that Agent Ceccardi was not a federal agent, he requires records
about how a CBPO is trained to conduct “port runner” motor vehicle stops and
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arrests. Def.’s Reply at 1. Mr. Bishop worries that Agent Ceccardi will “fall back on
his training and assert he was acting in compliance with his training as an effective
safe harbor.” Id. Mr. Bishop’s defense counsel asserts that it will be “impossible. . .
to meaningfully and effectively respond to such claims through cross examination of
Agent Ceccardi and other potential CBP employees. . . or to identify Agent Ceccardi’s
failure 	to 	follow 	the 	appropriate 	training 	without 	actual 	knowledge 	and
understanding of how CBP Agent Ceccardi was trained to conduct a motor vehicle
stop and arrest of a ‘port runner’”. 	Id. at 1-2. 	Mr. Bishop also asserts that the
Government waived the right to assert the law enforcement privilege when it failed
to move to quash or modify his subpoena. Id. at 2.
III. 	DISCUSSION
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the United States Supreme
Court recognized a law enforcement privilege against the revelation of the identity of
some confidential informants. Id. at 59. In Roviaro, the Supreme Court wrote that
the “scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose.” Id. at 60.
In his motion, Mr. Bishop first states that “[t]he question of Defendant’s
knowledge that the alleged victim was a federal officer is an element of the offense.”
Def.’s Mot. at 1. 	He later argues that these records “are essential to [his] defense,
which requires him to demonstrate that it was reasonable for him to believe that
Agent Ceccardi was not in fact a federal CBP agent based on his actions and behavior
on February 22, 2026, including his failure to use flashing blue emergency lights
when he stopped Bishop’s vehicle in the dark.” 	Def.’s Reply at 1.
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In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975), the United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue and ruled:
We conclude, from all this, that in order to effectuate the congressional
purpose of according maximum protection to federal officers by making
prosecution 	for 	assaults 	upon 	them 	cognizable 	in 	the 	federal
courts, § 111 cannot 	be 	construed 	as 	embodying 	an 	unexpressed
requirement that an assailant be aware that his victim is a federal
officer. All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an intent to
assault a federal officer. 	A contrary conclusion would give insufficient
protection to the agent enforcing an unpopular law, and none to the
agent acting under cover
Id. at 684. 	As Feola observed, a defendant may be prosecuted under § 111, when
person being assaulted is an undercover agent, so Mr. Bishop’s understanding that
his knowledge that the victim was a federal officer is material is inaccurate. 	See
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (stating in dissent that Feola held that a
“conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111 for assaulting a federal officer does not require
proof that the defendant knew the victim’s status.” Id. at 516-17 n.1 (J. White in
dissent).
In Feola, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a defendant’s state
of knowledge could be relevant:
We are not to be understood as implying that the defendant's state of
knowledge is never a relevant consideration under § 111. 	The statute
does require a criminal intent, and there may well be circumstances in
which ignorance of the official status of the person assaulted or resisted
negates the very existence of mens rea. 	For example, where an officer
fails 	to 	identify 	himself 	or 	his 	purpose, 	his 	conduct 	in certain
circumstances might reasonably be interpreted as the unlawful use of
force directed either at the defendant or his property. In a situation of
that kind, one might be justified in exerting an element of resistance,
and an honest mistake of fact would not be consistent with criminal
intent.
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Id. at 686.
The First Circuit’s latest decision on § 111 is United States v. Parrot, 133 F.4th
46 (1st Cir. 2025) (Justice Breyer opinion). In Parrot, the First Circuit reiterated the
Feola holding that Ҥ 111 is a general intent statute. 	That means that the statute
requires only ‘an intent to assault’ and ‘not an intent to assault a federal officer.’” Id.
at 49 (quoting Feola, 420 U.S. at 684). 	“To repeat, the statute does not require
specifically that ‘an assailant be aware that his victim is a federal officer.’” 	Id.
(quoting Feola, 420 U.S. at 684).
Mr. Bishop may be arguing about a narrow, potential self-defense described in
Feola, namely that he made an honest mistake of fact that would be inconsistent with
criminal intent. 	See Feola, 420 U.S. at 686. 	In Parrot, the district judge gave the
following instruction on this issue:
Mr. Parrot asserts that he acted in self defense. 	It is a defense to the
charge if, one, the defendant did not know that [Special Agent Angell]
was a federal officer; two, that the defendant reasonably believed that
use of force was necessary to defend one's self against an immediate use
of unlawful force; and three, that the defendant used no more force than
appeared reasonably necessary in the circumstances.
Parrot, 133 F.4th at 50-51. The Defendant in Parrot did not object to this instruction,
and the Court of Appeals concluded that this instruction was not plain error. Id. at
51.
However this issue is formulated – as a failure of the Government’s burden of
proof or as an affirmative defense, the Court does not understand why the CBP’s
policies and procedures would be relevant to whether Mr. Bishop made an honest
mistake of fact and was justified in resisting. Whatever else is argued here, the Court
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is dubious that Mr. Bishop would know what CBP’s policies and procedures were
while he was being stopped and arrested for failing to report and present for
inspection. Moreover, whether the arresting officer did or did not comply with all the
CBP policies and procedures, how the officer’s compliance or noncompliance would
have affected Mr. Bishop is unclear since there is no evidence that Mr. Bishop would
have known what those policies and procedures were. Taking the most obvious issue
as the prime example, Mr. Bishop is apparently claiming that the CBP Agent failed
to put on his flashing lights before pulling him over and when the Agent approached
his car, Mr. Bishop did not know that the person was a law enforcement officer. The
focus of the issue is upon Mr. Bishop and what he knew, not upon the CBP Agent and
what the CBP manual (which presumably Mr. Bishop had never read before the
incident) says the Agent should have done.
The Court’s preliminary conclusion is that Mr. Bishop is not entitled to an
unredacted version of the CBP’s policies and procedures because they are not relevant
to any issue properly before the jury. The Court is dismissing Mr. Bishop’s motion to
compel without prejudice to allow Mr. Bishop, if he wishes to do so, to refile his motion
and explain why the requested unredacted records would be relevant to the issues
before the Court.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Defendant’s Motion to Compel (ECF
No. 71).
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SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 14th day of October, 2026
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