RATCLIFFE v. BRP US INC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
STEPHEN J. RATCLIFFE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:20-cv-00234-JAW
)
BRP U.S., INC., et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF STEPHEN J. RATCLIFFE’S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT RELATING TO HIS THEN 14-
YEAR-OLD SON’S OPERATION OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLE
A plaintiff in a product liability case involving a vehicle rollover moves in
limine to preclude evidence or argument that his underage son operated the vehicle
several hours before the plaintiff’s accident in violation of law and the manufacturer’s
warnings. The defendant, the vehicle manufacturer, opposes the evidence’s exclusion
by asserting its relevance to the efficacy of alternative warnings and to rebut
plaintiff’s claim that the vehicle was prone to rollovers. The court finds the evidence
relevant to and probative of these purposes, and not unfairly prejudicial to the
plaintiff; thus, the court dismisses the plaintiff’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2019, a utility terrain vehicle (UTV) driven by Stephen J. Ratcliffe
overturned, causing significant injuries. Compl. ¶ 15 (ECF No. 1). On July 2, 2020,
Mr. Ratcliffe brought product liability claims against both BRP U.S., Inc. (BRP), the
manufacturer; 	and 	Tidd’s 	Sport 	Shop, 	Inc. 	(Tidd’s), 	the 	distributor; 	asserting
negligence and strict liability claims against both, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 17-57.
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
On October 4, 2024, Mr. Ratcliffe filed a motion in limine requesting the Court
exclude evidence of or argument relating to his then fourteen-year-old son’s operation
of the Can-Am Maverick X3 purchased and driven by the Plaintiff several hours
before Mr. Ratcliffe’s accident pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and
404. Pl. Stephen J. Ratcliffe’s Mot. in Lim. To Preclude Evid. or Arg. Relating to His
Then 14-Year-Old Son’s Operation of the Subject Vehicle (ECF No. 180) (Pl.’s Mot.).
On October 15, 2024, BRP objected to Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion, asking the Court to allow
evidence of and reference to Mr. Ratcliffe’s then underage son’s operation of the
Maverick X3 on the day of the accident. 	Def. BRP’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. in Lim. To
Preclude Evid. or Arg. Relating to Ratcliffe’s 14-Year-Old Son’s Operation of the
Subject Vehicle (ECF No. 190) (BRP’s Opp’n). Also on October 15, 2024, Tidd’s joined
BRP’s opposition to the motion. Def. Tidd’s Sport Shop, Inc.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mots. in
Lim. (ECF No. 215) (Tidd’s Opp’n).
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	Stephen J. Ratcliffe’s Motion to Preclude Evidence or Argument
of His Then 14-Year-Old Son’s Operation of the Subject Vehicle
Mr. Ratcliffe moves the Court to preclude evidence or argument of his then
fourteen-year-old son, C.R.,1 operating the Maverick X3 several hours before the
accident underlying Mr. Ratcliffe’s lawsuit occurred. 	Pl.’s Mot. at 1. 	The Plaintiff
notes that video shows C.R. operating the vehicle with Mr. Ratcliffe in the passenger
seat and concedes that “[C.R.] was under the legal age in Maine to be driving on a
1 	The Court, sua sponte, refers to Mr. Ratcliffe’s son by his initials, C.R., in this order. See
FED. R. C IV. P. 5.2(a)(3); United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 61-63 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing
privacy rights of third parties).
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
roadway, he was not a licensed driver in any state, and it is possible he was at times
driving above the speed limit.” 	Id. 	Mr. Ratcliffe also concedes that BRP’s operator
guide “warns against driving on paved roads and states that the operator should be
at least 16 years of age.” Id. at 1-2.
Nonetheless, Mr. Ratcliffe argues C.R.’s operation of the vehicle is irrelevant
to any claims or defenses in the case because his son is not a plaintiff, he drove on
paved roads rather than an off-road gravel pit, and no accident occurred while C.R.
drove the Maverick X3. 	Id. at 2. 	Mr. Ratcliffe adds that the video and arguments
regarding C.R.’s operation of the vehicle lack probative value under F ED. R. EVID. 401.
Id.
Even if the Court finds C.R.’s driving relevant, Mr. Ratcliffe says, evidence
and argument on the issue should still be precluded under Rule 403 because of the
risk of unfair prejudice. 	Id. 	The Plaintiff warns the Court that “a jury may judge
plaintiff harshly for allowing his son to drive while unlicensed, underage, and/or in
the manner he was driving” or “fault plaintiff for permitting his son to operate the
vehicle at all.” Id.
Finally, Mr. Ratcliffe argues that the evidence of C.R.’s driving should be
precluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a) and (b) governing character trait
evidence. 	Id. (citing F ED. R. EVID. 404). 	The Plaintiff describes Rule 404(a) as
“prohibit[ing] use of character or character trait evidence to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance therewith,” while Rule 404(b)(1) “prohibits
use of evidence of another crime, wrong, or act to prove a person’s character to show
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance therewith.” 	Id. 	Mr.
Ratcliffe avers that a jury may view his decision to allow his underage son to drive
the Maverick X3 as evidence of the Plaintiff’s reckless character and evidence of his
prior reckless acts, such that his operation of the Maverick X3 at the time of the
accident conformed with his reckless character. Id. at 2-3. Thus, Mr. Ratcliffe asks
the Court to preclude evidence of C.R.’s driving pursuant to Rules 404(a) and (b). Id.
at 3.
B. 	BRP’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude Evidence or
Argument 	Relating 	to 	Mr. 	Ratcliffe’s 	14-Year-Old 	Son’s
Operation of the Subject Vehicle
BRP opposes the preclusion of evidence of and reference to C.R.’s operation of
the Maverick X3, arguing that this provides further evidence of the Plaintiff’s
knowing disregard of the warnings provided by BRP regarding the operation of the
Maverick X3. BRP’s Opp’n at 1. The Defendant notes that it does not seek to use the
evidence “to assassinate the character of a 14-year-old,” but rather as evidence of two
different points. Id. at 2. First, to defeat the causation prong of Mr. Ratcliffe’s failure-
to-warn claim, “that, since Plaintiff disregarded a host of product warnings and safety
recommendations, that Plaintiff would not have heeded any additional or different
warnings that he was provided.” Id. Second, because C.R. operated the Maverick X3
“at speeds three times faster than what Plaintiff claims to have been driving at the
time of the accident, it is clearly not prone to rollovers or inherently unstable.” 	Id.
BRP urges the Court to deny Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion because the evidence is probative
on these two arguments and not unfairly prejudicial. Id. “Just because the evidence
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
hurts Plaintiff’s chances to prevail on his failure-to-warn claim does not mean that it
is ‘unfairly prejudicial,’” BRP contends. Id.
BRP avers that, to establish a prima facie case of failure-to-warn, a plaintiff
“must prove that the product warnings and safety instructions were inadequate and
that some new or different warning would have made a difference in altering behavior
in a way that would have prevented the accident.” Id. (citing Koken v. Black & Veatch
Constr., Inc., 426 F.3d 39, 45, 49-51 (1st Cir. 2005); Bouchard v. Am. Orthodontics,
661 A.2d 1143, 1145 (Me. 1995); Burns v. Architectural Doors & Windows, 19 A.3d
823, 830 (Me. 2011)). 	Collecting cases from the First Circuit and other courts, BRP
acknowledges that “[a] defendant in a failure-to-warn claim can then rebut or attack
the claim by offering evidence that the Plaintiff violated use and safety instructions
in such a way that it is implausible to believe that a new or different warning would
have made a difference.” 	Id. at 2-3 (citing, inter alia, Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 889 F.
Supp. 2d 253, 263 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d, 740 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Here, BRP points out that “th[e] accident occurred within hours of the
Plaintiff’s purchase of the X3.” 	Id. at 3. 	Further, BRP calls Mr. Ratcliffe’s decision
to permit his son to drive “one of the first things Stephen Ratcliffe did [after
purchasing the Maverick X3],” reiterating that C.R. was fourteen at the time, “not
licensed to operate motor vehicles,” and that C.R. was permitted by his father to drive
the Maverick X3 “on the public roads of Maine in violation of state law.” 	Id. 	In
addition to being illegal, BRP says, Mr. Ratcliffe’s decision “violated the safety
warnings of BRP,” as shown by the on-product decals and the front page of the
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Operator’s Guide instructing operation of the vehicle only by licensed drivers over the
age of 16. Id. at 3-6.
BRP argues that “[g]iven Plaintiff’s attack on the adequacy and sufficiency of
the product warnings, evidence of blatant misuse by the family and Plaintiff’s clear
disregard of safety messaging is relevant to rebut the causation prong of Plaintiff’s
claim.” Id. at 6. The Defendant asserts it should be “free to offer evidence of misuse
and disregard of those instructions that were given” to rebut Plaintiff’s claims that
the warnings were inadequate. Id.
Responding to Mr. Ratcliffe’s argument that evidence of C.R.’s driving of the
Maverick X3 is irrelevant to this case’s claims and defenses, BRP contends that the
evidence is relevant to rebut Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim by illustrating that Mr.
Ratcliffe “would not have heeded any additional or different warnings.” 	Id. at 7. It
argues further that the evidence “rebuts Plaintiff’s claim that the Subject Vehicle is
easy to roll over.” 	Id. 	BRP reiterates that, while C.R. is not a party to the case,
“Plaintiff allowed him to drive the Subject Vehicle,” id. (citing id., Attach. 2, Pl. Dep.
Tr. 81:16-17 (ECF No. 190-2)), and notes that Plaintiff’s own expert testified that C.R.
“was under the ‘direct controlled supervision’ of Plaintiff, who was riding in the
passenger seat.” 	Id. (citing id., Attach. 3, Lenorovitz Dep. Tr. 29:24-30:5 (ECF No.
190-3)). 	Moreover, the Defendant reminds the Court that driving the Maverick X3
on paved roads also contravened BRP’s warnings. Id. BRP insists these examples of
the “many times Plaintiff ignored BRP’s warnings” are “probative of the fact that
there are no additional or different warnings that Plaintiff would have heeded, which
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
tends to rebut Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim.” 	Id. at 7-8. 	The Defendant directs
the Court to further federal caselaw in which courts have admitted evidence of a
plaintiff’s failure to read instructions and follow warnings prior to an accident “as
relevant to prove that a plaintiff would not have heeded different warnings.” Id. at 8
(collecting cases). 	In sum, BRP asserts “[p]roving that Plaintiff does not heed
warnings will enable BRP to rebut Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim.” Id.
Next, BRP claims that evidence of C.R.’s operation of the Maverick X3 is
further relevant to rebut Plaintiff’s expert’s claim that the Maverick X3’s “geometry,
engine size, and the terrain on which it is used ensure that [ . . .] [it] will roll over
with a probability far in excess of that of a passenger vehicle designed for the public
roads.” Id. at 8-9 (quoting id., Attach. 4, Batzer Rep. at 11 (ECF No. 190-4)) (additions
made by Defendant). Pointing out that C.R. “drove the Subject Vehicle at excessive
speeds for approximately three minutes on public roads without incident,” BRP
opines that “the video tends to rebut Batzer’s claim.” Id. at 9.
BRP also insists that evidence of C.R.’s operation of the vehicle would not
unfairly prejudice the jury. 	The Defendant notes that Rule 403 “protects ‘against
unfair prejudice, not against all prejudice,’” id. (quoting United States v. Whitney, 524
F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2008)), and explains that “[a]ll evidence introduced by a party
is designed to be prejudicial—to help his case, or to harm his opponent’s case, or both.”
Id. (quoting Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 82 (1st Cir. 1999)). 	BRP emphasizes that
the evidence of C.R.’s underage driving above the speed limit “will undoubtedly make
it more difficult for [Mr. Ratcliffe] to establish his failure-to-warn claim” and the fact
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
that the Maverick X3 did not roll over during C.R.’s operation “will also make it more
difficult for Plaintiff to claim that the Subject Vehicle easily rolls over.” 	Id. at 9-10
(emphasis added by Defendant). 	However, these effects “do not warrant preclusion
on Rule 403 grounds,” BRP says, because the fact that the “that the jury may ‘judge’
or ‘fault’ him for allowing his son to recklessly operate the vehicle is exactly what
jurors should do, as it is evidence that Plaintiff was violating BRP’s warnings and
would not heed different warnings.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added by Defendant).
Finally, Defendant addresses Plaintiff’s argument that evidence of C.R.’s
operation of the Maverick X3 should be excluded from being presented under Rule
404(a) and (b) “to show that his operation of the vehicle at the time of the rollover was
in conformity with his reckless character and prior reckless acts.” Id. BRP responds
that it does not plan to offer this evidence as proof of comparative negligence,” id.,
and explains:
Instead, BRP plans to offer this evidence (i) to prove that—since Plaintiff
disregarded every warning he was given—no additional warnings would
have been heeded by Plaintiff, which is relevant to defend against
Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim; and [ii] to rebut [] Plaintiff’s claim that
the Subject Vehicle easily rolls over, since [C.R.] drove the vehicle at
extreme speeds on public roads without incident.
Id. Thus, BRP insists, “evidence of [C.R.’s] operation of the Subject Vehicle cannot be
precluded pursuant to Rule 404.” Id. (emphasis added by Defendant).
In sum, BRP insists the evidence of and reference to C.R.’s operation of the
Maverick X3 is admissible and requests the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion to preclude.
Id.
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
C. 	Tidd’s Sport Shop, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motions in
Limine
Tidd’s summarily joins BRP’s opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion to preclude
evidence or argument relating to the operation of the Maverick X3 by the Plaintiff’s
then fourteen-year-old son. Tidd’s Opp’n at 1.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Concluding that C.R.’s operation of the Maverick X3 is relevant to and
probative of the issue of whether Plaintiff disregarded BRP’s warnings, the Court
dismisses the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence and argument relating to the
same.
“[E]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” F ED. R. EVID. 401. Courts should generally admit relevant
evidence unless directed otherwise by the United States Constitution, a federal
statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court. F ED. R. EVID. 402.
Here, Plaintiff claims that evidence that his then underage son operated the
Maverick X3 hours before the accident underlying Mr. Ratcliffe’s product liability
claims lacks relevance to the issues of the case. 	Pl.’s Mot. at 2. 	BRP disagrees,
asserting that the evidence demonstrates Mr. Ratcliffe’s tendency to disregard its
warnings and that the son’s operation of the vehicle at high speeds rebuts the
Plaintiff’s assertion that the Maverick X3 was prone to rollovers. BRP’s Opp’n at 2.
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
The Court concludes the Defendant has the better side of this argument. 	As
cited by the Defendant, the First Circuit recognized in Koken v. Black & Veatch
Construction, Inc. that “a presumption exists in Maine law” that a warning will be
heeded, but ruled that the record lacked sufficient evidence to prove that the damage
at issue in that case “would not have occurred if the warning had been provided.”
Koken, 426 F.3d at 51. In so doing, the First Circuit indicated factual evidence may
be used to undermine a claim that an alternative warning would have prevented an
injury. Id. That is the precise purpose claimed by the Defendant here: BRP asserts
that evidence of Mr. Ratcliffe’s disregard for its warnings to not operate the vehicle
on paved roads and that operators must be licensed drivers above the age of sixteen
tends to prove that, even if an alternative warning had been given, it would not have
prevented Mr. Ratcliffe’s injury. The Court concludes the evidence of C.R. driving the
Maverick X3, mere hours after Mr. Ratcliffe purchased it with the accompanying
warnings and shortly before his own injury, relevant to this argument.
Finding relevance, the Court turns to consider whether its relevance is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, which directs courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” F ED. R. EVID. 403. Mr. Ratcliffe insists
“a jury may judge plaintiff harshly for allowing his son to drive while unlicensed,
underage, and/or in the manner he was driving.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2. BRP responds that,
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
while all evidence is inherently prejudicial to some extent, “Plaintiff seeks preclusion
solely on the basis that this relevant evidence will hurt his chance of prevailing at
trial,” which Rule 403 does not permit. BRP’s Opp’n at 9-10.
The Court again agrees with the Defendant. The evidence of C.R.’s operation
of the vehicle does not risk confusing the issues or misleading the jury; rather, Mr.
Ratcliffe objects to this evidence because of his concern that the jury will condemn
him for permitting it. 	But the reason the jury would criticize him for doing so is
precisely why the evidence is probative: allowing his underage son to drive on paved
roads at high speeds contravened the law, fundamental notions of safety, and the
explicit warnings of BRP. As such, the Court finds any potential prejudice not to be
unfair.
Finally, Mr. Ratcliffe asks the Court to preclude the evidence of his son’s
operation of the Maverick X3 pursuant to the rule governing character evidence, Rule
404. Pl.’s Mot. at 2-3. The Plaintiff asserts that introducing the evidence to prove he
acted recklessly at the time of the accident in accordance with his reckless character
would violate Rule 404(a), while introducing it as a prior bad act to show he acted in
accordance at the time of the accident would violate Rule 404(b)(1). 	Id. at 3 (citing
F ED. R. EVID. 404(a), (b)). 	BRP rejects this claim, asserting that it does not plan to
offer the disputed evidence to show Mr. Ratcliffe’s character or prove comparative
negligence but rather to prove that additional warnings would not have been heeded
by the Plaintiff as a defense to his failure-to-warn claim, and further to rebut
Plaintiff’s allegation that the Maverick X3 rolls over easily. BRP’s Opp’n at 10.
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
As discussed above, the Court finds the evidence admissible for the Defendant’s
proffered purposes and accepts its claim that it will not seek to introduce evidence of
C.R.’s operation of the vehicle as propensity or prior bad act evidence. However, the
Court notes its willingness to consider a limiting instruction regarding the evidence’s
purpose at trial, if and when the Defendants present the evidence in a manner
implicating Mr. Ratcliffe’s character or as evidence of prior bad acts. Further, under
the law of the First Circuit, it is the obligation of counsel to clarify at trial whether a
ruling on a motion in limine or other evidentiary ruling is definitive. 	Dimanche v.
Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 893 F.3d 1, 6 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018). 	In general, “[p]retrial
motions in limine in situations like this need to be renewed and pressed at trial in
order to be preserved.” Id. (citing F ED. R. EVID. 103 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment); see also Crowe v. Bolduc, 334 F.3d 124, 133 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Our rule
as to motions in limine is that a party must renew at trial its motion to . . . exclude
evidence if there has been an earlier provisional ruling by motion in limine and a
clear invitation to offer evidence at trial”).
With this said, the Court is concerned about BRP’s proposal to introduce the
entire video. Only a portion of the video, which is over twenty-five minutes in length,
is potentially related to BRP’s purposes. 	In addition, the Court assumes that BRP
will seek to admit evidence of the video for impeachment of Mr. Ratcliffe. 	If Mr.
Ratcliffe is willing to admit the salient aspects of the video, namely that his son was
fourteen and lacked a driver’s license at the time, that his son’s operation was not
only illegal but contrary to BRP’s warnings, and that his son operated the UTV at
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
high speeds on public roads, which is also illegal and against BRP warnings, then the
Court is chary about allowing the video to be played because of the video’s strong
implication that Mr. Ratcliffe is a careless person and negligent parent. At the same
time, if Mr. Ratcliffe denies what is evident on the video, the Court will be inclined to
allow the admission of portions of the video relevant to the denials.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff Stephen J. Ratcliffe’s
Motion In Limine to Preclude Evidence or Argument Relating to His Then 14-Year-
Old Son’s Operation of the Subject Vehicle (ECF No. 180).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 8th day of November, 2024
Case 1:20-cv-00234-JAW Document 272 Filed 11/08/24 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>