LOBSTER 207 LLC v. PETTEGROW et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
LOBSTER 207, LLC, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	1:19-cv-00552-LEW
)
WARREN B. PETTEGROW et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on Counts
V and VII (“Motion”) (ECF No. 271). For reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
B ACKGROUND
On April 20, 2020, Warren Pettegrow moved to compel arbitration of Counts V and VII of
Plaintiff’s original complaint, which counts asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach
of contract arising from Plaintiff’s former employment of Pettegrow. See Motion to Compel
Arbitration (ECF No. 44). These are the only two counts in the original Complaint—and now in the
First Amended Complaint—for which Warren Pettegrow is the sole defendant, though Warren
Pettegrow is also implicated in several of Plaintiff’s additional claims for relief. See generally First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 184). The arbitrator found in favor of Plaintiff on both
counts, while denying Pettegrow’s related arbitration claim for unpaid wages, and awarded Plaintiff
damages in the amount of $1,021,000. See Final Award (ECF No. 242-4). On December 10, 2021, I
issued an order confirming the arbitration award and denying Warren Pettegrow’s motion to vacate
the award. See Order Concerning Arbitration Award (ECF No. 269).
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S TANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 54 provides in relevant part:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no
just reason for delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54 expresses a “sound judicial administration” policy, Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956), to enable appeals on or by some but not all claims or parties,
so long as appeal is not apt to result in piecemeal appellate litigation that calls upon the “appellate
court . . . to decide the same issues more than once,” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S.
1, 8 (1980). There are two primary factors that guide the district court’s exercise of Rule 54(b)
discretion: first, that “the ruling in question is final,” and second, that “there is no persuasive reason
for delay.” Gonzalez Figueroa v. J.C. Penney Puerto Rico, Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 317 (1st Cir. 2009).
The Federal Arbitration Act establishes the existence of both factors when it comes to the
entry of judgment on the Order Concerning Arbitration Award. When a party moves for an order
confirming, modifying, or correcting an arbitration award, the party is moving for “entry of judgment
thereon.” 9 U.S.C. § 13. When the court grants such a motion, the “judgment shall be docketed” in
the same manner as, and “shall have the same force and effect” as, “a judgment in an action; and it
may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.” Id.
Accordingly, judgment should enter on the claims resolved by the order confirming the arbitration
award.
Assuming, arguendo, that the FAA does not supply a ready answer to the Rule 54(b) factors,
see Mountain Valley Prop., Inc. v. Applied Risk Servs., Inc., 863 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2017), the entry
of judgment on Counts V and VII is nevertheless appropriate. First, the confirmed arbitration award
is final as to discrete claims raised in this controversy between Plaintiff and Warren Pettegrow. See
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Lee-Barnes v. Puerto Ven Quarry Corp., 513 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that a judgment is
final if it “dispose[s] of all the rights and liabilities of at least one party as to at least one claim”)
(quotation omitted). Second, piecemeal litigation here will not undermine judicial efficiency.
Although the arbitrated claims and pending claims are factually interrelated, they are, at this point,
legally unrelated—the only legal issue that Warren Pettegrow has raised in connection with the
arbitration award is a collateral state law matter that does not bear on any of the pending claims. See
id. at 25 n.2 (finding that at “step two of the Rule 54(b) analysis,” the court must assess “1) any
interrelationship or overlap among the various legal and factual issues involved and 2) any equities
and efficiencies implicated by the requested piecemeal review”). Accordingly, “there is no just reason
[to] delay” the entry of judgment on Counts V and VII. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on Counts V and VII (ECF No. 271) is
GRANTED. The Clerk will enter judgment on the Order Concerning Arbitration Award (ECF No.
269).
S O ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of January, 2022.
/s/ Lance E. Walker
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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