USA v. STROTHER, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITES STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:19-cr-00171-LEW
)
CRYSTAL GREENLAW, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
On November 3, 2022, I sentenced Crystal Greenlaw to a 120-month term of
imprisonment following her guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute methamphetamine. I imposed the sentence based on the § 3553(a)
factors, which, in my view, did not warrant a sentence within the 210-to-240-month
Guideline range.
Greenlaw filed a Motion for Compassionate Release on January 24, 2024 (ECF No.
1186).1 	Greenlaw also asks that I appoint counsel to represent her in this endeavor.2
Greenlaw’s Motion is based on the fact that her minor son, age 7, is in the custody of the
Maine Department of Health and Human Services after being taken from the home of his
father. 	Greenlaw also relies on the quality of her behavior in incarceration and the
1 I note at the outset that Greenlaw’s Motion appears to be procedurally proper. The warden of her facility
received her request for release on December 13, 2023 (ECF No. 1186-1), satisfying the 30-day waiting
requirement for such requests. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
2 Technically, Greenlaw’s request for counsel is stated in her companion motion for a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (ECF No. 1190). I interpret her request to include a request for counsel to
assist her with her compassionate release motion.
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demonstrated progress she has made to date toward her rehabilitation. 	The Government
opposes the request for good and valid reasons. Gov’t’s Response (ECF No. 1196).
Request for Counsel
Greenlaw is not entitled to counsel on this matter. “There is no right to counsel in
postconviction proceedings,” Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 749 (2019), including a
motion for a reduced sentence. Instead, “the appointment of counsel [on a post-conviction
motion] must rest in the discretion of the court.” Dirring v. United States, 353 F.2d 519,
520 (1st Cir. 1965). When determining whether an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel
on a post-conviction motion, courts often look to the three-part test for whether to provide
court-appointed counsel in the analogous habeas corpus context. 	See, e.g., United States
v. Pinkham, No. 2:15-CR-00128-JDL, 2020 WL 7753968, at *2 (D. Me. Dec. 29, 2020)
(citing United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (1st Cir. 1993)). The test asks whether
the defendant has “a fair likelihood of success on” his claim, whether the issues raised are
“factually complex and legally intricate,” and whether “the facts are largely undeveloped.”
Mala, 7 F.3d at 1063–64.
For reasons that follow, Greenlaw has not shown that she is entitled to a court-
appointed attorney because she has not demonstrated the existence of an extraordinary and
compelling reason for early release.
Request for Reduced Sentence
A district judge does not have freewheeling authority to “vacate, alter, or revise a
sentence previously imposed,” and is empowered to do so only in certain “narrowly
circumscribed” circumstances. United States v. Mercado-Flores, 872 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.
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2017). 	By law, “[t]he court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been
imposed except [for certain prescribed reasons].” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Federal sentencing
law authorizes a court to modify a prior judgment imposing a term of imprisonment in
order to release a person from prison when release is justified by “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” and the customary § 3553(a) sentencing factors do not militate in
favor of a different result. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Greenlaw explains that one of her minor children is presently in the custody of the
Maine Department of Health and Human Services after being removed from his father’s
home. According to Greenlaw, there is no other family member available to raise the child
while Greenlaw is incarcerated. 	Greenlaw wishes to be released so she can be reunited
with the child and provide a home.
Greenlaw’s care and concern for her child is understandable, but her relationship
with the child has already been compromised by several years of absence. In terms of her
ability to provide a suitable home for a child, by all appearances the path forward for
Greenlaw is by no means certain, even if her sentence was at an end. 	I do not mean to
suggest that Greenlaw is not capable of parenting. Instead, I mean to emphasize that her
ability to parent is an unknown, even if she cohabitates with her boyfriend who, evidently,
is successfully raising his own child. 	Unfortunately, nothing in the record suggests that
Greenlaw has ever provided a stable household to any of her children so that I might
reasonably predict that she is capable of readily doing so again. Although the removal of
a child from another parent’s custody might be considered an extraordinary and compelling
situation in some cases and for some defendants, I find that Greenlaw has not made a
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colorable, let alone extraordinary and compelling, showing that she would be prepared to
parent upon her release from prison.
Nor, in any event, am I persuaded that early release can be justified by the other
sentencing factors. These include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history
and characteristics of the defendant, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants, and the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The circumstances of the offense gave rise to a Guideline sentencing range of
approximately twenty years, due in large part to the sheer volume of methamphetamine
trafficked by the conspiracy. Early release would not reflect the seriousness of the offense
or afford adequate deterrence. And while Greenlaw’s personal history and characteristics
persuaded me to impose a sentence of ten years, her history and characteristics are not good
predictors of Greenlaw’s preparedness to parent. 	For example, Greenlaw’s participation
in a methamphetamine conspiracy occurred when she was a parent, a fact that only
emphasizes the irresponsibility of her demonstrated behavior.
Early release would also deprive Greenlaw of the benefit of a good stretch of clean
and sober living and the educational and vocational training that she needs to be able to
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build a new life after her release. 	Greenlaw deserves to be commended for taking her
rehabilitation seriously, but demonstrated progress toward rehabilitation is not enough to
earn 	an 	early 	release 	based 	on 	“extraordinary 	and 	compelling” 	circumstances.
Rehabilitation is its own reward. Consequently, even though I am persuaded by Greenlaw
that she likely is no longer a threat to society and likely will succeed at finding her feet and
remaining sober following her release, I am not persuaded that early release is appropriate
or even, necessarily, compassionate.
Conclusion
Defendant’s request for compassionate release and appointment of counsel is
DENIED.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 21st day of February, 2024
/s/ Lance E. Walker
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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