USA v. GOGUEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ROBERT FREDERICK GOGUEN, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:11-cr-00003-JAW-1
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
)
ORDER DISMISSING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
An inmate serving a 168-month sentence for possession of material containing
child pornography including a minor under twelve, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A,
and a consecutive 24-month sentence for violating terms of supervision related to a
previous conviction for failing to register as sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2250, seeks relief, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), from the
court’s prior judgments dismissing his requests for postconviction relief. 	The Court
concludes 	that 	given 	the 	substance 	of 	the 	Rule 	60(b)(4) 	motion, 	it 	must 	be
recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition and dismisses the petition
because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review it.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Criminal Cases
1. 	United States v. Goguen, 1:11-cr-00003-JAW
On January 12, 2011, a federal grand jury indicted Robert Frederick Goguen
for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Indictment
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(ECF No. 1). On July 13, 2011, Mr. Goguen pleaded guilty to the charged crime, Min.
Entry (ECF No. 43), and on September 14, 2012, the Court sentenced him to thirty-
seven months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a $100 special
assessment, and no fine. J. (ECF No. 80); Am. J. (ECF No. 90). Mr. Goguen did not
appeal his conviction or sentence to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
On August 16, 2013, the Government filed a warrant and summons for
violations of supervised release, alleging Mr. Goguen violated his conditions of
supervised release by downloading pornographic movies at the Penobscot County
Judicial Center’s law library. 	Pet. for Warrant or Summons for Offender under
Supervision (ECF No. 96). 	On September 23, 2013, Mr. Goguen admitted the
violation, and the Court sentenced him to five months incarceration and thirty-one
months of supervised release. 	Revocation J. (ECF No. 113). 	Mr. Goguen appealed
this revocation judgment to the First Circuit, which it later affirmed. 	J. of Ct. of
Appeals for the First Circuit (ECF No. 142).
On November 13, 2015, the Government filed a second petition alleging that
Mr. 	Goguen 	violated two 	conditions 	of 	supervised release 	by 	possessing 	child
pornography on his computer. 	Pet. for Warrant or Summons for Offender under
Supervision (ECF No. 144). 	After the Court resolved several intervening motions,
Mr. 	Goguen 	admitted 	the 	violations 	alleged 	in 	the 	petition 	for 	revocation 	on
September 15, 2017. Min. Entry (ECF No. 193).
On February 7, 2019, the Court granted Mr. Goguen’s counsel’s motion for
leave to withdraw as counsel and continued the sentencing hearing in this case and
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on new criminal charges in United States v. Goguen, 1:16-cr-00167-JAW. 	United
States v. Goguen, 1:16-cr-00167-JAW, Order (ECF No. 110); United States v. Goguen,
1:11-cr-00003-JAW, Order (ECF No. 278). 	Mr. Goguen then vigorously challenged
his admission to the violations in the revocation petition from the spring of 2017 until
his September 2021 sentencing hearing. On September 20, 2021, the Court sentenced
Mr. Goguen to 168 months of incarceration on the new criminal charge of possession
of child pornography and a consecutive term of 24 months of incarceration on the
violations of his conditions of supervised release. J. (ECF No. 205).
2. 	Robert Goguen v. United States, 1:17-cv-00492-JAW & 1:11-
cr-0003-JAW
On December 15, 2017, Mr. Goguen filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence for his failure to register as a sex offender conviction, 1:11-cr-
00003-JAW, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 	Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct
Sentence (ECF No. 194). 	On December 29, 2017, Mr. Goguen filed additional
paperwork in support of his challenge to his original sentence, his first revocation,
and the decision on his appeal. Suppl. to Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence
(ECF No. 199). 	After Mr. Goguen amended his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the
Government answered and moved to dismiss his motion on March 26, 2018. Gov’t’s
Mot. to Summarily Dismiss Pet’r’s § 2255 Pet., Resp. to § 2255 Pet., and Resp. to Pet’r’s
Disc. Filing (ECF No. 220).
On September 24, 2018, Mr. Goguen filed a second amended § 2255 motion.
Second Further Amendment to [§] 2255 (ECF No. 252). 	On February 7, 2019, over
Mr. Goguen’s objection, the Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s recommended
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decision, see Recommended Decision on 28 U.S.C. 2255 Mot. (ECF No. 253), and
denied Mr. Goguen’s § 2255 motion and certificate of appealability. Order Affirming
Recommended Decision on 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Mot. (ECF No. 280). 	The Court agreed
with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that neither Mr. Goguen’s collateral challenge
to his conviction nor to his revocation was timely under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f). 	Id. at 20-22. 	The Court also rejected Mr. Goguen’s equitable tolling and
actual innocence arguments. 	Id. at 23-26. 	The First Circuit denied Mr. Goguen’s
subsequent request for a certificate of appealability to appeal the Court’s order.
Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 281); J. of Ct. of Appeals for the First Circuit (ECF No.
324).
On July 20, 2021, Mr. Goguen filed a motion for relief from the Court’s
February 7, 2019 order denying his § 2255 motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) and a proposed amended § 2255 motion. Mot. for Relief from the Ct.’s
Order (ECF No. 390); id., Attach. 1, Am. 2255 Mot. 	On August 10, 2021, the
Government responded, urging the Court to deny or summarily dismiss Mr. Goguen’s
motion. 	Gov’t’s Resp. and Request for Summ. Dismissal of “Mot. for Relief from the
Ct.’s 	Order” 	(ECF 	No. 	394). 	On 	September 	15, 	2021, 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge
recommended that the Court dismiss Mr. Goguen’s Rule 60(b) motion and denied his
request for appointment of counsel. 	Recommended Decision on Mot. for Relief and
Order on Mot. to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 400). 	On April 28, 2022, the Court
affirmed the Recommended Decision. 	Order Aff. Recommended Decision (ECF No.
417).
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On May 12, 2022, Mr. Goguen sought a certificate of appealability in relation
to the Court’s dismissal of his Rule 60(b) motion, Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 419);
Appeal Cover Sheet (ECF No. 420), which the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied
on March 6, 2023. 	J. of Ct. of Appeals for the First Circuit (ECF No. 434); Mandate
of Ct. of Appeals for the First Circuit (ECF No. 435).
On October 12, 2023, Mr. Goguen brought a second motion for relief from
judgment, the one now pending before the Court. Mot. for Relief of J. (ECF No. 437)
(Pet’r’s Mot.). The Government opposed on November 2, 2023. Resp. to Mot. for Relief
of J. (ECF No. 439) (Govt’s Opp’n).
3. 	United States v. Robert Goguen, 1:16-cr-00167-JAW-01
On December 14, 2016, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Goguen, alleging that
he engaged in new criminal conduct, namely the possession of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 	Indictment (ECF No. 1). On September 15,
2017, Mr. Goguen pleaded guilty to this new charge. Min. Entry (ECF No. 64). After
a substantial delay caused by Mr. Goguen’s multiple motions and an interlocutory
appeal, 	the 	Court 	sentenced 	him 	on 	September 	20, 	2021 	to 	168 	months 	of
incarceration, twenty years of supervised release, no fine, and a $100 special
assessment. 	J. (ECF No. 205). 	As earlier noted, on the same date, the Court
sentenced Mr. Goguen to a consecutive term of 24 months of incarceration for his
violations of the conditions of his supervised release in 1:11-cr-00003-JAW-01.
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II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	Robert Goguen’s Motion
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), Mr. Goguen moves the
Court to grant relief from judgment with respect to its order denying postconviction
relief. Pet’r’s Mot. at 1. To support this motion, he argues that the “Court’s judgments
regarding request for postconviction relief are void because the initial judgment of
conviction is void,” as the Court “has held that it affirmatively misadvised [Mr.
Goguen] as to the consequence of the plea” and “erroneously classified [him] as a Tier
II offender.” Id. (citing United States v. Goguen, 218 F. Supp. 3d. 11 (D. Me. 2016)).
In Mr. Goguen’s view, if the initial 2011 judgment is void, then “release
conditions imposed pursuant to it are void and revocation for violating them was and
is barred.” 	Id. at 2. 	Put simply, he believes he “cannot be penalized for violating
what was not legally proscribed.” Id. Mr. Goguen adds that the “constitutionally void
SORNA conviction was used to both support guilt and enhance the punishment for
the new offense, violating fundamental fairness and Due Process.” Id..
Given these issues, Mr. Goguen “humbly requests the Court set aside its
judgments concerning the § 2255 motion” and issue “an order to immediately release
Petitioner from incarceration.” 	Id. 	In essence, Mr. Goguen claims that because his
original conviction for failure to register as a sex offender is void, his subsequent
revocation and conviction are also void, and he should be immediately released from
incarceration. Id. at 2.
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B. 	The Government’s Opposition
The Government “respectfully requests that the Court deny Goguen’s claims
for lack of merit.” 	Gov’t’s Opp’n at 1. 	To support its position, the Government
advances three points. Id. at 2-7.
“First, though masquerading as a Rule 60 motion, Goguen's petition is actually
a second or successive petition within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), that
Goguen has neither sought, nor received, the appellate court’s permission to file.” Id.
at 2. 	The Government represents “this is at least the third time that Goguen has
brought a collateral challenge to his conviction.” Id. at 3. The Government contends
that “[a]lthough Goguen couches the instant pleading as one filed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b), precedent is clear that the label a prisoner attaches to a pleading
does not control how it is treated.” Id. at 4. The Government then says that “[w]hen
a 	motion’s 	factual 	predicate 	deals 	primarily 	with 	the 	constitutionality 	of 	the
underlying conviction, it should be treated for what it is—a second or successive
section 2255 petition.” 	Id. (citing Munoz v. United States, 331 F.3d 151 (1st Cir.
2003)).
“Second, even if Goguen’s most recent pleading could be construed as a true
motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), his claims are not timely.” 	Id. at 2 (citing
F ED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1)). The Government avers that Rule 60 requires claims for relief
brought under Rule 60(b)(4) “be made within a reasonable time.” Id. at 5 (citing F ED.
R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1)). The Government asserts Mr. Goguen’s motion does not meet this
bar as “Goguen’s delay is more than four years, far longer than the delay in Cotto.
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Goguen, moreover, offers no justification for the delay in filing” despite being “actively
involved in other pro se litigation in the last four years.” 	Id. at 6 (citing Cotto v.
United States, 993 F.3d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 1993) (saying a sixteen-month delay was
“overlong in virtually any event”)).
Third, the Government posits that Mr. “Goguen’s claims are not properly
within the authority of Rule 60(b) . . .. 	A party claiming errors of law at the
underlying judgment of conviction is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 2-
3. 	After noting that the First Circuit “explained that the list of infirmities that can
render a judgment void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) is exceedingly short,” id. at 6
(internal quotations omitted) (citing U.S. Air Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260,
270 (1st Cir. 2010)), the Government contends Mr. “Goguen’s claims do no fall within
the ‘exceptionally short’ list.” 	Id. at 7. 	This is so, they argue, because he ”does not
make any serious challenge to the integrity of the section 2255 proceedings and gives
only passing reference to a phantom jurisdictional argument.” Id.
C. 	Robert Goguen’s Reply
Mr. Goguen had until November 16, 2023 to reply to the Government’s
opposition. He did not.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows courts to relieve a party from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for several reasons. 	F ED. R. C IV. P. 60(b).
Relevant here, Rule 60(b)(4) allows such relief if the Court’s judgment “is void.” F ED.
R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4).
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A. 	The Rule 60(b) Motion is Properly Deemed a Habeas Petition
and is Barred
In United States Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010), the Supreme
Court wrote about the parameters of Rule 60(b)(4). 	“Although the term ‘void’
describes a result, rather than the conditions that render a judgment unenforceable,
it suffices to say that a void judgment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity
that the infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.” Id. at 270.
The Supreme Court further stated that “[t]he list of such infirmities is exceedingly
short; otherwise, Rule 60(b)(4)’s exception to finality would swallow the rule.” Id. “A
judgment is not void, for example, simply because it is or may have been erroneous.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995)).
“Instead, Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised
either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that
deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” 	Id. at 271 (collecting
authority).
To try to meet this high burden, Mr. Goguen offers that the “Court’s judgments
regarding request for postconviction relief are void because the initial judgment of
conviction is void.” Pet’r’s Mot. at 1. Mr. Goguen adds that the “constitutionally void
SORNA conviction was used to both support guilt and enhance the punishment for
the new offense, violating fundamental fairness and Due Process.” Id. at 2.
As far as Mr. Goguen’s request for relief from judgment is premised on issues
with his initial conviction, his claim is barred. By the framing of this argument, Mr.
Goguen admits that he is challenging the underlying conviction. See id. at 1. While
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Mr. Goguen has a right to challenge his original conviction, a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is
not the appropriate avenue to do so. Instead, such an action should be brought as a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 expressly states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “any motion filed in the
district court that imposed the sentence, and substantively within the scope of § 2255
[], is a motion under § 2255, no matter what title the prisoner plasters on the cover.”
Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 97 (1st Cir. 2008) (cleaned up) (quoting Melton
v. United States, 359 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2004)); see id. (collecting cases of courts
recharacterizing “imaginatively captioned petitions to reflect that they derive their
essence 	from 	section 	2255, 	and 	thus, 	must 	satisfy 	that 	section’s 	gatekeeping
provisions”).
As in Trenkler, “[a] close analysis of the substance of the petition in this case
leaves no doubt but that, regardless of its label, the petition falls within the compass
of section 2255.” 	Id. 	“On its face, the petition is brought on behalf of a federal
prisoner still in custody and challenges his sentence as unauthorized under the
statutes of conviction. 	This is a classic habeas corpus scenario, squarely within the
heartland carved out by Congress in section 2255.” Id.
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In Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit stated that “a
Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as a second or successive habeas petition if—and
only if—the factual predicate set forth in support of the motion constitutes a direct
challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying conviction.” 324 F.3d at 67. Mr.
Goguen’s challenge does just that.
Put simply, insofar as Mr. Goguen’s request for relief is premised on his
original conviction being unconstitutional, it is properly characterized as a habeas
petition under § 2255. 	Accordingly, it must meet certain statutory requirements
before this Court has jurisdiction to hear it. 	One such restraint is that the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
“require[s] a federal prisoner who sought to prosecute a second or successive section
2255 petition to obtain pre-clearance, in the form of a certificate, from the court of
appeals.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)).
Mr. Goguen did not present authorization from the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit along with his § 2255 petition stylized as a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. “When
faced with a second or successive § 2255 petition that has not been authorized by the
court of appeals, a district court must either dismiss the petition or transfer it to the
court of appeals.” Bucci v. United States, 809 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2015). The Court
heeds this appellate instruction and dismisses Mr. Goguen’s petition.
This leaves Mr. Goguen’s claim that the “constitutionally void [Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. 109-248,] conviction was used to both
support guilt and enhance the punishment for the new offense, violating fundamental
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fairness and Due Process.” Id. (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967)). Much
like his first argument, insofar as this one is different, Mr. Goguen is challenging the
constitutionality of his original conviction. As discussed above, claims that do so must
be brought under § 2255, and as a result require pre-clearance in the form of a
certificate from the court of appeals. 	As there is no evidence that the First Circuit
has certified Mr. Goguen’s motion, the Court dismisses Mr. Goguen’s petition. 	See
Bucci, 809 F.3d at 26.
In short, while Mr. Goguen has stylized his request for relief as a Rule 60(b)(4)
motion, the First Circuit has indicated “substance trumps form.” Trenkler, 536 F.3d
at 97. Furthermore, the substance of Mr. Goguen’s form makes it clear that this is a
habeas petition that must, yet fails to, meet AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions. 	See
id. at 98-99. Absent meeting those requirements, the Court lacks jurisdiction. As a
result, the Court DISMISSES Robert Frederick Goguen’s Motion for Relief of
Judgment (ECF No. 437).
B. 	The Claims Are Non-Meritorious and Have Previously Been
Denied
As just described, the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of Mr.
Goguen’s motion. Although the Court is confident that Mr. Goguen’s latest motion is
barred, in the unlikely event the First Circuit disagrees, the Court briefly turns to
the merits of Mr. Goguen’s motion. Although dismissing a request for habeas corpus
relief may be harsh for a meritorious claim, Mr. Goguen has raised these precise
claims previously, and they are plainly non-meritorious.
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1. 	The Tier II v. Tier III Offender Issue
At the time of Mr. Goguen’s September 14, 2012 sentencing hearing in 1:11-cr-
00003-JAW, 	the 	Court 	accepted—without 	objection 	from 	Mr. 	Goguen 	or 	the
Government—the United States Probation Office’s determination that Mr. Goguen
was a Tier II offender. See United States v. Goguen, 218 F. Supp. 3d 111, 118-23 (D.
Me. 2016).
The issue with Mr. Goguen’s Tier classification did not come to the Court’s
attention until the Government filed its November 13, 2015 petition for revocation of
Mr. Goguen’s supervised release, alleging that Mr. Goguen had accessed child
pornography on his laptop computer. 	Pet. for Warrant or Summons for Offender
under Supervision (ECF No. 144). The Government argued that the provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 3583(k) should apply because Mr. Goguen had committed a new qualifying
sex offense while on supervised release for his SORNA violation. See Goguen, 218 F.
Supp. 3d at 115.
Section 	3583(k) 	provides 	that 	if 	certain 	conditions 	are 	met, 	including
committing a new criminal offense under Chapter 110 of Title 18, a court must
sentence a defendant like Mr. Goguen to five years of incarceration for violating the
conditions of supervised release.1 Before § 3583(k) applies, the supervisee must have
been required to register under SORNA when he committed the new criminal offense.
1 	On June 26, 2019, after the Court issued its decision, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that § 3583(k)’s mandatory minimum term of incarceration was unconstitutional because it
violated a defendant’s right to trial by jury and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. United States v. Hammond, 588 U.S. 634, 637 (2019).
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After the November 13, 2015 petition was filed, Mr. Goguen raised for the first
time the argument that he was not required to register under SORNA because, as a
Tier II offender, his obligation to register as a sex offender had expired in 2010. Id.
at 116. The Government responded that he was properly deemed a Tier III, that he
was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA when he committed the new
sex offense, and that he was therefore subject to the five-year mandatory term of
incarceration under § 3583(k).
To answer whether the mandatory five-year penalty applied to Mr. Goguen, on
November 2, 2016, the Court extensively analyzed the Tier classification issue and
concluded that Mr. Goguen was properly classified as a Tier III, not a Tier II offender.
Id. at 123. 	This conclusion had two repercussions: Mr. Goguen was subject to a
lifetime of supervised release and a five-year mandatory sentence on the revocation
petition.
The 	Tier 	II 	classification 	likely 	benefitted 	Mr. 	Goguen 	at 	his 	original
sentencing because his sentencing guideline range as a Tier II was 37 to 46 months,
and Mr. Goguen received a sentence of 37 months of incarceration. Id. at 199, n.4. If
he had been properly classified as a Tier III at his original sentencing hearing, his
guideline range would have been 46 to 57 months, a higher starting point. Id.
2. 	The Potential Length of Supervised Release Issue
At his guilty plea on July 14, 2011, the Court misinformed Mr. Goguen about
the potential length of his term of supervised release, telling him that he faced a
maximum of three years, not the correct term of a minimum of five years and a
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maximum of life. Id. at 114-16. Similarly, the Court misinformed Mr. Goguen that
if he violated his supervised release, he was subject to only a two-year term of
incarceration, not the mandatory five-year term § 3583(k) required.
As a result, when the Court sentenced Mr. Goguen on September 17, 2012, it
imposed a three-year term of supervised release. 	See J. (ECF No. 80); Am. J. (ECF
No. 90). 	Moreover, even though Mr. Goguen was subject to a mandatory five-year
term of incarceration under § 3583(k) for his violation of supervised release, the Court
concluded that because it had misinformed him and to ensure fairness, it would apply
the two-year term. Goguen, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 125-30. On September 20, 2021, when
the Court finally sentenced Mr. Goguen for his violation of supervised release, it
imposed a two-year, consecutive term of incarceration and no term of supervised
release to follow on 1:11-cr-00003-JAW. 	J. (ECF No. 404); Tr. Of Proceedings at
87:20-88:1 (ECF No. 414). Mr. Goguen appealed that two-year consecutive sentence,
Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 406), and on January 25, 2023, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed the Court’s sentence. 	J. of the Ct. of Appeals for the First
Circuit at 1 (ECF No. 432).
When 	the 	Court 	sentenced Mr. 	Goguen 	on 	his 	new 	possession 	of 	child
pornography charge under 1:16-cr-00167-JAW-01, it imposed a period of supervised
release of twenty years after his period of incarceration. 	J. (ECF No. 205). 	Mr.
Goguen appealed that judgment as well, Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 207), and on
January 25, 2023, in the same decision in which it rejected Mr. Goguen’s appeal of
the revocation sentence, the First Circuit affirmed the sentence in the possession of
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child pornography case. 	J. of the Ct. of Appeals for the First Circuit at 1 (ECF No.
219).
3. 	The Bottom Line
In 	short, 	Mr. 	Goguen 	benefitted 	substantially 	from 	the 	errors 	he 	now
complains of. 	Mr. Goguen complains that he was misclassified as a Tier II offender
at his original sentencing, but the Court’s subsequent analysis confirmed that he
should have been classified as a Tier III, a classification that would have resulted in
a higher guideline sentence range. Although he would have been subjected to a longer
period of supervised release as a Tier III, he was sentenced to only three years of
supervised release, not the mandatory period of five years.2
Moreover, he avoided the mandatory term of five years under § 3583(k) that
would have been imposed if he had been informed at his original guilty plea that if
he violated a condition of supervised release, he would be subject to a mandatory term
of five years. 	Instead, he received a lesser consecutive sentence of two years on the
revocation.
Finally, Mr. Goguen is aware of all of this. 	He has litigated these same
questions previously. 	The Court has taken his arguments seriously and issued
multiple long opinions addressing and rejecting his concerns. 	If the Court had
jurisdiction and could reach the merits of his motion, the Court would arrive today at
the same conclusions that it has in the past as nothing has changed.
2 	Regardless, he violated the conditions of his supervised release within the three-year term.
Furthermore, Mr. Goguen is no longer subject to a period of supervised release on 1:11-cr-00003-JAW,
and once released, will serve a twenty-year term of supervised release on 1:16-cr-00167-JAW.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES Robert Goguen’s Motion for Relief from Judgment
(ECF No. 437) as barred and non-meritorious.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 12th day of July, 2024
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