Hall et al v. Camden Development, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
JOHN HALL and MONICA M. BAHENA
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 25-4101
:
CAMDEN DEVELOPMENT, INC.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After 	this 	court 	remanded 	this 	action 	based 	on 	the 	then-
operative 	complaint 	for 	lack 	of 	standing,1 	Plaintiffs 	John 	Hall
and 	Monica 	Bahena 	(“Plaintiffs”) 	filed 	an 	Amended 	Class 	Action
Complaint 	in 	state 	court 	against 	Camden 	Development, 	Inc.
(“Camden” or “Defendant”) arising from their experience in leasing
an apartment. 	(ECF No. 6). 	Camden removed again, citing federal
jurisdiction 	under 	the 	Class 	Action 	Fairness 	Act, 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§
1332(d), 	1453 	(“CAFA”). 	(ECF 	No. 	1). 	Plaintiffs 	have 	moved 	to
remand. 	(ECF 	No. 	12). 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	response 	(ECF 	No. 	14).
No 	reply 	was 	filed. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the 	motion 	to
remand will be granted.
I. 	Background
This is a putative class action brought by Plaintiffs pursuant
to 	the 	Maryland 	Consumer 	Protection 	Act, 	the 	Maryland 	Consumer
1 	See 	Hall 	v. 	Camden 	Development, 	Inc., 	No. 	25-cv-0366-DKC,
2025 WL 2958829 (D.Md. Oct. 17, 2025).
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Debt Collection Act, and Maryland common law. 	Plaintiffs, former
tenants of an apartment managed by Defendant, contend, among other
things, 	that 	Defendant 	failed 	to 	disclose 	mandatory 	charges 	for
utilities billed under a Ratio Utility Billing System (“RUBS”) in
its 	advertising 	and 	engaged 	in 	false 	and 	misleading 	marketing
through third-party listing platforms, leading prospective tenants
to 	pay 	nonrefundable 	application 	fees 	before 	learning 	the 	true
cost of living at the property.
Defendant 	operates 	large 	multifamily 	housing 	developments
throughout Maryland and the United States. 	(ECF No. 6 ¶ 2). 	Four
developments 	are 	located 	in 	Maryland, 	including 	Camden 	College
Park, which has 509 units. 	The others are Camden Fallsgrove with
268 	units, 	Camden 	Shady 	Grove 	with 	457 	units, 	and 	Camden
Washingtonian with 365 units. 	(Id.).
In March 2024, Plaintiffs began looking for an apartment “that
met 	both 	their 	budget 	and 	geographic 	preferences.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	19).
Their 	budget 	was 	no 	more 	than 	$1,800 	per 	month. 	(See 	id.).
Defendant 	advertises 	its 	rental 	units 	on 	its 	own 	website 	and 	on
third-party websites such as “Zillow, Trulia, Apartments.com, and
Realtor.com.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	13). 	While 	on 	Zillow, 	Plaintiffs 	found 	a
rental 	unit 	in 	Defendant’s 	Camden 	College 	Park 	complex 	available
for $1,729 per month. 	(Id. ¶ 20). 	On March 17, 2024, Plaintiffs
paid 	a 	$50 	application 	fee 	to 	apply 	for 	the 	unit 	they 	had 	found.
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(Id. 	¶ 	21). 	“Plaintiffs 	were 	later 	approved 	for 	a 	lease 	and
executed 	a 	written 	Lease 	Agreement” 	with 	Defendant 	around 	March
23, 	2024, 	for 	the 	Camden 	College 	Park 	unit, 	(Id. 	¶ 	22), 	at 	a
monthly 	“base 	rent” 	of 	$1,729, 	(Id.). 	After 	signing 	the 	lease,
Plaintiffs learned that Camden imposed additional mandatory fees,
including a monthly charge for utilities using RUBS. 	(Id. ¶ 23).
This 	system 	does 	not 	charge 	based 	on 	actual 	usage. 	Rather, 	the
charge is calculated by dividing the master utility bill among all
units 	“using 	an 	undisclosed 	formula 	that 	includes 	variables 	such
as 	square 	footage, 	number 	of 	occupants, 	or 	arbitrary 	‘allocation
factors.’” 	(Id. ¶ 24).
Plaintiffs contend that Maryland Real Property Code § 8-212.42
regulates 	the 	use 	of 	RUBS 	and 	requires 	that 	the 	method 	be 	“fully
disclosed 	in 	writing 	prior 	to 	lease 	execution,” 	that 	the 	tenant
receive 	“advance 	notice 	of 	the 	average 	monthly 	utility 	cost 	for
similarly 	sized 	units,” 	and 	that 	the 	tenant 	be 	“provided 	with
documentation 	sufficient 	to 	verify 	the 	landlord’s 	computation.”
2 	The 	Tenant 	Protection 	Act 	of 	2022 	was 	added 	by 	2022 	Md.
Laws, 	ch. 	34, 	effective 	June 	1, 	2022. 	That 	act 	contains 	the
following provision: “A lease provision that requires a tenant to
pay the utility charges billed to the tenant under a ratio utility
billing 	system 	shall 	be 	unenforceable 	if 	the 	landlord 	fails 	to
provide 	the 	information 	required 	under 	paragraph 	(1) 	of 	this
subsection 	to 	the 	tenant 	in 	writing.” 	Md. 	Code 	Ann., 	Real 	Prop.
§ 8-212.4(c)(2) (West).
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(Id. ¶ 25). 	Plaintiffs contend that Camden’s lease documents and
rental advertising fail to satisfy those statutory prerequisites.
(Id. ¶ 26). 	After moving in, Plaintiffs were billed approximately
$164 	per 	month 	for 	water 	and 	sewer 	services, 	“nearly 	double 	the
Prince 	George’s 	County 	median 	residential 	water-and-sewer 	charge
of roughly $90 per month, as published by the Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission.” 	(Id. ¶ 27).
Plaintiffs 	seek 	actual 	damages 	in 	an 	unspecified 	amount,
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees, as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief. 	(Id. at 21–22).
II. 	Standard of Review
Plaintiffs 	move 	to 	remand 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1447(c),
which 	provides 	in 	part 	that, 	“[i]f 	at 	any 	time 	before 	final
judgment 	it 	appears 	that 	the 	district 	court 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, 	the 	case 	shall 	be 	remanded.” 	The 	removing 	party
asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden to demonstrate that
removal is proper. 	Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 297
(4th 	Cir. 	2008). 	Perhaps 	unlike 	other 	types 	of 	removal, 	CAFA
removal is not subject to a presumption against removal. 	Congress
enacted CAFA to “facilitate adjudication of certain class actions
in 	federal 	court,” 	meaning 	that 	“no 	antiremoval 	presumption
attends 	cases 	invoking 	CAFA.” 	Lyles 	v. 	Santander 	Consumer 	USA
Inc., 	669 	F.Supp.3d 	469, 	474 	(D.Md. 	2023) 	(quoting 	Dart 	Cherokee
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Basin 	Operating 	Co. 	v. 	Owens, 	574 	U.S. 	81, 	89 	(2014)).
Nevertheless, 	a 	defendant 	must 	still 	demonstrate 	that 	removal 	is
proper when challenged:
As 	relevant 	here, 	CAFA 	relaxes 	diversity
jurisdiction 	requirements 	and 	provides
district 	courts 	authority 	over 	class 	actions
with 	(1) 	more 	than 	100 	class 	members, 	(2) 	an
amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000 and
(3) 	minimally 	diverse 	parties. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1332(d)(2), (5). 	A defendant invoking CAFA to
remove 	a 	class 	action 	from 	state 	court 	must
file 	a 	notice 	of 	removal 	in 	the 	proper
district 	court 	“containing 	a 	short 	and 	plain
statement 	of 	the 	grounds 	for 	removal.” 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 	1446(a). 	The 	defendant 	bears 	the
burden 	of 	alleging 	that 	CAFA 	jurisdiction
exists, Strawn, 530 F.3d at 296, and must file
the 	notice 	of 	removal 	within 	30 	days 	from
receipt of the initial pleading. 	28 U.S.C. §
1446(b). 	Because “no antiremoval presumption
attends 	cases 	invoking 	CAFA 	. 	. 	. 	a
defendant’s 	notice 	of 	removal 	need 	include
only a plausible allegation that the amount in
controversy 	exceeds 	the 	jurisdictional
threshold.” 	Dart 	Cherokee[, 	574 	U.S. 	at 	89]
(citations omitted).
Scott v. Cricket Commc’ns, LLC, 865 F.3d 189, 194 (4 th Cir. 2017).
If 	the 	plaintiff 	challenges 	removal,
however, 	the 	defendant 	“bears 	the 	burden 	of
demonstrating 	that 	removal 	jurisdiction 	is
proper.” 	Strawn, 	530 	F.3d 	at 	297. 	When 	a
plaintiff’s 	complaint 	leaves 	the 	amount 	of
damages 	unspecified, 	the 	defendant 	must
provide evidence to “show . . . what the stakes
of litigation . . . are given the plaintiff’s
actual 	demands.” 	Brill 	v. 	Countrywide 	Home
Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis 	omitted). 	To 	resolve 	doubts
regarding 	a 	defendant’s 	asserted 	amount 	in
controversy, “both sides submit proof and the
court 	decides, 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the
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evidence, 	whether 	the 	amount-in-controversy
requirement 	has 	been 	satisfied.” 	Dart
Cherokee, [574 U.S. at 88].
Scott, 865 F.3d at 194.
“To determine whether the jurisdictional
minimum is satisfied, the district court looks
to 	the 	aggregated 	value 	of 	class 	members’
claims.” 	Bartnikowski 	v. 	NVR, 	Inc., 	307
F.App’x 	730, 	734 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2009) 	(citing 	28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6)). 	Where plaintiffs leave
damages 	unspecified 	in 	their 	complaint, 	the
defendant 	has 	the 	burden 	to 	establish 	the
jurisdictional 	amount 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of
the 	evidence 	to 	remove 	the 	case 	to 	federal
court under CAFA. 	Id. 	The Fourth Circuit has
specified 	that 	defendants 	cannot 	reach 	the
amount 	in 	controversy 	requirement 	through
speculative assumptions but must support their
assumptions 	with 	any 	evidence. 	Id. 	at 	736.
Russo 	v. 	Eastwood 	Constr. 	Partners, 	LLC, 	No. 	22-cv-1686, 	2023 	WL
2386453, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2023).
III. Analysis
The Amended Complaint proposes two classes:
Application 	Fee 	Misrepresentation 	Class: 	All
persons who, within the applicable limitations
period, 	paid 	a 	nonrefundable 	application 	fee
to 	lease 	a 	Camden-managed 	apartment 	in
Maryland 	after 	viewing 	a 	rental 	listing 	on
Camden’s 	website 	or 	a 	third-party 	platform 	.
. . that failed to disclose mandatory RUBS or
other recurring monthly charges.
Utility Billing Class: All persons who, within
the 	applicable 	limitations 	period, 	were
tenants 	in 	a 	Maryland 	residential 	property
owned 	or 	managed 	by 	Camden 	and 	who 	paid 	for
water, 	sewer, 	or 	other 	utilities 	under
Camden’s 	[RUBS] 	without 	being 	provided 	i) 	a
copy 	of 	the 	last 	two 	utility 	bills 	issued 	to
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the landlord; ii) the average monthly bill for
all dwelling units in the residential property
in 	the 	previous 	calendar 	year, 	by 	utility;
and/or iii) a citation to the relevant section
of the law, as required by Md. Code Ann., Real
Prop. § 8-212.4(c)(1).
(ECF 	No. 	6 	¶ 	51). 	The 	amended 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	Camden
manages 	more 	than 	1700 	units 	in 	Maryland. 	(Id. 	¶ 	54). 	There 	is
no estimate of the number of persons who paid the application fee.
The 	notice 	of 	removal 	contends 	that 	the 	Amended 	Complaint
justifies 	removal 	under 	CAFA 	because 	the 	number 	of 	claimants 	is
well over 100, the minimal diversity requirement is satisfied, and
there is over $5,000,000 in aggregate damages. 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 29).
It 	posits 	that, 	if 	1700 	units 	are 	involved, 	and 	each 	overpaid 	by
$74 	per 	month, 	there 	would 	be 	more 	than 	$5,000,000 	at 	issue 	even
if the limitations period started in 2022. 	(Id. ¶ 43 & n.3). 	At
the 	threshold, 	Defendant’s 	calculation 	contains 	a 	glaring 	error:
The 	time 	between 	November 	of 	2022 	and 	November 	of 	2025 	is 	three
years, or 36 months, not the 48 months the removal notice states.
(See id.). 	The Amended Complaint does not allege a starting date
for 	the 	claims 	but 	merely 	seeks 	coverage 	“within 	the 	limitations
period.” 	As 	Defendant 	recognizes, 	that 	period 	might 	well 	relate
back 	to 	the 	initial 	complaint 	and 	thus 	permit 	recovery 	back 	to
November 	of 	2021, 	increasing 	the 	damages 	calculation 	by 	an
additional twelve months, or four years prior to the filing of the
Amended 	Complaint. 	(Id. 	¶ 	43 	& 	n.4). 	(As 	noted 	above, 	however,
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the 	Maryland 	statute 	regulating 	the 	use 	of 	RUBS 	did 	not 	go 	into
effect until June of 2022.)
Plaintiffs 	make 	two 	arguments. 	First, 	Plaintiffs 	agree 	to
limit recovery to less than $5 million, thus negating a sufficient
amount 	in 	controversy.3 	(ECF 	No. 	12, 	at 	2). 	Second, 	they 	argue
that 	Defendant’s 	amount 	in 	controversy 	showing 	rests 	on 	“stacked
assumptions” and relies on maximizing every possible variable: the
number 	of 	apartments 	subject 	to 	RUBS, 	the 	number 	of 	months 	each
apartment 	was 	occupied, 	whether 	statutory 	notices 	were 	uniformly
absent, and whether the average overcharge was lower than $74 per
month. 	(Id.).
Defendant 	answers 	only 	some 	of 	those 	questions 	in 	its
response. 	Defendant’s 	response 	provides 	a 	declaration 	attesting
to 	which 	properties 	in 	Maryland 	were 	subject 	to 	the 	challenged
utility rate charges, reducing the total number of apartments from
1700 to 1331. 	(ECF No. 14-1 ¶ 9). 	Otherwise, despite much of the
relevant information presumably being within Defendant’s control,
it produced no evidence and merely continues to rely on the facts
alleged in the Amended Complaint.
3 Because Defendant fails to demonstrate a sufficient amount
in 	controversy, 	it 	is 	not 	necessary 	to 	determine 	whether
Plaintiffs’ 	post-removal 	limitation 	has 	any 	effect 	on
jurisdiction.
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Thus, 	the 	record 	reflects 	that 	three 	of 	the 	apartment
complexes, 	with 	1331 	total 	apartments, 	were 	subject 	to 	the
challenged 	utility 	rates, 	which 	were 	uniformly 	used 	for 	all
tenants. 	There is no indication that any tenant received the kind
of notice plaintiffs contend was required, so all of those tenants
are 	included. 	On 	the 	other 	hand, 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	as 	to 	how
often, 	on 	average, 	occupancy 	turned 	over, 	or 	how 	many 	months
apartments 	were 	vacant 	on 	average 	when 	the 	tenancy 	turned 	over.
Defendant 	does 	not 	explain 	why 	it 	is 	reasonable, 	and 	not
speculative 	and 	likely 	unrealistic, 	to 	count 	every 	apartment 	for
every month within the limitations period. 	Furthermore, there is
no evidence showing why it is reasonable to assume that Plaintiffs’
overcharge of $74 per month is a reasonable average to use for all
of the apartments. 	Here, while the $74.00 figure was provided by
Plaintiffs 	as 	an 	estimate 	of 	their 	overcharge, 	and 	Plaintiffs
assert that their claim is typical of the class, Plaintiffs do not
allege 	that 	the 	overcharge 	billed 	to 	others 	was 	of 	similar 	size.
Defendant 	does 	not 	provide 	evidence 	that 	allows 	the 	use 	of 	that
figure as an average overcharge across all apartments, of any size
or 	number 	of 	occupants. 	Thus, 	as 	in 	Bartnikowski, 	Defendant’s
assertion of an amount in controversy falters. 	307 F.App’x at 735
(“NVR’s 	ultimate 	estimate 	of 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy, 	however,
is fatally undermined by the wholly unsupported assumption on which
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its calculations ultimately rest—that Plaintiffs and class members
will each claim to have worked an average of five hours of overtime
per week.”).
The Application Fee Class, as noted above, is not quantified
at all either in the Amended Complaint or Defendant’s papers. 	At
$50 per application, there would have to be 100,000 persons in the
class 	to 	meet 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy 	requirement. 	Defendant
does not even argue as much. 	It merely suggests that the damages
for 	this 	class 	would 	“likely 	exceed 	$200,000.” 	(ECF 	No. 	14, 	at
6). 	Given the uncertainty of the Utility Billing Class’s damages,
this figure does little to tip the scales in Defendant’s favor.
Ultimately, a defendant must do more than here:
In identifying the amount in controversy,
a 	defendant 	may 	“rely 	to 	some 	extent 	on
reasonable 	estimates, 	inferences, 	and
deductions.” 	Scott[, 	865 	F.3d 	at 	196].
However, “[t]o meet its burden, [a defendant]
must provide enough facts to allow a court to
determine—not speculate—that it is more likely
than 	not 	that 	the 	class 	action 	belongs 	in
federal court.” 	Id. at 197; see also Brennan
v. 	Stevenson, 	No. 	[15-cv-2931-JKB], 	2015 	WL
7454109, at *6 (D.Md. Nov. 24, 2015) (“Courts
may not engage in conjecture, speculation, or
judicial 	star 	gazing 	to 	determine
jurisdiction.”) 	(quoting 	Kamau 	v. 	Slate, 	No.
[11-cv-522], 2013 WL 1883257, at *3 (N.D.Fla.
Apr. 	4, 	2013)) 	(cleaned 	up); 	Osia 	v. 	Rent-a-
Center, 	Inc., 	No. 	[15-cv-1200-DKC], 	2015 	WL
3932416, 	at 	*5 	(D.Md. 	June 	25, 	2015) 	(“To
allow 	removal 	of 	this 	case 	based 	on
Defendant’s speculation as to a possible final
damage 	award 	would 	eviscerate 	the 	amount 	in
controversy requirement.”).
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Ayers v. CIOX Health, LLC, 735 F.Supp.3d 607, 615 (D.Md. 2024).
Defendant also contends that punitive damages and attorney’s
fees can make up some of the balance. 	Again, however, it does not
provide any evidence, or frankly any argument, of specific amounts
that 	would 	be 	recoverable. 	It 	is 	not 	up 	to 	the 	court 	to 	supply
those numbers. 	Judge Blake recently reached a similar conclusion:
Santander 	contends 	that 	the 	amount 	in
controversy must account for attorneys’ fees.
Santander 	merely 	speculates, 	however, 	that
adding 	attorneys’ 	fees 	to 	the 	class’s 	damage
amount 	would 	“easily” 	take 	the 	amount 	in
controversy above $5 million. 	Suppl. Opp’n to
Mot. 	to 	Remand 	at 	9. 	But 	it 	provides 	no
concrete 	“facts” 	that 	would 	allow 	the 	“court
to 	determine” 	the 	class’s 	attorneys’ 	fees
could 	approach 	the 	nearly 	$1.5 	million
necessary 	to 	fill 	the 	shortfall 	between 	the
class’s 	potential 	damages 	and 	CAFA's
threshold. 	See 	Scott, 	865 	F.3d 	at 	197.
Lyles, 669 F. Supp. 3d at 476.
IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, 	Defendant 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	a 	sufficient
amount in controversy to support federal jurisdiction under CAFA.
The 	motion 	to 	remand 	will 	be 	granted. 	A 	separate 	order 	will 	be
entered.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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