Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. C Kop Hurp, LLC et al

8:25-cv-02078MddNov 26, 2025

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL,
INC. 	:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 25-2078
:
C KOP HURP, LLC, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff 	Choice 	Hotels 	International, 	Inc. 	(“Plaintiff”)
filed 	a 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment 	to 	confirm 	an 	Arbitrator’s
award in its favor against C Kop Hurp, LLC, Tejash Bhoola, Prakash
Bhoola, 	and 	Rajendra 	Jariwala 	(“Defendants”). 	(ECF 	No. 	6).
Defendants have filed no response. 	For the following reasons, the
motion will be granted without a hearing. 	Local Rule 105.6.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	Complaint 	to 	confirm 	an 	arbitration 	award
against 	Defendants 	on 	June 	29, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	1). 	Attached 	to
the 	Complaint 	is 	the 	“ex-parte 	award 	of 	arbitrator,” 	dated
November 13, 	2024. 	(ECF 	No. 	1-2). 	It 	recites 	that 	Defendants
breached 	the 	Franchise 	Agreement 	entered 	into 	on 	May 	24, 	2017.
Plaintiff 	incurred 	damages 	under 	the 	Franchise 	Agreement 	for
unpaid 	franchise 	fees, 	interest, 	liquidated 	damages, 	and 	the
Arbitrator’s 	fees. 	The 	Arbitrator 	ordered 	Defendants 	to 	pay,
jointly and severally, the total sum of $509,094.30 (consisting of
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$235,604.23 in franchise fees, $197,669.85 in interest, $69,915.22
in 	liquidated 	damages, 	$4,400 	in 	administrative 	fees 	of 	the
American 	Arbitration 	Association 	and 	$1,505 	for 	the 	fees 	and
expenses 	of 	the 	arbitrator). 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	default
judgment 	requests 	the 	entry 	of 	a 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	Plaintiff
and 	against 	Defendants 	C 	Kop 	Hurp, 	LLC, 	Tejash 	Bhoola, 	Prakash
Bhoola, and Rajendra Jariwala, jointly and severally, in the amount
of 	$509,094.30, 	plus 	post-judgment 	interest 	until 	paid 	and 	costs
for this action. 	(ECF No. 1 at 7, ECF No. 6).
Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	return 	of 	service 	on 	September 	23, 	2025,
indicating 	that 	Prakash 	Bhoola 	personally 	received 	service 	on
August 21, 2025, on behalf of himself, individually, on behalf of
Tejash 	Bhoola, 	and 	on 	behalf 	of 	C 	Kop 	Hurp, 	LLC. 	(ECF 	No. 	4).
Rajendra 	Jariwala 	was 	personally 	served 	on 	August 	18, 	2025.
Plaintiff 	filed 	motions 	for 	the 	entry 	of 	default 	and 	for 	default
judgment 	on 	October 	2, 	2025. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	5, 	6). 	Although
Plaintiff’s 	Certificate 	of 	Service 	indicates 	that 	copies 	of 	the
motions 	were 	mailed 	to 	Defendants 	on 	October 	2, 	2025, 	Defendants
failed to respond to these motions. 	(ECF No. 7).
The 	Clerk 	entered 	default 	against 	Defendants 	on 	October 	17,
2025, 	for 	want 	of 	answer 	or 	other 	defense 	(ECF 	No. 	8) 	and 	issued
a 	Notice 	to 	each 	Defendant 	advising 	that 	a 	motion 	to 	vacate 	the
order 	of 	default 	could 	be 	filed 	within 	thirty 	(30) 	days. 	(ECF
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Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12). 	Defendants failed to move to vacate the
entry of default.
II. 	Motion for Default Judgment
A 	defendant’s 	default 	does 	not 	automatically 	entitle 	the
plaintiff to the entry of a default judgment; rather, that decision
is 	left 	to 	the 	discretion 	of 	the 	court. 	See 	Dow 	v. 	Jones, 	232
F.Supp.2d 	491, 	494 	(D.Md. 	2002). 	The 	United 	States 	Court 	of
Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	a 	“strong 	policy” 	that 	“cases
be decided on their merits,” United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co.,
11 	F.3d 	450, 	453 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1993), 	“but 	default 	judgment 	may 	be
appropriate when the adversary process has been halted because of
an [] unresponsive party,” SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F.Supp.2d 418, 421
(D.Md. 2005).
Upon 	entry 	of 	default, 	the 	well-pled 	allegations 	in 	a
complaint 	as 	to 	liability 	are 	taken 	as 	true, 	but 	the 	allegations
as to damages are not. 	Id. at 422. 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c) limits the
type 	of 	judgment 	that 	may 	be 	entered 	based 	on 	a 	party’s 	default:
“A 	default 	judgment 	must 	not 	differ 	in 	kind 	from, 	or 	exceed 	in
amount, 	what 	is 	demanded 	in 	the 	pleadings.” 	Thus, 	where 	a
complaint specifies the amount of damages sought, the plaintiff is
limited to entry of a default judgment in that amount. 	“[C]ourts
have generally held that a default judgment cannot award additional
damages 	. 	. 	. 	. 	because 	the 	defendant 	could 	not 	reasonably 	have
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expected that his damages would exceed that amount.” 	In re Genesys
Data Techs., Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 132 (4 th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	for 	confirmation 	of 	the 	arbitration
award 	and 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment 	both 	request 	the 	entry 	of
judgment 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$509,094.30, 	together 	with 	interest 	at
the post-judgment rate until paid and costs of this action.1 	(ECF
Nos. 	1, 	6). 	The 	court 	need 	not 	specifically 	grant 	an 	award 	of
post-judgment 	interest 	as 	Plaintiff 	is 	entitled 	to 	recover 	such
interest by operation of law. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (“Interest
shall 	be 	allowed 	on 	any 	money 	judgment 	in 	a 	civil 	case 	recovered
in a district court.”).
Where 	default 	judgment 	is 	sought 	with 	respect 	to 	an
application 	for 	confirmation 	of 	an 	arbitration 	award, 	the
petitioner 	“must 	show 	that 	it 	is 	entitled 	to 	confirmation 	of 	the
arbitration 	award 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law.” 	United 	Cmty. 	Bank 	v.
Arruarana, 2011 WL 2748722, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 13, 2011) (citing
D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 109–10 (2 d Cir. 2006);
McColl 	Partners, 	LLC 	v. 	DME 	Holdings, 	LLC, 	2011 	WL 	971575, 	at 	*1
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2011)). 	As set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 9:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed
that a judgment of the court shall be entered
upon 	the 	award 	made 	pursuant 	to 	the
1 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	requests 	costs 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$400.
Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment 	requests 	$405 	in 	costs.
Plaintiff 	paid 	a 	$405 	filing 	fee 	to 	initiate 	this 	action. 	Thus,
$405 in costs will be awarded.
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arbitration, and shall specify the court, then
at any time within one year after the award is
made any party to the arbitration may apply to
the court so specified for an order confirming
the award, and thereupon the court must grant
such 	an 	order 	unless 	the 	award 	is 	vacated,
modified, 	or 	corrected 	as 	prescribed 	in
sections 10 and 11 of this title. 	If no court
is specified in the agreement of the parties,
then 	such 	application 	may 	be 	made 	to 	the
United 	States 	court 	in 	and 	for 	the 	district
within which such award was made.
The 	arbitration 	clause 	in 	the 	parties’ 	Franchise 	Agreement
provides, 	in 	part, 	that 	“any 	controversy 	or 	claim 	arising 	out 	of
or relating to this Agreement or any other related agreements, or
the 	breach 	of 	this 	Agreement, 	. 	. 	. 	will 	be 	sent 	to 	final 	and
binding arbitration,” and that “Judgment on the arbitration award
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.” 	(ECF No. 1-1 ¶
21). 	Pursuant 	to 	the 	arbitration 	clause, 	the 	arbitration 	award
was 	determined 	on 	November 	13, 	2024. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	1-2, 	6-2). 	Thus,
Plaintiff properly filed its Complaint with this court within one
year 	after 	the 	award 	was 	made, 	and 	an 	order 	confirming 	the 	award
must 	be 	granted 	unless 	the 	award 	is 	vacated, 	modified, 	or
corrected.
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act allows for vacatur
of an award:
(1) 	where 	the 	award 	was 	procured 	by
corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) 	where 	there 	was 	evident 	partiality 	or
corruption 	in 	the 	arbitrators, 	or 	either 	of
them;
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(3) 	where 	the 	arbitrators 	were 	guilty 	of
misconduct 	in 	refusing 	to 	postpone 	the
hearing, 	upon 	sufficient 	cause 	shown, 	or 	in
refusing 	to 	hear 	evidence 	pertinent 	and
material 	to 	the 	controversy; 	or 	of 	any 	other
misbehavior 	by 	which 	the 	rights 	of 	any 	party
have been prejudiced; or
(4) 	where 	the 	arbitrators 	exceeded 	their
powers, 	or 	so 	imperfectly 	executed 	them 	that
a 	mutual, 	final, 	and 	definite 	award 	upon 	the
subject matter submitted was not made.
9 	U.S.C. 	§ 	10(a). 	Additionally, 	the 	court 	may 	vacate 	an
arbitration 	award 	“if 	the 	arbiter 	acted 	in 	manifest 	disregard 	of
law.” 	Apex 	Plumbing 	Supply, 	Inc. 	v. 	U.S. 	Supply 	Co., 	Inc., 	142
F.3d 	188, 	193 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1998). 	The 	scope 	of 	review 	of 	an
arbitrator’s 	award 	is 	strictly 	limited 	to 	avoid 	frustrating 	the
fundamental 	purpose 	of 	arbitration 	– 	i.e., 	quick 	dispute
resolution 	and 	avoidance 	of 	the 	expense 	and 	delay 	of 	court
proceedings – and the burden of proof is on the party challenging
the award to clearly establish one of the grounds for vacating the
award. 	Jih 	v. 	Long 	& 	Foster 	Real 	Estate, 	Inc., 	800 	F.Supp. 	312,
317 (D.Md. 1992).
By 	failing 	to 	answer 	or 	otherwise 	respond 	either 	to
Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	or 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment, 	Defendants
have 	not 	demonstrated 	any 	ground 	for 	vacating 	the 	award. 	The
Arbitrator 	issued 	the 	award 	after 	reviewing 	and 	considering 	the
papers 	supporting 	Plaintiff’s 	unopposed 	for 	judgment 	to 	be
supported 	by 	evidence 	presented. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	1-2, 	6-2). 	There 	is
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no 	evident 	reason 	why 	the 	award 	should 	not 	be 	confirmed.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	application 	for 	confirmation 	of 	the
arbitration 	award 	is 	granted, 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	default
judgment 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$509,094.30, 	together 	with 	interest 	at
the 	post-judgment 	rate 	until 	paid, 	plus 	costs 	of 	$405 	will 	be
granted.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Case 8:25-cv-02078-DKC Document 13 Filed 11/26/25 Page 7 of 7

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