Ruth v. Board of Education of Montgomery County et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TAMAR RUTH, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civ. No. DLB-25-1727
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 	*
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, et al.,
*
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tamar Ruth filed this action against the Board of Education of Montgomery County
(“Board”) and superintendent Thomas W. Taylor in his official capacity, alleging that while she
was employed as an assistant principal with Montgomery County Public Schools (“MCPS”), she
was discriminated against on the basis of her race and disability and retaliated against in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”); and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1 The
defendants’ motion to dismiss Ruth’s complaint for failure to state a claim is granted.
I. 	Background
Ruth is African American. ECF 1, at 8. “Her specialty and experience [is] in the area of
elementary education.” Id. at 3. She began working for MCPS as a teacher in 1996 and was
promoted to assistant principal in 2006. Id.
1 The Court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on January 26, 2026. During the hearing, Ruth
confirmed that she did not object to substituting the Board as a defendant in place of the named
defendant Montgomery County Board of Education, and that she also did not object to dismissing
all claims against Taylor with prejudice as duplicative of her claims against the Board.
Accordingly, the Board is so substituted, and the claims against Taylor are dismissed with
prejudice. Because the claims against Taylor are dismissed with prejudice, the remainder of this
opinion addresses only Ruth’s claims against the Board.
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Ruth alleges that after she began working as an administrator, she “had a more expansive
view concerning discrimination in the school system” and that she “observed disparate treatment
against people of color generally,” in particular against African American families and African
American boys. Id. She “began advocating for African American families,” and in response,
“superiors and other staff members” subjected her to “microaggressions and pushback[.]” Id.
In 2018, Ruth was transferred “to a school which did not have a large population with
special needs or who would require advocacy or special attention.” Id. at 4. This was an undesirable
transfer for Ruth because her expertise was “in engaging students in marginalized populations and
setting them on track for learning and success.” Id. Ruth states that she was moved to this school
“despite the absence of any performance issues or punitive justification[.]” Id. The school to which
she was transferred in 2018 “had a culture of racism[.]” Id. For instance, an African American
student “submitted a letter detailing incidents of discrimination and indicating [that] the student
felt subjected to discrimination.” Id. Ruth says that the gay, Latina president of the Parent Teacher
Association “had her home destroyed by fire in what was suspected to be arson.” Id.
In July 2021, Ruth took a leave of absence, due to anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”) 	brought 	on 	by 	“the 	pressures 	of 	advocacy, 	the 	COVID 	pandemic, 	and 	the
microaggressions [she] experienced[.]” Id. During her leave, “[s]he requested part-time work” as
a reasonable accommodation “so that she could return to work” and also indicated that she would
be willing to be demoted “and return to the classroom,” but MCPS denied her request. Id. at 4–5.
Although her allegations are not entirely clear on this issue, Ruth appears to have been on
leave from 2021 until 2024. In February 2024, less than a month before she returned to work, Ruth
filed what she describes as “a bullying/harassment complaint” with the “MCPS Ombudsmen.” Id.
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at 5. Ruth states that the ombudsmen assured her that her complaint would be investigated, but she
never received any follow-up. Id.
That same month, Ruth submitted a reasonable accommodation request that “would allow
her to work in an environment with less stress and discrimination” and that was “more suited for
her given her anxiety and other mental health conditions.” Id. at 6. MCPS denied this request too.
Id.
Ruth was cleared to return to work in March 2024. Id. at 5. Upon her return, she was
initially assigned to work at an elementary school. Id. However, a week later, she was transferred
to a middle school, despite having no middle school experience. Id. Ruth objected to the middle
school transfer. Id. The following week, she was transferred to Ritchie Park Elementary School
(“Ritchie Park”). Id.
The principal of Ritchie Park was a man named Andrew Winter. Id. Ruth states that Winter
was “on leave at the time of [her] transfer based on allegations of child abuse[.]” Id. Ruth was the
acting assistant principal in his absence. Id. Ruth had previously “expressed a desire to avoid
working with [Winter] or as his subordinate[.]” Id. Ruth believes that her transfer to Ritchie Park
was “retaliatory” because she had “previously complained about . . . Winter[.]” Id. According to
Ruth, Winter “had a poor reputation in terms of working with African American families, students
and staff[.]” Id. Ruth believed, based on her own past experiences with Winter, that he “harbored
discriminatory animus against African Americans.” Id. Winter “created a culture of race
discrimination and retaliation at Ritchie Park[.]” Id.
During this period, beginning in February and continuing to May 2024, Ruth sought out
positions that she believed would be “more favorable” to her “mental health condition.” Id. at 6.
Representatives from human resources, however, “told [her] that there were no available positions
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for her or that there were no Assistant Principal positions to which she could transfer.” Id. Ruth
believes this was false. Id. In Ruth’s view, “MCPS denied these positions to her because of her
complaints and advocacy for herself and African American students.” Id.
During her time at Ritchie Park, Ruth learned about an African American student whom
staff members were calling a “bad boy.” Id. at 5–6. She developed a positive relationship with this
student and “was able to look deeper into his experience and the concerns . . . through the lens of
racism.” Id. at 6. In the course of her relationship with the student, Ruth learned that he should
have had an individualized education program (“IEP”) but lacked one, and that school staff had
“subjected [him] to inappropriate actions[.]” Id. Ruth then filed “a complaint of bias and hate” on
the student’s behalf in May 2024, prompting an investigation in which she was interviewed by the
police and discussed the complaint with human resources. Id.
Sometime in May 2024, Ruth was instructed to facilitate “a previously unscheduled IEP
meeting for a student” over Zoom. Id. at 6–7. During the meeting, “a student who was upset or
disturbed and who should have been in the classroom came to Ruth’s door.” Id. at 7. Ruth
attempted to speak to the student and “calm[] the situation,” but the student “continued to beat at
her door in an attempt to gain entry.” Id. This event so disturbed Ruth that it, along with “the
circumstances with the transfer and the hostility she received[,] exacerbated her mental health
condition” to the point that she began to have “an emotional breakdown.” Id. “She was hospitalized
for a week” and engaged in therapy after she was discharged. Id.
On November 20, 2024, Ruth filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. at 3.
On January 20, 2025, Ruth “requested a reasonable accommodation . . . in order to facilitate
her return to work,” including “that she be permitted to work part-time initially and to gradually
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increase her hours of work; that the functions of her Assistant Principal position be transferred to
other staff members for support”; and that she “be provided with written instructions for work
assignments; . . . additional supervision and/or clinical support with new and/or complex projects,
progress performance reviews and any communication issues related to her disability; and . . .
breaks, as needed.” Id. at 7. MCPS denied these requests on February 26, 2025. Id.
On March 3, 2025, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. Id. at 3.
On May 30, 2025, Ruth filed this lawsuit. She asserts claims of race and disability
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, the ADA, and § 1981. She seeks
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 16,
2025, ECF 13 & 13-1, which is fully briefed, ECF 15 & 16. The Court held a hearing on the motion
on January 26, 2026.
II. 	Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may seek dismissal for failure “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Robertson v. Anderson Mill Elementary Sch., 989 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir.
2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). To survive the challenge, the opposing party must have
pleaded facts demonstrating it has a plausible right to relief from the court. Lokhova v. Halper,
995 F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A plausible
claim is more than merely conceivable or speculative. See Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293,
299 (4th Cir. 2022). The allegations must show there is “more than a sheer possibility that the
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d 635, 648
(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). But the claim does not need to be probable, and
the pleader need not show “that alternative explanations are less likely” than their theory. Jesus
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Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore Cnty., 915 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015)).
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept the allegations as true and
“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of” the pleader. Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759, 765
(4th Cir. 2022) (quoting King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016)). But the court does
not 	accept 	“legal 	conclusions 	couched 	as 	facts 	or 	unwarranted 	inferences, 	unreasonable
conclusions, or arguments.” United States ex rel. Taylor v. Boyko, 39 F.4th 177, 189 (4th Cir.
2022) (quoting United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455
(4th Cir. 2013)). Merely reciting a claim’s elements “and supporting them by conclusory
statements does not meet the required standard.” Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d
230, 234 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 212
(4th Cir. 2019)). The court “does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tobey v.
Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion typically is limited to the pleadings,
documents attached to the complaint, and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 12(d);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The court also may consider judicially noticed facts and documents
integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint when their authenticity is not disputed. See Zak
v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606–07 (4th Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	Timeliness
As a preliminary matter, the parties agree that, in connection with Ruth’s Title VII and
ADA claims, the Court may not consider any alleged discriminatory or retaliatory acts that
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occurred before January 25, 2024. This is because a Title VII plaintiff in Maryland must file a
charge of discrimination within 300 days of each alleged discriminatory or retaliatory act “or lose
the ability to recover for it.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002); see
also Davis v. Balt. Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701, 713 (D. Md. 2013) (explaining
that because Maryland is a “deferral state,” the time limit for filing an EEOC charge is 300 days).
The same rule applies to ADA claims. See, e.g., Handon-Brown v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary
Comm’n, No. RWT-13-3223, 2015 WL 1137728, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2015). Ruth filed a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC on November 20, 2024. Three hundred days before that date is
January 25, 2024. Thus, to the extent Ruth’s Title VII and ADA claims are predicated on
discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring before January 25, 2024, they are time-barred.2
B. 	Title VII Race Discrimination Claim
Ruth alleges that the Board discriminated against her on the basis of her race “by
transferring her to less desirable positions and by refusing transfers to the positions she sought or
to which she applied.” ECF 1, at 8.
Title VII forbids employers from “discharg[ing] any individual or otherwise . . .
discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
“Absent direct evidence” of discrimination, “the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination
under Title VII are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3)
adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside
2 Ruth also asserts § 1981 claims. The statute of limitations for § 1981 claims is four years. See
James v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 370 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2004). Thus, Ruth’s § 1981 claims
cover alleged discriminatory and retaliatory acts dating back to May 30, 2021. Even with an
extended limitations period, Ruth’s § 1981 claims do not survive the motion to dismiss for reasons
discussed at the end of this opinion.
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the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). “Although
a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination to state a claim, reference to the
prima facie case may nonetheless inform a court’s evaluation of a motion to dismiss.” Wooten v.
Univ. of Md., Balt., 733 F. Supp. 3d 402, 417 (D. Md. 2024). The facts alleged must be sufficient
“to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by” Title VII, Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959
F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway
Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015)), and the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the “relevant
decisionmaker was motivated by her race,” Barnhill v. Bondi, 138 F.4th 123, 131 (4th Cir. 2025).
Ruth alleges the Board discriminated against her when it transferred her to undesirable
schools and denied her transfer requests. A transfer (or a denial thereof) may constitute a harm
actionable under Title VII when it leaves the employee “worse off” in some way with respect to
her “employment terms and conditions”—even if there is no attendant pay cut or change in rank
and even if the employee is able to seek other positions. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S.
346, 355 (2024). Ruth alleges three adverse transfers or transfer denials within the limitations
period: (1) her transfer from an elementary school to a middle school in March 2024; (2) her
transfer a week later to Ritchie Park Elementary School; and (3) her being told, sometime between
February and May 2024, that there were no available positions at the schools to which she wanted
to transfer. The Court addresses each in turn.
Ruth’s March 2024 transfer to a middle school likely qualifies as an adverse action. Ruth
alleges that she lacked experience working in middle schools, so it is plausible that being
transferred to such a school would leave her “worse off” with respect to her “employment terms
and conditions.” See id. Ruth fails, however, to plausibly allege that this transfer was motivated
by discriminatory animus. She does not identify the decisionmaker who transferred her to the
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middle school, and she does not allege any facts that would suggest the decisionmaker transferred
her because she is African American. Nor does Ruth allege any other facts suggesting evidence of
discrimination, such as a non-African American employee who was allowed to retain a position in
their area of expertise. In fact, Ruth’s allegations belie discriminatory animus. As Ruth tells it, one
week after she objected to the transfer to the middle school, she was transferred to Ritchie Park—
an elementary school. This suggests the relevant decisionmakers were responsive to her concerns
and acted promptly to remedy them, not that they intended to subject her to disadvantageous
employment conditions on the basis of her race. Thus, Ruth has not alleged a Title VII race
discrimination claim based on this transfer.
As for the transfer to Ritchie Park Elementary School, Ruth fails to plausibly allege that
this constituted an adverse action. Ruth claims that Ritchie Park was an undesirable place to work
because Winter, the principal, “harbored discriminatory animus against African Americans” and
“created a culture of race discrimination and retaliation[.]” ECF 1, at 5. Yet Ruth does not explain
why she believes Winter harbored racial animus against African Americans or how he created a
culture of racism and retaliation. Moreover, according to Ruth’s own allegations, Winter was not
working at Ritchie Park when she was transferred there, and Ruth never claims that she had to
work with Winter or that his return to Ritchie Park was imminent or even likely at any point during
her time there. Beyond her conclusory allegations about Winter, Ruth does not point to any specific
instance when she experienced racial discrimination or retaliation while working at Ritchie Park.
She thus fails to plausibly allege that her transfer to Ritchie Park worsened her employment terms
and conditions. That dooms her Title VII race discrimination claim based on this transfer.
Even if Ruth had alleged that her transfer to Ritchie Park was an adverse action, she fails
to allege that the transfer was motivated by her race. Once again, Ruth does not identify the
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decisionmaker responsible for her transfer. Nor does she allege the decisionmaker knew that
Winter harbored racial animus against African Americans or that Winter created a racist and
retaliatory culture at the school. Ruth also does not plead any facts that would suggest she was
transferred to Ritchie Park because she is African American, such as a similarly-situated non-
African American comparator. For this additional reason, Ruth has not stated a Title VII race
discrimination claim based on her transfer to Ritchie Park.
Finally, the Court considers the denial of Ruth’s transfer requests. Ruth alleges that she
was misinformed about the existence of other open positions within MCPS to which she could
transfer. However, Ruth does not identify the positions she claims were open but was misinformed
were not. Nor does Ruth allege that she was qualified for the (unidentified) positions she sought.
Even if she had alleged as much, Ruth does not allege circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. Read generously, Ruth’s complaint plausibly alleges that (unidentified) MCPS
human resources personnel wanted to prevent her from transferring to positions she desired. But
Ruth does not plausibly allege that MCPS personnel wanted to deny her transfer requests because
of her race. For instance, Ruth does not allege that the MCPS personnel said or did anything in
connection with the denials of her transfer requests suggesting they harbored racial animus against
her. Nor does she allege comparator evidence that might support her allegations of discrimination.
Thus, Ruth fails to plausibly allege that she was denied transfers because she is African American.
Ruth’s Title VII race discrimination claim is dismissed without prejudice.
C. 	ADA Discrimination Claim
Ruth claims the Board discriminated against her because of her disability in violation of
the ADA in two respects: by failing to accommodate her anxiety and PTSD and by “involuntarily
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reassign[ing] her or transferr[ing] her [and] refus[ing] to allow her to transfer to desirable
positions[.]” ECF 1, at 10.
The ADA prohibits employers “from ‘discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability,’” including by “fail[ing] to make ‘reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee[.]’” Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 2013) (first
alteration in Wilson) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a)–(b)). “Generally, to plead a claim of
disability discrimination [under the ADA], a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that (1) the
plaintiff has a disability; (2) the plaintiff was a qualified individual for the position; and (3) the
employer took an adverse employment action, such as discharging the plaintiff, because of the
disability.” Gagnon v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 760 F. Supp. 3d 359, 370 (D. Md. 2024)
(citing Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015)).
“A plaintiff is disabled [within the meaning of the statute] if he can show ‘(1) that he has a
physical or mental impairment, (2) that this impairment implicates at least one major life activity,
and (3) that the limitation is substantial.’” Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 751
(4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 2006)).
A “qualified individual” is “a person who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of her job,” Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U.S. 46, 54 (2025)
(quoting Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999)), and “[a] job function
is” in turn “essential if it ‘bear[s] more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue,’” Rohan v.
Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 279 (4th Cir. 2004) (second alteration in Rohan)
(quoting Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)). In other
words, “to prevail under [the ADA’s anti-discrimination provision], a plaintiff must plead and
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prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without
reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer’s alleged act of disability-based
discrimination.” Stanley, 606 U.S. at 65. Finally, the plaintiff’s disability must be a but-for cause
of the employer’s alleged discrimination. See Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d
228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016).
When an ADA plaintiff’s discrimination claim is based on an alleged failure to
accommodate their disability, they can make out a prima facie case of discrimination by alleging
“(1) that [they were] an individual who had a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) that
the [employer] had notice of [their] disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation [they]
could perform the essential functions of the position . . . ; and (4) that the [employer] refused to
make such accommodations.” Wilson, 717 F.3d at 345 (quoting Rhoads v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001)) (second, fifth, and sixth alterations in Rhoads). As in the
Title VII context, while a plaintiff “need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination . . . to
survive [a] motion to dismiss,” they still must “allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause of
action created by th[e] statute[.]” Miller v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 813 F. App’x 869, 874 (4th Cir.
2020) (first, second, and third alterations in Miller) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 515 (2002) and McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585).
The Court begins with Ruth’s allegation that the Board failed to accommodate her
disability. For purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes that Ruth’s PTSD and anxiety qualify
as a disability under the ADA. The Court also assumes that the Board was on notice of Ruth’s
disability because she alleges that her conditions prompted her to take a leave of absence in 2021.
The Court can plausibly infer from those allegations that Ruth would have told the Board why she
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was taking this leave. And, Ruth alleges that the Board denied her accommodation requests in
February 2024 and January 2025.
Still, Ruth’s ADA discrimination claim—to the extent it is based on alleged failures to
accommodate—nonetheless falters because Ruth alleges no facts from which the Court could infer
that the accommodations she requested would have allowed her to perform the essential functions
of her position. She does not specify what her job duties as an assistant principal were; nor does
she explain how she would have been able to perform those duties had she received the
accommodations she sought—breaks, written instructions, temporary part-time work, and the like.
Indeed, Ruth’s own allegations indicate that at least one of her requested accommodations would
not have been reasonable. Ruth alleges that she asked for the “functions of her Assistant Principal
position [to] be transferred to other staff members for support[.]” ECF 1, at 7. Such an
accommodation request—which would “require an employer to ‘reallocate job duties in order to
change the essential functions of a job’”—is not reasonable. Shin v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.,
369 F. App’x 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 App. § 1630.2(o)).
Ruth’s other disability discrimination allegations—those based on the involuntary transfers
and denied transfer requests—fare no better. Once again, the Court assumes that Ruth has plausibly
alleged that she suffers from a disability. She has not, however, plausibly alleged that she was a
“qualified individual” because she does not allege facts indicating she could perform the essential
functions of her position with (or without) a reasonable accommodation. Moreover, Ruth simply
provides no facts from which the Court could plausibly infer that her PTSD and/or anxiety were a
cause—but-for or otherwise—of her transfer to the middle school, her transfer to Ritchie Park, or
the denial of her transfer requests. Thus, Ruth fails to state a claim of disability discrimination on
this basis.
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Ruth’s ADA discrimination claim is dismissed without prejudice.
D. 	Title VII and ADA Retaliation Claims
Ruth alleges she was retaliated against in violation of Title VII and the ADA. To state a
claim for either Title VII or ADA retaliation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) engagement in
a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected
activity and the employment action.” Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132 (quoting Coleman, 626 F.3d at
190); see also A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011). An
employee engages in protected activity under Title VII or the ADA by either “(1) opposing a
practice forbidden by Title VII” or the ADA or “(2) participating in a Title VII” or ADA
“investigation or proceeding.” Cosby v. S.C. Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 93 F.4th 707, 718
(4th Cir. 2024); see also Thompson v. City of Charlotte, 827 F. App’x 277, 279 (4th Cir. 2020).
Under the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADA, “an employee is protected when she
opposes ‘not only . . . employment actions actually unlawful . . . but also employment actions [she]
reasonably believes to be unlawful.’” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 282
(4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (first and third alterations in Boyer-Liberto) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Navy
Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005)); see also Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake
Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 216 (4th Cir. 2002).
To sustain a retaliation claim under either statute, an adverse employment action must be
“materially adverse”; that is, it must be “serious enough to dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Herkert v. Bisignano, 151 F.4th 157, 165–66
(4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 358); see also Laird v. Fairfax Cnty., 978 F.3d 887,
893 (4th Cir. 2020). Causation may be established by a “particularly close [temporal] proximity”
between the protected activity and adverse action, Hall Haggins v. Wilson Air Ctr., LLC, 163 F.4th
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872, 881 (4th Cir. 2026); see also Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19 F.4th 643, 654 (4th
Cir. 2021), or by a “pervasive sequence of intervening events indicating disdain for or
intermeddling with the protected activity,” Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132; see also Wilson v. City of
Gaithersburg, 121 F. Supp. 3d 478, 485 (D. Md. 2015). “In any event, the plaintiff must show that
a relevant decisionmaker was actually aware of the protected activity before making their
decision.” Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132.
1. 	Title VII Retaliation
Ruth alleges that she was subjected to retaliation in violation of Title VII when she was
transferred to undesirable positions and her transfer requests were refused. For purposes of this
Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court assumes that Ruth has alleged adverse employment actions.
Ruth has identified three protected activities that she claims resulted in retaliation. First,
Ruth claims she was retaliated against because she filed a “bullying/harassment complaint” in
February 2024. ECF 1, at 5. Yet Ruth provides almost no details about this complaint. She does
not attach or quote from the complaint. She does not identify who experienced the alleged bullying
and harassment or whether the bullying and harassment was because of the person’s protected
traits. Nor does she provide any details about the ombudsmen’s duties or responsibilities that might
illuminate the nature of her complaint. Without more information, the Court cannot plausibly infer
that Ruth opposed a practice actually or reasonably believed to be prohibited by Title VII or that
she participated in a Title VII investigation or proceeding when she filed the “bullying/harassment
complaint.”3
3 Another pleading flaw is that Ruth does not allege that any decisionmaker responsible for an
adverse action taken after she filed the “bullying/harassment complaint” in February 2024 knew
that Ruth had filed the complaint.
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Next, Ruth asserts that she was retaliated against because of her “advoca[cy] on behalf of
African American students and . . . families.” ECF 1, at 9. At the motions hearing, Ruth clarified
that this advocacy was the “complaint of bias and hate” she filed on behalf of an African American
student in May 2024. Id. at 6. Ruth’s “complaint of bias and hate,” filed on behalf of a student, is
not protected activity. This is because Title VII forbids discrimination only in the employer-
employee relationship. See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“An entity can be held liable in a Title VII action only if it is an ‘employer’ of the complainant.”).
To ensure an employee may complain about discriminatory employment practices without fear of
retribution, Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for opposing a
practice forbidden by the statute (or a practice the employee reasonably believes to be forbidden),
or for participating in a Title VII investigation or proceeding. Those forbidden practices include
discrimination by an employer against an employee because of the employee’s protected traits.
The practice that Ruth opposed was “bias and hate” by MCPS towards an African American MCPS
student, not discrimination by MCPS against an African American MCPS employee. By calling
attention to “bias and hate” directed at a student, Ruth was not opposing a practice forbidden by
Title VII, and she could not reasonably have believed that she was. And because the student was
not an employee of MCPS, it is not plausible that the ensuing police and human resources
investigations would have constituted a “proceeding or investigation” under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Schmidt v. Town of Cheverly, 212 F. Supp. 3d 573, 578–79 (D. Md. 2016) (police officer who
supported wife’s discrimination complaint accusing police chief of sexual harassment was not, and
could not reasonably have believed that he was, engaged in Title VII protected activity where wife
was not an employee of police department).
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Finally, Ruth asserts she was retaliated against for “complaining of her own discriminatory
treatment under . . . Winter and others.” ECF 1, at 9. As best the Court can tell, Ruth appears to be
referring to the complaint she made about Winter at some point before her transfer to Ritchie Park.
See id. at 5 (“[Ruth] had previously complained about . . . Winter and expressed a desire to refrain
from working for him or as his subordinate”). The Court assumes, without deciding, that this
constitutes protected activity. Even so, Ruth fails to plausibly allege causation. Ruth does not
specify when she made this complaint; she states only that she complained about Winter at some
point prior to her transfer to Ritchie Park. And she does not allege that any decisionmaker who
took the alleged adverse actions knew about her prior complaint about Winter. Without this
information, the Court cannot infer a sufficiently close temporal proximity or a “pervasive
sequence of intervening events indicating disdain for or intermeddling with the protected activity,”
Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132, between Ruth’s complaint and any adverse action.
Ruth’s Title VII retaliation claim is dismissed without prejudice.
2. 	ADA Retaliation
Ruth alleges that she was subjected to retaliation in violation of the ADA because she
“complained about disability discrimination and [the Board’s] refusal to afford her a reasonable
accommodation.” ECF 1, at 10. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Ruth argued that she also
was retaliated against because she requested a reasonable accommodation in February 2024.
As with the Title VII retaliation claim, the Court assumes, for purposes of this analysis,
that Ruth has alleged the transfer to the middle school and the denial of her transfer requests were
adverse employment actions. And, as with the Title VII retaliation claim, Ruth identifies three
potential protected activities.
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First, Ruth says she complained about disability discrimination, but she identifies no
specifics. The only possible disability discrimination complaint is the “complaint of bias and hate”
that Ruth filed on behalf of the African American student in May 2024 when she learned that he
lacked an IEP. Yet, at the motions hearing, Ruth’s counsel disclaimed any argument that this
complaint related to the student’s disability. See ECF 22, at 20 (“I believe [the complaint] was
racial bias and hate on behalf of the student. I don’t believe it included an ADA allegation.”). That
disclaimer was wise because Ruth’s complaint contains no allegations that she opposed disability
discrimination against the student. In fact, Ruth does not specify the nature of the “bias and hate”
at all. Reading the allegations in Ruth’s complaint generously, the Court infers that Ruth was
objecting to alleged racial bias against the student by school staff (an inference Ruth confirmed at
the motions hearing). On Ruth’s allegations, the Court cannot, however, infer that in filing a
complaint on behalf of the student, Ruth was opposing ADA-prohibited conduct.
Next, Ruth asserts she “complained about . . . [the Board’s] refusal to afford her a
reasonable accommodation[.]” ECF 1, at 10. But she identifies no specific instance, by date or
otherwise, in which she complained about the denial of disability accommodation requests. Ruth
cannot make out a retaliation claim on those grounds.
Finally, Ruth claims she was retaliated against because of her February 2024 reasonable
accommodation request. Requesting a reasonable accommodation is protected activity under the
ADA. See, e.g., Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001). Though Ruth
alleges she engaged in protected activity, she does not plausibly allege that the protected activity
caused the adverse employment actions. Ruth does not allege that the (unidentified) decisionmaker
who transferred her to the middle school or the (unidentified) human resources personnel who
informed her there were no positions to which she could transfer were aware of her accommodation
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request. This dooms her retaliation claim. See, e.g., Seabrook v. Driscoll, 148 F.4th 264, 273 (4th
Cir. 2025) (Title VII plaintiff failed to plausibly allege retaliation when, although she alleged that
she received a poor performance review the month after filing an equal employment opportunity
complaint, she “d[id] not allege facts to support an inference that [the supervisor who issued her
performance review] was aware of her complaint when he issued her review”).
Ruth’s ADA retaliation claim is dismissed without prejudice.
E. 	Section 1981 Claims
Ruth asserts claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which
“prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.” Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
Like her Title VII claim, Ruth’s § 1981 discrimination claim is based on alleged
discriminatory transfers and the denial of transfer requests. As the Court explained during the
hearing on the motion to dismiss, Ruth’s § 1981 discrimination claim must be dismissed without
prejudice because Ruth fails to plausibly allege that the transfers and denied transfer requests
resulted from an official policy or custom of discrimination of the Board. See Dennis v. Cnty. of
Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995).
The Court next considers Ruth’s § 1981 retaliation claim. Section 1981 “encompasses . . .
complaint[s] of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another
person’s contract-related ‘right.’” CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008). As in
the Title VII context, a prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to show (1) protected
activity, (2) adverse action, and (3) causation. See Irani v. Palmetto Health, 767 F. App’x 399, 421
(4th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff may engage in protected activity under § 1981 by “reporting
‘employment actions actually unlawful under [§ 1981] . . . [or] employment actions she reasonably
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believes to be unlawful.’” Ali v. BC Architects Eng’rs, 832 F. App’x 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2020) (first
alteration in Ali) (quoting Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282).
Ruth’s § 1981 retaliation claim is premised on the same three protected activities on which
her Title VII retaliation claim was premised. Ruth’s “bullying/harassment complaint” and her “bias
and hate” complaint on behalf of the African American student do not qualify as § 1981 protected
activity. 	As 	previously 	discussed, 	Ruth 	does 	not 	provide 	sufficient 	details 	about 	the
“bullying/harassment complaint” from which the Court could infer that the bullying and
harassment was based on race. And she does not allege that, in objecting to bias and hate against
the student, she was opposing a racially discriminatory employment practice or the violation of a
contract-related right the student may have had. Thus, the Court cannot infer that, in making either
complaint, Ruth sought to vindicate (or reasonably believed that she was vindicating) any rights
protected by § 1981. As for the third alleged protected activity, her complaint about Winter, Ruth
fails to plausibly allege a causal link between it and any adverse action, for the reasons discussed
earlier in this opinion.4 Thus, Ruth’s § 1981 retaliation claim is dismissed without prejudice.
IV. 	Conclusion
The motion to dismiss is granted. A separate Order follows.
Date:_________________ 	______________________
Deborah L. Boardman
United States District Judge
4 Ruth alleges one adverse action within the four-year limitations period for a § 1981 claim that
did not fall within the limitations period for her Title VII claims: the denial of the reasonable
accommodation request Ruth made while on leave. However, Ruth pleads no facts that would
plausibly suggest that this request was denied because of a policy or custom of discrimination or
that it was denied in retaliation for any § 1981 protected activity.
March 4, 2026
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