Doe, (S.E.S) v. Choice Hotels International, Inc. et al

8:24-cv-03776MddNov 25, 2025

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
JANE DOE (S.E.S., an individual)
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 24-3776
:
CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., et al. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff 	Jane 	Doe 	(“Plaintiff”) 	filed 	this 	Trafficking
Victims 	Protection 	Reauthorization 	Act 	(“TVPRA”) 	action 	against
Choice 	Hotels 	International, 	Inc., 	Choice 	Hotels 	International
Service 	Corp. 	(collectively, 	“Choice 	Defendants”),1 	and 	Phillip
Hall 	Properties, 	L.L.C. 	(“PHP”). 	She 	alleges 	that 	she 	was 	the
victim 	of 	sex 	trafficking 	at 	an 	Alabama 	hotel 	owned 	by 	PHP, 	the
purported franchisee of Choice Defendants. 	Presently pending and
ready for resolution in this TVPRA case is the motion to transfer
venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of 	Alabama 	or 	to 	dismiss 	filed 	by 	Choice 	Defendants. 	(ECF 	No.
18). 	The 	issues 	have 	been 	briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no
1 Choice Defendants contend that Choice Hotels International
Service Corp. is not a proper defendant to this case because “[i]t
does 	not 	play 	any 	meaningful 	role 	in 	the 	activities 	described 	in
the 	[complaint].” 	(ECF 	No. 	18-1, 	at 	10 	n.1). 	Because 	the 	court
will 	grant 	the 	motion 	to 	transfer 	venue, 	it 	does 	not 	reach 	any
arguments 	regarding 	dismissal. 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	against
the two entities are identical.
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hearing 	being 	deemed 	necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the
following 	reasons, 	the 	motion 	to 	transfer 	venue 	will 	be 	granted.
Choice 	Defendants’ 	alternative 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	nonparty 	Trent
Hall’s 	correspondence, 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend
the complaint remain for resolution in the transferee district.
I. 	Background
A. 	Factual Background2
S.E.S., 	proceeding 	as 	Jane 	Doe, 	alleges 	that 	she 	was 	the
victim 	of 	sex 	trafficking 	“an 	incalculable 	number 	of 	times” 	at 	a
Quality 	Inn 	hotel 	in 	Mobile, 	Alabama, 	between 	July 	2013 	and 	at
least December 2014. 	(ECF No. 14 ¶¶ 26, 30, 32). 	A franchisee of
Choice Defendants operates the Quality Inn. 	(Id. ¶¶ 17–19). 	Doe
alleges that her trafficker “forced [her] to engage in commercial
sex 	acts 	numerous 	times 	a 	day”; 	he 	“would 	drug 	her 	up 	and
physically 	and/or 	mentally 	abuse 	her.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	27). 	She 	alleges
that, when she tried to leave, he “would beat her and/or threaten
her.” 	(Id. ¶ 28). 	His actions put Doe “in constant fear for her
life.” 	(Id. ¶ 27).
As general background, Doe notes the particular prevalence of
sex 	trafficking 	in 	the 	hotel 	industry. 	(Id. 	¶ 	34). 	She 	alleges
that “[t]he signs of sex trafficking in a hotel environment follow
2 All facts herein are alleged in the operative complaint.
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well-established 	patterns 	and 	can 	easily 	be 	detected 	by
appropriately trained staff.” 	(Id. ¶ 38). 	Doe alleges that, given
the 	strong 	connection 	between 	sex 	trafficking 	and 	the 	hotel
industry, 	“reasonable 	diligence 	required 	treating 	signs 	of
commercial 	sex 	activity, 	particularly 	with 	apparent 	and 	obvious
involvement 	of 	a 	‘pimp,’ 	as 	evidence 	of 	sex 	trafficking[,] 	. 	. 	.
[and] 	required 	Defendants 	to 	avoid 	benefiting 	from 	the 	rental 	of
its rooms for commercial sex.” 	(Id. ¶ 42).
Doe alleges that Choice Defendants and PHP “have known, since
well 	before 	[her] 	trafficking, 	that 	sex 	trafficking 	was 	ongoing
and 	widespread 	at 	Choice 	Hotels 	branded 	properties 	including 	the
[Quality Inn]” named in the complaint. 	(Id. ¶ 49). 	She contends
that “each of the Defendants monitored criminal activity [related
to sex trafficking] occurring at Choice hotels branded properties”
and 	highlights 	news 	stories 	from 	around 	the 	country 	between 	2004
and 	2015 	regarding 	sex 	trafficking 	at 	Choice 	Hotels 	branded
properties. 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	50, 	52). 	Doe 	then 	points 	to 	online 	reviews
between 2006 and 2018 noting sex trafficking activity and apparent
prostitution 	at 	Choice 	Hotels 	branded 	properties 	across 	the
country. 	(Id. ¶ 55). 	She alleges that “[t]he common use of Choice
Hotel 	branded 	hotels 	for 	sex 	trafficking 	became 	a 	nationwide
problem 	that 	stemmed 	from 	decisions 	made 	at 	the
corporate/franchisor level.” 	(Id. ¶ 56).
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Doe 	next 	alleges 	that 	Choice 	Defendants 	and 	PHP 	“were
specifically aware that sex trafficking was widespread and ongoing
at the Quality Inn” named in the complaint. 	(Id. ¶ 60). 	Reasoning
upon 	information 	and 	belief 	that 	Choice 	Defendants 	“manage 	and
monitor” 	internet 	reviews 	for 	the 	Quality 	Inn 	at 	issue, 	Doe
highlights 	various 	internet 	reviews 	of 	the 	Quality 	Inn 	between
2015 	and 	2020 	that 	repeatedly 	note 	the 	abundance 	of 	used 	condoms
in 	rooms 	and 	apparent 	prostitutes 	on 	hotel 	premises. 	(See 	id. 	¶
62). 	Doe 	alleges 	that 	her 	trafficker 	and 	others 	“selected 	this
[Quality 	Inn] 	because 	of 	policies 	and 	practices 	that 	created 	a
favorable 	environment 	for 	trafficking 	and 	because 	hotel 	staff
turned 	a 	blind 	eye 	to 	. 	. 	. 	well-known 	‘red 	flags’ 	for 	sex
trafficking in the hospitality industry.” 	(Id. ¶ 63).
Concerning her own trafficking, Doe lists numerous red flags
that 	she 	alleges 	put 	hotel 	staff 	on 	notice 	that 	she 	was 	being
trafficked. 	For 	example, 	“[t]he 	hotel 	rooms 	in 	which 	she 	was
trafficked 	were 	frequently 	paid 	for 	with 	cash 	or 	prepaid 	cards”;
the “Do Not Disturb” sign was hung on her door for days at a time;
Doe “would give hotel management and/or employees ‘hush’ money not
to report her”; there was “heavy foot traffic in and out of [her]
room 	involving 	men 	who 	were 	not 	hotel 	guests,” 	which 	hotel
management 	noticed; 	and 	Doe 	“was 	forced 	to 	see 	at 	least 	5 	johns
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every day,” who would come and go at “unusual hours” and “for brief
periods of time.” 	(Id. ¶ 73).
Doe alleges that, as a result, PHP and Choice Defendants knew
or 	should 	have 	known 	of 	her 	sex 	trafficking. 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	75–76).
Furthermore, she contends that Choice Defendants and PHP knowingly
benefitted from her trafficking by continuing to rent rooms to her
trafficker and others. 	(Id. ¶ 95).
B. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the operative three-count complaint on March
31, 2025, against PHP3 and Choice Defendants. 	(ECF No. 14). 	All
counts arise under the TVPRA: Count I alleges perpetrator liability
against 	PHP, 	Count 	II 	alleges 	beneficiary 	liability 	against 	PHP
and 	Choice 	Defendants, 	and 	Count 	III 	alleges 	vicarious 	liability
3 	Plaintiff 	appears 	to 	have 	named 	PHP 	as 	the 	franchisee
defendant in error. 	She attempted to serve PHP unsuccessfully on
multiple 	occasions, 	(ECF 	No. 	15, 	at 	2), 	before 	finally
accomplishing 	service 	in 	April 	2025, 	(ECF 	No. 	26-2, 	at 	5). 	She
then 	learned 	that 	PHP 	was 	the 	incorrect 	party, 	an 	error 	she
ascribes 	to 	the 	“unique 	address 	numbering 	system 	in 	Mobile,
Alabama, that had incorrectly attributed the address of the Quality
Inn 	where 	she 	was 	trafficked 	to 	the 	wrong 	entity.” 	(ECF 	No. 	23-
1, at 2). 	Trent Hall, presumably related to Phillip Hall of PHP,
has filed correspondence styled as a motion to dismiss in which he
explains that PHP went out of business in 2010 and never owned the
Quality Inn at issue. 	(ECF No. 21). 	Plaintiff has since filed a
motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	her 	complaint 	to 	substitute 	the 	proper
franchisee 	defendant, 	which 	she 	identifies 	as 	Meenal 	LLC, 	an
Alabama limited liability company registered and headquartered in
Alabama, 	(ECF 	No. 	23-3 	¶ 	18), 	as 	well 	as 	to 	amend 	other
allegations. 	The 	Choice 	Defendants 	oppose 	the 	motion. 	(ECF 	No.
26).
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against 	Choice 	Defendants. 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	104–16). 	On 	April 	14, 	2025,
Choice Defendants filed a motion to transfer venue to the Southern
District of Alabama or, in the alternative, to dismiss. 	(ECF No.
18). 	Plaintiff filed her opposition on April 28, 2025. 	(ECF No.
24). 	Choice 	Defendants 	then 	filed 	their 	reply 	on 	May 	12, 	2025.
(ECF No. 25). 	Since then, Choice Defendants have filed two notices
of 	supplemental 	authorities 	regarding 	similar 	cases 	decided 	in
this district. 	(ECF Nos. 31; 32).
II. 	Analysis
Choice 	Defendants 	move 	to 	dismiss 	or 	transfer 	for 	improper
venue 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(3) 	and 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1406. 	In 	the
alternative, 	they 	move 	to 	transfer 	venue, 	even 	if 	proper 	in 	this
district, 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1404(a). 	The 	venue 	statute 	provides
two 	relevant 	bases 	to 	lay 	venue. 	First, 	venue 	is 	permissible 	in
a “district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents 	of 	the 	State 	in 	which 	the 	district 	is 	located,” 	with
residency 	of 	entities 	determined 	based 	on 	where 	they 	are 	subject
to personal jurisdiction. 	28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(2). 	Second,
venue is permissible in a “district in which a substantial part of
the 	events 	or 	omissions 	giving 	rise 	to 	the 	claim 	occurred.” 	Id.
§ 	1391(b)(2). 	Choice 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	venue 	is 	improper 	in
the 	District 	of 	Maryland 	because 	the 	court 	lacks 	personal
jurisdiction over the franchisee defendant and a substantial part
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of 	the 	events 	giving 	rise 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	did 	not 	occur 	in
Maryland. 	(ECF No. 18-1, at 14–19). 	Although it may well be that
the 	court 	lacks 	personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	franchisee
defendant 	and 	that 	a 	substantial 	portion 	of 	the 	relevant 	events
did not occur here, it is not necessary to decide those questions
because transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is available.4 	See Doe
(C.T.K.) v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 24-cv-2836-DLB, 2025 WL
2430024, at *3 (D.Md. Aug. 22, 2025) (“[W]hen jurisdiction over a
defendant 	is 	doubtful, 	‘transfer 	is 	often 	the 	better 	course.’”
(quoting Pilz v. Pere, No. 07-cv-1314-CCB, 2007 WL 2572433, at *1
(D.Md. Aug. 30, 2007))).
Section 1404(a) provides that “a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have 	been 	brought” 	if 	doing 	so 	is 	to 	“the 	convenience 	of 	parties
and 	witnesses” 	and 	“in 	the 	interest 	of 	justice.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1404(a). 	“The 	threshold 	question 	on 	a 	motion 	to 	transfer 	is
whether 	the 	action 	might 	have 	been 	brought 	in 	the 	transferee
forum.” 	Howard 	Univ. 	v. 	Watkins, 	No. 	06-cv-2076-DKC, 	2007 	WL
763182, 	at 	*3 	(D.Md. 	Mar. 	12, 	2007). 	In 	other 	words, 	the 	court
must assure itself that “venue and personal jurisdiction are proper
4 Because all of Plaintiff’s claims arise under federal law,
there are no choice of law consequences to proceeding under § 1404
rather than § 1406.
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in the transferee forum.” 	Corry v. CFM Majestic Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d
660, 663 (E.D.Va. 1998).
As to venue, it is uncontested that this case could have been
brought in the Southern District of Alabama. 	A “substantial part
of 	the 	events 	or 	omissions 	giving 	rise 	to 	the 	claim” 	occurred 	in
the Southern District of Alabama because that is where Doe alleges
the sex trafficking took place. 	28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
Personal 	jurisdiction 	is 	straightforward, 	too. 	A 	forum 	has
personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	a 	defendant 	if 	the 	defendant 	has
“certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit 	does 	not 	offend 	‘traditional 	notions 	of 	fair 	play 	and
substantial 	justice.’” 	Int’l 	Shoe 	Co. 	v. 	Washington, 	326 	U.S.
310, 	316 	(1945) 	(quoting 	Milliken 	v. 	Meyer, 	311 	U.S. 	457, 	463
(1940)). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	has 	split 	the
personal 	jurisdiction 	analysis 	into 	two 	branches: 	specific 	and
general. 	A 	court 	may 	exercise 	specific 	jurisdiction 	over 	a
defendant 	when 	the 	“suit 	aris[es] 	out 	of 	or 	relate[s] 	to 	the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.” 	Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, 	S.A. 	v. 	Hall, 	466 	U.S. 	408, 	414 	& 	n.8 	(1984). 	On 	the
other 	hand, 	courts 	may 	exercise 	general 	jurisdiction 	over 	the
defendant 	if 	the 	defendant 	is 	at 	home 	in 	the 	forum—meaning, 	for
business 	entities, 	that 	the 	forum 	is 	the 	defendant’s 	place 	of
incorporation 	or 	principal 	place 	of 	business—even 	if 	the 	suit 	is
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unrelated 	to 	the 	defendant’s 	forum 	contacts. 	See 	Daimler 	AG 	v.
Bauman, 	571 	U.S. 	117, 	127, 	137 	(2014). 	At 	the 	very 	least, 	the
proper 	franchisee 	defendant 	here 	is 	subject 	to 	specific 	personal
jurisdiction 	in 	the 	Southern 	District 	of 	Alabama 	because 	the
alleged sex trafficking arose out of the franchisee’s operation of
a hotel there.5
The 	Choice 	Defendants 	would 	likewise 	be 	subject 	to 	specific
personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of Alabama, as their
counsel 	has 	expressly 	acknowledged 	in 	at 	least 	one 	other 	case
within this district. 	Doe (J.S.H.) v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
No. 24-cv-1598-TDC, 2025 WL 2108792, at *12 (D.Md. July 28, 2025)
(“[A]s 	acknowledged 	at 	the 	hearing 	by 	Defendants, 	personal
jurisdiction 	would 	exist 	[in 	the 	transferee 	forum] 	over 	. 	. 	.
Choice.”). 	Even 	if 	Choice 	were 	to 	change 	its 	position, 	Judge
Boardman 	observed 	that 	“in 	other 	nearly 	identical 	TVPRA 	cases,
courts 	have 	agreed 	that 	the 	court 	in 	a 	franchisee’s 	home
jurisdiction 	may 	exercise 	personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	an 	out-of-
5 It is quite likely that the proper franchisee defendant is
at 	home 	in 	the 	Southern 	District 	of 	Alabama 	and 	thus 	subject 	to
general 	jurisdiction 	there. 	In 	her 	proposed 	second 	amended
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the proper franchisee defendant
is Meenal LLC, an entity registered and headquartered in Alabama.
(ECF 	No. 	23-2 	¶ 	18). 	Due 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	failure 	to 	identify 	the
proper 	franchisee 	entity 	at 	the 	outset, 	however, 	the 	court 	lacks
sufficient facts to reach such a conclusion.
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state 	franchisor.” 	Doe 	(C.T.K.), 	2025 	WL 	2430024, 	at 	*4
(collecting cases).
Therefore, this case could have been brought in the Southern
District of Alabama, satisfying the § 1404(a) threshold inquiry.
Once 	satisfied 	that 	the 	moving 	party 	has 	met 	this 	threshold
requirement, courts in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit apply a four-factor test to transfer motions: “(1)
the 	weight 	accorded 	to 	plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	venue; 	(2) 	witness
convenience 	and 	access; 	(3) 	convenience 	of 	the 	parties; 	and 	(4)
the 	interest 	of 	justice.” 	Trs. 	of 	the 	Plumbers 	and 	Pipefitters
Nat’l Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 444 (4 th
Cir. 2015) (citing, inter alia, Lynch v. Vanderhoef Builders, 237
F.Supp.2d 	615, 	617 	(D.Md. 	2002)). 	“The 	burden 	is 	on 	the 	moving
party to show that transfer to another forum is proper.” 	Gilbert
v. 	Freshbikes, 	LLC, 	32 	F.Supp.3d 	594, 	607 	(D.Md. 	2014) 	(citing
Cross 	v. 	Fleet 	Rsrv. 	Ass’n 	Pension 	Plan, 	383 	F.Supp.2d 	852, 	856
(D.Md. 	2005)). 	“Section 	1404(a) 	reflects 	an 	increased 	desire 	to
have federal civil suits tried in the federal system at the place
called for in the particular case by considerations of convenience
and 	justice.” 	Van 	Dusen 	v. 	Barrack, 	376 	U.S. 	612, 	616 	(1964).
While 	courts 	frequently 	defer 	to 	a 	plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	forum,
such 	“deference 	is 	not 	limitless 	. 	. 	. 	and 	can 	be 	overcome.”
Gilbert, 32 F.Supp.3d at 607 (citing Lynch, 237 F.Supp.2d at 617).
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Ultimately, “[t]he decision whether to transfer venue is committed
to 	the 	sound 	discretion 	of 	the 	trial 	court.” 	Hausfeld 	v. 	Love
Funding 	Corp., 	16 	F.Supp.3d 	591, 	604 	(D.Md. 	2014) 	(alteration 	in
original) 	(quoting 	Mamani 	v. 	Bustamante, 	547 	F.Supp.2d 	465, 	469
(D.Md. 2008)).
A. 	Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
“Where a plaintiff sues in her home forum, her choice of venue
is 	‘ordinarily 	accorded 	considerable 	weight.’” 	Hausfeld, 	16
F.Supp.3d 	at 	604 	(quoting 	Lynch, 	237 	F.Supp.2d 	at 	617). 	Such
deference 	“is 	lower 	when 	the 	plaintiff 	is 	not 	[a] 	citizen 	of 	the
[forum] 	state 	or 	the 	case 	does 	not 	otherwise 	have 	‘significant
ties’ 	to 	the 	forum.” 	Doe 	(J.S.H.), 	2025 	WL 	2108792, 	at 	*10
(quoting 	Carey 	v. 	Bayerische 	Hypo-Und 	Vereinsbank 	AG, 	370 	F.3d
234, 237–38 (2 d Cir. 2004)); see also Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia
Int’l 	Shipping 	Corp., 	549 	U.S. 	422, 	430 	(2007) 	(“Where 	the
plaintiff’s choice is not its home forum, however, the presumption
in the plaintiff’s favor ‘applies with less force.’” (quoting Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981))).
Plaintiff 	Doe 	is 	a 	citizen 	of 	Alabama, 	not 	Maryland. 	(ECF
No. 	14 	¶ 	11). 	Moreover, 	every 	other 	court 	in 	this 	district 	to
have considered a substantially identical case has concluded that
whatever ties Maryland does have to the case—because of potential
acts 	or 	omissions 	at 	Choice 	headquarters—are 	not 	significant
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enough 	to 	warrant 	substantial 	deference 	to 	the 	out-of-state
Plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	forum. 	See 	Doe 	(J.S.H.), 	2025 	WL 	2108792,
at *11; Doe (J.L.K.) v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 24-cv-3774-
GLR, 	2025 	WL 	2197035, 	at 	*6 	(D.Md. 	Aug. 	1, 	2025); 	Doe 	(C.T.K.),
2025 	WL 	2430024, 	at 	*5; 	Transcript 	of 	Motions 	Hearing 	at 	67, 	Doe
(P.T.L.) 	v. 	Choice 	Hotels 	Int’l, 	Inc., 	No. 	24-cv-3775-PX 	(D.Md.
Aug. 	26, 	2025), 	ECF 	No. 	43; 	Doe 	(A.E.W.) 	v. 	Choice 	Hotels 	Int’l,
Inc., No. 24-cv-3769-TDC, 2025 WL 2468510, at *11 (D.Md. Aug. 27,
2025). 	The 	alleged 	sex 	trafficking 	underpinning 	this 	case 	took
place 	entirely 	in 	Alabama, 	not 	Maryland. 	See 	Int’l 	Painters 	&
Allied 	Trade 	Indus. 	Pension 	Fund 	v. 	Marrero 	Glass 	& 	Metal 	Inc.,
No. 	18-cv-452-ELH, 	2019 	WL 	423409, 	at 	*4 	(D.Md. 	Feb. 	1, 	2019)
(attaching 	little 	weight 	to 	the 	plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	forum 	when
“the disputed conduct, or lack thereof, underlying the Complaint”
occurred outside the forum).
Plaintiff 	cites 	A.M.G. 	v. 	Red 	Roof 	Inns, 	Inc., 	No. 	23-cv-
4195, 2025 WL 588645 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 24, 2025), for the proposition
that 	a 	“plaintiff’s 	choice 	to 	file 	in 	the 	principal 	place 	of
business of [the] franchisor [is] entitled to deference in a TVPRA
case.” 	(ECF 	No. 	24, 	at 	15 	n.21). 	The 	A.M.G. 	court, 	in 	an
unpublished 	trial 	court 	decision 	denying 	the 	motion 	to 	transfer,
recognized that “where ‘the cause of action has little connection
with 	the 	chosen 	forum,’ 	a 	plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	forum 	is 	given
Case 8:24-cv-03776-DKC Document 33 Filed 11/25/25 Page 12 of 20
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less 	weight 	than 	such 	choice 	would 	be 	given 	otherwise.” 	A.M.G.,
2025 WL 588645, at *7 (quoting DRFP, LLC v. Republica Bolivariana
de 	Venezuela, 	945 	F.Supp.2d 	890, 	902–03 	(S.D.Ohio 	2013)). 	Other
courts have adopted a sliding scale approach. 	See Carey, 370 F.3d
at 237–38 (affirming diminished deference to plaintiff’s choice of
forum in proportion to diminished connection between the forum and
the case). 	Maryland’s ties to this case comprise the most tenuous
portions of Plaintiff’s complaint. 	Accordingly, deference to the
Plaintiff’s choice of forum is considerably diminished.
For 	these 	reasons, 	this 	factor 	does 	not 	weigh 	significantly
against transfer.
B. 	Convenience of the Witnesses
“The 	convenience 	of 	the 	witnesses 	is 	‘perhaps 	the 	most
important factor’ in determining whether a transfer of venue should
be 	granted.” 	Mamani, 	547 	F.Supp.2d 	at 	473 	(quoting 	Cronos
Containers 	Ltd. 	v. 	Amazon 	Lines, 	Ltd., 	121 	F.Supp.2d 	461, 	466
(D.Md. 2000)).
Choice 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	the 	relevant 	witnesses,
including 	“Plaintiff’s 	alleged 	trafficker, 	hotel 	staff,
knowledgeable 	law 	enforcement 	personnel, 	doctors, 	and 	other
damages 	witnesses,” 	are 	likely 	located 	in 	Alabama. 	(ECF 	No. 	18-
1, 	at 	20–21). 	Choice 	Defendants 	add 	that 	this 	court 	also 	“might
be unable to compel [those Alabama witnesses] to attend a trial in
Case 8:24-cv-03776-DKC Document 33 Filed 11/25/25 Page 13 of 20
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the 	District 	of 	Maryland” 	due 	to 	the 	limits 	of 	this 	court’s
subpoena 	power 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	45(c). 	(Id. 	at 	21 	(alteration
in original) (quoting Elliot AmQuip, LLC v. Bay Elec. Co., No. 10-
cv-3598-ELH, 	2011 	WL 	2174893, 	at 	*9 	(D.Md. 	June 	2, 	2011))); 	see
also Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(1)(A) (“A subpoena may command a person to
attend 	a 	trial, 	hearing 	or 	deposition 	only,” 	in 	relevant 	part,
“within 	100 	miles 	of 	where 	the 	person 	resides, 	is 	employed, 	or
regularly 	transacts 	business 	in 	person[.]”). 	Plaintiff 	counters
that Defendant has not met its burden as the moving party to show
“specific 	hardship,” 	and 	the 	passage 	of 	ten 	years 	since 	the
trafficking 	suggests 	that 	many 	of 	the 	witnesses 	no 	longer 	reside
in Alabama. 	(ECF No. 24, at 15). 	Moreover, the witnesses related
to 	corporate 	knowledge 	and 	conduct, 	Plaintiff 	contends, 	are
located 	in 	Maryland. 	(Id. 	at 	16). 	To 	Defendants’ 	Rule 	45(c)
concern, Plaintiff responds that the court can compel witnesses to
attend 	video 	depositions, 	which 	would 	be 	admissible 	at 	trial.
(Id.).
Choice 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	are 	more 	persuasive. 	At 	the
outset, 	Choice 	Defendants’ 	burden 	on 	specificity 	is 	lessened 	by
the 	fact 	that 	Plaintiff 	proceeds 	under 	pseudonym, 	has 	not
identified 	her 	trafficker, 	and 	alleges 	a 	long 	period 	of
trafficking. 	It 	is 	difficult 	to 	assess 	the 	inconvenience 	to
particular 	witnesses 	when 	the 	facts 	alleged 	do 	not 	give 	Choice
Case 8:24-cv-03776-DKC Document 33 Filed 11/25/25 Page 14 of 20
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Defendants 	reasonable 	and 	adequate 	notice 	of 	who 	all 	relevant
witnesses may be. 	The convenience inquiry must therefore proceed
at 	a 	higher 	level 	of 	generality. 	Choice 	Defendants 	are 	almost
certainly 	correct 	that 	nearly 	all 	the 	relevant 	witnesses 	were 	at
least 	once 	located 	in 	Alabama. 	Whether 	they 	remain 	there 	is
unclear, 	but 	mere 	speculation 	that 	some 	have 	moved 	away 	is
insufficient to defeat the commonsense conclusion that Alabama is
the 	likely 	locus 	of 	relevant 	witnesses. 	Regarding 	compulsory
process, 	Plaintiff 	is 	correct 	that 	witnesses 	can 	attend 	video
depositions, but that does not fully address the concern that the
court could not compel the witnesses’ in-person presence at trial.
See Doe (C.T.K.), 2025 WL 2430024, at *5.
The Southern District of Alabama is the more convenient forum
for 	the 	witnesses. 	This 	factor 	therefore 	weighs 	in 	favor 	of
transfer.
C. 	Convenience of the Parties
“[A] transfer of venue that merely switches the inconvenience
from one party to the other generally will be refused.” 	Pinpoint
IT Servs., L.L.C. v. Atlas IT Export Corp., 812 F.Supp.2d 710, 721
(E.D.Va. 	2011) 	(citing 	15 	Wright 	& 	Miller, 	Federal 	Practice 	and
Procedure § 3849 (3 d ed. 2007)). 	That is unlikely to be the case
here. 	Ironically, transfer here, from the headquarters of Choice
Defendants to Plaintiff’s home jurisdiction, is said to switch the
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inconvenience 	as 	between 	Plaintiff 	and 	Choice 	Defendants.
Undoubtedly, 	the 	transfer 	will 	render 	the 	litigation 	more
convenient to the franchisee defendant. 	Plaintiff evidently named
the wrong franchisee defendant, PHP, but the parties appear now to
have 	identified 	the 	correct 	franchisee 	defendant, 	an 	Alabama
limited liability company. 	(ECF Nos. 23-2 ¶ 18; 26-2). 	Although
this 	entity 	has 	not 	had 	a 	chance 	to 	weigh 	in, 	the 	logical
assumption is that it is more convenient for an Alabama entity to
litigate in Alabama than in Maryland.
Plaintiff also argues that it is more convenient to litigate
in 	Maryland 	because 	of 	“the 	potential 	benefits 	of 	centralizing
related 	TVPRA 	cases 	against 	Choice 	in 	this 	District.” 	(ECF 	No.
24, at 16). 	The five other TVPRA cases against Choice Defendants
in 	this 	district 	of 	which 	the 	court 	is 	aware, 	however, 	have 	all
been 	transferred 	to 	other 	districts. 	See 	Doe 	(J.S.H.), 	2025 	WL
2108792, 	at 	*13 	(transferring 	the 	case 	to 	the 	Middle 	District 	of
Florida); Doe (J.L.K.), 2025 WL 2197035, at *7 (District of Idaho);
Doe 	(C.T.K.), 	2025 	WL 	2430024, 	at 	*7 	(Eastern 	District 	of
Wisconsin); Transcript of Motions Hearing at 70, Doe (P.T.L.), No.
24-cv-3775-PX, 	ECF 	No. 	43 	(Eastern 	District 	of 	Louisiana); 	Doe
(A.E.W.), 	2025 	WL 	2468510, 	at 	*13 	(Eastern 	District 	of
Pennsylvania). 	Consequently, there is little left to centralize.
Case 8:24-cv-03776-DKC Document 33 Filed 11/25/25 Page 16 of 20
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The Southern District of Alabama is at least marginally more
convenient to the parties overall. 	This factor thus tilts in favor
of transfer.
D. 	Interest of Justice
Whether 	transfer 	is 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	justice 	is 	an
“amorphous and somewhat subjective” assessment in which the court
may 	account 	for 	a 	litany 	of 	other 	relevant 	considerations. 	Doe
(J.L.K.), 2025 WL 2197035, at *7 (quoting Gennari Consulting, Inc.
v. Wellington Corp., LLC, No. 19-cv-1851-ELH, 2019 WL 6829102, at
*9 (D.Md. Dec. 13, 2019)). 	“[A]voiding duplicative litigation” is
one such consideration. 	Id. 	(quoting Capitol Payment Sys., Inc.
v. 	Di 	Donato, 	No. 	16-cv-882-ELH, 	2017 	WL 	2242678, 	at 	*14 	(D.Md.
May 23, 2017)). 	Accordingly, “[c]ourts in this district have found
the interest of justice favors transfer when personal jurisdiction
over 	an 	indispensable 	party 	is 	a 	close 	question.” 	Doe 	(C.T.K.),
2025 WL 2430024, at *6 (collecting cases).
Here, it is highly doubtful the court could exercise personal
jurisdiction over the franchisee defendant. 	The parties indicate
that 	the 	proper 	franchisee 	defendant 	is 	an 	Alabama 	limited
liability 	company 	registered 	and 	headquartered 	in 	Alabama.
Therefore, 	it 	would 	not 	be 	subject 	to 	general 	jurisdiction 	in
Maryland. 	Plaintiff would need to establish specific jurisdiction
over the franchisee defendant in Maryland. 	In the five other TVPRA
Case 8:24-cv-03776-DKC Document 33 Filed 11/25/25 Page 17 of 20
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cases 	against 	Choice 	in 	this 	district, 	four 	courts 	have 	found
specific jurisdiction over the franchisee defendant lacking. 	See
Doe (J.S.H.), 2025 WL 2108792, at *9 (holding that the alleged sex
trafficking 	did 	not 	arise 	out 	of 	or 	relate 	to 	the 	franchisee’s
contact 	with 	Maryland, 	namely 	the 	franchise 	agreement); 	Doe
(J.L.K.), 	2025 	WL 	2197035, 	at 	*3–4 	(same); 	Transcript 	of 	Motions
Hearing 	at 	61–63, 	Doe 	(P.T.L.), 	No. 	24-cv-3775-PX, 	ECF 	No. 	43
(same); 	Doe 	(A.E.W.), 	2025 	WL 	2468510, 	at 	*9 	(same). 	One 	court
found such specific jurisdiction “highly doubtful.” 	Doe (C.T.K.),
2025 	WL 	2430024, 	at 	*6. 	The 	reasoning 	in 	these 	materially
indistinguishable cases is persuasive, raising significant doubts
about 	the 	assertion 	of 	specific 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	franchisee
defendant in this case.
If the franchisee defendant is indeed not subject to specific
jurisdiction here, Plaintiff would need to bring her claims against
the franchisee defendant separately in Alabama. 	Such duplicative
litigation is precisely what this factor seeks to avoid. 	It would
also 	be 	wholly 	unnecessary 	because 	Choice 	Defendants 	are 	likely
subject 	to 	specific 	jurisdiction 	in 	the 	Southern 	District 	of
Alabama. 	That 	district 	is 	the 	appropriate 	forum 	because 	it 	is
likely 	the 	only 	forum 	in 	which 	Plaintiff 	can 	assert 	her 	claims
against all defendants in the same litigation. 	See Aphena Pharma
Sols.-Md. 	LLC 	v. 	BioZone 	Lab’ys, 	Inc., 	912 	F.Supp.2d 	309, 	320–21
Case 8:24-cv-03776-DKC Document 33 Filed 11/25/25 Page 18 of 20
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(D.Md. 	2012) 	(holding 	that 	the 	interest 	of 	justice 	required
transfer 	to 	avoid 	splitting 	the 	litigation, 	despite 	none 	of 	the
other factors favoring transfer).
Another 	consideration 	under 	this 	factor 	is 	the 	“interest 	in
having 	local[] 	controversies 	decided 	at 	home.” 	Hausfeld, 	16
F.Supp.3d 	at 	605 	(quoting 	Atl. 	Marine 	Constr. 	Co. 	v. 	U.S. 	Dist.
Ct. 	for 	the 	W. 	Dist. 	of 	Tex., 	571 	U.S. 	49, 	62 	n.6 	(2013)).
Plaintiff 	and 	Choice 	Defendants 	dispute 	whether 	Maryland 	or
Alabama has a greater interest in this controversy. 	(Compare ECF
No. 18-1, at 22, with ECF No. 24, at 17). 	Courts in this district
to consider this particular issue have concluded that the state of
the 	franchisee 	where 	the 	alleged 	sex 	trafficking 	occurred 	has 	a
greater 	interest 	than 	the 	state 	of 	the 	franchisor. 	E.g., 	Doe
(J.S.H.), 	2025 	WL 	2108792, 	at 	*12 	(“[T]his 	case 	has 	relatively
stronger 	ties 	to 	Florida, 	where 	the 	sex 	trafficking 	actually
occurred[.]”). 	The 	court 	need 	not 	decide 	that 	issue 	here. 	Even
if Maryland did have a marginally greater interest, that would not
outweigh 	the 	imperative 	of 	keeping 	the 	litigation 	intact. 	See
Aphena, 912 F.Supp.2d at 320–21.6
The interest of justice strongly favors transfer.
* 	* 	*
6 	Plaintiff 	also 	raises 	her 	centralization 	argument 	here
again. 	As explained, however, there is nothing left to centralize
in this district.
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In 	sum, 	Plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	forum 	is 	not 	entitled 	to
meaningful deference, transfer is more convenient to the witnesses
and parties, and transfer is strongly in the interest of justice.
Accordingly, 	the 	court 	will 	transfer 	the 	case 	to 	the 	Southern
District 	of 	Alabama, 	where 	Choice 	Defendants’ 	alternative 	motion
to dismiss, nonparty Trent Hall’s correspondence, and Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend will remain for resolution.
III. Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Choice 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to
transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama will be granted. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Case 8:24-cv-03776-DKC Document 33 Filed 11/25/25 Page 20 of 20

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