Pacheco et al v. Baywood Hotels, Inc. et al

8:24-cv-02284MddDec 15, 2025

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(SOUTHERN DIVISION)
VANESSA PACHECO, ET AL., 	*
Plaintiffs 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Case No. 8:24-cv-02284-GLS
BAYWOOD HOTELS, INC., ET AL. 	*
Defendants. 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a dispute over unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219, and Maryland state law. Pending before the Court is a Joint Motion for Approval of
Settlement of the dispute between the parties pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216. ECF No. 83. For the
reasons discussed below, the Joint Motion for Approval of the Settlement shall be granted. Upon
the parties’ request, the case shall be stayed for forty-two days.
BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint and the parties’ Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement,
Defendants Baywood Hotels, Inc. (“Baywood”), Arundel Mills Hospitality, LLC (“Arundel
Mills”), Columbia Hospitality, Inc. (“Columbia”), Elmwood Hospitality, LLC (“Elmwood”),
Lakeland 	Suites, 	LLC 	(“Lakeland”), 	Red 	Wolf 	Holdings, 	LLC 	(“Red Wolf”), 	Westshore
Hospitality, LLC (“Westshore”), and UMD Lodging, LLC (“UMD Lodging”) (collectively
referred to as “the Baywood Defendants”) hired Plaintiffs Vanessa Pacheco and Claudia Lara
(hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) to perform the duties of construction workers finishing hotels. ECF No.
1, at 2. 	Plaintiffs worked for the Baywood Defendants from January 17, 2022, to June 8, 2024.
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Id. 	Plaintiffs allege that during their period of employment, they routinely worked more than forty
hours per week and did not receive an overtime premium for their overtime hours. 	Id. 	The
Baywood Defendants, in turn, deny Plaintiffs’ version of events. ECF No. 83, at 2. They counter
that the Baywood Defendants never employed Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs were, instead,
independent contractors or were employed exclusively by Defendant Rodriguez (hereinafter “Mr.
Rodriguez”). 	Id. As such, the Baywood Defendants argue that they are not liable for any violations
of the law that Plaintiffs allege. 	Id. 	The Baywood Defendants also dispute that Plaintiffs worked
the hours they claim and assert that they had a good faith basis for their position. 	Id.
Plaintiffs initiated this suit on August 7, 2024. ECF No. 1. Their Complaint alleges that
the Baywood Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201–216(b); the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-
413, 3-420; and the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Law (MWPCL), Md. Code Ann., Lab. &
Empl. §§ 3-501– 3-507.2, by failing to pay Plaintiffs an overtime premium for each hour they
worked beyond forty hours per week. ECF No.1, at 1-2. As relief, Plaintiffs seek their unpaid and
withheld wages, an equal amount as liquidated damages, and their attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF
No. 1, at 9.
On October 15, 2025, the undersigned held a settlement conference with the parties during
which they reached a resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims, including their FLSA claims, and additional
claims pending in the Howard County Office of Human Rights. ECF No. 83, at 2-3. Defendants
have agreed to pay each Plaintiff a sum of $41,500. 	Id. 	at 1. Of this amount, $11,250 is allocated
to settling each Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages, and the
remaining amount is to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims against the Baywood Defendants currently
pending with the Howard County Office of Human Rights. 	Id. 	Plaintiffs’ counsel – Melehy &
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Associates LLC (“M&A”) – will separately receive the sum of $70,000 to resolve Plaintiffs’
demands for attorneys’ fees and costs in both matters. 	Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When evaluating settlement agreements for approval under the FLSA, courts must ensure
that a settlement “reflects a ‘reasonable compromise of disputed issues’ rather than ‘a mere waiver
of statutory rights brought about by an employer’s overreaching.’” 	Saman v. LBDP, Inc., No. DKC
12-1083, 2013 WL 2949047, at *2 (D. Md. June 13, 2013) (quoting 	Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v.
United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982)).
In making such a determination, district courts in the Fourth Circuit typically “employ the
considerations set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in 	Lynn’s Food Stores,” which holds that a “FLSA
settlement generally should be approved if it reflects ‘a fair and reasonable resolution of a 	bona
fide 	dispute over FLSA provisions.’” 	Id. at *3 (quoting 	Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355). As
part of this assessment, courts must evaluate: (1) whether there are FLSA issues actually in dispute;
(2) whether the settlement is fair and reasonable in light of the relevant factors; and (3) whether
the attorneys’ fees, if included in the agreement, are reasonable. 	Id. at *3 (citing 	Lane v. Ko-Me,
LLC, No. 10-2261, 2011 WL 3880427, at *2-3 (D. Md. Aug. 31, 2011); 	Lomascolo v. Parsons
Brinckerhoff, Inc., No. AJT-08-1310, 2009 WL 3094955, at *10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2009)).
DISCUSSION
The parties have asked the Court to approve their proposed Settlement Agreement. 	The
Court finds that approval is proper, as the Settlement Agreement reflects a fair and reasonable
resolution of a 	bona fide 	dispute between the parties.
A. 	There is a 	Bona Fide 	Dispute Between the Parties.
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To determine “whether a 	bona fide 	dispute exists as to a defendant’s liability under the
FLSA,” the Court should “examine the pleadings in the case, along with the representations and
recitals in the proposed settlement agreement.” 	Duprey v. Scotts Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 404, 408 (D.
Md. May 23, 2014) (citing Lomascolo, 2009 WL 3094955, at *16–17). “Disagreements over rates
of pay and hours worked can constitute 	bona fide 	disputes over a defendant’s liability.” 	Fernandez
v. Washington Hosp. Servs., LLC, No. 8:23-cv-839-AAQ, 2023 WL 4627422, at *2 (D. Md. July
19, 2023); 	see Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (finding a 	bona fide 	dispute where the “parties
disagree[d] about Duprey’s rate of pay and hours worked”); 	Galizia v. Ricos Enters., Inc., No.
DKC-21-2592, 2022 WL 374511, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 8, 2022) (finding a 	bona fide 	dispute where
defendants contested the number of hours plaintiffs worked); 	Tomeh v. Veriphyr, Inc., No. 8.21-cv-
0214-AAQ, 2022 WL 1422897, at *2 (D. Md. May 5, 2022) (finding a 	bona fide 	dispute where
plaintiff alleged he was an employee under the FLSA and defendant countered that plaintiff worked
as an independent contractor not covered by the statute); 	Beam v. Dillon’s Bus Serv., Inc., No. DKC
14-3838, 2015 WL 4065036, at *3 (D. Md. July 1, 2015) (finding a 	bona fide 	dispute where
defendant denied it could be liable as a joint employer).
In their Joint Motion, the parties state that the proposed settlement resolves a 	bona fide
dispute because Defendants and Plaintiffs disagree regarding: (1) the number of hours Plaintiffs
worked; (2) whether the Baywood Defendants directly employed Plaintiffs and their supervisor;
and (3) whether the Baywood Defendants exercised sufficient control over the Plaintiffs or their
conditions of employment rendering them liable as a joint employer. 	ECF No. 83, at 4-5.
Moreover, the Baywood Defendants have invoked the FLSA’s good faith defense, arguing that any
potential violation of the FLSA was based on a reasonable belief that Plaintiffs’ pay was consistent
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with the FLSA’s requirements. ECF No. 83, at 5. This Court has held that these issues are 	bona
fide 	disputes. Accordingly, a 	bona fide 	dispute exists between the parties under the FLSA.
B. 	The Settlement Agreement is Fair and Reasonable.
In assessing whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the Court should evaluate the
following six factors:
(1) [T]he extent of discovery that has taken place; (2) the stage of
the proceedings, including the complexity, expense and likely
duration of the litigation; (3) the absence of fraud or collusion in the
settlement; (4) the experience of counsel who have represented the
plaintiffs; (5) the opinions of . . . counsel . . . ; and (6) the probability
of plaintiffs’ success on the merits and the amount of the settlement
in relation to the potential recovery.
Saman, 2013 WL 2949047, at *3 (second omission in original) (quoting 	Lomascolo, 2009 WL
3094955, at *10).
The first factor asks courts to consider the extent to which discovery has taken place. When
looking at this factor, courts assess whether the parties have “had adequate time to conduct
sufficient discovery to ‘fairly 	evaluate the liability and financial 	aspects of [the] case.’”
Lomascolo, 2009 WL 3094955, at *11 (alteration in original) (quoting 	A.H. Robins Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 88 B.R. 755, 760 (E.D. Va. July 26, 1988)).
The parties represent that they participated in and substantially completed written
discovery. ECF No. 83, at 5. Discovery began in September 2024 and lasted for nearly 11 months.
Id. 	at 2. During that time, Plaintiffs served written discovery directed to the Baywood Defendants,
and propounded subpoenas to two banks seeking to obtain copies of their payroll records. 	Id.
When calculating damages, Plaintiffs had access to some of their time records and payroll records,
and the parties state it is unlikely that additional discovery would have uncovered the missing
records. 	Id. 	at 5. 	In addition, during Plaintiffs’ period of employment, they participated in a
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WhatsApp group chat with Mr. Rodriguez and other construction workers. 	Id. 	at 6. 	This chat
contained information about Plaintiffs’ work schedule, which aided in calculating Plaintiffs’
alleged damages. 	Id. 	While the parties did not conduct depositions, by avoiding parts of formal
discovery, “resources that otherwise would have been consumed by the litigation [can be] made
available for settlement, and the risk and uncertainties for both parties [can be] reduced.” 	Duprey,
30 F. Supp. 3d at 409. 	As such, the first factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement
Agreement.
The second factor looks to the current stage of the proceedings. Settlements can be found
to be fair where proceeding further would be difficult and costly, and the parties would prefer to
end proceedings before significant investment in litigation. 	See, e.g., 	Black v. Reviera Enters.,
Inc., No.: DLB-19-201, 2020 WL 6544820, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2020) (holding that a settlement
agreement was fair and reasonable where parties recognized remaining discovery would require
significant investment of time, effort, and financial resources); 	Saman, 2013 WL 2949047, at *4
(finding that the parties’ representation that they chose to settle “to avoid the costs of formal
discovery, dispositive motions, and a possible trial” supported a finding that the settlement
agreement was fair and reasonable). 	Here, Plaintiffs compromised and accepted less than the
maximum possible estimated amount they could recover, reflecting the risk associated with
proceeding to trial and proving the number of uncompensated hours worked. 	ECF No. 83, at 6.
The compromise also reflects the possibility that Defendants may have prevailed on one or more
of their defenses, as well as the burden and expense of prolonged litigation. 	Id. 	Given the parties’
joint preference to terminate proceedings early rather than bear the risk of proceeding to trial, this
factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement.
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The third factor assesses whether there has been fraud or collusion in the formation of the
settlement. There are no facts before the Court that suggest either, allowing the “presumption that
no fraud or collusion occurred between counsel[.]” 	Lomascolo, 2009 WL 3094955, at *12.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement.
Under the fourth factor, courts look to the experience of counsel. Generally, where counsel
is well-versed in the underlying law, courts presume that clients have been appropriately advised
on the merits and challenges associated with settlement. 	See Hackett v. ADF Rest. Invs., 259 F.
Supp. 3d 360, 366 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2016) (finding a fair and reasonable settlement where counsel
had litigated numerous lawsuits involving wage and hour violations). Here, Plaintiff is represented
by Omar Vincent Melehy, Suivta Melehy, and Andrew G. Balashov of Melehy & Associates. ECF
No. 1, at 10; ECF No. 83, at 8. Mr. Melehy and the other Melehy & Associates professionals who
worked on this case have significant experience litigating wage and hour cases on behalf of
plaintiffs before this Court. ECF No. 83, at 9-10. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’
counsel is sufficiently experienced in litigating similar matters, and this factor weighs in favor of
approving the Settlement Agreement.
The fifth factor incorporates the opinions of counsel. Counsel’s opinion that the expense
and potential duration of litigation weighs in favor of early settlement lends credence to a proposed
settlement agreement. 	See Castro v. Early Learning Language Acads., LLC, No. CBD-18-2421,
2021 WL 915106, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2021). In their Joint Motion, both counsel aver that the
settlement is fair and reasonable given “uncertainty of the availability of actual and liquidated
damages under FLSA.” ECF No. 83, at 7. While “counsel’s opinion and recommendation as to
the fairness and reasonableness of a settlement is not to be blindly followed,” 	Saman, 2013 WL
2949047, at *5 (quoting 	Lomascolo, 2009 WL 3094955, at *12), their representations in this case
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weigh in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. For the same reason, the sixth factor—the
probability of Plaintiffs’ success and the relationship between the amount of the settlement and the
potential recovery—weighs in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement.
Upon consideration of the relevant factors, the Court finds the Settlement Agreement to be
fair and reasonable.
C. 	The Settlement Agreement Awards Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees.
The 	Settlement Agreement 	must 	also 	contain 	reasonable 	provisions 	for 	allocating
attorneys’ fees and costs. 	Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 411. Here, the parties have decided upon an
award of $70,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 83, at 8.
“In assessing the reasonableness of the fee, courts typically refer to the principles of the
traditional lodestar method as a guide[.]” 	Hackett, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 367. The lodestar approach
multiplies “the number of hours reasonably expended . . . by a reasonable hourly rate” to achieve
“an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Under the lodestar approach, an hourly rate “is
reasonable if it is ‘in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers
of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” 	Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 412
(quoting 	Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 890 n.11 (1984)). 	This Court maintains guidelines
regarding appropriate hourly rates in Appendix B to its Local Rules. D. Md. Local R. App. B(3).
Of the total settlement amount for attorneys’ fees and costs, $51,000 is allocated to the fees
and costs in this case and $19,000 is awarded in connection with the matters pending before the
Howard County Office of Human Rights. ECF No. 83, at 8. The Settlement Agreement provides
for $49,212.98 in attorneys’ fees in this matter, $1,787.02 in costs. 	Id. 	Plaintiffs’ counsel
calculated their fee request by first determining their lodestar amount of $63,960.50 and then, as
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part of the settlement compromise, reducing that figure by $14,747.52 as an exercise of billing
judgement. 	Id.
According to the Joint Motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel spent 155.5 hours working on this case:
110.2 hours from the firm’s attorneys and 45.3 hours from paralegals and paraprofessionals. 	Id.
Plaintiffs’ counsel has documented their time spent on this case and provided the Court with an
itemized list of work hours along with a description for each entry explaining how the time was
spent. 	ECF No. 83-2. 	In their Joint Motion, the parties assert, and the Court agrees, this total
number of hours is reasonable given Plaintiffs’ counsel’s work researching and drafting the
Complaint, calculating damages, meeting with opposing counsel, conducting and responding to
discovery, and negotiating and drafting the Settlement Agreement. ECF No. 83, at 9. Regarding
hourly rates, Plaintiffs’ counsel charged as follows: Mr. Omar Vincent Melehy charged an hourly
rate of $695; Ms. Suvita Melehy charged an hourly rate of $645; Mr. Andrew Balashov charged
an hourly rate of $465; Mr. Alexandre Todorov charged an hourly rate of $400; and Ms. Michaela
Keegan charged an hourly rate of $300.1 	Id. 	at 8. Plaintiffs’ counsel also charged an hourly rate
of $245 for their paralegals and law clerks. 	Id.
These hourly rates are higher than the presumptively reasonable rates outlined in Appendix
B to the Local Rules. D. Md. Local R. App. B(3). However, this Court has found these rates to
be reasonable in FLSA settlements when all parties have agreed to them. See, e.g., 	Jose Ramos v.
Digit. Prosthodontics, LLC, et al., No. 8:25-2052-CDA, 2025 WL 3523116, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 8,
2025). 	Plaintiffs’ counsel also negotiated a reduction in their lodestar, thereby lowering the
attorneys’ fee request from $63,960.50 to $49,212.98 and narrowing the discrepancy between the
1 	It is not clear from the Motion whether Michaela Keegan is an attorney or a paralegal. ECF No.
83, at 8. Given her small number of hours compared to the number of hours worked as a whole,
her singular work does not provide a basis to deny the Motion.
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guidelines and the requested rates. 	ECF No. 83, at 8. 	Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement
awards reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement, ECF No. 83,
shall be granted and the Court shall stay this matter for a period of forty-two days to allow
Defendants time to make the settlement payments due under the Agreement.
So ordered.
Date: 	December 15, 2025 	_________/s/______________
Ajmel A. Quereshi
United States Magistrate Judge
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