Podmostko v. Nationwide General Insurance Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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CHARLES PODMOSTKO, 	*
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Plaintiff, 	*
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v. 	* 	Civil No. SAG-25-03412
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NATIONWIDE GENERAL INS. CO., 	*
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Defendant. 	*
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Charles Podmostko (“Plaintiff”) filed this insurance action in state court against
Defendant Nationwide General Insurance Company (“Nationwide”), seeking to compel payment
on his wife’s life insurance policy. ECF 2. Nationwide removed the case to this Court, ECF 1, and
has now filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, ECF 9. Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF 10, and
Nationwide filed a reply, ECF 11. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For
the reasons that follow, Nationwide’s motion must be granted and the complaint will be dismissed
without prejudice.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are derived from the Complaint and assumed to be true for the purposes
of adjudicating this motion. On June 19, 2007, Nationwide issued a twenty-year term life insurance
policy for $100,000 (“the Contract” or “the Policy”) to Plaintiff’s wife, Mary B. Podmostko (“Mrs.
Podmostko”). ECF 2 ¶ 6. The Contract named Plaintiff as the beneficiary. Id. ¶ 7. From 2007
through the end of 2023, Plaintiff and Mrs. Podmostko paid the quarterly premiums due on the
Policy, for a total of $8,238.32. Id. ¶ 8. In 2024, Mrs. Podmostko became gravely ill from a
combination of serious medical conditions. Id. ¶ 9.
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The relevant portions of the Policy read:
GRACE PERIOD: If any premium after the first one is not paid when due, a period of 31
days from the due date of the unpaid premium will be allowed for payment. The policy will
continue in force during this 31 day period. However, if the Insured dies during this 31 day
period, any unpaid premium will be deducted from the Death Benefit. In no event will
premiums be charged past the policy month of death. This policy will lapse, without value,
if premiums are not paid.
REINSTATEMENT: If this policy lapses prior to the expiration date, you may reinstate it.
You must apply in writing within five years after the date the first unpaid premium was due.
We must also have evidence of insurability that is acceptable to us. All overdue premiums
must be paid with 6% compound interest. Compounding interest is added to the amount
owed and begins to bear interest itself during the following year.
ECF 9-3 at 6.
On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff and Mrs. Podmostko received a lapse notice from Nationwide
informing them that the Policy had lapsed for lack of payment. ECF 2 ¶ 10. Plaintiff contacted
Nationwide to tell them that he had not received any notice of lack of payment or potential lapse.
Id. ¶ 11. Nationwide refused to reinstate the Policy and stated that Mrs. Podmostko would have to
reapply for coverage to have the policy reinstated. Id. ¶ 12. Mrs. Podmostko passed away on
February 19, 2025, and Nationwide has not made payment on the Policy or refunded the premiums
paid. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. This lawsuit ensued.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a claim for breach of contract and a claim for unjust
enrichment. ECF 2. Defendant seeks to dismiss those claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The Rule 12(b)(6) standard presumes the facts alleged by a plaintiff to be true,
then assesses whether the complaint still fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all
reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
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v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); Houck v. Substitute Tr.
Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). But if a complaint provides no more than “labels
and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A breach of contract claim requires a “contractual obligation, breach, and damages.” Tate
v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 627 F.Supp.3d 480, 489 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting Parkway 1046, LLC v.
U.S. Home Corp., 961 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 2020)). Plaintiff contends that the contractual
obligation that was breached is one not expressly stated in the Policy. He alleges, “Nationwide
breached the ‘Grace Period’ provision of the Contract by not providing adequate notice to Mrs.
Podmostko that her life insurance policy had entered a grace period.”1 ECF 2 ¶ 22. He
acknowledges that the Contract is silent as to whether notice is required and argues that the Policy
is therefore ambiguous and should be construed against Nationwide to impose such an obligation.
Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.
The problem with Plaintiff’s contention is the existence of a Fourth Circuit opinion
deciding that when neither the policy nor the applicable state law “require[s] any notice prior to
cancelling the policy . . . the policy contains no ambiguity as to notice.” Wactor v. Jackson Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 604 F. App’x 220, 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff cites no Maryland law requiring
notice before a grace period takes effect or a policy is cancelled. And the Policy itself, as Plaintiff
concedes, makes no reference to notice, simply stating that “a period of 31 days from the due date
1 Plaintiff also alleges that Nationwide violated the “implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing” by failing to make payment on the Policy or refund the premiums they paid. But the duty
of good faith and fair dealing is “not understood to interpose new obligations about which the
contract is silent, even if inclusion of the obligation is thought to be logical and wise.” Blondell v.
Littlepage, 413 Md. 96, 114 (2010).
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of the unpaid premium will be allowed for payment” while the Policy remains in force. ECF 9-3
at 6. Because the Policy’s language is not ambiguous, this Court must enforce the contract as
written and cannot read in the additional requirement that notice be given. Plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim, premised on a contractual obligation that does not exist, must be dismissed.2
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is also deficient. While, in certain circumstances, an
unjust enrichment claim can be viable even where a contract exists, those situations typically
involve contractual ambiguities or the possibility that a factfinder will conclude no binding
contract existed to cover the subject of the dispute. See Transamerica Premier Life Ins. Co. v.
Selman & Co., LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 576, 597–98 (D. Md. 2019). This is not one of those cases.
Here, a contract exists between the parties concerning the same subject matter on which Plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment rests: the circumstances in which Nationwide can lapse the Policy and retain the
already-paid premiums. See ECF 9-3 at 6 (“This policy will lapse, without value, if premiums are
not paid.”). As a result, Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment cannot stand. See Transamerica,
401 F. Supp. 3d at 597 (noting that unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual cause of action that is
a remedy “to provide relief for a plaintiff when an enforceable contract does not exist but fairness
dictates that the plaintiff receive compensation for services provided.”) (quoting Cnty. Comm’rs
v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83, 97 (2000)); see also FLF, Inc. v. World Publ’ns,
Inc., 999 F. Supp. 640, 642 (D. Md. 1998) (“It is settled law in Maryland, and elsewhere, that a
claim for unjust enrichment may not be brought where the subject matter of the claim is covered
by an express contract between the parties.”). While, in this particular case, the result is a harsh
2 In his opposition, Plaintiff insinuates that he may have a different argument premised on a fact
dispute about whether premiums were paid after the end of 2023. ECF 10 at 4–5. Those allegations
are not contained in the Complaint, and Plaintiff cannot amend his Complaint through motions
briefing.
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one for this Plaintiff, permitting a plaintiff to contravene express contractual provisions using
quasi-contractual theories “would turn the basic foundation of contract law on its ear.” J. Roland
Dashiell, 358 Md. at 100 (“This rule holds the contract parties to their agreement and prevents a
party . . . from asking the court to restore his expectations.”) (quoting Prodromos v. Poulos, 202
Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1032 (1990)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF 9, will be granted and Plaintiff’s
claims are dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order follows, which will close this case
subject to reopening should Plaintiff seek leave to amend within thirty days of this memorandum
opinion and order.
Dated: February 6, 2026 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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