Haskins v. Credit Collections Services, Inc. et al

1:25-cv-03150MddDec 19, 2025

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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ARIANA HASKINS, 	*
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Plaintiff, 	*
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v. 	* 	Civil No. SAG-25-3150
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EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, 	*
INC., et al., 	*
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Defendants. 	*
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ariana Haskins, who is self-represented, filed this lawsuit against Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) and Trans Union, LLC (“TransUnion,” collectively,
“Defendants”), seeking damages for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).
ECF 1. Trans Union filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. ECF
10. Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF 12, and Trans Union filed a reply, ECF 17. Experian filed a
motion to join Trans Union’s motion, ECF 21, which has not been opposed. This Court has
reviewed the briefing, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the
reasons stated herein, Experian’s motion to join Trans Union’s motion will be GRANTED,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss will also be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed
without prejudice.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF 1. Experian and Trans
Union are consumer reporting agencies. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 11, 14, 15. In April and May of 2025,
Plaintiff submitted written disputes to both Defendants “regarding multiple inaccurate tradelines,
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including two bankruptcies, Self, Santander, LVNV Funding, Credit One, Credit Collection
Services, and First National Bank.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 15. Shortly thereafter, Experian notified Plaintiff
that it had verified “most” of the disputed accounts, though it deleted the Credit One Bank
tradeline. Id. ¶ 17. Trans Union told Plaintiff that it had verified all of the disputed accounts. Id.
“Upon information and belief,” both Defendants processed Plaintiff’s disputes using the
Automated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) system, not by reviewing account-level
documentation as required. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated several
different provisions of the FCRA.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A defendant is permitted to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to
dismiss. See, e.g., In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs.
Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a
defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of
law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the
claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .”); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d
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93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). But, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not
countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the
claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a
complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the
minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken
as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is
improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts]
in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440
(4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th
Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). A court is not
required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286 (1986). Ultimately, “[a] court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the
legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations,
and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the
plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d
342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
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Because Plaintiff is self-represented, her pleadings are “liberally construed” and “held to
less stringent standards than [those filed] by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “However, liberal construction does not
absolve Plaintiff from pleading a plausible claim.” Bey v. Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP, 997 F. Supp.
2d 310, 314 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d, 584 F. App’x 135 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Coulibaly v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civ. No. DKC-10-3517, 2011 WL 3476994, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 8,
2011) (“[E]ven when pro se litigants are involved, the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege
facts that support a viable claim.”), aff’d, 526 F. App’x 255 (4th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, a federal court may not act as an advocate for a self-represented litigant. See
Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 242–43 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring in judgment); Weller
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Therefore, the court cannot “conjure up
questions never squarely presented,” or fashion claims for a self-represented plaintiff. Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); see also M.D. v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 560
F. App’x 199, 203 n.4 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting self-represented plaintiff’s argument that district
court erred in failing to consider an Equal Protection claim, because plaintiff failed to allege it in
the complaint).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not, at this point, contain sufficient factual information to state
a plausible claim against either Defendant. Plaintiff provides only the names of some creditors that
presumably appear on her credit reports, without specifying the transactions she is challenging or
the inaccuracies she asserts. Inaccurate information is an essential element of Plaintiff’s FCRA
claims. See, e.g., Johnson v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2015 WL 7769502, at *8 (D. Md. Nov. 17,
2015), aff’d, 670 F. App’x 778 (4th Cir. 2016); Brooks v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 2013 WL
1010455, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2013); Brown v. Experian Credit Reporting, 2012 WL 6615005,
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at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 17, 2012). Nevertheless, Plaintiff simply asserts the existence of “inaccuracies”
with no further detail. That level of generality does not provide Defendants with “fair notice” of
the nature of her claims and does not set forth enough factual matter to suggest a viable cause of
action. She has not therefore provided the required “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
That said, Defendants’ request that this case be dismissed with prejudice is unfounded.
Particularly because Plaintiff is self-represented, she will be afforded a window in which she may
seek leave to amend her complaint to add sufficient factual detail about the inaccuracies she asserts
Defendants improperly verified.
Because Plaintiff, at present, has not stated any claim plausibly entitling her to relief,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Join, ECF 10 and 21, are granted and Plaintiff’s
claims are dismissed without prejudice. Administratively, this case will be closed, subject to
reopening should Plaintiff file a motion seeking leave to amend her complaint within thirty days
of this opinion. A separate Order follows.
Dated: December 19, 2025 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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