Hill v. American Design & Build/Tunney, Joe & Sandi et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-02032-ABA Document 24 _ Filed 02/23/26 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

YUL HILL,
Plaintiff,

y Case No. 25-cv-2032-ABA

AMERICAN DESIGN & BUILD, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Plaintiff Yul Hill, who is self-represented, initiated this action against Defendants
American Design & Build (ADB), Joe Tunney, Sandi Tunney,! and Brian Young with a
complaint filed on June 24, 2025. Defendants have moved to dismiss, contending that
they were not properly served. The Court will dismiss the complaint for a different
reason: Mr. Hill’s federal law claims are frivolous and the Court will decline to exercise
jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the case is at the pleading stage, the Court will construe the allegations
in the complaint to be true. See Episcopal Church in S.C. v. Church Ins. Co. of Vermont,
997 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2021). This dispute stems from a residential solar panel
installation. Mr. Hill alleges in his complaint that ADB began “an installation of only 12
solar panels” at his home in November 2017. ECF No. 1 at 6. Mr. Hill further contends

that the “installation was never completed.” Id. He states that ADB has been “false

1 Mr. Hill’s complaint names “American Design & Build/Tunney, Joe & Sandi” as
defendants. The Court will construe all three parties to be defendants (i.e., American
Design & Build, Joe Tunney, and Sandi Tunney). Doing so has no impact upon any part
of the analysis below.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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advertising and scamming me out of money for years.” Id. ADB subsequently sued Mr.
Hill in the Maryland District Court for Prince George’s County and obtained a money
judgment against Mr. Hill for $40,000 in 2018. Id. at 6-7; ECF No. 20 at 1; American
Design & Build, Ltd. v. Yul Hill, Case No. 05-02-0031052-2018 (Dist. Ct. Prince
George’s Cnty.). Mr. Hill unsuccessfully appealed this decision to the Appellate Court of
Maryland and unsuccessfully petitioned the Maryland Supreme Court for review. See
Case Nos. CSA-REG-1838-2019 (Appellate Ct. of Md.), COA-PET-0374-2019. Mr. Young
was ADB’s attorney in these proceedings (and before this Court, where he represents
both ADB and himself pro se). Mr. Hill alleges that the state court lawsuit was frivolous
and that Mr. Young committed “Fraud on the Court.” ECF No. 1 at 6.

Mr. Hill filed his complaint with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
but subsequently paid the civil filing fee. ECF No. 2, 7. Defendants have moved twice to
strike service of the complaint and dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) for insufficient process and insufficient service of process. ECF No. 16,
23. Mr. Hill responded, ECF No. 20, and also filed a “motion to vacate judgment,” ECF
No. 22. Mr. Hill has also filed supplements to his complaint, ECF Nos. 13 and 21, which
the Court has reviewed.

II. DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “[nJotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof,
that may have been paid,” the Court may dismiss a case “at any time” if it determines
that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Chong Su Yi v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F. App’x
247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to
the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid.”); Mallard v.

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U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307—08 (1989) (“Section [1915(e)], for
example, authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little
doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”).
“A ‘frivolous’ complaint is one lacking an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Nolan
v. Bright, Case No. 22-cv-196-DKC, 2022 WL 717048, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2022)
(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)). Accordingly, though
Defendants have moved to strike the complaint and dismiss it on service grounds only,
the Court may also dismiss sua sponte if Mr. Hill’s action plainly fails to state a claim
and/or lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. See Cofield v. Passport Motors Holdings,
Inc., 686 F. Supp. 3d 424, 427 (D. Md. 2023) (“This Court ‘is authorized to sua sponte
dismiss complaints that fail to state a claim.””) (quoting Emrit v. Md. State Bar Assn,
Case No. 15-cv-2548-JKB, 2015 WL 1102774, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 10, 2015)).

Mr. Hill’s complaint appears to assert both federal and state law claims. His pro
se complaint was submitted on the District of Maryland’s standard complaint form. ECF
No. 1. In the section labeled “Basis for Jurisdiction,” Mr. Hill contends that federal
question jurisdiction applies in this case because his claims arise under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 4. He also refers to “Federal Rule 7 Motion for Abeyance/Stay for the
District Court for Prince George’s County” in the jurisdiction section of the complaint.
Id. Elsewhere in his complaint, he contends that ADB defrauded him out of money
related to the solar panel installation and that Mr. Young committed “[f]raud on the
[cJourt” in connection with the state law proceedings. Id. at 6. Though his complaint
does not lay out the exact nature of his claims, his opposition to Defendants’ motion to

strike appears to clarify that he considers himself to have asserted a fraud claim. See

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ECF No. 20 at 2-3. An “ordinary fraud claim” is typically handled “under state law,”
Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, Educ. & Emp. of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 506
(4th Cir. 1998), and Mr. Hill has not cited any federal statute that would form the basis
for his fraud claims instead. Mr. Hill also requested that the Court add a breach of
contract claim in later correspondence, which the Court will construe as a motion to
amend the complaint. ECF No. 21 at 1.

Even reading the complaint with deference to Mr. Hill, and accepting all of the
allegations in his complaint as true, his constitutional claims plainly fail because they
cannot be asserted against private citizens. Other than with respect to private persons
acting under color of state law, the protections guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution run
against the federal government and, to the extent incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, against state governments. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)
(“[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such
action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”). “With few
exceptions, constitutional guarantees, including those of individual liberty and equal
protection, ‘do not apply to the actions of private entities.” Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge
Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 341 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991)). In other words, “[a] claim of constitutional
rights violation requires state actors.” Noonan v. Galinaitis, Case No. 09-cv-2406-
WDQ, 2009 WL 3152825, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2009). Certain exceptions exist for
private parties that receive state funding or are connected to state action if the private
party acts with such a “close nexus” to the state that they “may fairly be said to be a state

actor.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).

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Defendants here are private citizens: an attorney, a company, and two individuals
associated with the company. See ECF No. 20 at 2. Mr. Hill has not alleged that they are
state actors in any way. Accordingly, to the extent he intended to bring constitutional
claims in this case, they lack any legal basis as pled and are therefore dismissed.
Although the pleadings of self-represented litigants must be liberally construed,
see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), liberal construction does not mean that
the Court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a plausible claim. See
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial
solicitude’ with which a district court should view . .. pro se complaints does not
transform the court into an advocate.”). The Court has reviewed Mr. Hill’s complaint,
supplements, and motions. Even upon liberal construction, there is no arguable basis
for his Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Defendants in this case.
Mr. Hill’s reference to a “Motion for Abeyance/Stay” in the jurisdictional section
of his complaint does not save his federal law claims from dismissal either. Mr. Hill
appears to cite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 in relation to a motion to stay the
Circuit Court’s ruling. ECF No. 1 at 4. Rule 7 merely sets out the kinds of pleadings and
motions allowed in federal court and certain formal requirements. It does not provide
an independent basis for jurisdiction. Furthermore, if Mr. Hill intended to seek this
Court’s review of the state court’s judgment, that request is not a jurisdictional basis
either. To the contrary, federal courts are generally precluded from exercising
jurisdiction to review state court judgments under claim preclusion or the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. See Martin v. Am. Bancorporation Ret. Plan, 407 F.3d 643, 650 (4th
Cir. 2005) (“Res judicata (or claim preclusion) precludes the assertion of a claim after a

judgment on the merits in a prior suit by the parties or their privies based on the same

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cause of action.”); T.M. v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 139 F.4th 344, 350 (4th
Cir. 2025), cert. granted sub nom. T. M. v. Univ. of Md Med. Sys., No. 25-197, 2025 WL
3493155 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2025) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests
federal courts of jurisdiction over claims “[1] brought by state-court losers [2]
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments”) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005)). To the extent Mr. Hill’s complaint seeks review of the state court
judgment, the Court lacks jurisdiction.

If there is plainly no basis for the federal claims, that leaves Mr. Hill’s implied
state law fraud and breach of contract claims.? The Court will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Courts may hear certain state-law claims
related to federal claims via supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But a district
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if it “has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[A]
district court has inherent power to dismiss the case or, in cases removed from State
court, to remand, provided the conditions set forth in § 1367(c) for declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction have been met.” Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d
611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt. of Maryland, LLC,
948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 537 (D. Md. 2013), affd, 593 F. App’x 204 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“[S]upplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, and not a plaintiffs right.”).

“Among the factors that inform this discretionary determination are convenience and

2 The Court will grant Mr. Hill’s request to add breach of contract claims to his
complaint. ECF No. 21 at 2. These claims are also based in state law.

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fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity,
and considerations of judicial economy.” Morales v. Richardson, 841 F. Supp. 2d 908,
914 (D. Md.), affd, 475 F. App’x 894 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Gregory v. Otac, Inc., 247
F. Supp. 2d 764, 773 (D. Md. 2003) (“A majority of the courts which have considered the
question have declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state claim when the
federal claims have been disposed of prior to a full trial on the merits.”); 13D Fed. Prac.
& Proc. Juris. § 3567.3 (3d ed.) (“As a general matter, a court will decline supplemental
jurisdiction if the underlying claims are dismissed before trial.”).

Here, the case is at an early stage, well before trial. The parties have not invested
significant resources in discovery. Further, there was already state court litigation
regarding at least some of Mr. Hill’s claims (which may prevent further litigation
anyway under claim preclusion or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as discussed above).
Considering principles of fairness, judicial economy, and comity this Court will not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any tort or contract claims, to the extent Mr. Hill
intended to bring them.

Ill. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice;

2. The Clerk of Court shall mark the case as CLOSED.

Date: February 23, 2026 /s/
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge