Blackmon v. International Van Lines, Inc.

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Case 1:25-cv-01671-JKB Document16 - Filed 02/19/26 Page1of10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
_FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ROBERT BLACKMON, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * CIVIL NO. JKB-25-1671

INTERNATIONAL VAN LINES, INC, *

Defendant. *

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 6). For
the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted as to Counts II-IV of the Complaint and.denied
as to Count I.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case concerns allegations of malfeasance related to an interstate shipment of
household goods. According to the Complaint, on April 26, 2024, Plaintiff Robert Blackmon
contracted with Defendant International Van Lines, Inc. to ship his household belongings from
Biloxi, Mississippi to Baltimore, Maryland. (ECF No. 1 f] 6-7.) Plaintiff paid a deposit, and his
pickup date was set for June 10 or 11, 2024. (id. 4 7.)

In the week preceding the pickup, Plaintiff communicated several times with Defendant’s
employee, Karen Gonzalez. Ud. 4§ 7-9.) On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff electronically signed both a
bill of lading (“BOL”) (ECF No. 15-1 at 8-1 1) and a “binding moving estimate” (ECF No. 6-3).
In the BOL, Plaintiff specified that he was seeking “Full (Replacement) Value Protection” for all

the articles in the shipment. (ECF No. 15-1 at 8-9.) But in the binding moving estimate, he

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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indicated that he was seeking only “Basic Value Protection” for his goods. (ECF No. 6-3 at 1.) In

.addition, each document contained a forum selection clause which stated that litigation relating to

“any dispute” between the parties “shall and must only be brough ” in Florida state court. (/d. at
5; ECF No. 15-1 at 11.)

On June 11, 2024, Defendant’s moving truck driver arrived to pick up Plaintiff's goods.
(ECF No. 1 § 10.) Although Plaintiff had already signed a BOL and moving estimate, Plaintiff -
alleges that the moving truck driver instructed Plaintiff to complete and sign each of these
documents again. (/d.) These documents contained forum selection clauses that were identical to
those contained in the June 7 moving estimate and ‘BOL. (ECF Nos. 6-2 at 2; 6-4 at 2.)
Additionally, this time, Plaintiff indicated on the BOL that he was waiving full value protection
for his goods. (ECF No. 6-2 at 1.) But Plaintiff alleges that this was unintentional. (ECF No. 1 {
10.) Rather, he states that it was “oppressively hot” outside and he was pressured to sign the
documents quickly. (/d.) Thus, he did not realize that he was signing a new BOL or that he was
waiving full value protection. Ga) Plaintiff also explains that he explicitly told the driver that he
did not want to waive full value protection. (/d. 12.) Thus, following the driver’s instructions,
Plaintiff signed an additional document, entitled “General Agreement,” and wrote that he was
“waiting on Karen from IVL for FULL VALUE INSURANCE.” Ud. ECF No. 15-1 at 13.) The
driver then left with Plaintiff's goods. |

On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff explains that he sought to schedule delivery of his goods in
Baltimore, but Defendant did not respond. (ECF No. 1 413.) Defendant finally responded in early
August 2024 but continued to delay delivery. (id. { 14.) Defendant then began imposing storage
fees on Plaintiff, even though Plaintiff had requested delivery within the agreed upon delivery -

window. (/d. § 15.) On December 27, 2024, Defendant informed Plaintiff that his goods were

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housed at a storage facility in Virginia. (/d. 7 17.) Defendant demanded additional storage fees,
which Plaintiff refused to pay. Ud.)

On May 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the instant matter. He alleges that
Defendant has violated the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, and Florida trade practices
law, and he asserts that Defendant has committed common law fraud. Plaintiff seeks damages and
injunctive relief, because, at least as of the date of the Complaint, he has still not ‘received his

. goods. Defendant responds that this Court must dismiss the claims because the forum selection
clauses require that they be brought in Florida. In the.alternative, Defendant argues that while the
Carmack Amendment claim may proceed, federal law preempts the state law claims.

Il. . STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Forum Non Conveniens

Defendant styles its motion to dismiss as one based on Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 6 at 1.) -However, the Supreme Court has explained that when a
defendant secks to dismiss a case based on a forum selection clause, the dismissal is not pursuant
to any provision of Rule 12(b). Afl. Marine Const. Co. v. US. Dist. Ct for W. Dist. of Texas, 571
U.S. 49, 60-61 (2013), Rather, it is judged according to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
fd. Although Defendant does not invoke forum non conveniens, its “dismissal motion plainly
invoke[s] the forum selection clause and ask{s] the [C]ourt to enforce it” so the Court is “well
within [its] discretion to treat the motion as, in substance, a forum non conveniens motion.” Ripley
v. Long Distance Relocation Servs., LLC, No. CV CCB-19-0373, 2019 WL 5538343, at *2 n.3 (D.
Md. Oct. 25, 2019) (quoting Mueller v. Apple Leisure Corp., 880 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Thus, the Court will evaluate the Motion pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. When

deciding a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, “[t}he Court will consider evidence —

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outside the pleadings . . ., and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Shaomin
Sui v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No, CV 19-3318, 2020 WL 3639984, at *2 (D. Md. July
6, 2020). |
B, Failure to State a Claim

Alternatively, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal
law, so it moves to dismiss these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When
considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.”
Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir. 2023). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbal, 446 U.S. at 662. A “pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd.
at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S, at 555, 557).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Forum Non Conveniens

When a patty moves to transfer or dismiss a case based on the existence of a forum
selection clause, courts follow a three-step process to determine if the clause should be enforced.
First, the Court must ask if the clause is contractually valid. Av/., Marine, 571 U.S. at 62.n.5. Ifit

is, then the Court determines if the clause is mandatory or permissive. BAE Sys. Tech. Sol. &

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Servs., Inc. v. Republic of Korea’s Def. Acquisition Program Admin., 884 F.3d 463, 470 (4th Cir.
2018). Ifthe clause is both valid and mandatory, then the Court considers if certain public interest
factors nevertheless weigh against enforcing the clause. Atl Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. But at this
third step, there is a strong presumption of enforceability. Id. In this case, however, the Court’s
. analysis ends at the first step because the forum selection clause is contractually invalid.

Federal courts determine the validity of forum selection clauses according to federal law.
Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010). And under federal
law, the validity of a forum selection clause is governed by the Bremen factors. M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US. 1 (1972). These four factors are whether: (1) agreement to the
clause was induced by fraud; (2) the selected venue is so inconvenient that it will deprive the
plaintiff of their day in court; (3) the chosen law is so unfair as to deprive the plaintiff of a remedy;
or (4) enforcement of the clause would violate public policy. Allen v. Lioyd’s of London, 94 F.3d
923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13, 15, 18).

Here, Plaintiff alleges the first and fourth factors: that he was fraudulently induced to agree
to the forum selection clause and that the clause violates public policy under the Carmack
Amendment. The Court need not address the fraudulent inducement argument because it agrees
with Plaintiff that the forum selection clause violates public policy under the Carmack
Amendment.

“The Carmack Amendment was enacted in 1906 as an amendment to the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887.” Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F.2d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 1993).
In relevant part, the Amendment requires “that a carrier transporting property issue a bill of lading
or a receipt to the shipper.” Jd, The Amendment then “makes the carrier liable to the one entitled

to recover under the bill of lading or the receipt for loss of or injury to the property.” Jd. Thus,

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the Amendment “creates a national scheme of carrier liability for goods damaged or lost during
interstate shipment under a valid bill of lading. It is a comprehensive exercise of Congress’s power
to regulate interstate commerce,” 5K Logistics, Inc. v. Daily Exp,, Inc., 659 F.3d 331, 335 (4th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted),

Although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue, many courts around the country
have found that the Carmack Amendment renders forum selection clauses invalid in contracts for
the interstate shipment of goods. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115,

1121-23 (9th Cir. 2011); Castiglia v. Arrow Express Packing & Shipping, LLC, No. 5:25-CV-
1406, 2025 WL 3062653, at *4—5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2025); Dabecca Nat. Foods, Inc. v. RD
Trucking, LLC, No. 14 C 6100, 2015 WL 2444505, at *5—6 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2015). That is
because, as part of its “national scheme of carrier liability,” the Carmack Amendment contains a
special venue provision which states that shippers of goods can sue carriers in any judicial district
“through which the defendant carrier operates” and “in the judicial district in which [the] loss or
damage is alleged to have occurred.” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(d)(1}(2). As the Ninth Circuit has
explained, “[t]hese provisions assure the shipper a choice of forums as plaintiff.” Smallwood, 660
F.3d at 1122. Thus, “alt the time of contracting, . .. a carrier of household goods may not force
the shipper to relinquish his right to sue in one of those venues.” fd; see also Martinez v.
Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 229 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he inclusion of a special venue provision in
an act of Congress may express a broader federal policy of ensuring access to a federal forum to
enforce certain statutory claims.”). |

The Court’s conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that the shipment at issue was for
household goods, rather than commercial goods. That is because the Carmack Amendment also

contains a waiver provision that allows shippers and carriers of commercial goods to contractually

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waive the protections of the Amendment. 49 U.S.C. § 14101(b)(1). But this provision expressly
states that it does not apply to contracts “for the movement of household goods.” Jd. This
exclusion exists because, unlike more sophisticated shippers of commercial goods, those shipping
household goods would be “for all practical purposes ... at the mercy of the carrier” if forum
seléction clauses were permissible. Stewart v. Am. Van Lines, No. 4:12CV394, 2014 WL 243509;
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2014), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Stewart v, Lines,
No. 4:12CV394, 2014 WL 12573370 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14,2014). And this would violate “the right
of the shipper to sue the carrier in a convenient forum of the shipper’s choice” which is “a right
that Congress intended to codify.” Aaacon Auto Transp. Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins, Co.,
537 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, “in the context of household goods... [,] the Carmack
Amendment essentially prohibits enforcement of forum-selection clauses.” Scotlynn USA Div.,
Inc. v. Singh, No. 215CV381FTM29MRM, 2016 WL 8679295, at *2 (M.D. Fia. Sept. 9, 2016).
Accordingly, the forum selection clause in this case violates public policy under the Carmack
Amendment, so it is contractually invalid. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff? s Carmack Amendment claim under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.!-
B. Failure to State a Claim

The Court next addresses whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Counts II through IV.

The Court begins with Count IV, which is a freestanding claim for injunctive relief (ECF No. 1

{{] 38-43.) Because an injunction is a “form[] of relief, not [a] freestanding cause[] of action,”

1 The parties do not address whether the forum selection clause should be rendered invalid only as to the Carmack
Amendment claim or as to the state law claims as well. Regardless, because the Court will dismiss the state law claims
on the merits, it need not decide this question. See Conflict Kinetics, Inc. v. Bagira Sys., Lid., No. 22-2000, 2024 WL
339347, at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 2024) (unpublished) (“A district court may dismiss part of a lawsuit for forum non
conveniens while deciding the merits of other issues.” (internal citation and quotations omitted)).

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Birara v. Kelel, No. CV TDC-17-3241, 2019 WL 3208685, at *7 (D. Md. July 16, 2019), the Court
will grant the motion to dismiss this count for failure to state a claim.

Moving on to Counts TI and III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated Florida’s
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and that it has committed common law fraud. Although
Plaintiff only brings one count each to allege these two causes of action, he asserts four different
theories of how the statute and the common law were violated as to each. Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that Defendant (1) misrepresented the process for obtaining full value insurance; (2)
fraudulently induced him into signing the’ second bill of lading under duress; (3) falsely denied
receipt of his Iuly 2, 2024, request for delivery so that it could impose storage fees; and (4) has
continued to unlawfully retain his goods to extort additional fees. (ECF No. 1 {J 28, 35.) The |
Court pauses to note that this form of pleading is unclear. Each of these alleged violations of law
should be brought in its own count. That is, because Plaintiff contends that there are four discrete
violations of the Florida statute, there should be four different counts alleging that the statute was
violated. If these allegations were viable, this form of pleading could pose an issue for Plaintiff
moving forward. But ultimately, the issue is. moot because all of Plaintiff's allegations are
preempted by federal law.

There are two federal ‘statutes that have preemptive effect in this area: the Carmack
Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 ULS.C. §
14501(c)(1). The Court begins with Carmack preemption. Because the Carmack Amendment “is
a comprehensive exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce,” 5X Logistics, 659
F.3d at 335, it preempts “all state or common law remedies available to a shipper against a carrier
for loss or damage to interstate shipments,” Brenizel v. Fairfax Transfer & Storage, Inc., No. 21-

1025, 2021 WL 6138286, at *5 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 2021) (unpublished). In particular, “state law .

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conversion claims are preempted.” /d. But as Judge Grimm has noted, “there is considerable —
disagreement and even confusion regarding whether the Carmack Amendment’s preclusive effect
extends beyond claims related to the loss, damage, or delayed delivery of household goods.”
Monga v. A.B.S. Moving & Storage, Inc., No. PWG-16-2000, 2017 WL 3228139, at *3 (D. Md.
July 31, 2017). * |

Likely recognizing this disagreement, Plaintiff creatively styles his state law allegations as ~
“intentional misconduct inducing the contract,” rather than as allegations directly related to loss or:
damage. (ECF No. 11 at 12.) But this description only applies to the first two state law theories
_ described above. While these two allegations may fall outside of Carmack’s ambit, the other
two—imposing storage fees and retaining Plaintiff's goods—assuredly do not. These two
allegations are merely that Defendant has unlawfully exerted dominion over Plaintiff's goods. But
that is the definition of conversion, Hobbs v. St. Martin, 198 F. Supp. 3d 530, 537 (D. Md. 2016),
which Plaintiff admits in the Complaint (ECF No. 1 §{ 17, 22). Thus, these two theories as to how
the Florida statute and the common law were violated are preempted by the Carmack Amendment.
Brentzel, 2021 WL 6138286, at *5.

Plaintiff's remaining two state law allegations—relating to misrepresentation and
fraudulent inducement in the making of the contract—may also be preempted by Carmack. See,
e.g., Gordon y. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 289 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Although we consider
it a close call, we conclude that claims relating to the making of the contract for carriage are so
closely related to the performance of the contract, and the measure of damages for such claims so
likely to be the loss or damage to the goods, that they are also preempted by the Carmack
Amendment.”). But even if they are not, they are preempted by the ICCTA. Unlike Carmack’s

implied preemptive scheme, the ICCTA expressly preempts all state laws “related to a price, route,

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or service of any motor carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). And numerous courts have found that
state law claims relating to misrepresentation, false advertising, and bait and switch pricing fall
within this preemptive scheme. Swenson vy. All. Moving & Storage LLC, No. 21-CV-01968-CMA-
STV, 2022 WL 1508506, at *10 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 21-CV-01968-CMA-STV, 2022 WL 1500778 (D. Colo. May 12, 2022) (collecting
cases). Indeed, many courts have specifically found that claims brought under state deceptive
trade practices statutes (as Plaintiff brings here) are preempted. Jd. Thus, even if Plaintiff's
fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation allegations are not preempted by Carmack, they are
preempted by the ICCTA. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims will be
granted in its entirety.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 6) will be

granted as to Counts II-IV of the Complaint and denied as to Count I. A separate Order follows.

DATED this AD) day of February, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

ZOD san. Th AE fcr

Jame$ K. Bredar
United States District Judge

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