Adekson v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES.DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
AD EDAYO OLUWAKAYODE ADEKSON,
*
Plaintiff,
*
v.
* 	Civil No. 25-1660-BAH
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC, 	*
Defendant. 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
* 	*
Plaintiff Adedayo Oluwakayode Adekson (:'Plaintiff') brought suit against Comcast Cable
Communications, LLC ("Comcast") in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for claims arising out
of allege_dly deficient internet speed. 	See ECF 4 (amended state court complaint). 	On May 23,
2025, Comcast removed the action to this Court.. See ECF 1. 	Pending before the Court is
Comcast's motion to compel arbitration (the "Motion"). ECF 15. Plaintiff filed an opposition and
a supplement thereto, ECF 16 (opposition); ECF 23 (supplement), and Comcast filed a reply, ECF
22. 	All filings include memoranda of law, and the Motion and Plaintiffs opposition include
exhibits. 1 The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See
"Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Comcast's Motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-
generated page numbers at the top of the page.
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 1 of 16

I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he and his mother, Mary Adekson, moved into a shared residence in
June of 2024 and "obtained Internet service with Xfinity ... shortly thereafter." ECF 9, at 1 ,r l. •
According to Comcast, "Plaintiff and his mother ... signed up for Comcast' s high speed internet
... via the Comcast website, opening an account under the name Mary Adekson." 	ECF 15-2
(Padgett declaration), at 2 ,r 5. 	"At the time of purchase of services, affirmative consent to the.
Comcast Subscriber Agreement was given for the Adekson account," and the subscriber agreement
"includes an Arbit~ation Provision." Id at 2 ,r 6, at 4 ,r 9. The first page of the subscriber agreement
alerts readers of the existence of an arbitration provision in capitalized, bold font:
Note: 	THIS 	AGREEMENT 	CONTAINS 	A 	BINDING 	ARBITRATION
PROVISION IN SECTION 13 THAT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ALL SERVICES. UNLESS YOU
HAVE OPTED OUT IN A TIMELY MANNER, THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION REQUIRES 	THAT ALL DISPUTES 	BE 	RESOLVED 	IN
INDIVIDUAL 	ARBITRATIONS 	OR 	SMALL 	CLAIMS 	COURT
PROCEEDINGS. IN ARBITRATION, THERE IS NO JUDGE OR JURY
AND THERE IS LESS DISCOVERY AND APPELLATE REVIEW THAN
IN COURT.
ECF 15-4 (Comcast subscriber agreement), at 2.
The arbitration provision of the subscriber agreement then provides that: "Any Dispute
involving you and us shall be resolved through individual arbitration as described in this Section
13 (the 'Arbitration Provision')." Id at 6. It further defines a "dispute" as:
Id
any and all claims or controversies arising out of or related to any aspect of our
relationship, including, but not limited to, any and all: (i) claims for relief and
theories of liability, whether based fn contract, tort, fraud, negligence, statute,
regulation, ordinance, or otherwise; (ii) claims or controversies that arose before
this Agreement or any prior agreement; (iii) claims or controversies that arise after
the expiration or termination of this Agreement; and (iv) claims or controversies
that are the subject of purported class, collective, or representative action litigation.
2
11
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 2 of 16

In general, to obtain services, Comcast requi_res customers to "check □ the box and click □
the 'I agree' button affirming consent to the Subscriber Agreement." ECF 15-2, at 418 (emphasis
·omitted). 	With respect to Plaintiff's residence, "by checking a box and clicking on 'I agree,'
Plaintiff agreed to the· terms of the Subscriber Agreement, which was immediately accessible
through a purple hyperlink." Id. at 2-3 1 6 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff also has "manager level
·access," meaning he "has access to the services, settings, billings, troubleshooting, and contact
information" on the account. 	Id. at 4 1 10; ECF 15-5 (Comcast's record of Plaintiff's mother's
account), at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that after obtaining internet service from Comcast, he and his mother
experienced "inexplicable [internet] speed degradation; despite paying for a service that should
provide circa 300mbps, [their] speed would sometimes hover around 0kbps and [they] would not
_be able to use the Internet at all." 	ECF 9, at 2 1 5. 	The internet speed issues led to "buffering,
sputtering and stopping" which caused "video calls that [Plaintiff] ... made for employment
purposes" to drop, which Plaintiff claims cost him lucrative employment opportunities. Id. at 3-
_4116-7. 	Plaintiff also alleges that the slow speed interfered with his "usage of the Internet for
mundane purposes like streaming YouTube Clips." Id at 4 1 8. 	To correct the internet issues,
Plaintiff had "numerous interactions with Xfinity representatives," including "contacting Mr[.]
Bill Connors (the President of Xfinity at Comcast) repeatedly since 12 August 2024 via his
personal electronic mail address," "[speaking] on numerous occasions with Xfinity representatives
via telephone, chat[ting] with them using their App; ha[ving] two technicians visit the apartment
on three occasions and sp[eaking] with a person named Tyrone who is affiliated with Xfinity's
Computer Security unit." Id at 214, at 419. According to Comcast, Plaintiff "contacted Comcast
numerous times since the Adeksons subscribed to Comcast Services in June 2024," and "[d]uring
3
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 3 of 16

those calls, Plaintiff asked that Comcast contact him directly through his email address." ECF 15-
2, at 411 l.
Plaintiff all 7ges that the internet speed issues are "not coincidental," but instead the result.
ofa "calculated, callous and concerted campaign that is designed to ensure that [Plaintiff] do[es]
not secure employment." ECF 9, at 4-5 17. 	As such, he filed a lawsuit against Comcast in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging damages in the amount of$100,000. ECF 4, at 8. On.
May 23, 2025, Comcast filed a notice ofremoval in this Court, asserting subject matter jurisdiction
on the basis of diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See ECF 1, at I. On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint as a matter of right, see ECF 9, and a supplement containing exhibits,
see ECF 13. Comcast filed the instant motion to compel arbitration on June 20, 2025, ECF 15, to
which Plaintiff filed an opposition one day later, ECF 16. 	Shortly thereafter, on June 24, 2025,
Plaintiff also filed a second amended complaint, see ECF 17, without consent from Comcast or
requesting leave of the Court as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)('.?,). 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ("In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's
written consent or the court's leave"). 	On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an "addendum" to his
response in opposition to the Motion. ECF 23. One day later, Comcast filed its reply brief, ECF
22, and the Motion is now ripe for resolution.
The nature of Plaintiffs claim (or claims) is not entirely clear as he does not identify the
applicable law or legal theory supporting the allegations in the amended complaint. See ECF 9, at
5 ~ 12 (identifying Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § J1-109 as the statute under which Plaintiff requests
damages, but no ~tatute or legal theory -under which he brings his claims). 	Moreover, although
Comcast does not directly raise this issue, "[t]he filing of the Second Amended Complaint without
leave of court ordinarily is a nullity." Jamison v. Todd Allan Printing, Inc., Civ. No. DKC 2008-
4
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 4 of 16

2025, 2009 WL 10727794, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2009) (citing Booth v. United States; 2007 WL
246215 8, at * 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007) ("If an amended pleading cannot be made as of right and
·is filed without leave of court or consent of the opposing party, the amended pleading is a nullity
and without legal effect.")). 	Here, the Court observes that the amended complaint at ECF 9 and
the proposed second amended complaint filed at ECF 17 are essentially identical and reflect only
.slight revisions in article usage. Compare ECF 9, at 1 ,r 1 (alleging "we moved to" _the address at
issue), with ECF 17, at 1 ,r I (alleging "they moved to" the address at issue); see also ECF 17-1
(where Plaintiff asserts that the "Amended Complaint was modified in one instance"). 	These
_insubstantial differences between the first and second amended complaint do not alter the Couq's
conclusion with respect to the pending Motion. As such, the Court considers the second amended
complaint filed at ECF 17 as null. 	The operative complaint considered herein is the amended
complaint filed at ECF 9.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56'
"Where, as here, the formation or validity of the arbitration agreement is in dispute, a
motion to compel arbitration is treated as one for summary judgment." 	Caire v. Conifer Value
Based Care, LLC, 982 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (D. Md. 2013) (citing Shaffer v. ACS Gov't Servs.,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 682, 683 (D. Md. 2004)); see also Cherdak v. ACT, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 3d
442, 454 (D. Md. 2020) (holding that "[t]reating a motion to compel as a motion for summary
judgment is proper where the formation or validity of the arbitration agreement is in dispute ... or
where documents outside the pleadings must be considered" (internal citations omitted)). Under
·Rule 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that there is·no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242,250 (1986); Celotex
5
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 5 of 16

Corp. v. Catrett, 47,7 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute of material fact is only
"genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return•
a verdict for that P\illY· Id. 	When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
I
'
the facts in the lig~t most favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn
in that party's favor. 	Id at 255 (citation omitted). 	However, the Court may rely only on facts.
supported in the record. See Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514,522
(4th Cir. 2003). The Court may not rely upon unsubstantiated assertions in the pleadings. Id.
B. 	The Federal Arbitration Act
Comcast moves to compel arbitration and dismiss the amended complaint. 	ECF 15-1, at
7. 	Under Section :2 of tht1 Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), an arbitration agreement is "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 	9 U.S:C. § 2. 	While Section 2 has been interpreted as "a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," Moses H 	Cone Mem 'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), the Supreme Court has been careful to
clarify that "arbitration agreements are as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so." Morgan !
v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022) .(citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395,404 n.12 (1967)).
The FAA permits a party to an arbitration agreement to seek to compel another party to
that agreement to submit claims to arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 4. In this regard, Section 4 of the
FAA provides that a "party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition ... [a] district court ... for an order
directing that sucJ:i arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." Id. 	The. 	.
statute also provides that, when presented with such a petition, the Court "shall hear the parties,
6
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 6 of 16

and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue, the
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
-terms of the agreement." Id 	But, if the "making of the arbitration agreement" is at issue, "the
[C]ourt shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof." Id
In the Fourth Circuit, a litigant can compel arbitration under the FAA if the litigant can
.demonstrate "(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that
includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the
transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce, and ( 4) the
failure, neglect or refusal of the [party avoiding arbitration] to arbitrate the dispute." See Adkins
v. Lab. Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2002). The question of"[w]hether a party has
agreed to arbitrate an issue is a matter of contract interpretation: ' [A] party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."' 	Levin v. Alms and
Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260,266 (4th Cir. 2011) (brackets in original) (quoting Am. Recovery Corp.
v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, 96 F.3d 88, 92 '(4th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)). 	And so,
"where the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the dispute is generally for courts to
decide." Granite Rock Co. v. Int'[ Bhd. a/Teamsters, 561 U:S. 287,296 (2010); see also Berkeley
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Hub Int'! Ltd., 944 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 2019) (stating that Section 4 of the
FAA "requires that the district court-rather than the arbitrator-<lecide whether the parties have
formed an agreement to arbitrate"). But "[a] district court ... has no choice but to grant a motion
to compel arbitration where a valid arbitration agreement exists and the issues in a case fall within
its purview." Adkins, 303 F.3d at 500 (citing United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 319
(4th Cir. 2001 )).
7
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 7 of 16

Because Plaintiff brings this suit pro se, the Court must liberally construe his pleadings,
holding them to a l,ess stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 	This leniency has its limits, though. "A court may not construct the·
plaintiff's legal arguments for him, nor is a district court required to recognize 'obscure or
extravagant claims, defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them."' Runge v. Barton, No.
CIVA 6:08-0231-GRA, 2009 WL 3245471, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2009) (first citing Small v ..' 	.
Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993), then quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,
1277 (4th Cir. 1985)), aff'd, 368 F. App'x 361 (4th Cir. 2010).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Comcast moves to compel arbitration, and subsequently dismiss this action, because
Plaintiff uses and benefits from the services provided under the subscriber agreement. ECF 15-1,
at 17. 	As noted, a litigant can compel arbitration under the FAA if the litigant can demonstrate
"(l) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an
arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the transaction,
' 	.
which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect
or refusal of the [party avoiding arbitration] to arbitrate the dispute." Adkins, 303 F.3d at 500-01.
Here, Plaintiff disputes only the second element 2 and contends that he is not bound by the
2 The other three elements are met here. The first and fourth elements are plainly met as there is a·
dispute between the parties which Plaintiff is refusing to arbitrate. 	See ECF 9 (amended
complaint); ECF I 6 (opposition to arbitration). 	The third element is also met as the agreement,
which is appended as an exhibit to the Motion at ECF 15-4, pertains to the provision of internet
services. As Comcast contends, and Adekson does not contest, "[t]he provision ofinternet services
over cable systems involves interstate commerce." ECF 15~1, at 7; see also Kl v. Tyagi, Civ. No.
JRR-23-2383, 2024 WL 4732703, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2024) (explaining that the internet is a.
facility of interstate commerce (citing United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314, 385 (4th Cir.
2021)), report and recommendation adopted, Civ. No. JRR-23-02383, 2024 WL 5399243 (D. Md.
Nov. 25, 2024).
8
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 8 of 16

arbitration clause because the Comcast account at issue is in his mother's name, and not his own. 3
ECF 16, at 2. He also disagrees that the arbitration provision covers his claims. Id.
A. 	Equitable Estoppel
Comcast asserts that although Plaintiff is a non-signatory to the subscriber agreement, he
"is equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration for his claims against Comcast." 4 ECF 22, at 7.
"Generally, 'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed' to arbitrate." R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II
Homeowners Ass 'n, 384 F.3d 157, 160 (4th Cir. '2004) (alteration in R.J. Griffin omitted) (quoting
Int'! Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen· & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir.
2000)). But "there is no requirement that arbitration agreements must be signed to be enforceable."
In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp: 2d 840, 854 (D. Md. 2013); see also Krusch
v. TAMKO Bldg. Prods., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 584,589 (M.D.N.C. 2014) ("Arbitration agreements
must be in writing, 9 U.S.C. § 2, but they need not be signed to be enforceable."). 	The Fourth
Circuit has held that "[w]ell-established common law principles dictate that in an appropriate case
a nonsignatory can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision." Washington Square Secs.,
3 Plaintiff does not dispute, however, that there exists a valid written agreement containing an
arbitration provision here. See ECF 16, at 2 ("[B]ased on Plaintiffs understanding, it is unlikely
that the remit of the Defendant's Arbitration Provision is comprehensive enough to cover the
aforesaid concerns."); see also ECF 22, at 6 (asserting that "Plaintiff does ncit dispute that the
_Subscriber Agreement exists, nor does he allege that it does not govern his relationship with
Comcast").
4 "In deciding whether a party· may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute, [courts] 'apply ordinary
state law principles that govern the formation of contracts,' and 'the federal substantive law of
arbitrability."' 	R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners Ass'n, 384 F.3d 157, 160 (4th
Cir. 2004) (first quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 1995; and
·then quoting Moses R Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24). Here, "[b]ecause the determination of
whether [Plaintiff], a nonsignatory, is bound by the [Comcast subscriber agreement] presents no
state law question of contract formation or validity, we look to the 'federal substantive Jaw of
arbitrability' to resolve this question." 	See Int 'l ·Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen &
Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411,417 (4th Cir. 2000).
9
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 9 of 16

Inc. v. Aune, 385 F.3d 432,435 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Int'! Paper, 206 F.3d at 416 (explaining
a non-signatory "can agree to submit to arbitration by means other than personally signing a
contract containing an arbitration clause"). 	Relevant here, the doctrine of"[ e]quitable estoppeJ'
precludes a party from asserting rights 'he otherwise would have had against another' when his
own conduct renders assertion of those rights contrary to equity." Int'! Paper, 206 F.3d at 417-
18 (quoting First Union Commercial Corp. v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough (In re Varat'
Enters., Inc.), 81 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996)).
"When the signatory to an arbitration agreement seeks to compel a nonsignatory to
arbitrate, the Fourth Circuit applies the 'direct benefit' test." Thomas v. Progressive Leasing, Civ ..
No. RDB-17-1249, 2017 WL 4805235, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2017) (first citing Int'! Paper, 206
F.3d at 418; and then citing R.J. 	Griffin, 384 F.3d at 161). 	"[M]ore specifically, ... '[a]
nonsignatory is estopped from refusing to comply with an arbitration clause when it [is seeking.
or] receives a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause."' R.J. Griffin, 384
F.3d at 161 (alterations in R.J. Griffin) (citing Int'! Paper, 206 F.3d at 418). 	The direct benefit
"test recognizes that a nonsignatory should be estopped from denying that it is bound by an_
arbitration clause when its claims against the signatory 'arise from' the contract containing the
arbitration clause." Thomas, 2017 WL 4805235, at *3 (quoting Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v.
Long, 453 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir. 2006)). 	"A nonsignatory's claims 'arise from' a contract
containing an arbitration provision when the claims seek to enforce rights contained in that
contract." Id
Comcast asserts that "[c]ourts have repeatedly. enforced Comcast's arbitration agreement
against individuals who were not primary accountholders when they have regularly used and
benefitted from Cpmcast's services," and cites Shelton v. Comcast Corp., No. CV 20-1763, 2021
10
II
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 10 of 16

WL 214303 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2021), in support of its argument. 	ECF 15-1, at 19. Though not
binding precedent, the Court finds the opinion in Shelton instructive. 	There, the United States
_District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed a motion to compel arbitration
under similar circumstances to those presented here. 	In Shelton, the plaintiff contended that
Comcast's arbitration provision was not binding on him because he was not a signatory to the
subscriber agreement that provided internet and cable services to his residence. Shelton, 2021 WL
214303, at *1. 	Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the.Third Circuit has held that a non-signatory can
be bound by an arbitration agreement where he '"knowingly exploits' an agreement either'(!) by
knowingly seeking and obtaining direct benefits from that contract; or (2) by seeking to enforce
terms of that contract or asserting claims based on the contract's other provisions."' 	Id. at *4
(quoting Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 F.3d 264, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2014)). 	The Shelton .
court found that the plaintiff"sought and obtained benefits under the agreement by, not only using
the Comcast services provided under the agreement at the Shelton Household, but also by
exercising control over the account" by listing the household "as his own home and place of
employment[,] ... associat[ing] his own personal cell phone" with the household account, and
"plac[ing] a service call regarding the account" where he "acknowledged using the Comcast
services and setting up his account online and sought customer service." Id. at *5 (emphasis in
original). As such, the plaintiff was "equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration provision."
Id.
Here, the crux of the amended complaint is that Comcast did not provide adequate internet
service as required by the subscriber agreement. For example, Plaintiff takes issue with "persistent
'interruptions of and intrusions into [his and his mother's] usage of the internet," and "intrusions
... extend[ing] to the usage of the Internet for mundane purposes like streaming YouTube [c]!ips."
11
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 11 of 16

ECF 9, at 3--4. Plaintiff also explicitly asserts that he should be provided the internet speed that
he paid for under the subscriber agreement, alleging that he experienced "inexplicable [internet]
speed degradation; ·despite paying for a service that should provide circa 300mbps." Id. at 3; see
also Thomas, 2017 WL 4805235, at *4 (considering in its equitable estoppel analysis that the non-
signatory plaintiff trying to avoid arbitration "voluntarily assumed the obligation of payment of
ihe Lease" which gave rise to his claim). 	Plaintiffs claims "'arise from' the contract containing'
the arbitration clause," in that he seeks to enforce his right to certain internet speeds under the
subscriber agreement. See Thomas, 2017 WL 4805235, at *3; cf Innotec LLC v. Visiontech Sales,
Inc., No. 3:17CV00007, 2018 WL 3521181, at *6 (W.D. Va. July 20, 2018) (finding plaintiff was·
equitably estopped from denying it was bound by an arbitration provision when it "sued to enforce
various terms of the" contract).
Moreover, like the plaintiff in Shelton, Plaintiff provides several times that he was involved.
not only with obtaining the internet service for his household, see ECF 9, at I ("[W]e ... obtained
internet service with Xfinity"); at 2 ("[W]e signed up for Internet service in June 2024"), but also
engaging in numerous service calls with Comcast to complain about the internet service including.
emailing the President of Xfinity at Comcast "repeatedly since 12 August 2024 via his personal
email address," S]Jeaking "on numerous occasions with 	Xfinity representatives via telephone,
chatt[ing] with ~em using their App, ha[ving] two technicians visit the apartment on three
occasions and speak[ing] with a person named Tyrone who is affiliated with Xfinity' s Computer
Security unit regarding this breach of [Plaintiffs] Inti;met service to no avail." ECF 9, at 4; see
also ECF 23, at 1 ("Plaintiff assumed responsibility for calling and otherwise chatting, speaking
and corresponding with myriad Comcast-affiliated individuals in his mother's stead."). 	Also
similar to the plaintiff in Shelton, Plaintiff associated his personal contact information with the
12
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 12 of 16

account by "ask[ing] that Comcast contact him directly through his email address" regarding the
account, rather than contacting his mother, the account holder. 	ECF 15-2, at 4 ~ 12. 	For these
I
_reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff derived a benefit from the subscriber agreement and is
estopped from avoiding arbitration.
B. 	Whether the Dispute Falls Within the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
As noted, the applicable law under which Plaintiff brings his claims is not entirely clear.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration provision does not apply to his claims, which he
provides are "not .solely or primarily about a commercial or contractual dispute but the
weaponization 	of the 	Internet 	to 	cause 	[Plaintiff] 	grievous 	harm 	both 	personally 	and
professionally." ECF 16, at 3. Plaintiffs claims sound in either contract or tort, and the arbitration
clause is sufficiently broad to encompass his dispute. 	A dispute is defined under the applicable
arbitration provision as "any and all claims or controversies arising out of or related to any aspect
of our relationship, including, but not limited to, any and all: (i) claims for relief and theories of
liability, whether based in contract, tort, fraud, n~gligence, statute, regulation, ordinance, or
otherwise[.]" ECF 15-4, at 6. Plaintiffs amended complaint appears to raise a breach of contract
'claim,5 see ECF 9, at 3 (alleging slower internet speed than was paid for); see also ECF 22, at 4
(alleging Comcast "shirk[ed] its contractual obligation to provide the Plaintiff and his elderly
mother ... adequate internet service"), as well as a tort claim for interference with economic
'relations, 6 see id. at 3--4 (alleging loss of economic opportunities based on an alleged "campaign
5 See, e.g., Reamer v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 556 F. Supp. 3d 544,550 (D. Md. 2021) ("To state
a claim for breach of contract under Maryland law, the plaintiff must establish that 'the defendant
owed the plaintiff a contractual obligation and that the defendant breached that obligation."'
·(quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 776 A.2d 645, 651 (Md. 2001 ))), ajf'd 2022 WL 17985700
(4th Cir. Dec. 29, 2022).
6 See e.g., Nat. Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 485 A.2d 663, 674 (1984) (describing the tort of
"maliciously or wrongfully interfering with economic relationships in the absence of a breach of
13
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 13 of 16

that is designed to ensure that [Plaintiff] do[e~] not secure employment"), which are both types of
claims explicitly covered under the arbitration provision. To the extent Plaintiff brings other sorts
of claims, those too are covered by the arbitration provision, given the breadth of the provision
covering "any and. aJJ claims" related to Plaintiffs "relationship" with Comcast, as well as the
"liberal federal 	policy favoring 	arbitration agreements," which provides that "any doubts
concerning the scqpe of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." 	0 'Neil v.
Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Moses H Cone Mem. Hosp.,
460 U.S. at 24-25). 	Accordingly, all of the disputes raised in the amended complaint must be
arbitrated.
C. 	Request for Dismissal
Comcast accordingly moves to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF 15-1, at 21. Plaintiff
does not directly respond to Comcast' s request for dismissal but asks the Court "to dismiss the-	,
Defendant's request to remove this case yet again to another locale" and "asks the Court to considerI 	.
the peculiarities of his Complaint, experiences and supporting exhibits, schedule a hearing date,
ensure that the undeniable imbalance of power and resources between him and the Defendant does.
not disadvantage him, and aJJow t~ansparency and integrity to prevail." ECF 16, at 6. In Smith v.
Spizzirri, the Supreme Court held that "[w]lien a federal coirrt finds that a dispute is subject to
arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court_
does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to
arbitration." 601 U.S. 472, 475-76 (2024). However, the Fourth Circuit has held that "Smith says
nothing about what happens when the appealing party never requests a stay," and thus "'does not
require' an appell~te court to vacate a 'district court's dismissal order' under such circumstances."
contract" where "a party is liable if [it] interferes with and damages another in his business or	I 	,
occupation").
14
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 14 of 16

Mod. Perfection, LLC v. Bank of Am., NA., 126 F.4th 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing National
Cas. Co. v. Continental Ins., 121 F.4th 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 2024)).
Here, Plaintiff does not specifically ask the Court to consider a stay despite Defendant's
explicit request for dismissal. 	See ECF 15, at 21 ("The Court should dismiss the Amended
Complaint and order Plaintiff to submit his claims to arbitration .... "); ECF 22, at 12 ("Comcast
respectfully requests the Court grant its Motion to Compel Arbitration and enter an Order
dismissing this action .... "). 7 However, because Plaintiff brings this suit prose, certain leniency
is required. 	See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. 	Given- Plaintiffs pro se status, the Court liberally
construes his request for this Court to "schedule a hearing date" as one opposing dismissal and in
favor of a stay. ECF 16, at 6; ECF 23, at 5. 	Moreover, "[9 U.S.C.] § 3 provides only for a stay
and does not permit dismissal unless 'there is a separate reason to dismiss, unrelated to the fact
that an issue in the case is subject to arbitration."' Miranda Sorto v. Carro/s LLC, Civ. No. DKC-
·23-2263, 2024 WL 2783906, at *8 (D. Md. May 30, 2024) (citing Smith, 601 U.S. at 476 n.2). As
such, the Court will stay this action pending arbitration. 	Cf Steele )'. FreedomRoads, LLC, No.
1:23-CV-00816, 2025 	WL 3004609 (M.D.N.C. 	Oct. 	27, 2025) (staying the case pending
"arbitration where prose plaintiff never addressed whether the case should be dismissed or stayed);
Reed v. LTN Glob. Commc'ns, Inc., Civ. No. JRR-24-03649, 2025 WL 2653196, at *11 (D. Md.
Sept. 16, 2025) (exercising the Court's discretion to stay rather than dismiss the matter during the
·pendency of arbitration, despite the defendant's request for dismissal).
7 Plaintiff ultimately had the last word on the issue by filing an "addendum" to his opposition after
.Comcast filed its reply. 	See ECF 23. 	In that filing, Plaintiff again failed to request a stay and
instead stressed that he "wants to be rehumanized vis-a-vis the Defendant and ensure that he gets
the justice and answers to which he and his mother are entitled as human beings" and requested
"that the Court summarily dismiss the Defendant'.s motion to compel arbitration and preside
instead over a formal trial." Id. at 5.
15
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 15 of 16

IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Comcast's motion to compel, ECF 15, is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. This action is hereby STAYED. The parties are to submit a joint status report
in 180 days advising the Court of the status of the arbitration proceedings.
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: February 10, 2026 	Isl
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
16
i!
II
Case 1:25-cv-01660-BAH Document 27 Filed 02/10/26 Page 16 of 16