Tafah v. Lake Village Townhomes et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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BOLIMA TAFAH ET AL.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
* 	Civil No. 25-1408-BAH
LAKE VILLAGE TOWNHOMES ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION * 	*
Bolima Tafah and Akwi Suna Epse Tafah (also known as Ambele Nancy Akwi Suna)
(together "Plaintiffs") brought suit against Lake Village Townhomes ("Lake Village"), Orchards
.at Severn, LLC ("Orchards"), RentGrow, Inc. ("RentGrow"), and Equifax Information Services
LLC ("Equifax") (collectively "Defendants") alleging numerous claims arising from Plaintiffs'
residential leases at Lake Village's and Orchards' respective properties. 	See ECF 21 (amended
_complaint). Pending before the Court are Lake Village's Motion to Dismiss (ECF 24), Orchards'
Motion to Dismiss (ECF 28), Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Pleading (ECF
34), and Lake Village's Motion to Strike (ECF 40). Several responses and replies to the pending
_motions have been filed. 	See ECF 33 (Plaintiffs' opposition to ECFs 24 and 28); ECF 36 (Lake
Village's reply); ECF 37 (Lake Village's opposition to ECF 34); ECF 39 (Plaintiffs' reply). 1 The
Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loe. R. 105 .6
(D. Md. 2025). 	Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to
supplement is DENIED, Orchards' motion to dismiss is GRANTED, Lake Village's motion to
1 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-
•generated page numbers at the top of the page.
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dismiss is GRANTED, Lake Village'.s motion to strike is DENIED as moot, and the amended
complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to all four Defendants.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint against Lake Village, Orchards, and RentGrow on May
2, 2025. See ECF 1. Lake Village filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint, ECF 17, which •
Plaintiffs opposed, ECF 20. 	Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, adding Equifax as a
Defendant. ECF 21 (amended complaint). The Court then denied as moot Lake Village's motion
to dismiss. 	See ECF 23. 	The amended complaint alleges that Defendants violated "over 50
separate ... state and federal housing, consumer protection, civil rights, and fair credit reporting
laws." 	ECF 21, 	at 2. 	Plaintiffs "demand compensatory and punitive damages 	totaling
$31,765,000." Id. Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit Orchards from evicting them, ECF 22, which the Court
denied, ECF 23. 	Lake Village and Orchards then each filed a motion to dismiss the amended·
complaint. ECF 24 (Lake Village); ECF 28 (Orchards). Plaintiffs opposed both motions, ECF 33,
and filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading, ECF 34. Lake Village filed a reply to
Plaintiffs' opposition, ECF 36, and a response in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to supplement;
ECF 37. 	Plaintiffs also filed an "Exhibit Claims Test Proof tliat Counts III and XVI meet all
Standards to state a plausible claim under IIED or FHA for Count XVII," ECF 3 8, along with a
"Reply in further support of their opposition to Defendant Lake Village's Motion to Dismiss the-
Amended Complaint," ECF 38-1. 	Lake Village moved to strike those filings. 	ECF 40. 	The
pending motions are now ripe for resolution.
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II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement EECF 34)
Plaintiffs request leave to file a supplemental pleading. See ECF 34 (motion); ECF 34-2
(proposed supplement). 	Lake Village opposes the inotion on the grounds that the allegations in
the proposed supplement "are frivolous because they do not pertain to any claim asserted against
any defendant in this case," and the proposed supplement "is rife with allegations concerning
occurrences and events that happened before the filing of the amended complaint" in violation of
Rule 15(d). ECF 37, at 4 (emphasis omitted). The Court agrees with Lake Village and will deny
Plaintiffs' motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides that the Court may "permit a party to serve
a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the
date of the pleading to be supplemented." 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (emphasis added). 	Rule 15(d)
aims to ensure "as complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as is possible." 6A
Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1504 (3d ed.). 	The general rule is
·supplementation of pleadings is favored and should be granted absent futility, undue delay, bad
faith, dilatory tactics, or unfair prejudice to the party_ to be served with the proposed pleading. See
id.; see also Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 198 n.15 (4th Cir. 2002) (instructing that leave to
·supplement "should be freely granted" and warrants denial only where there is a "good reason"
for doing so (citation omitted)). 	A proposed amendment to a complaint is futile "when the
proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face." Miller.v. Md. Dep't of Nat.
-Res., 813 F. App'x 869,880 (4th Cir. 2020).
"Under Rule 15(d), the filing of a supplemental pleading is not available to the pleader as
a matter of right but, rather, is subject to the court's discretion." Wood v. Yancey, No. 1:23CV462
.(RDA/JFA), 2025 WL 2493327, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Gadbois v.
.3
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PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2015)). 	And it "is implicit in the logic of Rule 15(d)
that a motion to supplement may be denied where the referenced events occurred before the filing
of the original complaint." Gadbois, 809 F.3d at 7 (citing Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d
858, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Lake Village first asserts that the allegations in the proposed supplement are frivolous
because they are irrelevant to the claims against the Defendants in this action. 	ECF 37, at 4.
Plaintiffs "reject this characterization" because "the Supplemental Complaint was filed in good
faith to address continuing events, newly arising facts, and retaliatory conduct." 	ECF 39, at 2.
The Court agrees that the proposed supplemental pleading is frivolous and runs afoul of Rule
15(d).
First, the proposed supplement is forty-one pages long, and the amended complaint is
already thirty pages (not including the thirty-four pages of attached exhibits, see ECFs 21-4-21-
25). 	Supplementing the amended complaint would make the operative complaint over seventy'
pages long, nearly doub\e the forty-page limit set forth in the Local Rules. See Loe. R. 103.l(d)
(D. Md. 2025). 	Further, the proposed supplement includes wholly irrelevant information-
including twenty pages c;if information about suits against non-party entities, which occurred long·
before the filing of the amended complaint, ECF 34-2, at 13-24, 31-37, as well as commentary on
"[p]ublic confidence in the judiciary," id at 8, and "historical and literary reference[s] from the
Christian Bible," id. at 11. A supplemental pleading must conform to Rule 8, which requires that•
complaint allegations mμst be "simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(l); see Malone
v. Lewisburg USP, Civ. No. ELH-17-2471, 2017 WL 6437188 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 2017) (dismissing
a supplemented complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8), ajf'd, 714 F. App'x 299 (4th Cir..
2018). 	The proposed supplement fails to meet this standard. 	And although Plaintiffs assert that
4
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they have included this extraneous information to provide the Court with "the merits and
_contextual relevance of those separate proceedings," ECF 39, at 3, such information is irrelevant.
As Lake Village asserts, the proposed supplement is also "rife with allegations concerning
occurrences and events that happened before the filing of the amended complaint," ECF 37, at 4,
even though "Rule 15(d) plainly permits supplemental amendments to cover events happening
after suit." 	Wood, 2025 WL 2493327, at *2 (quoting Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S.
218, 226 (1964)) (emphasis in Wood); see ECF 34-2, at 2-9 (detailing events from May through
July 2025). Plaintiffs assert that they include these events "to demonstrate a continuing course of
conduct." ECF 39, at 3. Plaintiffs recount the filing of the original complaint in this action, their
conversations with opposing counsel, and details of their state eviction court proceedings including
certain "irregularities" Plaintiffs allege occurred in those proceedings, all of which happened prior
to the filing of the amended complaint. See ECF 34-2, at 2-9. These allegations fail to demonstrate
any continuing course of conduct by the Defendants as it relates to the pleaded claims. 	Further,
only a few pages of the proposed supplement involve events that occurred after the filing of the
amended complaint. 	See id at 7 (alleging issues with the state eviction proceedings), at I 0
(detailing Plaintiffs' eviction on August 13, 2025). These allegations do not supplement the claims
against any defendant in this action but instead appear to take issue with state entities involved in
'Plaintiffs' 	eviction 	proceedings. 	See 	id 	at 	7 	(alleging 	"undue 	interference 	by 	court
administrators"), at 10 ("[T]he sheriffs commenced the eviction process prior to the scheduled
time"), at 11 (alleging that "neither [the District or Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County] issued
·a valid warrant of restitution"). 	And the twenty pages related to non-parties to this case involve
events that occurred as long ago as 2019. See id. at 13.:..15 (purchase of a vehicle in 2024 that was
repossessed in April 2025), at 16--21 (purchase of a vehicle in 2019 that was repossessed in 2024),
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at 21-24 (allegations related to Bolima Tafah's employment with three public school systems as
long ago as 2020). As such, the proposed supplement violates Rule 15(d) and Plaintiffs' motion
to supplement is denied.I Cf Quarles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No. GJH-20-3200, 2022 WL
3290722, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2022) (denying leave to amend when the proposed amended
complaint was "full of superfluous material, and difficult to decipher").
As an alternative their requested relief, Plaintiffs informally seek to "file an amended
complaint incorporating both the pre- and post-amendment facts." 	ECF 39, at 3. 	Putting aside
Plaintiffs' failure to adhere to the rules for seeking leave to file another amended complaint, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2);Loc. R. 103.6 (D. Md. 2025),2 Plaintiffs fail to note exactly what relevant
pre- and post- amendment facts would be included in the proposed second amended complaint.
They also fail to differentiate their proposed amended complaint from the supplemental pleading
the Court has already rejected. See, e.g., Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2009)
("[P]laintiffs failed to provide the district court with a means by which to determine whether the·
amendment would, cure the defects in the initial complaint. In the[ se] circumstances, we conclude
that the district court did not .abuse its discretion in failing to give the plaintiffs a blank
authorization to 'do over' their complaint."); Estrella v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 497 F. App'x·
361,362 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a district court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave
to amend where "the plaintiff fails to formally move to amend and fails to provide the district court
with any proposed amended complaint"); Hall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Civ. No. JKB-19-.
2510, 2020 WL 1452132, *8 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2020) (denying a plaintiff leave to amend to add
• 	'
2 Further, "parties cannqt amend their complaints through briefing." Nunez v. Eagles Beachwear,
& Swimwear of Myrtle Beach, No. 4:24-CV-3002-JD-K.DW, 2025 WL 1625592, at *4 (D.S.C.
Feb. 19, 2025) (quoting.S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. Openband at Broadlands,
LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2013)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:24-CV-
03002-JD, 2025 WL 1540585 (D.S.C. May 3·0, 2025). 	•
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new facts and new causes of action as procedurally improper where he "did not file a motion or
_submit a proposed amended complaint" and "merely expressed his wish to amend in his opposition
brief'). 	Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs' informal effort to amend the pleadings in the
manner described in ECF 39.
To the extent Plaintiffs request that the Court consider their response to the motions to
dismiss as a proposed second amended complaint, see ECF 33, at 5 (offering a "reorganization and
clarification" of their claims), "it is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs
in opposition to a motion to dismiss." Mylan Lab ys, Inc. v. Akzo, N. V., 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1068
(D. Md. 1991) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.1984)).
Regardless, the filing violates the Local Rule for pleadings as it is nearly fifty pages long, see Loe.
R. 103.l(d) (D. Md. 2025), and, like the proposed supplement, raises grievances against entities
and individuals that are not a party to this case. See ECF 33, at 12 (claim against Jennifer Clerk
of Community Legal Services), at 29 (claim against Capital One and "ACA"), at 49 (claim against
American Credit Acceptance, Capital One, and "Associated State Actors"). 	Although Plaintiffs
are generally permitted to add new parties to an amended complaint, see Galustian v. Peter, 591
F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir.2010), and even construing. their pro se request liberally, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,520 (1972), Plaintiffs fail to clearly articulate who they wish to add to their
·suit, and why they wish to add them. Plaintiffs' myriad filings "place[]an unjustifiable burden on
defendants to determine the nature of the claim[ s] _against them and to speculate on what their
defenses might be," and "imposes a similar burden on the court to sort out the facts now hidden in
·a mass of charges, arguments, [and] generalizations." Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122 (D.
Md.1981 ). Plaintiffs informal request to amend is denied.
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B. 	Orchard,s' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 28)
Orchards moves to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 	12(b)(5) 	for
insufficient service, or in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) for failure to state a claim. ECF
28-1, at 3-8. Dismissal is warranted as to Orchards due to a failure to properly effectuate service.
Under Rule 12(b)(5), a defendant may challenge the validity of service by filing a motion
to dismiss. When a defendant contests service, the burden rests with the plaintiff to establish valid
service pursuant to Rule,4. Miller v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Com 'rs, 833 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516
(D. Md. 2011). 	Under Rule 4(m), a plaintiff must serve a defendant "within 90 days after the
complaint is filed." Fed, R. Civ. P. 4(m). If a defendant is not served within that time, "the court
... must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specified time.'; Id. 	Rule 4(m) also_provides that, "if the plaintiff shows good cause for
the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period." Id.· In the context
of Rule 4(m), "good cause" entails "some showing of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs."·
Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 627 (4th Cir. 2019). 	Diligence exists "when the failure of
service is due to external factors, such as the defendant's intentional evasion of service." Id.
"While pro se litigants are typically afforded greater leniency than represented litigants;
'[p]ro se status ... is insufficient to establish good cause' for failure to comply with Rule 4, 'even
where the pro se plaintiff mistakenly believes that service was made properly."' 	Davis v. Bait.
City Cmty. Coll., Civ. No. ADC-19-2194, 2019 WL 5636362, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2019),
(quoting Tann v. Fisher, 276 F.R.D. 190, 193 (D. Md. 2011)). "Although the court can 'construe
Rule 4 liberally' when the service of process, even if technically deficient, provided actual notice
to the defendant, the 'plain requirements' for effecting service of process cannot be ignored.".
Harris v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., Civ. No. ELH-23-701, 2023 WL 3624733, at *2 (D.
8
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Md. May·23, 2023) (quoting O'Meara v. Waters, 464 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Md. 2006)); see
also Scott v. Md. State Dep 't ofLabor, 673 F. App'x 299, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) ("Actual notice does
. 	.
not equate to sufficient service of process, even under the liberal construction of the rules
applicable to a pro se plaintiff.").
Orchards contends that Plaintiffs failed to properly serve the original complaint, instead
addressing the summons "to a non-party at [Orchards'] corporate office," and then failed to serve
the amended complaint on Orchards "in any manner:" ECF 28-1, at 4. Plaintiffs, however, assert
that they "fully complied with the Clerk's instructions" to properly serve Orchards and also "went
further by personally serving the Orchards leasing office with every filing." ECF 33, at 55-56.
Service of process on corporations and associations is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h).
Rule 4(h) provides, in relevant part, that a corporation, partnership, or association "must be served
... in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(l) for serving an individual," or "by delivering a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(l )(A)-
(B). 	Under Rule 4(e)(l), an individual may be served by "following state law for serving a
summons in an action brought in courts of general ji,irisdiction in the state where the district court
is located or where service is made." 	Under Maryland law, "[s]ervice is made upon a limited
"liability company by serving its resident agent." Md. Rule 2-124(h). 	Service of process may be
effected by personal delivery, "leaving a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers
filed with it at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a resident of suitable
·age and discretion," or by mailing these documents to the individual "by certified mail requesting:
'Restricted Delivery-show to whom, date, address of delivery."' Md. Rule 2-12l(a). 	When a
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plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the U.S. Marshal effects service of process on the plaintiffs
behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
The record shows that despite explicit instructions from the Court, Plaintiffs failed to serve
the original complaint on Orchards' resident agent. After Plaintiffs filed the original complaint,
the Court notified_ Plaintiffs that service could not be effected because the proposed summonses
were deficient. See ECF 7, at I. Further, because Plaintiffs proceed in forma pauperis, they were
required to provide U.S. Marshal service of process forms but failed to do so. Id. at 2. The Court
informed Plaintiffs that they must serve the resident agent for each Defendant and instructed
Plaintiffs on how to obtain the resident agent information.3 Id. 	The Court then directed the Clerk
to send Plaintiffs three I).ew summonses and blank U.S. Marshal forms for Plaintiffs to complete·
and return so that the U.S. Marshals could effect service of a summons and the complaint. Id at
3.
Orchards' resident agent is listed on the Maryland State Department of Assessment and'
Taxation's ("SDAT's"); website as "Michael E. Marino, Esquire, Levy & Marin, 609 Bosley
Avenue, Towson, MD 21204." 4 However, the record reflects that Plaintiffs failed to include the
correct resident agent il).formation on the summons and U.S. Marshal form sent to the Clerk's·
office for service on Orchards. 	See ECF 9, at 1 (summons including incorrect resident agent
information: "Blibaum & Associates, PA, 40 York Rd, Suite 300, Towson, MD 21204"); ECF 12,
3 Specifically, the Court provided: "Service of process on corporations and associations may be
made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h). The ~ummons and complaint are generally served on the
resident agent, president, secretary, or treasurer. 	See Maryland Rule 2-124(d). 	Plaintiff may
contact the office of the State Department of Assessments and Taxation at (410) 767-1330 or visit
the website at https://egov.maryland.gov/BusinessExpress/EntitySearch to obtain the name and.
service address for the resident agent of a corporate defendant." ECF 7, at 2.
4 Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation ("SDAT"), Business Entity Search,
https ://egov .maryland. gov/businessexpress/entitysearch [https://perma.cc/KEB6-6DSE].
10
I:
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at 1 (U.S. Marshal form addressed to "Apartment Services Inc (The Orchards II), 216 Schilling
Circle, Hunt Valley, MD 21031"). 	Accordingly, the U.S. Marshals served Plaintiffs' complaint
against Orchards on Apartment Services, Inc. via certified mail to this address. 	Orchards asserts
that Plaintiffs "failed to correctly serve Orchards" by not serving Orchards' resident agent. ECF
28-1, at 4.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they failed to serve Orchards' resident agent but contend that
service on Apartment Services, Inc. instead of Orchards' resident agent was nonetheless proper
because Apartment Services, Inc. is Orchards' "managing agent." 	ECF 33, at 56. 	Plaintiffs,
however, provide no evidence that Apartment Services, Inc. was authorized to accept service on
behalf of Orchards, only asserting that it was named-on Plaintiffs' lease agreement "in connection
with Orchards." 	Id. 	Indeed, Orchards confirms that "Apartment Services is the apartment
community management community," and not a "person authorized to accept service" on
Orchards' behalf. 	ECF 28-1, at 4. 	As such, Plaintiffs' service of the original complaint on
Apartment Services, Inc. does not constitute proper service on Orchards. Plaintiffs further assert
'that Orchards was validly served because "every filing ... was personally served on [Orchards]
by Plaintiff Bolima Tafah." 	ECF 33, at 55. 	This_ method of service is still improper because
"[w]hether under the Federal Rules or Maryland law, a party to the case may not effect service of
'process." Ayres v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Civ. No. AW-13-1597, 2013 WL 4784190, at *2
(D. Md. Sept. 5, 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) and Md. Rule 2-123(a)). 	Plaintiffs thus
failed to validly serve the original complaint on Orchards under Rule 4.
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiffs served Orchards (or any
Defendant) with the amended complaint. 	"[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original
pleading, rendering the original pleading ofno effect." Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d
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567, 573 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Fawzy v. Wauquiez Boats SNC, 873 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir.
2017) ("Because a properly filed amended complaint supersedes the original one and becomes the
operative complaint in the case, it renders the original complaint 'of no effect•. "'). 	And '"[a]
pleading filed after the original complaint," including an amended complaint, "must be served on
every party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(l)(B). Orchards contends that it only became apprised of the
amended complaint "through a PACER search of the docket entries by its counsel." ECF 28-1, at
1. Plaintiffs do not respond to Orchards' argument regarding service of the amended complaint,
thus conceding the point. 	See United Supreme Council v. United Supreme Council of Ancient
Accepted Scot. Rite for !33 Degree of Freemasonry, 329 F. Supp. 3d 283, 292 (E.D. Va. 2018)
("Failure to respond to an argument made in a dispositive pleading results in a concession of that
claim."). Based on the r,ecord before the Court and Plaintiffs' failure to respond to the argument,
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs failed to properly serve Orchards with the amended complaint
Plaintiffs also fail to establish good cause for failing to serve Orchards. Plaintiffs first offer·
that any failure is attributable to the fact that Plaintiffs are "not fully versed in legal procedures."
ECF 33, at 54. However, prose status is insufficient to establish good cause for failure to comply
with Rule 4. See Davis, 2019 WL 5636362, at *3. Plaintiffs further assert that it does not matter·
whether they served Orchards, Apartment Services, Inc., or Pioneer City Realty Company, another
entity they claim is affiliated with Orchards, as long as Orchards was "placed on notice" that they
were being sued. ECF ~3, at 56 ("[I]fthe service documents.were received under at least one of.
these affiliated names, [Pioneer City Realty Company or Apartment Services, Inc.], [Orchards
was] necessarily placed on notice[.]"). 	But notice is not the controlling standard, and "[a]ctual
notice does not equate to sufficient service of process, even under the liberal construction of the.
rules applicable to a pro se plaintiff." Scott, 673 F. App'x at 305. Plaintiffs also argue that "the
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absence of any further deficiency notice from the Clerk confirms that service was properly effected
and accepted." 	ECF 33, at 56. 	This argument is unavailing. 	"A plaintiff proceeding in forma
pauperis may rely on the United States Marshals Service to effect service, but [he or she] maintains
responsibility for preparing and presenting summonses to the clerk that are addressed properly to
each defendant." 	Hammond v. N 	State Acceptance, LLC, No. 5:21-CV-376-FL, 2022 WL
22998563, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b)-(c)(3)); see Scott, 673 F.
App'x at 306 ("It is the plaintiffs responsibility to provide proper addresses for service."
(alterations omitted) (quoting Lee v. Armantrout, 991 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1993))). 	Here,
Plaintiffs knowingly presented an improperly addressed summons and U.S. Marshal form for
service on Orchards, and their reasons for failing to properly serve Orchards do not show the
diligence required to establish good cause. CJ Scott, 673 F. App'x at 306-07 (ruling that a plaintiff
did not demonstrate good cause where his service attempts lacked diligence).
The "plain requirements for the means of eff~cting service of process may not be ignored."
Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984). 	Despite
·explicit instruction from the Court, Plaintiffs did not properly serve Orchards' resident agent and
have failed to establish good cause for their failure to do so. 	Accordingly, dismissal of the
amended complaint without prejudice as to Orchards is warranted. 5 See Scott, 673 F. App 'x at
299 (finding that dismissal was appropriate when a prose plaintiff failed to properly serve process
"for the sole reason that [they] refused to follow the district court's specific instructions about how
to find the proper service address for [the defendant]"); Knox v. Amazon. com Servs., LLC, Civ.
5 The Court notes that the amended complaint also fails to include sufficient factual allegations to
state a plausible claim against Orchards. See ECF 21, at 2-9. Plaintiffs instead offer little more
than conclusory.assertions and citation's to caselaw to support their claims. Accordingly, dismissal
of Plaintiffs' claims against Orchards is also appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) in accordance with
.the same reasoning outlined in the section below. See irifra Section II.C.
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No. BAH-24-126, 2024 }VL 4556902 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 2024) (finding dismissal appropriate where
a pro se plaintiff purposefully served the wrong party despite the Court's instruction), aff'd, No.
24-2141, 2025 WL 1177249 (4th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025).
C. 	Lake Village's Motion to Dismiss (ECF 24)
'
Lake Village moyes to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
contending thatthe "factual allegations against Lake Village are entirely conclusory (and in some
instances, totally non-existent)." ECF 24-1, at 7 (footnote omitted). The Court agrees with Lake
Village's characterization and will grant the motion to dismiss.
Federal Rule of ~ivil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to "state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a motion under this
rule, courts discount legal conclusions stated in the complaint and "accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in, the complaint." 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.,S. 662, 678 (2009). A court ~en draws all reasonable inferences in favor·
of the plaintiff and considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumerajfairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,253 (4th Cir. 2009). "A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the·
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. "The complaint mμst offer 'more than labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause <;>faction[.]'" Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App'x 745, 747·
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007)). At the same time,
a "complaint will not be dismissed as Jong as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiffs]
claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than°conceivable chance of success on the merits.".
Owens v. Bait. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379,396 (4th Cir. 2014).
'
14
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Because Plaintiffs bring this suit pro se, the Court must liberally construe their pleadings,
holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520.
This leniency has its limits, though. "A court may not construct the plaintiffs legal arguments for
him, nor is a district court required to recognize 'obscure or extravagant claims defying the most
concerted efforts to unravel them."' 	Runge v. Barton, No. CIVA 6:08-0231-GRA, 2009 WL
3245471, at *I (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2009) (first citing Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993),
then quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985)), affd, 368 F.
App'x 361 (4th Cir. 2010).
As Plaintiffs note, the "amended complaint references over fifty 	federal 	and state
violations." ECF 21, at 9. However, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff
must do more than reference violations oflaw. A plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs fail to do so here.
In support of Plaintiffs' fifty claims, the amended complaint includes only eight pages of
'factual allegations, ECF 21, at 2-9, and then two tables spanning fifteen pages listing the alleged
violations oflaw, id. at 9-23. 6 Plaintiffs bring twenty-one claims against Lake Village, but most
of the factual allegations are merely "legal conclusion[s] couched as [] factual allegation[s]."
-/qbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	As an example, paragraph one of
Plaintiffs' factual summary states:
6 The Court notes that Plaintiffs also appear to allege that non-parties to this case are liable for
certain claims, and thus it is unclear why these claims are included in the amended complaint. See
ECF 21, at 3, 4 (Jennifer Clerk), at 10 (Community Legal Services), at 15 (District Court), at 18
(Court Staff), at 20 (Legal Services Org).
15
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Deceptive Leasjng Practices at Lake Village Townhomes The bait-and-switch
increase from $1,550 to $1,750 directly contradicts prior representations. Similar
conduct was fo~d actionable in Marchese v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 917 F.
Supp. 2d 452,464 (D. Md. 2013), establishing liability under Maryland Consumer
Protection Act for misrepresentations causing financial harm.
ECF 21, at 2 ,r 1. 	The additional allegations against Lake Village are similarly vague and lack
sufficient factual detail to state any claim. See, e.g., id. at 3 ,r 2 ("Posting public notices for minorI
rent delays contributed to a hostile housing environment."), ,r 3 ("The refusal to accommodate
postpartum recovery vi?lated FHA reasonable accommodation requirements."), ,r 5 ("Refusing
source-of-income assistance from ACDS raises claims .... "), ,r 6 ("Repeated denials based on
incomplete or inaccurate records raises concerns .... "). 	These bare assertions fail to allege
I
individual conduct that, jf proven, would demonstrate any law was violated by Lake Village. As
Lake Village notes, these sparse factual allegations do not support the myriad claims Plaintiffs
[ 	.
bring against Lake Village, including alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42I
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., F.air Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., Fair Debt'
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("IIED"). See ECF 24-1, at 7-9.
For examp)e, tht FHA prohibits any person "engaging in residential real estate-related·
transactions [from] discriminat[ing] against any person ... because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin." 	42 U.S.C, § 3605(a). 	To state a claim under the
I 	.
FHA, "a plaintiff must ~how direct evidence of discrimination or establish a prima facie case of
discrimination." Johnson v. Bank of Am., N.A., Civ. No. PX-17-3007, 2018 WL 3036470, at *3
(D. Md. June 15, 2018). 	While Plaintiffs describe Lake Village's alleged conduct in brief
statements, such as "[r]yfusal to accommodate postpartum recovery," "[r]etaliation after request.
for accommodation," or,, [r]ejection of public housing assistance," ECF 21, at 17, these allegations
16
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do "not meet the requisite pleading standard" as they are only "conclusory allegations of ...
discrimination with no facts averred in support." Johnson, 2018 WL 3036470, at *3.
Plaintiffs also allege that Lake Village "[r]eport[ed] false information to bureaus" in
violation of§ 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. 	"To state a claim under § 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must
plead '(I) that [they] notified the [credit reporting agencies, or] CRAs of the disputed information; .
(2) that the CRAs notified [the defendant] of the dispute; and (3) that [the defendant] then failed
to investigate and modify the inaccurate information."' Tyson v. Cap. One, NA., Civ. No. DLB-
25-1794, 2025 WL 3166795, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2025) (quotingDavenportv. Sallie Mae, Inc.,
124 F. Supp. 3d 574, 581 (D. Md. 2015), aff'd, 623 F. App'x 94 (4th Cir. 2015)). The amended
complaint does not contain any alleged facts in support of this cause of action.
Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim similarly fails. 	"To state a claim for relief under the FDCPA, a
'plaintiff's complaint must allege facts that show: '(l) the plaintiff has been the object of collection
activity arising from consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCP A;
and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA."' 	Queen v.
'LVNV Funding, LLC, Civ. No. LKG-24-2237, 2025 WL 2532710, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 3, 2025)
(quoting Boosahdav. Providence Dane LLC, 462 F. App'x 331,333 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiffs
do not allege anywhere in the amended complaint that Lake Village was a debt collector. And as
·noted by Lake Village, to the extent that Plaintiffs assert that Lake Village was a debt collector
because it was collecting rent, that claim fails because "courts have noted that landlords and/or
property management companies are not debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA when
.they 	are 	collecting 	their 	own 	debts." 	Woods 	v. 	Brookside 	Pointe 	Apartments, 	No.
623CV05108HMHJDA, 2023 WL 7928314, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2023) (citingRamsayv. Sawyer
17
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Prop. Mgmt. of Md., LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531 (D. Md. 2013)), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV62305W8HMHJDA, 2023 WL 7924684 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2023).
Plaintiffs also do not sufficiently plead a claim of IIED. 	"To state a prima facie case of
intentional infliction of. emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: (1) the
conduct in question was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)
there was a causal connection between the conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the
emotional distress was severe." 	Rubino v. New Acton Mobile Indus., LLC, 44 F. Supp. 3d 616,
624 (D. Md. 2014) (citing Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560,380 A.2d 611,614 (Md. 1977)). While
Plaintiffs state that they.suffered "[e]motional distress," ECF 21, at 10, this bare assertion fails to •
meet the extremely high bar of pleading an IIED claim, which requires plausible allegations that
Lake Village engaged i~ conduct that was "so outrageous that it goes beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and is regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Williams v. Wicomico Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 836 F. Supp. 2d 387, 399 (D. Md. 2011) (quoting·
Borchers v. Hyrchuk, 126 Md. App. 10, 727 A.2d 388,393 (Md. App. 1999)).
Plaintiffs also fail to state any claims of fraud against Lake Village, as they do not "state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud" as required under Rule 9(b ). For example,·
'
Plaintiffs allege that Lake Village engaged in fraud on the Court when it "failed to inform the court
that it had rejected an offer from the Arundel Community Development Services (ACDS) to cure
the outstanding rent bahmce." ECF 21, at 6116. 	Plaintiffs also allege Lake Village committed·
"[c]ommon law contrac,t fraud" based on their "[r]efusal to honor agreed rental rate." 	Id. at 9.
These brief allegations fail to identify the requisite information to state a fraud claim, including
"the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person-
'
making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby." 	Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
18
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776 F.3d 214, 219 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176
F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Lake Village also asserts that some of Plaintiffs' purported constitutional claims "fail as a
matter of law." 	See ECF 24-1, at 10. 	The Court agrees. 	Plaintiffs allege a "violation of due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment," ECF 21, at 5 1 13, an allegation that is not, as
plead, a cognizable claim against a private company like Lake Village. United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (noting "the time-honored.principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by
its very terms, prohibits only state action"); Webster Cnty. Lumber Co. v. Wayne, 61 F. App'x 63,
66 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t has been well-established for over a century that the Fourteenth
Amendment restrains or controls only state actors, n_ot private actors.").
As noted supra, in response to Lake Village's motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs provide a
'"reorganization and clarification of Plaintiffs' previously asserted" allegations, "structured into
detailed, distinct counts." ECF 33, at 5. However, it bears repeating that "parties cannot amend
their complaints through briefing" and therefore the additional facts provided in Plaintiffs'
·response "are not properly before the Court and cannot be considered." Nunez, 2025 WL 1625592,
at *4 (quoting S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, 713 F.3d at 184); see also Mylan Labs.,
Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1068 ("It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs
-in opposition to a motion to dismiss."); Glenn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No. DKC-15-3058,
2016 WL 3570274, at *9 (D. Md. July 1, 2016) ("[A]llegations raised for the first time in response
to a motion to dismiss are not properly considered by the court."). Plaintiffs also argue that their
.complaint should be liberally constructed because they are prose. ECF 33, at 53. The Court has
liberally construed the complaint but again notes that liberal construction has its limits; the Court
"is not obliged to ferret through-a [c]omplaint, searching for viable claims," Wynn-Bey v. Talley,
19
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Civ. No. RWT-12-3121, 2012 WL 5986967, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 28, 2012), and it will not do so
here. Plaintiffs' claims ~gainst Lake Village ·are dismissed.
D. 	RentGrow and Equifax
Review of the record reveals that Plaintiffs have failed to properly serve RentGrow and
Equifax. Instead of serving the original complaint on RentGrow's resident agent, CSC-Lawyers
Incorporating Service Company, 7 St. Paul Street, Suite 820, Baltimore, Maryland 21202,7	' 	. 	.
Plaintiffs instructed the U.S. Marshals to serve RentGrow at "400 5th Avenue, Waltham, MA
02451." See ECF 11, at 1. The signature on the certified mail "green card" showing delivery is
illegible, so it is unclear who accepted service of the amended complaint at the address provided.
See id. at 2. 	Plaintiffs also filed a "stipulation to extend time for defendant RentGrow, Inc. to
respond to complaint" on July 1, 2025, agree_ing to extend RentGrow's response deadline to July
18, 2025. 	ECF 15, at 1. 	However, RentGrow never responded to the original complaint, and
Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on July 28, 2025. 	See ECF 21. 	Plaintiffs never served
RentGrowwith the amended complaint. See-ECF 21-1, at 1. (including only a proposed summons
for Equifax).
As noted, Plaintiffs added Equifax as a Defendant to the amended complaint. ECF 21, at·
1. And although Plaintiffs attached a proposed summons to the filing, it is incorrectly addressed
to "2605 York Rd, Suite 201, Lutherville, Timonium, MD, 21093," ECF 21-1, at 1, instead ofto
Equifax's resident agent, CSC- Lawyers Incorporating Service Company, 7 St. Paul Street, Suite·
820, Baltimore, MD 21202. 8 Further, despite the Court's previous instruction that a U.S. Marshal
'
7 	Maryland 	SDAT, 	Business 	Entity 	Search,-
https ://egov .maryland. gov/businessexpress/entity search (https ://perma.cc/KU9H-V CD BJ.
;
8 	Maryland 	SDAT, 	Business 	Entity 	Search,
https :/I egov. maryland. gov/businessexpress/entitysearch [https://perma.cc/ZH8L-NXZB J.
20
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form is required for service, Plaintiffs failed to attach the form to the amended complaint. 	See
ECF 21-1, at 1. As a result, Equifax was never served with the amended complaint or apprised of
the action.
Ordinarily, the Court could order Plaintiffs to show cause why the claims against
RentGrow and Equifax should not be dismissed for insufficient service of process of the amended
complaint. But doing so would be an exercise in futility because the amended complaint fails to
state a claim against them. The amended complaint contains two allegations relating to RentGrow
and Equifax, namely that their "[f]ai!ure to verify credit and eviction information prior to housing
·denial violates FCRA obligations," ECF 21, at 3 ,r 8, and that "RentGrow and Equifax, by virtue
of maintaining and disseminating harmful credit information, contributed significantly to Plaintiff
Bolima Tafah's inability to secure stable employment and housing," id at 23. As best the Court
·can tell, these factual allegations appear to correspond with Plaintiffs' claims under§ 1681e(b) or
§ 1681i(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). 	See id at 10 ("Denial of housing post-
eviction based on credit report"), at 11 ("Failure to investigate disputed report").
Section 1681 e(b) of the FCRA provides that "[ w]henever a consumer reporting agency
prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates." A consumer
-reporting agency violates§ 1681e(b) if"(!) the consumer report contains inaccurate information
and (2) the reporting agency did not follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy." Dalton v. Cap. Associated Ind., Inc., 257 F.3d 409,415 (4th Cir. 2001).
Section 168li(a)(l)(A) requires that, "if the completeness or accuracy of any item of
information contained in a consumer's file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the
consumer" and the consumer notifies the agency, the agency shall "conduct a reasonable
21
Case 1:25-cv-01408-BAH Document 41 Filed 01/16/26 Page 21 of 25

reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current
status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file" within 30 days ofreceiving the
' 	'
notice. 	"A claim under § 168li requires showing that the [credit reporting agency] failed to_
respond or conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the disputed items." Jackson v. Warning, Civ.
No. PJM-15-1233, 2016 WL 7228866, at •3· (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2016) (internal citation omitted).
However, "[t]he mere failure of a [credit reporting agency] to delete information does not raise a
' 	'
claim under§ 168li," as the statute "only requires the deletion of information if the reinvestigation
reveals that the information is 'inaccurate or-incomplete or cannot be verified."' Id (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 168li(a)(5)(A)).
To support either claim under the FCRA "a plaintiff must demonstrate that the consumer
report prepared by the credit reporting agency contains inaccurate information." 	Johnson v.
Experian Info. Sols., Inc;., Civ. No. PWG-15-558, 2015 WL 7769502, at *8 (D. Md. Nov. 17, 2015)
(collecting cases), qff'd, 670 F. App'x 778 (4th Cir. 2016). 	Although Plaintiffs assert that the
credit information was "harmful," ECF 21, at 23, they do not contend that it was inaccurate or
provide any facts detailing purported inaccuracies. See Brown v. Experian Credit Reporting, No.
JKB-12-2048, 2012 WL 6615005, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 17, 2012) ("In order to state a claim for
failure to comply with § 1681 e(b), Plaintiff m1;1st allege that a consumer report contained inaccurate
information. The same is true of§ 1681i(a)." (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs also do not allege that
they disputed information in their credit reports, nor do they state that RentGrow or Equifax failed°
'
to follow reasonable procedures. 	Plaintiffs' two conclusory assertions are not enough to sustain
their FCRA claims against RentGrow and Equifax.
Given that Plaintiffs have failed to serve RentGrow and Equifax despite the Court's explicit'
instructions on how to do so, and noting that they have failed to state a claim against them,
22
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dismissal is warranted as to both Defendants. 	See Lee v. Meyers, Civ. No. ELH-21-1589, 2022
WL 252960, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2022) (declining to provide pro se plaintiffs with another
opportunity to effect service because an extension would be futile since the complaint failed to
state a claim); see also Mallory v. Verizon, No. 2:12-CV-02366 KM MAH, 2015 WL 404369, at
*3 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2015) (dismissing complaint instead of"work[ing] out a cooperative procedure
to effect service of process" because it "patently fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and, even if properly served, [wa]s subject to immediate dismissal").
E. 	Lake Village's Motion to Strike (ECF 40)
Lake Village moves to strike Plaintiffs' "Exhibit Claims Test," ECF 38, and "[r]eply in
further support to deny defendants' motion to dismiss amended complaint ECF 21," ECF 38-1, as
improper surreplies. ECF 40. Because Plaintiffs characterize the filing as one made "in response
'to Defendant's Reply," ECF 38-1, at 3, the Court will construe it as a surreply. 	Hall v. Prince
George's Cnty., 189 F. Supp. 2d 320,321 n.1 (D. Md. 2002) ("The court construes the document
to be a surreply due to its explicit reference to the Defendant's Reply memorandum .... "). 	A
·surreply may not be filed without leave of court. 	Loe. R. 105.2(a) (D. Md. 2025) ("Unless
otherwise ordered by the Court, surreply memoranda are not permitted to be filed."). 	Plaintiffs
did not request to file a surreply, nor have they specified what new matters they needed to address
-from Lake Village's reply, and instead re-assert that they have stated plausible claims against Lake
Village. Cf Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 85 F. App'x 960
(4th Cir. 2004) ("Surreplies may be permitted when the moving party would be unable to contest
.matters presented to the court for the first time in the opposing party's reply."). 	Nevertheless,
since the amended complaint is being dismissed in its entirety, the Court will deny as moot Lake
Village's motion to strike. 	Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty., 982 F. Supp. 2d 641,
23
Case 1:25-cv-01408-BAH Document 41 Filed 01/16/26 Page 23 of 25

664 (D. Md. 2013) (denying as moot plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a surreply as well as
defendants' motion to ~trike surreply and commenting that "surreplies are disfavored in this
District and the surreply would not alter the Court's analysis") (alteration omitted) (quoting Chubb
& Son v. C & C Complete Servs., LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679 (D. Md. 2013)), ajf'd, 605 F.
App'x 159 (4th Cir. 2015).
III. 	CASE CITATION ISSUES
The Court also observes that Plaintiffs cite to numerous cases in the amended complaint,
see ECF 21, at 2-9, many of which appear to be inaccurate or non-existent. For example, Plaintiffs
'
cite to "Bourne v. GatliffBuilding Co., 380 F.3d 848 (5th Cir. 2004)," a case that does not appear
to exist. Id. at 312. The closest match to this reporter information is Matchett v. Dretke, 380 F.3d
844 (5th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff also cites to "Corey v. Secretary ofHousing & Urban Dev., 719 F.2d
122 (5th Cir. 1983)," id. 15, and "White v. Olathe Housing Auth., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6029
(D. Kan: 1997)," id. 1,7, but the correct case names corresponding with the provided reporter
information are Baber v. Edman, 719 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983) and Shakman v. Democratic Org.,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6029 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 	Given that the Court is dismissing the amended
complaint, it will not require Plaintiffs to explain these citation issues. 	However, Plaintiffs are·
cautioned that courts have "routinely threatened to impose sanctions on litigants proceeding pro
se who cite AI-hallucinated or otherwise nonexistent legal authority to support their positions,"
I
Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Skinger, No. 3:24CV874, 2025 WL 1559593, at *10 (E.D. Va. June 2;
2025) (collecting cases), and Plaintiffs may face consequences if they continue to cite to non-
existent cases in future litigation.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement, ECF 34, is DENIED,
Orchards' motion to dismiss, ECF 28, is GRANTED, Lake Village's motion to dismiss, ECF 24,
24
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is GRANTED, Lake Village's motion to strike, ECF 40, is DENIED as moot, and the amended
complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to all four Defendants.
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: January 16, 2026 	Isl
Brendan A. Burson
United States District Judge
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