Bergdoll v. Bisignano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
MDD_DRMChambers@mdd.uscourts.gov
(410) 962-7770
March 3, 2026
LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD
Re: Dianna B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner, Social Security Administration1
Civil No. 24-3778-DRM
Dear Counsel:
On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff Dianna B. (“Plaintiff”) petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s (“SSA’s” or “Commissioner’s” or “Defendant’s”) final decision
to deny Plaintiff’s claim for Social Security benefits. ECF No. 1. This case was then referred to
me with the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Loc. R. 301. I have considered the record in
this case and the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 9, 12, 14, 15. I find that no hearing is necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6. The Court must uphold the decision of the SSA if it is supported by substantial
evidence and if the SSA employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will REMAND the
Commissioner’s decision. This letter explains why.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Title II application for Disability Insurance Benefit benefits on May 21,
2021, alleging a disability onset of October 7, 2020. Tr. 24. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially
and on reconsideration. Tr. 92-97. On June 7, 2024, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a
hearing. Tr. 21-44. Following the hearing, on June 26, 2024, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act2 during the relevant time frame. Tr. 21-
44. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, Tr. 1-7, so the ALJ’s decision
constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the SSA, Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).
1 Plaintiff filed this case against Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
on December 31, 2024. ECF No. 1. Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security
on May 7, 2025. Accordingly, Commissioner Bisignano has been substituted as this case’s
Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
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Dianna B. v. Frank Bisignano
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II. THE ALJ’S DECISION
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The ALJ is required to evaluate a claimant’s disability determination
using a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. “Under this
process, an ALJ evaluates, in sequence, whether the claimant: ‘(1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to [their] past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.’” Kiser v. Saul, 821 F. App’x 211, 212
(4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, at step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since October 7, 2020, the alleged onset date.” Tr. 27. At step two, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
status-post surgical intervention including L5-S1 microdiscectomy and medial facetectomy;
lumbar radiculopathy; degenerative disc disease of the cervical and thoracic spine; iron deficiency
anemia; hypothyroidism and obesity.” Tr. 27. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity
of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. 29. The ALJ
also determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), except the claimant
can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. The
claimant requires an assistive device (a cane) to assist with walking and
balancing and would require the option to change positions every 45 minutes to
one hour, as needed.
Tr. 30.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work but could
perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy such as phone quotation
clerk, call-out operator, parimutuel ticket checker, and film touch-up inspector. Tr. 34-35.
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 36.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application
of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). “The
findings of the [ALJ] . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .
. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept
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as sufficient to support a particular conclusion.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1966). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. In
conducting the “substantial evidence” inquiry, my review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed
the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained their findings and rationale in crediting the
evidence. See, e.g., Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439–40 (4th Cir. 1997);
DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Judicial review of an administrative
decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the [ALJ].”).
IV. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence
because the RFC assessment violates Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184
(July 2, 1996). ECF No. 12 at 7. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ expressed the RFC
in terms of “sedentary work” without first conducting the required function-by-function analysis
of exertional abilities, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing and pulling, or
non-exertional abilities, such as reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling. ECF No. 12 at 12.
Plaintiff argues that this error is significant because the ALJ acknowledged limitations inconsistent
with the full range of sedentary work, including the need to change positions every 45 to 60
minutes. Id. Plaintiff cites Dowling v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir.
2021) to argue that the ALJ is required to evaluate each relevant function explicitly. Id. Plaintiff
argues that, as in Dowling, the ALJ here acknowledged evidence of sitting limitations, such as the
need to change positions every 45 to 60 minutes but never performed a function-specific analysis
or explained how the evidence factored into the RFC. Id.
In response, the Commissioner contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion of non-disability and that the ALJ properly evaluated the record. ECF No. 14 at 6.
According to the Commissioner, the RFC is supported by the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s
treatment history, clinical findings, subjective reports, and the prior administrative medical
opinions, and Plaintiff failed to present evidence showing greater sitting limitations. ECF No 14
at 7. The Commissioner further contends that Dowling does not require remand here because the
ALJ’s decision, read as a whole, provides sufficient reasoning under SSR 96-8p. ECF No. 14 at
10. The ALJ found Plaintiff capable of sedentary work with a cane and a sit/stand option, and
nothing in the record supports additional restrictions. ECF No. 14 at 12.
As this Court explained in Elizabeth T. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-1046-BAH, 2022 WL 2649055
(D. Md. July 8, 2022):
The RFC “assessment must first identify the individual’s functional limitations
or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-
function basis....” [SSR] 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1. “Only after that may
[the RFC] be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light,
medium, heavy, and very heavy.” Id. “In performing this assessment, an ALJ
‘must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and
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nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).’” Woods v. Berryhill,
888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636
(4th Cir. 2015)). “In other words, the ALJ must both identify evidence that
supports [their] conclusion and ‘build an accurate and logical bridge from [that]
evidence to [their] conclusion.’” Id. (citing Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189
(4th Cir. 2016)).
2022 WL 2649055, at *2.
Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work without narratively
discussing the extent to which Plaintiff can sit. Tr. 30-34. See Nicole C. v. Kijakazi, No. JMC-22-
02123, 2023 WL 4027481, at *5 (D. Md. June 15, 2023) (remanding where ALJ “prematurely
concluded that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work without narratively discussing the extent
that Plaintiff can sit” and thereby “failed to perform a proper function-by-function analysis
regarding Plaintiff's ability to perform the work functions relevant to sedentary work.”)
The regulations define sedentary work as follows:
Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain
amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.
Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (emphasis added).
Although the medical record consistently reflects that Plaintiff has a sitting limitation, see
Tr. 96, 101, 318, 438, and the ALJ included such a limitation in his conclusion, Tr. 30, the ALJ
never conducted a discrete, function-specific assessment of the Plaintiff’s sitting capacity. In
Dowling, the Fourth Circuit held that an ALJ errs when they fail to separately evaluate how a
claimant’s sitting limitations impact their ability to perform sedentary work, and when the decision
contains no narrative discussion supporting the absence of such a limitation. Specifically, the court
found that “[t]he ALJ never explicitly discussed the extent of the claimant’s sitting limitation and
only mentioned it ‘when rattling off a laundry list of her many impairments and functional
restrictions.’” Jeffrey B. v. Saul, No. GLS-20-1090, 2021 WL 797920, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2021)
(quoting Dowling, 986 F.3d at 388). Therefore, Dowling, and the subsequent line of cases, “stands
for the proposition that where an ALJ finds multiple RFC limitations, each one must be
accompanied by a narrative discussion with a separate analysis citing specific evidence that
explains how it supports each of the ALJ’s conclusions.” Id. See also Emily W. v. Kijakazi, No.
AAQ-21-01194, 2022 WL 2681158, at *4 (D. Md. July 12, 2022); Stephanie S. v. Kijakazi, No.
CDA-23-0292, 2023 WL 8358926, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2023).
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Dianna B. v. Frank Bisignano
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Similarly, the courts in both Nicole C., 2023 WL 4027481, at *4, and Henderson v.
Kijakazi, No. AAQ-20-3346, 2022 WL 1555408, at *2-*3 (D. Md. May 17, 2022), concluded that
the ALJs in those cases failed to conduct the proper function-by-function assessment because their
decisions, like the ALJ decision in the instant case, contained language clearly indicating the use
of a symptom-based analysis.
Indeed, the relevant language in the instant case:
Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could
reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms has
been shown, the undersigned must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which
they limit the claimant’s work-related activities[,]
and
[T]he claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record,
Tr. 30, 32, is remarkably similar to that used in Nicole C3 and Henderson4, and appears to be
derived in part from SSR 16-3p, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims,
2017 WL 5180304, at *3 (republished Oct. 25, 2017). The Court similarly concludes that the ALJ
here conducted a purely symptom-based assessment, as opposed to the requisite function-by-
function assessment.
The ALJ here referenced Plaintiff’s sitting difficulties only in passing while summarizing
her impairments, without analyzing how those problems impact her ability to perform sedentary
3 “‘Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be
expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms has been shown, the undersigned must
evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine
the extent to which they limit the claimant’s work-related activities,’ [and] ‘the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons
explained in this decision.’” Nicole C., 2023 WL 4027481, at *4.
4 “‘[O]nce an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to
produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms has been shown, the undersigned must evaluate
the intensity persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent
to which they limit the claimant’s work-related activities,’ [and] ‘the claimant’s statement
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.’” Henderson, 2022 WL
1555408, at *3.
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work or providing the narrative explanation required by SSR 96-8p and Thomas v. Berryhill, 916
F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019). Tr. 30-31. As in Dowling, this “grouping” of sitting complaints with
other impairments falls short of the mandated function-by-function analysis and leaves the Court
without a basis to review whether the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s capacity to sit on a
regular and continuing basis. Tr. 30-34. Without a function-specific assessment, the Court cannot
meaningfully review the RFC finding, and remand is therefore appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the SSA’s
judgment is REMANDED.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be docketed as a Memorandum Opinion.
A separate implementing Order follows.
Sincerely,
/s/
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
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