Johnson v. Lewis et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JERROD JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CO II LORKE, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.: PX-24-1316
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Jerrod Johnson, an inmate at North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”), brings this
civil rights action against Sergeant Garret Lewis, Correctional Officer Patrick Lark, and
Correctional Officer Vincent Lark,1 for assaulting him and subsequently failing to provide medical
care while he was housed at Western Correctional Institution (“WCI”). ECF No. 1.2 On April 16,
2025, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment to be
granted in their favor. 	ECF No. 18. 	The Court notified Johnson of his right to respond to the
motion, and that his failure to respond may result in the Court deciding the motion without his
further input. See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975); ECF No. 21. Johnson has
not responded and the deadline for doing so has long passed. For the reasons discussed below,
Defendants’ motion is granted.
Johnson alleges that on September 21, 2022, after losing consciousness because of
uncontrolled diabetes, responding officers assaulted him, injuring his wrist and leg. ECF No. 1 at
4. Despite his complaints, Johnson did not receive medical care for two days. Id. Johnson also
1 The Clerk shall be directed to amend the docket to reflect Defendants’ full and correct names.
2 The copy of the Complaint received by the Clerk’s office was difficult to read; therefore, staff made a second copy
of the Complaint in a manner that made the text darker and thus more legible. See ECF No. 1-2.
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asserts that he exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing suit but offers no specifics and
does not append any proof of exhaustion. Id. at 5.
Defendants now urge the Court to dismiss the action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. See Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 623 n.3 (4th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases); Germain v.
Shearin, 653 F. App’x 231, 234–35 (4th Cir. 2016) (“mandatory” dismissal for failure to exhaust
requires dismissal without prejudice). The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Although exhaustion
under § 1997e is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, a plaintiff must nonetheless exhaust before the
court will hear the claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007); Anderson v. XYZ Corr.
Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.2d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005). Because the Court may not consider an
unexhausted claim, exhaustion prior to federal suit is mandatory. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639
(2016). A court ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. Id. (citing Miller v. French, 530
U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (explaining “[t]he mandatory ‘shall’. . . normally creates an obligation
impervious to judicial discretion”)).
Exhaustion requires an inmate to complete “the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 88, 93 (2006). At the same time, the Court must ensure that “any defects in exhaustion were
not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478
F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate
need only exhaust “available” remedies. 	42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Ross, 578 U.S. at 636. 	An
administrative remedy is not “available” where the prisoner, “through no fault of his own, was
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prevented from availing himself of it.” 	Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing Aquilar-Avellaveda, 478 F.3d at 1225); Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684.
The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”) provides
state inmates an “inmate complaint resolution” process. See generally Md. Code Ann. (2008 Repl.
Vol.), Corr. Servs. (“C.S.”), § 10-201 et seq.; Md. Code Regs. (“COMAR”) 12.07.01.01B(1)
(defining ARP). The process requires that the inmate first file what is known as an “ARP” with
the facility’s “managing official” within 30 days from the date of occurrence or discovery of the
claimed violation, whichever is later. See COMAR 12.02.28.05(D)(1) & 12.02.28.09(B).
If the ARP is denied, the inmate must appeal the denial to the Commissioner of Correction.
COMAR 12.02.28.05(D)(1) & 12.02.28.14(B)(5). If the Commissioner denies the inmate relief,
the inmate next must file a grievance with the Incarcerated Individual Grievance Office (“IIGO”).
C.S. § 10-206(a); C.S. § 10-210; COMAR 12.02.28.18. 	If the grievance is determined to be
“wholly lacking in merit on its face,” the IIGO may dismiss it without a hearing. C.S. § 10-
207(b)(1); see also COMAR 12.07.01.06(B). An order of dismissal constitutes the final decision
of the Secretary of DPSCS for purposes of judicial review. 	C.S. § 10-207(b)(2)(ii). 	Because
failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, the Defendants must demonstrate that the inmate failed
to exhaust all available remedies. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215–16 (2007); Custis v. Davis,
851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017).
Defendants have submitted declarations of proper records custodians who attest that no
ARPs or any appeals for any ARPs exist pertaining to this incident. See ECF Nos. 18-4, 18-5, 18-
6. Johnson, for his part, has not responded to the motion, despite having been placed on notice of
his right to be heard. Accordingly, nothing supports that Johnson ever exhausted his administrative
remedies prior to filing suit. The Complaint must, therefore, be dismissed without prejudice.
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Order, it is this 20 th day of January, 2026, by
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the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that:
1. 	The Clerk SHALL AMEND the docket to reflect the correct names of Defendants
Garret Lewis, Patrick Lark, and Vincent Lark;
2. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 18) IS GRANTED;
3. 	The Complaint IS DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies;
4. 	Defendants’ Motion to Seal (ECF No. 20) IS GRANTED;
5. 	The Clerk SHALL SEAL the documents at ECF No. 19;
6. 	The Clerk SHALL PROVIDE a copy of this Memorandum Order to Johnson and to
counsel; and
7. 	The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.
_____________/S/____________
Paula Xinis
United States District Judge
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