USA v. Porter

1:23-cr-00154MddDec 12, 2025

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JERMAINE PORTER,
Defendant
Case No. 23-cr-00154-ABA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On September 24, 2025, a jury unanimously found Mr. Jermaine Porter guilty of
one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a prohibited person in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mr. Porter has filed a combined Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and for a New Trial under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33. For
the following reasons, that motion will be denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 27, 2023, Mr. Porter was charged by indictment with one count of
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). ECF No. 1. That charge arose from a March 5, 2023 traffic stop of a vehicle
in which Mr. Porter was a passenger, during which Baltimore Police Department
(“BPD”) officers recovered a loaded firearm. On January 13, 2025, a jury trial
commenced before Judge Richard D. Bennett. ECF No. 95. The jurors were unable to
reach a unanimous verdict during that trial. Judge Bennett declared a mistrial on
January 15, 2025. ECF No. 97.
On Monday, September 15, 2025, a retrial commenced, presided over by the
undersigned. ECF No. 177. On the first day of trial, the parties selected a jury and gave
opening statements. 	Id. During voir dire, the Court informed the jury that the trial was
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expected to proceed from Monday, September 15 through Wednesday, September 17
and Friday, September 19, and that proceedings would not be held on Thursday,
September 18.
On Tuesday, September 16, 2025, the Government presented its case with
testimony by four witnesses (the driver of the vehicle, Deonate Cooper, and three BPD
officers: Detective Reynardo Gomez, Sergeant Jorge Bernardez-Ruiz, and Officer Joshua
Kelly), introduced body camera footage from the traffic stop, and introduced
stipulations into the record. ECF No. 178. In the body camera footage, Mr. Porter, who
had recently been shot and was recovering from surgery, is seen sitting on a thin
medical pillow. The gun at issue was recovered from the passenger seat where Mr.
Porter was seated, between the car seat and the medical pillow. The body camera
footage shows that Mr. Porter, after requesting multiple times to not have to get out of
the car, showed no surprise when the officer pulled the firearm from under Mr. Porter.
After the Government rested, Mr. Porter made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), which the Court denied.
Mr. Porter called two witnesses on September 16, 2025 (Mr. Porter’s mother,
Andrea Hartz; and Sean Mayberry) and one witness on September 17, 2025 (Dr. Ovais
Inamullah, a neurologist). ECF Nos. 178 & 179. Upon resting his case, Mr. Porter
renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, on which the Court reserved decision.
ECF No. 179. The Court then gave instructions to the jury, and the parties gave closing
arguments. Following closing arguments, one of the final instructions to the jury
directed that “no member of the jury should communicate with the court by any means
other than a signed writing” and instructed them that they “may not reveal to any
person—even to the court—how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on the
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question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, until after you have reached a
unanimous verdict.” The jury began deliberations that afternoon (Wednesday,
September 17). 	Id. The jury did not deliberate on Thursday, September 18, 2025,
resuming its deliberations on Friday, September 19, 2025.
On Friday, September 19, 2025 at 3:42 p.m., after the jury had been deliberating
most of the day, the Court sent a note to the jury stating: “Dear jurors, Thank you for
your continued service in this case. In order that I may direct the courthouse staff,
please respond with a note stating how much longer you would like to continue
deliberating today, before being dismissed for the weekend to return on Monday.” ECF
No. 188. This was the first note between the Court and the jury in this case. At 3:56 p.m.,
the jury sent a note back stating: “Dear Judge, We would request to talk/think until
4:15pm today, if at that point we will either have a verdict or will come back Monday.”
ECF No. 189. At 4:25 p.m., the jury sent another note stating: “No decision made as of
yet. We will be back Monday.” ECF No. 190. Therefore, the jury was excused at
approximately 4:30 p.m. on September 19 to return on Monday, September 22, 2025.
The jury returned on Monday, September 22, 2025, and, at approximately 11:37
a.m., the Court sent a note to the jury stating: “Thank you for your continued service in
this case. The Rosh Hashanah holiday starts this evening. Will any of you be observing
the holiday? If so, I will plan to dismiss the jury around 3:30 p.m. today, to reconvene to
continue deliberations on Wednesday.” ECF No. 191. At 11:45 a.m., the jury responded:
“Dear Judge, We are close to verdict but have 1 holdout. We are still discussing the
points. A couple of jurors mentioned that they are observing the holiday tomorrow.”
ECF No. 192. The information about how the jury was divided was not only unsolicited,
but contradicted the Court’s instruction that the jury “not reveal to any person—even to
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the court—how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on the question of the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.”
At 3:25 p.m., the Court sent a note stating:
Dear jurors, Thank you for your continued service in this case.
I understand the jury has not yet reached a verdict, and that
some of you observe the Rosh Hashana holiday. Accordingly,
you are dismissed for the day, to return on Wednesday at 9:30
a.m. to resume your deliberations. As always, please make
sure not to discuss the case with anyone (other than when all
your fellow jurors are assembled in the jury room) and not to
conduct any independent research about the case.
ECF No. 193. The jury did not sit on Tuesday, September 23, to allow observation of the
holiday, and returned for deliberations on Wednesday, September 24, 2025. At 1:05
p.m. on Wednesday, the jury sent a note stating: “We have reached a verdict.” ECF No.
194. Once the Court reconvened with all parties and counsel present, the foreperson
informed the Court that the jury had reached a consensus and unanimously found Mr.
Porter guilty.
On October 2, 2025, Mr. Porter filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and for a
new trial. ECF No. 203. On October 16, 2025, the government filed a response in
opposition. ECF No. 206.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 29: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a court may set aside a guilty
verdict returned by a jury and enter an acquittal if, “as a matter of law[,] the
government’s evidence is insufficient ‘to establish factual guilt’ on the charges in the
indictment.” 	United States v. Alvarez, 351 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Smalis
v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986); 	citing 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 (a), (c)). “The
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jury’s verdict must be accepted if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 	United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989
F.2d 1390, 1402 (4th Cir. 1993) (hereinafter, “United Med.”) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); 	United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1983)
(citing 	Jackson)); 	United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
Accordingly, the Court must affirm a guilty verdict “if there is substantial evidence of
each element of each offense.” 	United Med., 989 F.2d at 1402 (citing Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)).
“[I]n the context of a criminal action, substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion
of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this standard of review,
[the Court] must remain cognizant of the fact that ‘[t]he jury, not the reviewing court,
weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence
presented, and if the evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury
decides which interpretation to believe.’” 	United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th
Cir. 1996) (hereinafter, “Burgos I”) (citing 	United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 914, 917 (4th
Cir. 1994); 	United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994)) (internal citations
omitted). Therefore, in the event of a conviction, the Court “must assume that the jury
resolved all contradictions . . . in favor of the Government.” 	United States v. Barronette,
46 F.4th 177, 205 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting 	United Med., 989 F.2d at 1402) (finding that
the uncorroborated testimony of one witness was sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction).
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B. 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 33: New Trial
“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a
new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). “In reviewing the
sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, a guilty verdict must be upheld if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the prosecution, to support it.”
United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). The Court must exercise its discretion in determining
whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. 	Id. But “a court should
exercise its discretion to grant a new trial sparingly, and [] it should do so only when the
evidence weighs heavily against the verdict.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	United States v. Wilson, 118
F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir. 1997); 	United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1486 (4th Cir.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	See also United States v. Ali, 991 F.3d 561,
570 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a); 	United States v. Palin, 874 F.3d 418,
423 (4th Cir. 2017)) (“Trial courts may vacate convictions ‘and grant a new trial if the
interest of justice so requires.’ However, these are highly disfavored motions that a court
should grant only ‘sparingly.’”) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Mr. Porter’s jury coercion claim
Mr. Porter first argues that given the length of time that the jury deliberated, and
the Court’s awareness that there was an 11-1 split, the sole holdout juror likely felt
coerced to change their vote. ECF No. 203 at 5–6. “Any criminal defendant . . . being
tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.” 	Lowenfield v. Phelps,
484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988). The Court must evaluate a motion regarding jury coercion “in
its context and under all the circumstances” to determine whether any instructions by
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the Court had a coercive effect on the jury. 	Id. 	at 237 (quoting Jenkins v. United States,
380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965)); 	United States v. Taylor, 19 F. App’x 62, 65 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing 	Jenkins).1 	For example, if a jury returns a verdict soon after receiving
supplemental instruction, this suggests the possibility of coercion but is not dispositive.
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 (citing 	United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 462 (1978)).
In 	Jenkins, the Supreme Court held that the trial court’s jury instructions had a
coercive effect where the jury had sent a note advising the judge that it was unable to
agree upon a verdict “because of insufficient evidence” and the judge told the jury, “you
have got to reach a decision in this case.” 	Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446. In 	Brasfield v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge’s inquiry into how the jury
was divided when they had sent a note stating that deliberations had stalled had a
coercive effect. 272 U.S. 448, 448–50 (1926); 	accord Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 239
(“[T]he inquiry into the jury’s numerical division necessitated reversal because it was
generally coercive and almost always brought to bear ‘in some degree, serious although
not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury.’”).
However, in 	Lowenfield, the Supreme Court held that a trial court’s polling of the
jury regarding whether further deliberations might assist them in returning a verdict
1 	Mr. Porter also relies upon 	United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1995)
(hereinafter, “Burgos II”) to argue that, where the Court is aware of the jury split, it
must evaluate a claim of jury coercion from the perspective of a juror in the minority.
See 	ECF No. 203 at 5. However, 	Burgos II 	specifically held that this rule applies to the
evaluation of an 	Allen 	charge, which the Court did not give in this case; therefore, the
Court concludes that that rule does not apply here. To any extent that it does apply, the
Court concludes that Mr. Porter has not shown any entitlement to a new trial on that
basis either.
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after deliberation had stalled was not coercive as it was not an inquiry into the jury’s
division on the verdict. 484 U.S. at 239–40. In 	Taylor, after four hours of deliberations
the jury sent a note asking what verdicts to write if they were not unanimous, to which
the judge responded,
The jury cannot reach a verdict unless it is unanimous; in
other words, you cannot find the defendant guilty and you
cannot 	find 	the 	defendant 	not 	guilty 	unless 	you 	are
unanimous 	in 	your 	decision. 	So 	you 	need 	to 	work 	as
vigorously as you can as a jury to see whether or not without
violence to your individual judgments of the case you can
reach a unanimous decision on any one or all four of the
counts.
19 F. App’x at 65. After another hour of deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating that
they were at an impasse as to three of the four counts. 	Id. The judge called the jury back
to ask if there was a unanimous verdict as to count one, to which the foreperson stated
that the jury had unanimously found the defendant guilty of count one but could not
reach a unanimous verdict as to the remaining counts. 	Id. The Fourth Circuit in 	Taylor
held that the trial court’s handling of these inquiries from the jury did not have a
coercive effect as the jury reached a unanimous verdict as to one of the four counts. 	Id.
The facts in Mr. Porter’s case are more alike to 	Taylor, 19 F. App’x at 65, than any
of the other cited cases, as the Court here did not inquire into the division of the jury
(compare Brasfield, 272 U.S. at 450), the jurors never indicated that they were at an
impasse or unable to reach a decision (compare id.; Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446), and the
Court never stated or suggested to the jury that they were required to reach a verdict in
this case (compare Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446). Each of the notes sent by the Court were
for scheduling purposes only: on September 19, inquiring only into how much more
time the jury wanted to deliberate that day before being dismissed for the weekend (ECF
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No. 188); on the morning of September 22, inquiring whether any jurors observed the
Rosh Hashanah holiday so the Court could dismiss the jury early to reconvene the day
after the holiday (ECF No. 191); and on the afternoon of September 22, dismissing the
jury early for the holiday and instructing them to reconvene on September 24 (ECF No.
193). Although the jury did volunteer in their response to the Court’s note about
dismissing early for the holiday that there was “1 holdout,” the Court had not inquired
into the split of the jury and did not respond to the mention of the holdout in dismissing
the jury for the day. ECF No. 192. Similar to 	Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 239–40, the jury
indicated that the jurors believed that they would be able to make a decision with more
time as they were “still discussing the points.” ECF No. 192. Accordingly, there is no
indication that any of the notes between the Court and the jury had a coercive effect
such that Mr. Porter’s motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial should be granted.
B. 	Substantial evidence supported the jury’s guilty verdict
Mr. Porter next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
guilty verdict. ECF No. 203 at 3–4. That requires the Court to consider whether there
was substantial evidence presented at trial, which “is evidence that a reasonable finder
of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 	Burgos I, 94 F.3d at 863. In applying this standard of
review, a court “must remain cognizant of the fact that ‘[t]he jury, not the reviewing
court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence
presented, and if the evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury
decides which interpretation to believe.’” 	Id. 	(citing 	Smith, 29 F.3d at 917; 	Murphy, 35
F.3d at 148) (internal citations omitted).
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To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to prove
four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that prior to March 5, 2023, Mr. Porter
had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
year, his civil rights had not been restored, and he had knowledge of his felony status on
March 5, 2023; (2) that the firearm meets the definition of “firearm” in 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(3), and the eight rounds of ammunition loaded in that firearm meet the
definition of “ammunition” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(17); (3) that the firearm and the
ammunition traveled in or affected interstate commerce; and (4) that Mr. Porter knew
he was in possession of the firearm and ammunition on March 5, 2023. 	See 	18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(3). Mr. Porter stipulated to the first three elements; therefore, the only dispute at
trial was whether Mr. Porter knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition at issue.
See 	ECF No. 183 at 3.
In presenting its case, the government elicited testimony from four witnesses (the
driver of the car and three BPD officers), played body camera footage from BPD’s traffic
stop of Mr. Porter and the driver, showed still images from the body camera footage,
and read the stipulations onto the record. As noted above, the body camera footage
showed that Mr. Porter was sitting on the gun that was recovered, with only a thin
medical pillow between him and the gun. The footage also showed that the pillow was
designed with several holes in it, such that the gun would have been visible even with
the pillow sitting on top of it. The footage also showed that when Mr. Porter eventually
acceded to getting out of the car—for which he required assistance, given his recent
gunshot injury—he showed no surprise when the officer pulled the gun out from under
his thigh. The body camera footage, even standing alone, was sufficient for the jury to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the knowledge element was satisfied. But there
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was other evidence of Mr. Porter’s knowledge too, including testimony from Sergeant
Ruiz, who described, among other things, having observed Mr. Porter reaching down as
the officers followed the car before it stopped, and the testimony of the driver, whose
testimony the jury could reasonably have concluded supported the conclusion that the
gun was Mr. Porter’s. As the Court is not to consider the credibility of the evidence and
must instead view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the
consistent testimony by the government’s witnesses and the videographic evidence are
sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Mr. Porter knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition.
Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial was substantial such that Mr. Porter’s
motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial must be denied.
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
or a New Trial (ECF No. 203) is DENIED.
Date: 	December 12, 2025
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge
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