USA v. Thomas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
*
v. 	*
Crim. No. 04-232-BAH
EDUADO SHAWAN COUNTESS, 	*
Defendant. 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Eduado Shawan Countess (“Countess”)1 is currently incarcerated at FCI-Talladega and
serving a life sentence for the murder of Jesse Williams. 	Two of Countess’s co-defendants
accepted plea bargains and were sentenced to significantly shorter terms of imprisonment that have
now run their course. Countess and co-defendant Solothal Thomas (“Thomas”) went to trial. Both
were convicted and sentenced to serve multiple life sentences. 	In late December of 2024, Thomas
successfully petitioned to have his sentence reduced to thirty-five (35) years by Judge Blake. ECF
389.2 Countess, who is now represented by counsel, seeks compassionate release on similar
grounds as Thomas. See ECF 349 (pro se motion); ECF 401 (supplemental memorandum filed by
1 The record contains various spellings of Countess’s name. 	Counsel has explained that “Mr.
Countess has confirmed that his name is Eduardo Shawn Countess.” ECF 401, at 1 n.2. Because
no party has asked the Court to amend the case caption, which has contained the incorrect spelling
of Countess’s name for over two decades, the Court will not amend the spelling in the caption
beyond noting the misspelling.
2 The opinion addressing Thomas’s motion for compassionate release can also be found at United
States v. Thomas, Crim. No. CCB-04-232, 2024 WL 5239411 (D. Md. Dec. 27, 2024). 	Judge
Blake also granted in part and denied in part Thomas’s motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
See ECF 387; Thomas v. United States, Crim. No. CCB-04-232, 2024 WL 5239049 (D. Md. Dec.
27, 2024).
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counsel). 	The motion is fully briefed and ripe for a decision. 	See ECF 406 (Government’s
response in opposition); ECF 409 (Countess’s reply); ECF 412 (update filed by counsel for
Countess). 	No hearing on the motion is necessary. 	See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	For the
reasons noted below, the motion will be GRANTED and Countess’s sentence will be reduced to
a total of thirty-five (35) years. His term of supervised release will remain unchanged.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are thoroughly summarized in Countess’s supplement (ECF 401) and
the Government’s opposition (ECF 406). 	The Court assumes familiarity with these filings and
will not recount all the details of Countess’s case here. In short, in 2004, Countess was indicted
on six charges related to a murder for hire conspiracy. ECF 387, at 1. Countess and Thomas were
hired to kill Williams by Tyree Stewart, a Baltimore drug dealer who was upset with Williams for
Williams’s role in allegedly robbing Stewart’s mother’s home. Id. On October 2, 2001, Countess
and Thomas shot and killed Williams and later collected payment for their crime. Id. at 1–2. They
were subsequently arrested and charged federally in May of 2004. ECF 1 (indictment); ECF 11
(superseding indictment).
In 2006, a jury convicted Countess of one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and § 841(b)(1)(A) (Count One); one count of conspiracy
to use interstate commerce facilities in commission of murder-for-hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1958(a) (Count Two); one count of using interstate commerce facilities in commission of a
murder-for-hire, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (Count Three); one count of conspiracy
to possess a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count
Four); one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Five); and one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
violence resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (Count Six). See ECF 231 (judgment),
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at 1. 	Countess was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts One, Two,
Three, and Six, a concurrent term of 240 months’ imprisonment on Count Four, and a consecutive
sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment on Count Five. See id., at 3. Countess was also sentenced
to serve concurrent terms of supervised release totaling five (5) years. Id. at 4. The convictions
and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on direct
appeal. 	See ECF 373; United States v. Thomas, 282 F. App’x 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam). Countess subsequently filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. See ECF 285. That motion was denied in 2021. See ECF 293. A subsequent
motion to vacate, see ECF 320, was also denied, see ECF 338. 	On August 20, 2021, Countess
filed a motion seeking compassionate release. ECF 349.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A sentencing court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see United States v. Stavrakis, Crim. No. ELH-19-0160, 2025 WL 2897668,
at *13 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2025) (collecting cases).3 But, “the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow
exceptions,” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011), such as when the modification
is “expressly permitted by statute.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); see also United States v.
Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 495 (4th Cir. 2020).
One exception is 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which is commonly referred to as “compassionate
release” and was first enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 224(a), 98 Stat. 2030 (1984). See United States v. Osman, 2024 WL 3633573, at *3 (4th Cir.
Aug. 2, 2024) (per curiam) (stating that a motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is “commonly referred to
3 Much of this section is taken directly from Judge Hollander’s opinion in Stavrakis. Other sections
are borrowed from Judge Blake. Both esteemed jurists are meticulous in summarizing the relevant
law and any effort to improve on their exhaustive work would be futile. As such, much of this is
lifted word-for-word from their prior work, but with deep respect and admiration.
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as a motion for compassionate release”). Specifically, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) authorizes a court, in its
discretion, to reduce a defendant’s sentence if: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
such a reduction”; (2) “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) the Court has considered the factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
With the passage of the First Step Act (“FSA”) in 2018, see Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat.
5194, 5239 (2018), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Congress “broadened” the authority of
courts to grant sentencing modifications pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. 	In particular, the FSA
authorized a court to grant compassionate release “upon motion of the Director of [BOP], or upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal
a failure of the Bureau of Prisons [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse
of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility,” whichever
occurs first. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 283 (4th
Cir. 2020). As a result, a federal inmate may now file a motion for compassionate release directly
with the Court, as long as the inmate first exhausts administrative remedies. See McCoy, 981 F.3d
at 283.
Courts use a two-step process in evaluating motions for compassionate release under the
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) criteria mentioned above. See United States v. Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th 274,
279 (4th Cir. 2024). The first step consists of two parts, which “are supposed to work together.”
United States v. Burleigh, 145 F.4th 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2025). 	The Court “must determine: (1)
whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant . . . a [sentence] reduction; and (2) that such
a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
Stavrakis, 2025 WL 2897668, at *14 (citing United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167, 173 (4th Cir.
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2023)). When there was no applicable policy statement relating to compassionate release motions,
the Court had discretion to make its “own independent determination of what constitutes an
extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Burleigh, 145 F.4th at 548 (cleaned
up); see also United States v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 212, 215 (4th Cir. 2025) (explaining that, “[i]n
the absence of an applicable policy statement, district courts” have the power to “consider any
extraordinary and compelling reason for release” (cleaned up)). However, in 2023, the Sentencing
Commission issued guidance about what qualifies as extraordinary and compelling reasons to
grant relief to a defendant who moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 	The Fourth Circuit has held that “district courts deciding motions for
compassionate release after November 1, 2023, should apply § 1B1.13 when rendering their
decisions.” United States v. Crawley, 140 F.4th 165, 170 (4th Cir. 2025). Relevant here, Countess
asserts—as 	Thomas 	did 	before 	him—that 	a 	finding 	of 	“extraordinary 	and 	compelling”
circumstances is supported by the “‘broad catchall provision’ found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5)[.]”
ECF 409, at 2.4
4 That Guideline provision holds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist” when “[t]he
defendant presents any other circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered
by themselves . . . are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(5). Paragraphs (1) through (4) of that Guideline include medical circumstances, age,
family circumstances, and whether the defendant was victim of abuse while incarcerated. 	Id. at
(b)(1)–(4). 	Countess also notes that if the Court agreed with his argument that his life sentence
was, “in fact exceptionally long” compared to other sentences imposed for drug-related murders,
such a finding “is consistent with the spirit of [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.13(b)(6).” ECF 409, at 3. Section
1B1.13(b)(6) is entitled “unusually long sentence” and notes that
[i]f a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years
of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in
determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling
reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the
sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion
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If both parts of step one are satisfied, the Court then proceeds to the second step and
determines whether release is appropriate in light of the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) “to the extent those factors are applicable.” 	United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 831
(4th Cir. 2022).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Administrative Exhaustion
As noted, “[t]he threshold requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is non-jurisdictional and
satisfied if a defendant requests the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on their behalf and either
fully exhausts all administrative rights to appeal the Bureau’s decision or waits 30 days from the
date of their initial request to file a motion in the district court.” United States v. Muhammad, 16
F.4th 126, 131 (4th Cir. 2021). Countess submitted a request to the Warden of FCI Talladega on
July 8, 2021. ECF 349-1, at 1–6. He never heard back and far more than 30 days has now elapsed.
Therefore, Countess has exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A); see also ECF 406, at 10 (conceding that Countess satisfies the administrative
exhaustion requirements for filing a petition seeking compassionate release).
is 	filed, 	and 	after 	full 	consideration 	of 	the 	defendant’s 	individualized
circumstances.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Given that Countess identifies no “change in the law” applicable to his
case, this provision would not provide a literal “extraordinary and compelling reason” under the
Guidelines. 	However, the Court acknowledges Countess’s point that a reduction to reflect the
length of his original sentence compared to other sentences for similar conduct would be in keeping
with the “spirit” of § 1B1.13(b)(6). Countess also notes that his petition rests on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
(d), which recognizes that “rehabilitation of the defendant while serving [his] sentence may be
considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a
reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted.”
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B. 	Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances
Countess 	raises 	several 	grounds 	in 	support 	of 	his 	claim 	that 	he 	has 	established
extraordinary and compelling circumstances for compassionate release including “the disparity
between [his] sentence and the sentence imposed on his co-conspirators,” ECF 401, at 10, “the
disparity between [his] sentence and the sentence he would likely receive if he were sentenced
today,” id. at 15; and his “relative youthful age at the time of his criminal acts,” id. at 18. The
Court will address each in turn.
1. 	Sentencing Disparity Between Countess’s Sentences and Those of His Co-
Defendants
As Judge Blake observed in granting Thomas a sentencing reduction, “[a] sentencing
disparity may, in some circumstances, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant
compassionate release.” 	ECF 389, at 2 (citing United States v. Payton, Crim. No. PJM-06-341,
2021 WL 927631, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2021)). The disparity between the sentences of those
convicted in this case was well documented in the opinion granting Thomas a reduction in his
sentence. 	ECF 389, at 4–5. 	Thomas and Countess both received mandatory life sentences.
Thomas’s bother, Danta Thomas, and fellow co-defendant Linwood Smith also played a role in
the murder of Williams. Danta Thomas drove his brother and Countess to Williams’s home where
Thomas and Countess shot and killed Williams. Id. at 4. Danta Thomas received a sentence of 77
months of imprisonment. 	Id. Linwood Smith, who “was supposed to drive Mr. Thomas and
Countess to Williams’s home that morning, but [] overslept,” was sentenced to 64 months in
federal prison. Id. Of course, neither Linwood Smith nor Danta Thomas pulled the trigger to kill
Williams directly, but both played a role in his death. Both also pleaded guilty, and Danta Smith
testified for the prosecution at Countess and Thomas’s trial. See ECF 298, at 2; Thomas v. United
States, Civ. No. CCB-09-2461, 2013 WL 331337, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2013). Given their minor
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roles in the conspiracy relative to those of Thomas and Countess, and noting their prompt
acceptance of responsibility and guilty pleas, both Linwood Smith and Danta Thomas received
significantly lower sentences than others involved in the conspiracy. ECF 389, at 4 (citing United
States v. Morales-Vega, Crim. No. PJM-08-0051, 2021 WL 4864450, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 19,
2021)). Though some disparity is justified, the significant difference between a life sentence and
the sentences these co-conspirators received is notable.
Also of note are the relatively low sentences that Corey Smith and Tyree Stewart received
for their significant roles in the offense. Stewart, who “issued the contract” for Williams’s murder,
received a sentence of 83 months. Id. Smith, “who brokered the contract and hired Mr. Thomas
and Mr. Countess for $10,000,” was sentenced to 97 months. Id. Both pleaded guilty and both
testified for the Government at trial. See ECF 298, at 1; Thomas, 2013 WL 331337, at *1. As with
the other co-defendants, some disparity is justified given that these co-defendants testified and
spared the Government the expense of their own trial, but the sentences these co-conspirators
received “were dramatically shorter” than those imposed on Thomas and Countess. ECF 389, at
4.
The Court also cannot ignore the reduction in sentence that Thomas received just over a
year ago. As the Government notes in its response, Thomas and Countess were equally culpable
in Williams’s murder. ECF 406, at 3. And following the murder, “Countess, Thomas, and Danta
Smith met up with Stewart and Corey Smith, and collected the agreed-upon $10,000 payment from
Stewart for the murder.” Id. That two men who committed essentially the same crime are serving
sentences of different lengths is not, in and of itself, grounds for a reduction in sentence as the
practice of sentencing requires an “individualized assessment” that is “tailored to the particular
case at hand.” 	United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
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However, the record reflects that both Countess and Thomas were similarly situated in almost all
key respects and the current disparity in their sentences thus provides an extraordinary and
compelling reason weighing in favor of a reduction of Countess’s life sentence.
2. 	The Difference in Countess’s Sentence and Sentences Imposed in Other Cases
for Similar Conduct
As Judge Blake observed, “modern sentencing courts in this District ‘routinely impose
sentences within the thirty-year range’ for youthful defendants ‘involved in drug-related killings.’”
United States v. Ferebe, Crim. No. CCB-96-0401, 2023 WL 6809707, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 16, 2023)
(citing United States v. Williams, Crim. No. CCB-07-0402, 2021 WL 3725435, at *3 (D. Md. Aug.
23, 2021)). The median sentence for murder in this District is 300 months, and the national average
is even lower. 	Id.; see also ECF 401, at 17. 	Thus, a sentence of thirty-five years would still
“remain consistent with this precedent even [though Countess] continues to face a Guideline
sentence of life imprisonment today.” Ferebe, 2023 WL 6809707, at *3. As such, a “mandatory
life sentence, however imposed, constitutes a significant sentencing disparity when considering
how the modern criminal justice process” operates on defendants like Countess. 	See Mem. and
Order at 8, United States v. Linton, Crim. No. JKB-98-0258 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2021), ECF 471.5
5 Though three of Countess’s counts of conviction carried mandatory life sentences, “nothing in §
3582 prevents its application to mandatory life sentences.” 	ECF 389, at 2 (“[W]hile the
Government centrally contends that no reduction is appropriate in light of the still applicable
mandatory life sentence . . . Congress did not exempt mandatory life sentences from (a) relief
under the original language in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) or (b) the modifications to the exhaustion
requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A).” (quoting United States v. Johnson, Case No. 1:97-cr-314-AJT,
2023 WL 5049267, at *15 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2023))); see also United States v. Perez, No. 3:02CR7
(JBA), 2021 WL 837425, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2021) (collecting cases and noting that
“[a]lthough his life sentences are mandatory, the mandatory component does not bar relief under
the First Step Act”).
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3. 	Countess’s Age at the Time of the Offense, His Difficult Upbringing, and His
Rehabilitation
Like Thomas, Countess was twenty-five years old at the time he murdered Williams, see
ECF 401, at 19, and Judge Blake’s observations about Thomas’s age apply with equal force to
Countess. 	“[M]odern research . . . instructs that the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain that
makes it possible to exercise good judgment when presented with difficult life situations, does not
finish maturing until age 25.” ECF 389, at 5 (citing Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms,
Tobacco & Explosives, 5 F.4th 407, 476 (4th Cir. 2021), as amended (July 15, 2021), vacated as
moot, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021) (Wynn, J., dissenting)). 	As was the case with Thomas, the
difficult upbringing Countess endured and his relatively young age at the time of Williams’s
murder also support a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting a reduced
sentence. Id.
Countess has also taken significant steps to rehabilitate himself while in custody. Though
rehabilitation, standing alone, does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance,
it “may be considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what
extent a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d).
Countess received the highest average score on the GED test at USP Canaan. ECF 349-3, at 9.
He has become a solid Unicor contributor and certified operator of heavy machinery. Id. at 6. 	He
completed other courses while in custody, see, e.g., id. at 4 (CDL), at 5 (weight loss), and has
maintained a relatively clean disciplinary record, see ECF 406-2, at 1–2 (noting only minor
infractions in nearly 20 years of incarceration, with no infractions since late 2021). 	While
incarcerated, Countess suffered through the loss of his grandmother, ECF 349-4, at 3, as well as
the sudden loss of his son, see ECF 401-1, at 2.
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Countess’s upbringing was extraordinarily difficult. 	As his sister recounts in an email,
Countess was raised by a mother who was addicted to heroin. Id. His father was also addicted to
heroin. Id. Though his father was often in jail, Countess’s sister notes that when he was at home,
the home was marked by “physical, emotional, mental, and sexual abuse.” 	Id. 	Countess was
frequently beaten as a young man. Id. He and his siblings would go without basic necessities, and
Countess “would take the risk of sneaking out to get food for [the children left at home] when he
knew the adults weren’t home.” Id. Countess’s childhood homes were filled with drug abuse and
violence, as were the communities surrounding them. Id. That Countess continues to make strides
in his rehabilitation journey despite his challenging upbringing is, as it was in Thomas’s case,
“noteworthy.” ECF 389, at 7 (citing Johnson, 2023 WL 5049267, at *6). Plus, despite apparently
defiant and obstreperous conduct during trial, see ECF 401, at 3 n.6, Countess now shows remorse
for his criminal behavior. ECF 349-4, at 2. He notes that “there is not a single day that goes by
that [he does] not regret [his] actions.” Id. In sum, Countess has established “extraordinary and
compelling circumstances” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5).
C. 	Application of the Factors Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
As noted, the Court must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent
they are applicable” before reducing a defendant’s sentence for “extraordinary and compelling
reasons.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). These factors include (1) “the nature and circumstances of
the offense”; (2) “the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (3) the need for a sentence to
“provide just punishment,” “promote respect for the law,” “reflect the seriousness of the offense,”
deter crime, protect the public, and provide rehabilitative services; (4) the Guideline sentence; and
(5) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among” similarly situated defendants.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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Countess’s gravest offense of murder-for-hire is among the most serious offenses a
defendant can commit. 	It merits a stiff sentence. 	At the same time, in consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors, the record reflects that Countess’s upbring was extraordinarily difficult and he
was exposed to drug abuse, violence, and physical and emotional abuse as a child. He was thrust
into a life of lawlessness at a young age and committed the offenses at the heart of this case when
he was just twenty-five years old. With the benefit of time and after spending a significant portion
of his life behind bars, he appears to recognize the harm he has caused and has learned the valuable
lesson that “respect for others in paramount.” ECF 349-4, at 3. 	He is now fifty years old and has
obviously grown tremendously as a person while in custody. 	Simply put, given his extensive
family support and demonstrable personal growth in prison, the Court agrees with his sister that
Countess has proven “to be a better man than he was” twenty-five years ago when he murdered
Williams. 	ECF 401-1, at 2. 	Thus, it is clear to the Court that a life sentence is not needed to
protect the public from further crimes committed by Countess.
A reduced sentence of a length equal to Thomas’s will promote respect for the law and
provides for just punishment. Thirty-five years remains a staggering sentence, and one that serves
as a powerful deterrent. Moreover, it means that Countess still has a long time to go before he will
re-enter society. 	When he does, he will have reaped the benefit of additional programming in
custody and will be at an age where “recidivism becomes dramatically less likely, and the risk of
endangering the public correspondingly less acute.” United States v. Taylor, Crim. No. CCB-02-
0410-3, 2023 WL 4407593, at *6 (D. Md. July 7, 2023).
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Finally, given Thomas’s reduced sentence and the drastically lower sentences for his other
co-defendants, a reduction in Countess’s sentence addresses the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants.6
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons noted above, Countess’s sentence will be reduced to a total of thirty-five
(35) years. Specifically, his sentences on Counts One, Two, Three, and Six are reduced to three
hundred (300) months, to run concurrent to a sentence of two-hundred-and-forty (240) months on
Count Four. The Court will impose a sentence of one-hundred-and-twenty (120) months on Count
Five to be served consecutively to the sentences for all other counts. The result is a total sentence
of four-hundred-and-twenty (420) months. 	The Court will also re-impose the same terms of
supervised release: five (5) years as to Counts One, Two, Three, Five, and Six, and three (3) years
6 The Court notes that while it will reduce Countess’s sentence to match Thomas’s, it must take a
slightly different path to achieve that result. 	As noted, prior to granting Thomas’s request for
compassionate release and reducing his sentence, Judge Blake also granted in part Thomas’s
motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See ECF 387; Thomas v. United States, Crim. No. CCB-
04-232, 2024 WL 5239049 (D. Md. Dec. 27, 2024). With the agreement of the Government, this
ruling vacated three of Thomas’s counts of conviction because they could “no longer stand” after
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), and United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir.
2019) (en banc). ECF 387, at 4. Thus, Judge Blake vacated Thomas’s convictions for conspiring
to possess firearms and actually possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and
crime of violence (Counts Four and Five) and his conviction for causing the death of a person
using a firearm in the course of committing a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence (Count
Six). Id. at 11–12. At a status conference on January 29, 2026, the parties in the case at bar agreed
that Countess’s counts of conviction are not impacted by Davis and Simms, and thus similar § 2255
relief is not warranted in Countess’s case. ECF 420. Given that Count Five carries a mandatory
consecutive sentence of 10 years, the Court cannot simply reduce the remaining counts of
conviction to 35 years as the result would be a sentence of 45 years. To ensure equal treatment to
Countess, the Court will reduce the sentences on Counts One, Two, Three, and Six to 300 months,
to run concurrent to a sentence of 240 months on Count Four. The Court will impose a sentence
of 120 months as to Count Five to be served consecutive to the sentences for Counts One, Two,
Three, Four, and Six. The result is a total sentence of 420 months, or 35 years, the same length of
Thomas’s revised sentence. ECF 391, at 2.
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as to Count Four, to be served concurrent to one another for a total term of supervised release of
five (5) years.
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: February 20, 2026 	/s/
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
Case 1:04-cr-00232-BAH Document 421 Filed 02/20/26 Page 14 of 14