Rinn v. Fraidin

1
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT’
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
In re: 	*
JACOB FRAIDIN, 	* 	Case No. 92-52338-JS
Debtor 	* 	Chapter 7
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MICHAEL G. RINN, Chapter 7 Trustee, 	*
Plaintiff 	*
v. 	* 	Adv. Proc. 06-1795-JS
JACOB FRAIDIN, 	*
Defendant 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING TRUSTEE’S
APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND OVERRULING THE
OBJECTION OF THE DEBTOR THE
Date signed October 10, 2008
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The matter before the Court is the application for counsel fees filed by
counsel to the Chapter 7 trustee and the debtor’s objection. For the reasons stated,
the objection will be overruled and the application will be granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	On November 23, 2005, the debtor, Jacob Fraidin (the “debtor”), was
granted a Chapter 7 discharge in this case.
2. 	On November 18, 2006, the trustee, Michael G. Rinn, filed the instant
complaint to revoke the discharge based upon the debtor’s continued refusal to
comply with the trustee’s requests for information and to turnover property of the
estate. 	The complaint recited the following tortured history of the debtor’s
bankruptcy case, which is the oldest one now pending in this Court:
A. 	On August 9, 1991, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, which was
transferred to this Court by order [Teel, J.], dated March 17, 1992.
B. On December 29, 1993, this Court ordered the appointment of a Chapter
11 trustee by order [P. 217].1
1 In an unreported opinion in the case of Fraidin v. Weitzman (In re Fraidin),
1994 WL 687306, decided December 9, 1994, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
made the following statements in upholding this Court's appointment of a Chapter
11 trustee:
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After Fraidin filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 	two 	creditors 	with 	outstanding 	judgments 	against 	Fraidin
moved for the appointment of a trustee. 	At the conclusion of a two-
day hearing, the bankruptcy court stated that it was appointing a
trustee because it had “absolutely no confidence in the debtor in terms
of 	his 	capacity 	to 	honestly 	administer 	his 	own 	Chapter 	11
bankruptcy.”
The bankruptcy court based its decision on what it called “a multitude
of factors,” one of which was pre-petition dishonesty. 	Fraidin is a
convicted felon, having been found guilty of theft while acting as a
foreclosure trustee. 	See Fraidin v. State, 85 Md. App. 231, 583 A.2d
1065, cert. denied, 322 Md. 614, 589 A.2d 57 (1991). [Footnote: The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals wrote: “The permissible picture
emerges of Fraidin as an extremely clever manipulator of complicated
commercial transactions who . . . at least had avarice in his heart. To
feed that avarice, he created at-times labyrinthine confusion. He then
sought to exploit that confusion to his own advantage.” 	Fraidin, 583
A.2d at 1081.] 	More recently, Fraidin was found liable in a civil
action for tortious interference with contract and civil conspiracy and
was ordered to pay $1.5 million in punitive damages. 	Also, the
bankruptcy judge found that Fraidin had used aliases as late as 1986,
but did not disclose those names as required on the bankruptcy
petition. 	Moreover, the bankruptcy court found that Fraidin had no
credibility, given his "evasive, self-serving, unclear, and obviously not
forthcoming" testimony during the hearing. . .
The decision of whether a debtor's conduct justifies the appointment
of a trustee is a matter committed to the discretion of the lower courts.
See Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828
F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1987). 	Here, the decision was made in the
first instance by the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district
court. 	This court, as a second court of review, considers the decision
of the bankruptcy court under the same standards that apply to the
district court. 	Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union,
851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1988). Thus, the question here is not whether
this court would have appointed a trustee had it been deciding the
question in the first instance, but whether the bankruptcy court abused
its 	discretion 	in 	appointing 	a 	trustee. 	Findings 	of 	fact 	by 	the
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C. After the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, the case was converted on
April 11, 1995 to a proceeding under Chapter 7.2 Michael G. Rinn, Esquire was
appointed Chapter 7 trustee (the “trustee”).
bankruptcy court are reviewable by this court only for clear error and
legal questions are subject to de novo review. 	Canal Corp. v.
Finnman (In re Johnson), 960 F.2d 396, 399 (4th Cir.1992); Bankr. R.
8013. . . .
We conclude that the findings of the bankruptcy court – that Fraidin
had engaged in a prolonged pattern of dishonest conduct and had no
credibility at the hearing – are supported by the record. 	Section
1104(a)(1) expressly provides that dishonesty, whether before or after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, justifies the appointment of a
trustee. 	The bankruptcy court considered Fraidin's evidence of his
proper conduct regarding his bankruptcy case, but nonetheless found
that his pattern of dishonesty justified the appointment of a trustee.
We find no abuse of discretion and accordingly affirm the order of the
district court.
Id.
2 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conversion to Chapter 7 in an unreported
opinion styled Fraidin v. Weitzman (In re Fraidin), 1997 WL 153826, decided
April 3, 1997, in which it stated:
In order to convert a case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, a bankruptcy
court must first determine that there is cause for the conversion. 	11
U.S..C. § 1112(b); In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc., 14 F.3d 240,
242-43 (4th Cir. 1994). . .
The bankruptcy court relied upon Fraidin’s inability to effectuate a
plan as its basis for ordering conversion, and the record substantiates
that finding. the trustee explained at length that Fraidin would not be
able to obtain confirmation of a reorganization plan. 	Indeed, Fraidin
has never submitted a plan for approval. The bankruptcy court did not
abuse its discretion in converting the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding.
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D. 	On April 9, 1997, the trustee filed a complaint in Adversary Proceeding
No. 97-5223-JS against the debtor to avoid and recover fraudulent transfers,
postpetition transfers and the turnover of property of the estate.
E. 	On July 21, 1998, the Court ordered that the trustee had 90 days to
conduct discovery of the debtor, but the debtor refused to comply with the trustee’s
discovery requests.
F. On September 9, 1998, the trustee filed a motion to compel discovery and
to deem facts admitted by the debtor. The debtor failed to respond to the motion.
G. 	On November 16, 1998, the trustee filed a second motion to compel
discovery.
H. On April 29, 1999, after conducting a hearing on the motions, this Court
[Keir, J.] granted both motions to compel discovery.
I. 	The debtor disobeyed the Court’s order and refused to comply with the
trustee’s requests for discovery.
J. 	On May 14, 1999, the trustee filed a third motion to compel discovery,
which the debtor ignored.
K. On May 26, 1999, the trustee filed a fourth motion to compel discovery.
The debtor continued to refuse the trustee’s requests for discovery. 	During a
Id., at 2.
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deposition of the debtor by the trustee, the Court conducted a telephonic hearing,
overruled the debtor’s objections and ordered him to desist in refusing to answer
questions, but again, the debtor refused.
L. 	On June 14, 1999, the Court issued an order that directed the debtor to
file written answers within 20 days to questions posed at the deposition which he
had refused to answer, upon the threat of having a judgment entered against him by
default.
M. 	The debtor did not comply with the order by continuing to refuse to
answer questions and by failing to attend scheduled depositions.
N. 	On January 8, 2001, the Court entered an order granting a default
judgment against the debtor.
O. 	On March 14, 2001, the Court conducted a hearing on the trustee’s
request for damages and determined that the debtor was liable to the trustee for
damages in the amount of $1,659,077, plus attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount
of $4,179, plus interest. 	On April 4, 2001, judgment was entered against the
debtor.3
3 The Fourth Circuit reversed the order because it held that the notice that
scheduled the hearing, denominated “ex parte hearing on damages,” deprived the
debtor the opportunity to contest the trustee’s calculations. 	See Fraidin v. Rinn (In
re Fraidin), 34 Fed. Appx. 932, 2002 WL 1025092, decided May 22, 2002. 	On
remand, a second hearing was held on January 13-14, 2003, at which the debtor
participated fully. 	The second hearing produced the same result and a second
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3. Before the debtor filed the instant bankruptcy case, Andre Weitzman and
Sheldon Braiterman obtained judgments against him and his various corporations
in amounts exceeding $3 million, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on
January 30, 1991. 	The amount of the judgments was reversed on appeal by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 	See Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md. App.
168, 611 A.2d 1046 (1992). 	On remand, the Circuit Court entered reduced
judgments 	against 	the 	debtor 	in 	favor 	of 	Weitzman 	and 	Braiterman 	in 	the
respective amounts of $1,250,000 and $250,000. 	By order [P. 25] entered on
September 16, 1996, this Court determined the judgments to be nondischargeable.
Weitzman v. Fraidin, Adv. Proc. No. 95-5335. 	The trustee settled the claims of
Weitzman and Braiterman against the bankruptcy estate in exchange for a $20,000
payment by him, while recognizing their right to proceed directly against the
debtor outside of bankruptcy to satisfy their claims. 	This Court approved the
settlement and the district court [Nickerson, J.] affirmed.
4. 	During the course of the instant adversary proceeding, the debtor
continued to refuse to comply with the trustee’s reasonable requests for discovery.
5. On September 20, 2007, at a deposition of the debtor conducted by
counsel for the trustee that lasted three-and-one-half hours, the debtor objected and
judgment identical in amount to the first was entered against the debtor on
September 30, 2003.
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refused to answer questions. 	In addition, he brought no documents with him in
violation of the trustee’s subpoena duces tecum and request for production of
documents. 	See Transcript of deposition, Exhibit to trustee’s first motion to
compel discovery [P. 24] filed on September 21, 2007.
6. 	As a result, by order [P. 36] entered on November 13, 2007, this Court
granted the trustee’s motion to compel discovery. The order required the debtor to
respond to the trustee’s discovery requests or risk having the complaint to revoke
his discharge being granted by default. 	The order reserved the issue of sanctions
against the debtor involving the payment of the trustee’s counsel fees, pending the
debtor’s compliance with the order. Order Granting Motion To Compel Discovery
and for Sanctions.
7. 	On November 30, 2007, the trustee filed a second motion to compel
discovery [P. 40] and requested sanctions in the form of reimbursement by the
debtor of fees and expenses.
8. 	On December 18, 2007, the debtor filed an opposition [P. 45] to the
trustee’s second motion for discovery and the request for reimbursement of counsel
fees and costs.
9. 	By order [P. 46] entered on December 20, 2007, this Court granted the
trustee’s second motion to compel discovery, revoked the debtor’s discharge and
imposed sanctions upon him for his failure to comply with the trustee’s requests
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for discovery. 	The order required the trustee to submit a statement of fees and
costs for the purpose of establishing a basis for the Court to award sanctions
against the debtor. 	Order Granting Second Motion to Compel Discovery and for
Sanctions.
10. 	On January 9, 2008, the trustee filed a statement of fees and costs [P.
51]. 	The statement indicated that the trustee’s counsel had expended effort
resulting in fees in the amount of $7,696.50, and claimed expenses of $1,427.49,
representing requested compensation in the total amount of $9,123.99, to be paid
from non-estate assets. 	Statement of Fees and Costs Pursuant to Order Granting
Second Motion to Compel Discovery and For Sanctions and Request for Entry of
Order. 	Attached as an exhibit was the following statement containing a record of
counsel’s time entries:
Date 	Timekeeper 	Status 	Dollars 	Hours 	Rate 	Description
9/21/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$586.50 	1.7 	$345.00 	Draft Motion to Compel.
10/9/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$207.00 	.6 	$345.00 	Telephone with Trustee; review
Response of Fraidin on Motion to
Compel.
10/10/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$69.00 	.2 	$345.00 	Review Pleadings for Exhibits and
Detail on Opposition.
11/2/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$379.50 	1.10 	$345.00 	Preparation for hearing on motion to
compel.
11/5/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$966.00 	2.80 	$345.00 	Preparation for hearing (.9 hours) ;
confer with Mr. Fraidin (.2 hours);
attend hearing; confer with Mr. Fraidin
asking for November 15, 2007
deposition (1.1 hour) and draft order
(.6).
11/6/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$310.50 	.90 	$345.00 	Prepare order and objection.
11/8/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$138.00 	.40 	$345.00 	Finalize proposed order.
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11/9/07 	LeVie 	Billed 	$42.00 	.30 	$140.00 	Revise and upload order to compel;
telephone call to chambers re same.
11/13/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$276.00 	.80 	$345.00 	Letter to Fraidin and review of orders
issued by Court.
11/19/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$1,104.00 	3.20 	$345.00 	Preparation for deposition.
11/20/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$2,277.00 	6.60 	$345.00 	Prepare for deposition (1.7); conduct
deposition (4.5). Conference with Mr.
Rinn regarding Fraidin’s non-
cooperation (.4).
11/28/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$276.00 	.80 	$345.00 	Return call to Fraidin; revisions to
motion to compel.
11/29/07 	Sweeney 	Billed 	$103.50 	.30 	$345.00 	Revise motion.
11/30/07 	LeVie 	Billed 	$42.00 	.30 	$140.00 	E-file motion to compel.
$6,777.00 	20.00
11/30/07 	Sweeney 	Work-in-
Process
$448.50 	1.30 	$345.00 	Finalize motion to compel (1.1);
telephone call with trustee regarding
same (.2).
12/4/07 	LeVie 	Work-in-
Process
$98.00 	.70 	$140.00 	Telephone call with clerk re deficiency
(.10); telephone call with clerk (.10).
Revise motion to compel and draft order
(.30); E-file order and certificate of
service (.20).
12/6/07 	LeVie 	Work-in-
Process
$28.00 	.20 	$140.00 	Prepare line with exhibits, file and
arrange for service.
12/6/07 	Sweeney 	Work-in-
Process
$345.00 	1.00 	$345.00 	Draft and revise supplemental filing.
$919.50 	3.20
$7,696.50 	23.20
Exhibit A to the Trustee’s Statement.
11. 	In the meantime, on December 31, 2007, the debtor filed a notice of
appeal [P. 48] of the order [P. 46] entered on December 20, 2007, that revoked his
discharge. 	12. 	On January 18, 2008, the debtor filed an objection [P. 53] to the
request for attorneys’ fees And costs. The grounds for the objection are as follows:
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A. 	An appeal of this Court’s order granting the revocation of the
debtor’s discharge is now pending.
B. Other appeals by the debtor are pending regarding orders granting
compensation to trustee’s counsel.
C. 	The conduct of the trustee’s counsel during the depositions of the
debtor was “clearly inappropriate, abhorrent and violated the Debtor/Fraidin’s
constitutional and civil rights.” Objection, ¶ 3 [P. 53].
D. 	The 	trustee’s 	counsel 	violated 	Local 	Bankruptcy 	Rules 	and
Federal Rules governing proper discover procedures and guidelines.
E. The trustee’s counsel “attempted on numerous occasions to coerce
and intimidate defendant/Fraidin into disclosing to him the contents and legal
strategies of the Attorney Grievance Commission Complaint and impending
Civil Lawsuits being filed against himself and his client Michael G. Rinn, Esq.”
Objection. ¶ 5 [P. 53].
F. 	“Mr. Sweeney insisted that defendant/Fraidin disclose to him his
trial strategies in a pending appeal.” Objection, ¶ 6 [P. 53].
G. 	Trustee’s counsel filed the instant suit against the debtor without
the knowledge of the trustee.
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H. 	The debtor claimed that he answered all questions put to him by
the trustee’s counsel to the best of his ability, but that he was badgered by the
trustee.
I. The debtor was unable to recall events from 17 years ago.
J. 	The debtor asserted that the trustee’s counsel “will shortly no
longer be associated with [his current law firm] and any funds paid to him directly
would not be readily recoverable.” Objection, ¶ 12 [P. 53].
K. 	“Mr. Sweeney should not be granted any monetary awards until
such time as Appellate Review has been exhausted, the U.S. Trustee’s Office has
completed its investigation and published its findings and defendant/Fraidin has
been granted a full evidentiary hearing at which he could preserve a record for
appellate review.” Objection, ¶ 13 [P. 53].
13. 	On March 10, 2008, a hearing went forward on the debtor’s objection,
despite his having filed a motion for continuance [P. 61] on March 4, 2008, which
the Court denied by order [P. 64] entered on March 7, 2008. 	Among the reasons
given by the debtor to continue the hearing was to “grant the parties a reasonable
period of time to resolve the controversy.” Motion for continuance [P. 61].
14. 	The matter was held sub curia to permit the Court to consider fully the
debtor’s allegations contained in his objection and to permit a complete review of
the record.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 157(b)(2)(F). 	Venue is
appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1409.
2. 	The Court has reviewed the trustee’s request for compensation from the
debtor and has determined that the amounts requested are fair and reasonable. 	In
light of the debtor’s obnoxious, oppressive and obstructive behavior throughout the
course of the administration of this case, a fee twice as large as this would be well
within reason. 	To their great credit, the trustee and trustee’s counsel have not
sought a greater amount.
3. 	A review of the debtor’s allegations contained in his objection are
without merit. Contrary to his complaints against the trustee and trustee’s counsel,
the Court finds that they have performed their duties in accordance with the
applicable requirements of the Federal Rules, the Bankruptcy Rules and the
Bankruptcy Code. 	The Court finds all of the allegations of the debtor to be false
and to have been made in order to prevent the trustee from performing his statutory
duties.
4. 	It ill behooves this debtor to complain about the time and expense to
which the trustee has been put in this case when it was the consistently obstructive
conduct of the debtor that caused the long delays in the administration of this case
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to a conclusion with the attendant costs. The debtor has unclean hands in opposing
the application to compensate the trustee’s counsel. 	Cf. In re LBH Associates
Limited Partnership, 109 B.R. 157, 158 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (creditor whose
conduct materially increased fees of debtor’s counsel was estopped from objecting
to the size of the fee and held not to have clean hands.).
5. 	The determination by this Court to grant the requested compensation to
trustee’s counsel will facilitate the pending appeal by the debtor of the order
revoking his discharge by bringing before the district court a more efficient
consolidation of all of the issues raised by the debtor at one time.
6. 	The debtor has been afforded every opportunity by this Court to
cooperate with the trustee in order to preserve his right to a bankruptcy discharge.
He has chosen instead to continue to hinder and delay the orderly administration of
this estate to the extreme prejudice of his creditors and the bankruptcy system. His
refusal to cooperate with the trustee’s reasonable requests for discovery has already
resulting in the revocation of the discharge in bankruptcy, pursuant to Federal Rule
37.4 This Court also has the authority under the Rule, in appropriate cases to
4Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, made applicable here by Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, provides as follows:
Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.
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(1) In General. 	On notice to other parties and all affected
persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or
discovery. 	The motion must include a certification that the movant
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or
party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it
without court action.
(2) Appropriate Court. 	A motion for an order to a party must
be made in the court where the action is pending. 	A motion for an
order to a nonparty must be made in the court where the discovery is
or will be taken.
(3) Specific Motions.
(A) To Compel Disclosure. 	If a party fails to make a
disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to
compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.
(B) To Compel a Discovery Response. 	A party seeking
discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation,
production, or inspection. This motion may be made if:
(i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked
under Rule 30 or 31;
(ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a
designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4);
(iii) 	a 	party 	fails 	to 	answer 	an 	interrogatory
submitted under Rule 33; or
(iv) a party fails to respond that inspection will be
permitted--or fails to permit inspection – as requested under Rule 34.
(C) 	Related 	to 	a 	Deposition. 	When 	taking 	an 	oral
deposition, the party asking a question may complete or adjourn the
examination before moving for an order.
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(4) 	Evasive 	or 	Incomplete 	Disclosure, 	Answer, 	or
Response. 	For 	purposes 	of 	this 	subdivision 	(a), 	an 	evasive 	or
incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure
to disclose, answer, or respond.
(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.
(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery
Is Provided After Filing). If the motion is granted– or if the disclosure
or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed-the court
must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney
advising 	that 	conduct, 	or 	both 	to 	pay 	the 	movant’s 	reasonable
expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.
But the court must not order this payment if:
(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting
in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court
action;
(ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response,
or objection was substantially justified; or
(iii) 	other 	circumstances 	make 	an 	award 	of
expenses unjust.
(B) If the Motion Is Denied. If the motion is denied, the
court may issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and
must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the
attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who
opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the
motion, including attorney's fees. 	But the court must not order this
payment 	if 	the 	motion 	was 	substantially 	justified 	or 	other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(C) If the Motion Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may issue
any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after
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giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses
for the motion.
(b) Failure to Comply with a Court Order.
(1) Sanctions in the District Where the Deposition
Is Taken. If the court where the discovery is taken orders a deponent
to be sworn or to answer a question and the deponent fails to obey, the
failure may be treated as contempt of court.
(2) Sanctions in the District Where the Action Is
Pending.
(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order. 	If a party or a
party's officer, director, or managing agent– or a witness designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)– fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a),
the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders.
They may include the following:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order
or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the
action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) 	prohibiting 	the 	disobedient 	party 	from
supporting 	or 	opposing 	designated 	claims 	or 	defenses, 	or 	from
introducing designated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or
in part;
(vi) 	rendering 	a 	default 	judgment 	against 	the
disobedient party; or
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(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to
obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination.
(B) For Not Producing a Person for Examination. 	If a
party fails to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) requiring it to
produce another person for examination, the court may issue any of
the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), unless the disobedient
party shows that it cannot produce the other person.
(C) Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the
orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney
advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's 	fees, 	caused 	by 	the 	failure, 	unless 	the 	failure 	was
substantially 	justified 	or 	other 	circumstances 	make 	an 	award 	of
expenses unjust.
(c) 	Failure 	to 	Disclose, 	to 	Supplement 	an 	Earlier
Response, or to Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. 	If a party
fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule
26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness
to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the
failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or
instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an
opportunity to be heard:
(A) 	may 	order 	payment 	of 	the 	reasonable 	expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including
any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
(2) Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit what
is requested under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves a
document to be genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may
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move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred in making that proof. 	The court
must so order unless:
(A) the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a);
(B) 	the 	admission 	sought 	was 	of 	no 	substantial
importance;
(C) the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to
believe that it might prevail on the matter; or
(D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Party's Failure to Attend Its Own Deposition, Serve
Answers to Interrogatories, or Respond to a Request for Inspection.
(1) In General.
(A) Motion; Grounds for Sanctions. The court where the
action is pending may, on motion, order sanctions if:
(i) 	a 	party 	or 	a 	party's 	officer, 	director, 	or
managing 	agent--or 	a 	person 	designated 	under 	Rule 	30(b)(6) 	or
31(a)(4)– fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear for
that person's deposition; or
(ii) 	a 	party, 	after 	being 	properly 	served 	with
interrogatories under Rule 33 or a request for inspection under Rule
34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.
(B) Certification. 	A motion for sanctions for failing to
answer or respond must include a certification that the movant has in
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to
act in an effort to obtain the answer or response without court action.
(2) Unacceptable Excuse for Failing to Act. 	A
failure described in Rule 37(d)(1)(A) is not excused on the ground
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impose upon the debtor as the non-complying party with the payment of the
trustee’s reasonable costs of discovery.
WHEREFORE, the request for compensation by counsel to the Chapter 7
trustee in the total amount of $9,123.99 will be GRANTED, and the objection of
the debtor thereto will be OVERRULED. The debtor shall tender payment of said
amount directly to the trustee from his personal, non-estate assets within ten (10)
that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing to
act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).
(3) Types of Sanctions. Sanctions may include any of the
orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). 	Instead of or in addition to
these sanctions, the court must require the party failing to act, the
attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was
substantially 	justified 	or 	other 	circumstances 	make 	an 	award 	of
expenses unjust.
(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system.
(f) Failure to Participate in Framing a Discovery Plan. If
a party or its attorney fails to participate in good faith in developing
and submitting a proposed discovery plan as required by Rule 26(f),
the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require that
party or attorney to pay to any other party the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
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days hereof. The debtor’s failure to comply with this directive will subject him to
additional sanction within the discretion of this Court.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
cc: 	Michael G. Rinn, Esquire
111 Warren Road, Suite 4
Cockeysville, MD 21030
Chapter 7 Trustee
Paul Michael Sweeney, Esquire
` 	Linowes & Blocher LLP
7200 Wisconsin Ave
Suite 800
Bethesda, Maryland 20814-4842
Jacob Fraidin
3406 Fielding Road
Pikesville, Maryland 21208
Office of the United States Trustee
2625 U.S. Courthouse
101 W. Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
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