Drae Watkins

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
at Greenbelt
In re:
DRAE WATKINS,
Debtor.
Case Number: 25-14502-MCR
(Chapter 13)
MEMORANDUM OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER
DENYING RUBEN PARTIES’ SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DEBTOR’S MOTION TO ENFORCE AUTOMATIC STAY
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss Case [ECF No. 118] filed by Stephen D. Ruben
and the Law Offices of Ruben and Ruben, LLC and a Motion to Enforce the Automatic Stay and
for Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 103] filed by Drae Watkins. The Court has considered both
motions, the related responses, the record in this case, and applicable law and finds that a hearing
would not aid the decisional process. 	See Md. L. Bankr. R. 9013-1(b) (“Except as otherwise
provided in the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Bankruptcy Rules, these Rules or by the Court, the
Court may decide a motion on the papers filed.”).
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny both motions.
Signed: September 30th, 2026
Entered: September 30th, 2026
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2025, Drae Watkins (the “Debtor”) filed a Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition [ECF
No. 1] (the “Petition”). The Debtor’s Verification of Creditor Matrix filed with the Petition lists
one creditor – Capital One. The Debtor’s Schedules D and E/F [ECF No. 37] list “U.S. Bank &
Trust” as having a secured claim in the amount of $542,333.00, the “Maryland Dept of Taxation”
as having a secured claim in the amount of $60.00, the “PG Office of Finance” as having a secured
claim in the amount of $17,057.47, and Capital One as having two priority, unsecured claims in
the amounts of $1,370.00 and $570.00. 	Six proofs of claim have been filed in the Debtor’s
bankruptcy case, and the claims bar date has now passed. The creditors who filed a proof of claim
are Merrick Bank; OneMain Financial Group, LLC; Quantum 3 Group LLC as agent for Mercury
Financial/First Bank & Trust; LVNV Funding, LLC; TD Retail Card Service; and Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission.
The Debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan [ECF No. 38] (the “Plan”) proposes monthly plan payments
of $500.00 for 36 months. 	On September 30, 2025, the Court held a hearing to consider
confirmation of the Plan at which the Chapter 13 trustee, Timothy P. Branigan (the “Trustee”),
stated that he was unable to conduct the meeting of creditors because the Debtor had not provided
copies of his identification. 	The Trustee further stated that the Debtor had not made any plan
payments and had not provided various requested documents to the Trustee. The Debtor responded
that he had recently obtained bankruptcy counsel (Stephen Ruben) and that he would promptly
provide all required documents and make the missed plan payments. 	The Court continued the
hearing for four weeks and advised the Debtor that it would deny confirmation without leave to
amend if the Debtor did not make substantial progress with his plan payments by the time of the
next hearing.
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The Court held the continued hearing on October 28, 2025, at which the Trustee stated that
the Debtor had provided some documents and had made one plan payment of $200.00, bringing
his total plan default to $2,300.00. 	The Debtor explained that the government shutdown had
affected his ability to make plan payments. The Court encouraged the Debtor to engage counsel,
continued the hearing for an additional two weeks, and advised the Debtor that it would deny
confirmation without leave to amend if he was not current on plan payments by the next hearing.
On November 12, 2025, the Court held the continued confirmation hearing. At the hearing,
the Trustee reported that the Debtor was still behind on his plan payments by $2,000.00 (four
months). Consequently, as warned twice previously, on November 13, 2025, the Court entered an
Order Denying Confirmation Without Leave to Amend [ECF No. 67] (the “Order Denying
Confirmation”). On November 25, 2025, the Debtor filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order Denying
Confirmation [ECF No. 71]. As of the date of entry of this Order, the appeal remains pending in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
On April 14, 2026, Stephen D. Ruben and the Law Offices of Ruben and Ruben, LLC (the
“Ruben Parties”) filed a Motion to Dismiss Chapter 13 Case or, in the Alternative, to Convert the
Case for Cause Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) [ECF No. 97] (the “First Motion to Dismiss”) and
a Motion for Relief From Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) [ECF No. 98] (the
“Lift Stay Motion”). 	The Lift Stay Motion sought relief from the automatic stay “to permit
Movants to prosecute their compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor in a pending Maryland
state-court action to final judgment for liquidation purposes only.” On the same day, the Ruben
Parties filed an Amended Motion for Relief From Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1) [ECF No. 99] (the “Amended Lift Stay Motion”), which superseded and replaced the
original Lift Stay Motion. The Amended Lift Stay Motion appears identical to the Lift Stay Motion
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but adds the following exhibits: (i) a copy of an invoice from “AEPOP” issued to Stephen Ruben
in the amount of $1,529.00 with an “Order Date” of January 6, 2026; (ii) a copy of the complaint
filed on January 22, 2026, by the Debtor against the Ruben Parties in the District Court of
Maryland for Prince George’s County (the “State Court”) in the case styled Watkins v. Law Offices
of Ruben and Ruben LLC, et al., Case No. D-05-CV-26-007630 (the “State Court Action”) seeking
damages of $1,529.00 plus six percent (6%) interest for “8 months of web hosting, business phone,
and meeting [sic] system services provided” from May until December; (iii) a copy of the
counterclaim filed by the Ruben Parties in the State Court Action on April 2, 2026, seeking
damages in the amount of $30,000.00 based on an alleged “blackout” by the Debtor of “all hosting
and email access without notice” on December 11, 2025; and (iv) a Notice of Bankruptcy Filing
and Suggestion of Automatic Stay filed by the Debtor in the State Court Action on April 7, 2026.
On April 22, 2026, the Debtor filed a Notice of Filing Supplemental Exhibits in Support of
Motion to Enforce the Automatic Stay and for Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 103] (the “Motion
to Enforce Automatic Stay”).1 	The Motion to Enforce Automatic Stay asserts that the Ruben
Parties filed a motion in the State Court Action on April 14, 2026, in which they asked the State
Court to enter an order recognizing the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, staying any further proceedings
to the extent they constitute the prosecution of claims against the Debtor within the meaning of
Section 362(a), and clarifying that the Ruben Parties are not pursuing any action in the State Court
that would violate the automatic stay. The Debtor attached a copy of the Ruben Parties’ motion as
an exhibit to the Motion to Enforce Automatic Stay along with (i) an application for statement of
charges dated January 24, 2026, filed by the Stephen D. Ruben against the Debtor in the State
1 Although the title of the pleading suggests that the Debtor previously filed a motion to enforce the
automatic stay, he did not. Therefore, the Court treats this pleading as a motion to enforce the automatic
stay.
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Court in a new case (Case No. D-05-CR-26-000471); (ii) a notice issued by the State Court on
March 3, 2026, confirming that it will not prosecute Case No. D-05-CR-26-000471; (iii) a
summons issued on March 31, 2026, to the Debtor by the District Court of Maryland for Anne
Arundel County in the case styled State of Maryland v. Drae J. Watkins (Case No. D-07-CR-26-
004974) (the “Criminal Case”); (iv) a copy of the docket report in the Criminal Case identifying a
filing date of March 20, 2026, identifying “Ruben, Stephen” as the complainant, and setting forth
four criminal charges (i.e., extortion, unlawful possession or publication of computer access codes,
obstruction of justice, and harassment); and (v) a document titled “Memorandum of Record:
Timeline of Vindictive Prosecution and Demand for Investigation” prepared by the Debtor in
connection with the Criminal Case, dated April 20, 2026, describing alleged actions undertaken by
the parties from December 11, 2025 to March 30, 2026.
On April 23, 2026, the Court issued deficiency notices for the First Motion to Dismiss and
the Amended Lift Stay Motion [ECF Nos. 101 and 102] because the filings did not include notices
required under the Court’s local rules. 	On May 14, 2026, the Court entered orders striking the
First Motion to Dismiss and the Amended Lift Stay Motion [ECF Nos. 108 and 109] because the
Ruben Parties did not correct the stated deficiencies. 	On May 19, 2026, the Debtor filed an
Amended Supplemental Status Update to Enforce the Automatic Stay and for Sanctions [ECF No.
112] (the “Supplemental Statement”). 	The Supplemental Statement “updates” the Motion to
Enforce Automatic Stay and states that the Criminal Case was dismissed on May 7, 2026. It also
alleges that the Ruben Parties are attempting to “weaponize” this Court through improper ex parte
filings – namely, the First Motion to Dismiss and the Amended Lift Stay Motion – without the
requisite notices and without serving copies on the Debtor in a “calculated attempt to secure federal
relief secretly and deprive the Debtor of due process.” The Supplemental Statement requests that
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the Court “grant the pending Motion for Sanctions” against the Ruben Parties, award “actual
damages and costs incurred by the Debtor,” and impose punitive damages pursuant to Section
362(k)(1) for the Ruben Parties’ alleged violations of the automatic stay. The Court notes that, as
of the filing of the Supplemental Statement, there was no pending motion for sanctions against the
Ruben Parties.
On June 10, 2026, the Ruben Parties filed an opposition to the Supplemental Statement
[ECF No. 117] in which they argue that they were not listed as creditors in the Debtor’s bankruptcy
schedules and never received “formal notice” of the bankruptcy filing. The Ruben Parties further
assert that the Criminal Case is not relevant to the Debtor’s bankruptcy case and was exempt from
the automatic stay because it was a criminal proceeding against a debtor. The Ruben Parties deny
that sanctions are warranted under Section 362(k) and explain that (i) they chose not to cure the
deficiencies regarding the First Motion to Dismiss and the Amended Lift Stay Motion so they
never “legally became active motions in this case;” (ii) the State Court Action involves the
Debtor’s corporate entity, AEPOP, LLC, which has not filed for bankruptcy and therefore is not
subject to the automatic stay; (iii) they have filed all documents through the Court’s CM/ECF
system, thereby providing electronic notice to all registered participants;2 (iv) they have “no
formal standing, interest, or active engagement in the debtor’s estate asset distribution” because
they were not listed as creditors; and (v) the issuance of 	the notice of non-prosecution in the
Criminal Case was an exercise of “administrative prosecutorial discretion that leaves the state fully
free to re-indict or revive the charges in the future.”
2 The Debtor, who is proceeding pro se in his bankruptcy case, is not a registered CM/ECF participant and
does not receive electronic notices in this case.
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Also on June 10, 2026, the Ruben Parties filed a second Motion to Dismiss Case [ECF No.
118] (with the exhibits filed at ECF No. 119, the “Second Motion to Dismiss”) seeking dismissal
of the Debtor’s case pursuant to Section 1307(c) based on the Debtor’s alleged bad faith conduct.
The Second Motion to Dismiss asserts that the Debtor’s bankruptcy case is an abuse of the
bankruptcy system because it was not filed to “achieve a legitimate financial reorganization or to
manage honest debt.” 	Instead, the Ruben Parties argue, “this Chapter 13 petition is a bad-faith
tactical litigation maneuver designed to shelter a serial, pro se vexatious litigant from the
consequences of his tortious actions, while providing him a federal platform to continue a
relentless campaign of harassment against his former legal counsel, Stephen D. Ruben Esq.” The
Motion to Dismiss then describes the history between the parties and the various legal actions that
were commenced after the alleged “digital kidnapping” by the Debtor on December 11, 2025. The
Court notes that, unlike the First Motion to Dismiss, the Second Motion to Dismiss was served on
the Debtor by first-class mail at his address of record, and the Ruben Parties filed and served the
required notice for the Second Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 121] on June 14, 2026, after the Court
issued a deficiency notice [ECF No. 120] for the missing notice.
On June 16, 2026, the Debtor filed a Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Strike Deficient
Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 123] (the “Motion for Sanctions”) requesting that sanctions be
imposed against the Ruben Parties and that the Second Motion to Dismiss be stricken for alleged
“bad-faith filing practices and deliberate violations of due process.” On June 18, 2026, the Court
summarily denied the Motion for Sanctions with the following notation:
The relief sought is unwarranted. 	Mr. Ruben filed his motion to
dismiss on June 10, 2026, the Court issued a deficiency notice
regarding the missing notice on June 12, 2026, and Mr. Ruben
promptly cured the deficiency on June 14, 2026. If the Court were
to sanction a party every time they filed a deficient pleading, the
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Debtor would have been sanctioned seven times. 	See [ECF] Nos.
22, 42, 45, 48, 56, 62, and 83.
Order denying Motion for Sanctions [ECF No. 124].
On July 7, 2026, the Debtor filed an opposition to the Second Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
126] and a reply in support of his Supplemental Statement [ECF No. 127]. The Debtor’s reply
states that the Ruben Parties had notice of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing as early as June 18, 2025,
when Mr. Ruben emailed the Debtor with bankruptcy advice, and that the Ruben Parties filed the
counterclaim in the State Court Action on April 2, 2026, despite their knowledge of the Debtor’s
bankruptcy case. The Debtor attached a copy of an email from law@rubenandruben.com to the
Debtor dated June 18, 2025, to his reply.
After the flurry of filings and the Court’s issuance of orders on some of the pending
motions, the Ruben Parties’ Second Motion to Dismiss and the Debtor’s Motion to Enforce
Automatic Stay remain pending. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny both motions.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	The Ruben Parties’ Second Motion to Dismiss
Section 1307 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part: “Except as provided in
subsection (f) of this section, on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee and after
notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of
this title, or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors
and the estate, for cause[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). Local Bankruptcy Rule 9001-1, in turn, defines
“party in interest” as “a party having an interest in the bankruptcy case, including the debtor, the
trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security
holder, an indenture trustee, a party to a contract or lease with the debtor, a co-debtor, and a co-
owner of property of the estate.” Md. L. Bankr. R. 9001-1(k).
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1. 	The Ruben Parties appear to lack standing to seek relief from this Court.
The Court questions whether the Ruben Parties are parties in interest who have standing to
seek dismissal of the Debtor’s bankruptcy case. It is unclear whether the Ruben Parties possess a
prepetition claim against the Debtor under Section 502(b),3 whether they have a post-petition claim
that may be allowed under Sections 507(a)(2) and 503(b),4 and whether the Debtor and the Ruben
Parties are parties to an executory contract with the Debtor subject to Section 365.5 If the answer
to any of these questions is in the affirmative, then the Ruben Parties would be parties in interest.
Although the Court cannot answer any of the questions based on the record, the Court need not
determine these issues to determine the Second Motion to Dismiss. In short, if the Ruben Parties
are not parties in interest, then the Second Motion to Dismiss must be denied because the movants
lack standing to seek dismissal. If the Ruben Parties are parties in interest with standing to seek
dismissal, then the Court must deny the Second Motion to Dismiss because the Ruben Parties have
not demonstrated “cause” under Section 1307(c).
Based on the record before the Court, it appears that the Ruben Parties are not “parties in
interest” in this bankruptcy case and, therefore, do not have standing to file the Second Motion to
Dismiss. All of the allegations against the Debtor made by the Ruben Parties relate to post-petition
events commencing on December 11, 2025, when the Debtor allegedly caused a “digital
kidnapping” or “blackout” that caused harm to the Ruben Parties. Any post-petition claim in favor
of the Ruben Parties arising from the Debtor’s actions would be allowed only if it falls within one
3 Section 502(b) sets forth the bases for a court to disallow a prepetition claim after an objection to the claim
is made.
4 Section 507(a)(2) provides that administrative expense claims allowed under Section 503(b) are entitled
to second priority (after certain domestic support obligations). Section 503(b) provides for the allowance
of administrative expense claims in nine narrowly-defined circumstances.
5 Section 365 addresses the rights of the debtor and counterparties under executory contracts (which term
is defined under case law) and unexpired leases of real and personal property.
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of the narrowly-defined subparagraphs of Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, and none of
those subparagraphs applies here.6
Moreover, the Court cannot determine, based on the record, that the Ruben Parties are
parties to an executory contract with the Debtor. The Debtor did not identify any potential contract
with the Ruben Parties (or anyone else) on his schedule of executory contracts and unexpired leases
(Schedule G), it appears the parties did not have a written agreement setting forth the terms
governing the parties’ relationship, and the Debtor’s company, AEPOP, LLC (as opposed to the
Debtor), issued the invoice to the Ruben Parties for services allegedly rendered. 	It is therefore
unclear whether there is an agreement between the Debtor and the Ruben Parties and, if so, when
any such agreement went into effect, what the terms were, and when the agreement terminated (if
it terminated). 	More importantly, there is nothing to confirm whether any agreement that may
have existed between the Debtor and the Ruben Parties constitutes an “executory contract” under
Section 365 and applicable law. Instead, the Ruben Parties’ counterclaim generally describes the
parties’ agreement as “a long-standing ‘Barter Arrangement’ where Counter-Plaintiffs provided
professional services to Watkins in exchange for web hosting and email services,” while the Debtor
generally claims the Ruben Parties owe him for services rendered from May to December 2025.
It is conceivable that the parties’ agreement could have been in place before the Debtor filed this
bankruptcy case on May 20, 2025, but notably, the Ruben Parties (a law firm and an attorney
admitted to practice in this Court) admit that they do not have standing in this bankruptcy case in
6 Section 1305(a) of the Bankruptcy Code also provides for the allowance of a post-petition claim under
two limited circumstances, but any claim the Ruben Parties’ may have falls far outside the scope of this
section.
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their opposition to the Supplemental Statement where they state that “they have no formal
standing, interest, or active engagement in the debtor’s estate asset distribution.”7
Lastly, the Ruben Parties have not filed a proof of claim against the Debtor in this case for
any pre- and/or post-petition legal services rendered to the Debtor.8
Simply put, there is nothing in the record to confirm that the Ruben Parties are parties in
interest with standing to seek relief from this Court.
2. 	The Ruben Parties have not demonstrated cause for dismissal.
Although the Court could conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Ruben
Parties are creditors, administrative expense claimants, and/or parties to an executory contract with
the Debtor, the Court need not conduct any such hearing because the Second Motion to Dismiss
fails to set forth sufficient cause to dismiss this case under Section 1307(c).
Section 1307 sets forth a nonexhaustive list of circumstances that may constitute “cause”
for conversion or dismissal:
(1) 	unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors;
(2) 	nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter
123 of title 28;
(3) 	failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;
(4) 	failure to commence making timely payments under section
1326 of this title;
7 The Ruben Parties are judicially estopped from asserting that they have standing to file the Second Motion
to Dismiss while admitting that they have no standing or interest in this bankruptcy case. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prohibit litigants
from “playing fast and loose” or “blowing hot and cold” by barring parties from taking inconsistent
positions during the course of litigation. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jones, 846 F.2d 221, 234 (4th Cir.
1988) (quoting United Virginia Bank v. B.F. Saul Real Estate, 641 F.2d 185, 190 (4th Cir. 1981)). See also
Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Constr., Inc., 608 U.S. 647, 655, 146 S.Ct. 1532, 1539 (2026) (“we assume without
deciding that judicial estoppel can apply in the bankruptcy context”). Although the Court could deny the
Second Motion to Dismiss based on the Ruben Parties’ admission that they lack standing, the Court prefers
to address matters on the merits.
8 The Ruben Parties have asserted no such claim, and the Court is not making any determination as to
whether any such claim would be allowable.
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(5) 	denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of this
title and denial of a request made for additional time for
filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(6) 	material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a
confirmed plan;
(7) 	revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330
of this title, and denial of confirmation of a modified plan
under section 1329 of this title;
(8) 	termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence
of a condition specified in the plan other than completion of
payments under the plan;
(9) 	only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the
debtor to file, within fifteen days, or such additional time as
the 	court 	may 	allow, 	after 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	petition
commencing 	such 	case, 	the 	information 	required 	by
paragraph (1) of section 521(a);
(10) 	only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely
file the information required by paragraph (2) of section
521(a); or
(11) 	failure of the debtor to pay any domestic support obligation
that first becomes payable after the date of the filing of the
petition.
11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).
In addition to these specific factors for dismissal, courts have recognized a “good faith”
requirement in the filing of Chapter 13 cases. As previously explained by this Court:
While bad faith is not included in the enumerated factors set forth in
Section 1307(c), courts have applied a “good faith” standard to
Chapter 13 cases when deciding whether to dismiss a case “for
cause” under Section 1307(c). 	Courts use a “totality of the
circumstances” test in determining whether a Chapter 13 case was
filed in good faith, and the burden of proving that the case should be
dismissed is on the moving party.
In re Kelly, 656 B.R. 541, 591 (Bankr. D. Md. 2023) (internal citations omitted), aff’d sub nom.
Kelly v. Naples Prop. Holding Co., LLC, 671 B.R. 432 (D. Md. 2025). 	Courts have also found
cause for dismissal when a bankruptcy case is a two-party dispute lacking a legitimate bankruptcy
purpose. As stated by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland:
A court may dismiss two-party disputes for cause because those
cases 	undermine 	the 	collective 	nature 	of 	bankruptcy. 	The
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Bankruptcy Code is “not intended to provide an additional forum for
the continuation of litigation over what is essentially a two-party
dispute.”
Liebmann v. Goden, 629 F.Supp.3d 314, 323 (D. Md. 2022) (citing In re Crown Fin., Ltd., 183
B.R. 719, 723 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995)), aff’d sub nom. Rullan v. Goden, No. 22-2099, 2023 WL
4787463 (4th Cir. July 27, 2023).
Here, the Second Motion to Dismiss does not rely on the specific examples of “cause” set
forth in Section 1307(c). Rather, the Ruben Parties argue that the Debtor’s bankruptcy case was
filed in bad faith because it lacks a legitimate financial purpose and consists of a “tactical litigation
maneuver designed to shelter a serial, pro se vexatious litigant from the consequences of his
tortious actions, while providing him a federal platform to continue a relentless campaign of
harassment against [the Ruben Parties].” The Court disagrees. As previously stated, six (6) proofs
of claim were filed in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, soundly suggesting that this case was filed
with an intent to reorganize the Debtor’s financial affairs. 	The number of filed claims also
confirms that this case is not a two-party dispute between the Debtor and the Ruben Parties (who
did not file proofs of claim). More importantly, however, is the fact that the State Court Action,
the Criminal Case, and the allegations underlying the Second Motion to Dismiss all took place
several months after the Debtor commenced this bankruptcy case. Clearly this case was not filed
with the intention of bringing the Debtor’s disputes with the Ruben Parties to a federal forum or
otherwise filed as a nefarious tactic in litigation that had not yet even commenced.
3. 	The Ruben Parties’ Second Motion to Dismiss must be denied.
In sum, the Court concludes that, based on the record before it, the Ruben Parties are not
parties in interest in this bankruptcy proceeding and thus lack standing to file the Second Motion
to Dismiss. The Court’s conclusion is based on the Ruben Parties’ failure to establish that they
have a claim against the Debtor entitled to treatment in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, failure to
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establish (or even assert) that there is an executory contract between the parties, and admission
that they have no standing in this case. 	Even if the Ruben Parties did have standing to request
relief from this Court, the Second Motion to Dismiss does not present sufficient cause to dismiss
this case as a bad-faith filing. Rather, it appears to the Court that the allegations contained in the
Second Motion to Dismiss and the Debtor’s related pleadings would be more appropriately
presented in the various state courts in which the parties are litigating. 	For these reasons, the
Second Motion to Dismiss must be denied.9
B. 	The Debtor’s Motion to Enforce Automatic Stay
The Court will deny the Debtor’s Motion to Enforce Automatic Stay for similar reasons.
The gravamen of the motion is that the Ruben Parties filed their counterclaim in the State Court
Action with knowledge of the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, allegedly violating the automatic stay
imposed by Section 362(a). 	Although the Ruben Parties may have had informal notice of the
bankruptcy case in light of the June 18, 2025 email attached to the Debtor’s reply in support of his
Supplemental Statement,10 the issue of notice is of no import because the Ruben Parties’ filing in
9 As a practical matter, the reprieve afforded the Debtor through denial of the Second Motion to Dismiss
will likely be short-lived. 	This Court expects that the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland will dismiss the Debtor’s appeal of the Order Denying Confirmation because it is not a “final
order” for purposes of appeal. See Byrd v. Branigan, No. CIV.A. AW-06-0895, 2006 WL 4458702, at *2
(Bankr. D. Md. Nov. 29, 2006) (“An order denying confirmation of a proposed Chapter 13 plan, without
also dismissing the underlying petition or proceeding, is not final for purposes of appeal.”). Once the appeal
is dismissed, this Court will either dismiss the Debtor’s bankruptcy case or convert it to a Chapter 7
proceeding.
10 The Ruben Parties only deny receiving “formal notice” of the Debtor’s bankruptcy case because they
were not identified in the Debtor’s schedules or creditor matrix. 	Nevertheless, “[n]otice or actual
knowledge of a bankruptcy case is described as ‘knowledge of facts sufficient to apprise the creditor that a
case was actually filed, and where the proceeding is pending.’” In re Foxson, 660 B.R. 633, 644 (Bankr.
D. Md. 2023) (quoting In re Taylor, 2009 WL 3398711 at *5 (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 2, 2009)), aff’d sub nom.
Foxson v. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., No. CV RDB-23-2843, 2024 WL 3252957 (D. Md. July 1, 2024).
Based on the email correspondence, it appears the Ruben Parties had knowledge of the bankruptcy case no
later than a month after the Debtor filed his Chapter 13 petition.
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the State Court of the counterclaim and motion to clarify the impact of the stay did not violate the
automatic stay.
The counterclaim seeks a judgment against the Debtor based on post-petition events. As
explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
A petition filed under Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code “operates as
a stay, applicable to all entities, of ... the commencement or
continuation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding 	against 	the 	debtor 	that 	was 	or 	could 	have 	been
commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.”
11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991). The stay is limited to
actions that could have been instituted before the petition was filed
or that are based on claims that arose before the petition was filed.
2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.04[1] (L. King 15th ed. 1989). 	It
does not include actions arising post-petition. Grady v. A.H. Robins
Co., 839 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260,
109 S.Ct. 201, 101 L.Ed.2d 972 (1988). Thus, this provision did not
bar the institution of the Pennsylvania district court action by Bellini
as a result of a post-petition breach of contract by Mason and Dixon.
See Weymouth v. York (In re York), 13 B.R. 757 (Bankr. D. Me.
1981).
However, the stay is also applicable to “any act to obtain possession
of property of the estate or of property from the estate” and to “any
act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate.” 	11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(3)–(4) (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
Because attachment or execution of a judgment obtained as a result
of a post-petition claim would fall within the stay provision of
subsections 362(a)(3) and (4), a creditor must obtain relief from the
stay to satisfy a judgment against property of the bankruptcy estate.
Bellini Imports, Ltd. v. Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 944 F.2d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1991). 	The
grounds for the Ruben Parties’ alleged counterclaim did not arise until December 11, 2025 – the
date of the alleged “blackout” – nearly seven months after the Debtor filed his Chapter 13 petition
on May 20, 2025. Therefore, the automatic stay imposed by Section 362(a) when the Debtor filed
his Chapter 13 petition could not have possibly stayed the filing of the then non-existing
counterclaim. Nevertheless, as discussed in Bellini, the Ruben Parties must obtain relief from the
automatic stay from this Court before undertaking “any act to obtain possession of property of the
Case 25-14502 Doc 130 Filed 09/30/26 Page 15 of 17

estate or of property from the estate” and/or “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate.” 	See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and (4) (imposing the automatic stay with
respect to these types of acts). See also Bellini Imports v. Mason and Dixon Lines, 944 F.2d at 201
(recognizing that the commencement of a post-petition proceeding is not stayed but an act to
enforce a post-petition judgment against property of the estate is). In other words, in the event the
Ruben Parties obtain a judgment against the Debtor in the State Court Action, they must come
back to this Court to obtain relief from the automatic stay for authorization to execute against any
property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate (if the Debtor’s bankruptcy case is still pending).
Similarly, the Ruben Parties’ filing of the subsequent request for clarification regarding the
application of the automatic stay in the State Court Action did not violate the automatic stay
because the filing occurred long after the bankruptcy filing.
The commencement of the Criminal Case also did not violate the automatic stay because
the Ruben Parties filed the application for charges post-petition and also because a criminal
proceeding is specifically exempted from application of the automatic stay in Section 362(b).11
Accordingly, the Debtor’s Motion to Enforce Automatic Stay and his request for damages
and/or sanctions pursuant to Section 362(k) must be denied.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the Second Motion to Dismiss, deny the
Motion to Enforce Automatic Stay, and deny the Debtor’s request for damages and sanctions. The
Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
11 “The filing of a petition … does not operate as a stay … under subsection (a) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.” 	11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(1).
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cc: 	Debtor – Drae Watkins (pro se)
Movants/Respondents – Stephen D. Ruben and Law Offices of Ruben and Ruben, LLC
Chapter 13 Trustee – Timothy P. Branigan
END OF MEMORANDUM
Case 25-14502 Doc 130 Filed 09/30/26 Page 17 of 17