Michael James Brooker

IN THE UNITED S TATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
F OR THE DISTRICT OF M ARYLAND
at Greenbelt
In Re: 	:
M ICHAEL BROOKER 	Case No. 05-19651
: 	Chapter 13
Debtor
. 	. 	. . 	. 	. 	.
BANK ONE, N.A.
C/ O OCWEN F EDERAL BANK, FSB
:
Movant 	:
v.
M ICHAEL BROOKER 	:
Debtor/Respondent. 	:
and
T RACYE ROBIN BROOKER 	:
Co-Debtor/Respondent. 	:
M EMORANDUM OF DECISION IN S UPPORT OF ORDER [44] GRANTING M OTION
F OR RELIEF F ROM S TAY TO P ERMIT RATIFICATION OF F ORECLOSURE S ALE ON P ROPERTY LOCATED
AT 904 M AHER COURT, F ORT WASHINGTON, MD 20744, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ANNULMENT OF
THE AUTOMATIC S TAY NUNC P RO TUNC TO APRIL 25, 2005, AND IMPOSING EQUITABLE S ERVITUDE
ENTERED AUGUST 26, 2005, AND CORRECTED ORDER [50] ENTERED S EPTEMBER 14, 2005
This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Relief from Stay to Permit Ratification of
Foreclosure Sale on Property Located at 904 Maher Court, Fort Washington, MD 20744 or, in the Alternative,
Date signed September 16, 2005
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Annulment of Automatic Stay Nunc Pro Tunc to April 25, 2005 [4] ( the "Lift Stay Motion") filed by Bank
One, N.A. (the "Creditor"), and the Response [13] thereto (the "Response") filed by the Debtor, Michael J.
Brooker (the "Debtor"). A hearing was held on the Lift Stay Motion and Response on May 26, 2005.
The Court has heard the evidence, reviewed the exhibits, considered the materials submitted by the
parties and had the benefit of the arguments of counsel. On August 26, 2005, the Court entered its Order [44]
Granting Motion For Relief from Stay to Permit Foreclosure Sale on Property Located at 904 Maher Court, Fort
Washington, MD 20744, or in the Alternative, Annulment of the Stay, and Imposing Equitable Servitude, and
on September 14, 2005, entered its Corrected Order [50] (together, the "Order").
In its Order, the Court stated that it would, contemporaneously or subsequently, set forth an
explanation of its decision for the benefit of the parties and any reviewing court. The Court now issues this
Memorandum of Decision of its findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Rule 7052(a) of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, made applicable to contested matters by Rule 9014 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
I. 	F ACTS
The Court finds the facts stated herein based upon an evaluation of the evidence including the
credibility of witnesses and the inferences which the Court has found reasonable to draw from the evidence.
A. 	The Parties.
Michael Brooker is the Debtor in this chapter 13 case. The case was commenced by voluntary petition
filed on April 25, 2005. Bank One, N.A. is the Creditor and movant in this contested matter brought against
the Debtor and Tracye Brooker. Tracye Brooker is the Debtor's spouse and Co-Debtor in this action (the "Co-
Debtor" or "Spouse"). This contested matter was commenced by the filing of the Lift Stay Motion. In the Lift
Stay Motion, the Creditor seeks from Debtor relief from the automatic stay of Section 362, and seeks from the
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1Unless otherwise indicated, all section and chapter references herein are to the Bankruptcy Code,
i.e., the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code.
2The Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice for Failure to Complete Required Filings [8] entered
on March 2, 2005 in Case No. 05-12666, states: "pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §105(a) and §13079(c) and Local
Bankruptcy Rule 1017-1, the above-captioned case [of Co-Debtor Tracye Brooker] under Chapter 13 is
dismissed subject to 11 U.S.C. §109(g) that prohibits a new filing by an individual debtor for 180 days. "
3It warrants mention that even in the instant case, it appears that the Debtor may be failing again
to comply with bankruptcy requirements. On June 10, 2005, the Chapter 13 Trustee filed a Motion to
Dismiss this Case for Debtor's Failure to Appear at the Meeting of Creditors without Excuse [31]. A
previously set hearing on this matter has been rescheduled for November 11, 2005.
3
Co-Debtor relief from the codebtor stay of Section 1301 of the Bankruptcy Code1
, so as to proceed with
foreclosure on a deed of trust on residential real property located at 904 Maher Court, Fort Washington, MD
20744 (the "Property").
B. 	The Operative Facts.
In a period of less than two years, the Debtor and his Spouse have filed five (5) separate, sequential
individual bankruptcy cases in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland:
1. 	On August 19, 2003, the Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition, Case No. 03-18152. This
case was dismissed on October 14, 2003 for failure to complete required filings.
2. 	On July 21, 2004, the Debtor filed another chapter 13 petition, Case No. 04-27295.
This case was dismissed on August 11, 2004 for failure to complete required filings.
3. 	On September 14, 2004, the Co-Debtor Spouse filed a chapter 13 petition, Case No.
04-31149. On September 23, 2004 the case was voluntarily dismissed.
4. 	On February 8, 2005, the Co-Debtor Spouse filed a chapter 13 petition, Case No. 05-
12666. This case was dismissed on March 2, 2005 for failure to complete required
filings. It is significant to note that as a result of this dismissal, and by virtue of the
Bankruptcy Code and Local Rules, the Co-Debtor became ineligible to file another
bankruptcy petition until August 30, 2005. 2
5. 	On April 25, 2005, the Debtor filed the instant chapter 13 case, Case No. 05-19651.3
This case was filed literally on the eve of the Creditor's scheduled foreclosure sale.
The Debtor concedes that each bankruptcy case was filed with the intention to prevent foreclosure on
the Property.
The Creditor commenced foreclosure on the Property and scheduled a foreclosure sale to take place
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4At the hearing, the substitute trustee, Jacob Geesing, testified as follows:
QUESTION: 	What transpired at the [foreclosure] sale?
MR. GEESING: 	I was at the Courthouse. I got a call [from my office] [. . .][My
office] received a call from Mr. Brooker saying that he had filed
for bankruptcy. [. . .] I called him. We hadn't conducted the
auction yet. [. . .] Apparently the bankruptcy was filed the day
before [the foreclosure sale]. I had noticed that in the morning
when I was searching the Pacer.
Tr. of 5/26/05 Hr’g p. 34-37: 23 - 5.
4
on April 26, 2005. On April 25, 2005, the Debtor filed the instant chapter 13 case. After the bankruptcy
petition was filed, but before the sale took place, the Debtor called the substitute trustee who was conducting
the foreclosure sale for the Creditor, and notified him of the Debtor's newly filed bankruptcy case. 	On the
morning of the sale, the substitute trustee conducted his own due diligence search for bankruptcies in the Court's
"Pacer" system, and discerned that the Debtor had indeed filed a chapter 13 petition the day before. It is
undisputed that the Creditor had notice of the Debtor's bankruptcy filing before the sale. 4
Also on the morning of the foreclosure sale, in another exercise of due diligence, the substitute trustee
conducted a title search on the Property. 	The title search revealed that the most recent deed of record was a
deed dated June 30, 2003. Under that deed, the Property had been deeded in its entirety from the Debtor to the
Co-Debtor. Accordingly, based on the title search, as of the morning of the foreclosure sale, the Creditor and
the substitute trustee believed that the Property was owned by the Co-Debtor and not the Debtor. The substitute
trustee also observed that since the Co-Debtor was prohibited from filing another bankruptcy case until August
30, 2005 (See f.n. 2, above), no automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code protecting the record owner could be
in effect to thwart the April 26, 2005 foreclosure sale. Consequently, on April 26, 2005, a foreclosure sale was
held which produced a bid-purchaser. The Creditor seeks to ratify that foreclosure sale in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County, Maryland and to that end, filed the Lift Stay Motion.
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The Creditor and the Debtor disagree whether the Debtor or his Spouse was "in title" to the Property
at the time of sale. The Debtor maintains that a Quitclaim Deed was executed on March 4, 2005 transferring
the Property to the Debtor from his Spouse for $10.00. They also disagree whether the Debtor advised the
Creditor or substitute trustee of the existence of the Quitclaim Deed prior to the April 26, 2005 foreclosure sale.
The substitute trustee maintains that he specifically asked the Debtor whether he was "in title" to the Property
when the Debtor reported his recent bankruptcy filing, and that the Debtor said he was not. It is undisputed that
the Quitclaim Deed, to the extent it existed on the sale date, was unrecorded. In short, the Debtor posits that
because he was "in title" under the Quitclaim Deed, that the Property was "property of the estate" under Section
541, and therefore that the Property was protected by the bankruptcy stay on the sale date. On the other hand,
the Creditor's Lift Stay Motion seeks permission to ratify the sale, and seeks alternatively the retroactive
annulment (to April 25, 2005) of the stay of Section 362 and the codebtor stay of Section 1301, to the extent
they existed at the time of sale.
The Court cannot find that a Quitclaim Deed was executed by the Co-Debtor in favor of the Debtor
in March of 2005. 	The testimony of the Debtor and his Spouse on this point is not credible, and no
corroborative evidence was presented. 	(The notary who supposedly notarized the Quitclaim Deed did not
appear to testify at the hearing.) There was no logical reason given why this Quitclaim Deed would have been
executed, or why it would have been left unrecorded. The Court simply does not believe the testimony of the
Debtor that the Deed was left unrecorded for almost two months on purpose, on the advice of a financial
institution from which the Debtor and his Spouse supposedly were seeking refinancing. 	Allegedly, 	the
refinance company told the Debtor not to record because the company would do the recordation properly at the
time of refinance. Again, this testimony is uncorroborated. (The purported advisor from the refinance company
who might have substantiated the existence of the Deed, as well as his alleged advice not to record the deed,
was not produced.) Further, the Court believes the testimony of the substitute trustee that the Debtor did not
mention the Quitclaim Deed when he informed the substitute trustee just prior to the foreclosure sale about his
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latest bankruptcy filing. The Court finds credible the testimony of the Creditor that the first time the Creditor
ever heard of the Quitclaim Deed was in the Debtor's Response to the Lift Stay Motion, and that the first time
the Creditor ever saw the Quitclaim Deed was when it was produced by the Debtor as an exhibit in connection
with this contested matter. The Court finds that disclosure about the Quitclaim Deed was not made to the
Creditor prior to the April 26, 2005 foreclosure sale, and indeed that the Quitclaim Deed did not then exist. In
keeping with this view of the facts, the Creditor would be entitled to proceed with ratification because on the
sale date, the Property would have been the property of the Co-Debtor, who was not then a debtor (and who
was precluded from becoming one again until August 30, 2005).
However, as discussed herein, even if the Court assumes that a Quitclaim Deed to the Property had been
executed on March 4, 2005 by the Co-Debtor in favor of the Debtor for $10.00 (and that the Deed remained
unrecorded on April 26, 2005), the Court would still grant the relief requested in the Lift Stay Motion. Stated
differently, even assuming the existence of the unrecorded Deed, the Creditor would be entitled to nunc pro
tunc annulment of the automatic stay and the codebtor stay given the facts and circumstances of this case. This
is the relief granted by the Court.
II. 	ISSUES
The Court must decide whether the Debtor held equitable or legal title to the Property at the time he
filed the instant chapter 13 case, and whether the Property constituted property the estate upon which the
Creditor foreclosed without consent or a court order granting stay relief. If the Property was not property of
the estate, the Court must decide whether to enter an order allowing the Creditor to consummate the sale now
by authorizing ratification. If the Property was property of Debtor's estate at the time of the foreclosure sale,
the Court must decide whether given the facts and circumstances of this case, the stays should be annulled nunc
pro tunc, thereby permitting the Creditor to proceed now with ratification.
Case 05-19651 Doc 53 Filed 09/16/05 Page 6 of 13

5The Stay Relief Motion at Paragraph 4 states: "Tracye Brooker is the Co-Debtor in this action."
The Debtor's Response at Paragraph 2 admits this allegation.
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III. 	LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. 	The Applicable Law
A debtor's bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 11 U.S.C. §541. 	The legal and equitable interests of a
debtor at the commencement of a bankruptcy case are defined and created according to state law. Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). This Court looks to Maryland law to determine if the instant Debtor held
a legal or equitable interest in the Property, by virtue of an unrecorded quitclaim deed, at the time he filed his
bankruptcy petition.
B. 	Maryland Property Law
Under Maryland law, an unrecorded deed conveys an equitable interest upon its delivery to the grantee,
but subordinate to any recorded transfer made later to a party without knowledge of the unrecorded deed. See
Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403, 414 (Md. 1851) (an equitable claim will be enforced in a court of equity, except
against a bona fide purchaser without notice.) See Md. Code Ann. Real Prop. §3-202-203 (2004) . Under
Maryland law, the unrecorded Quitclaim Deed dated March 4, 2005 would have conveyed to the Debtor at least
an equitable interest in the Property which interest the Debtor held at the time he commenced the present
bankruptcy case.
C. 	The Bankruptcy Framework
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." Accordingly,
applying Maryland property law in the context of this Bankruptcy Code provision, Debtor's equitable interest
in the Property constituted property of Debtor's bankruptcy estate under Section 541 when he filed his petition.
The Property was protected by the automatic stay of Section 362, and incidentally, the co-debtor stay of Section
1301 was invoked given the Spouse's codebtor status. 5
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The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an automatic stay that "serves as an injunction [to protect]
the debtor, debtor's property and property of the estate from certain creditor actions." In re Thompson-Mendez,
321 B.R. 814 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005). The filing of a consumer bankruptcy petition under chapter 13 also creates
a codebtor stay under Section 1301 that protects nondebtors who are liable with the debtor on consumer debts.
Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 3d Ed. (2000 & Supp. 2004) at p. 84.1. (The automatic stay of
Section 362 and the codebtor stay of Section 1301 are together sometimes referred to herein as the "stays.")
The Creditor's post-petition foreclosure sale of Property without having obtained consent or court-ordered relief,
violated the stays. Given the aforesaid findings of fact, however, including the Creditor's pre-sale due diligence
into "Pacer" and its title search, the Court finds that the Creditor's violation was not a knowing violation of the
stay.
Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. In re Bennett, 317 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D. Md.
2004); see also In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). However, post-petition violations of the
automatic stay may be validated if the stay is "annulled" retroactively. 	In re Williams, 323 B.R. 691 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2005). Section 362(d) states that a court may terminate, annul, modify, or condition an automatic stay
if a party in interest sets forth cause. 11 U.S.C. §362(d). The codebtor stay of Section 1301 may similarly be
annulled for cause shown. In re Allen, 300 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. D.C. 2003).
The decision whether to "grant retroactive relief from the [stay] under §362(d) is a decision committed
to the discretion of the bankruptcy court." In re Williams, 323 B.R. at 700. 	In determining whether to annul
a stay, courts have identified various factors. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 	adopted "a
balancing of the equities approach for analyzing a request for retroactive stay relief, and identified two factors
to be considered by the bankruptcy court: (1) whether the creditor was aware of the bankruptcy petition; and
(2) whether the debtor engaged in unreasonable or inequitable conduct, or prejudice would result to the
creditor." In re Williams, 323 B.R. at 700, quoting from In re Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d 1052, 1055-
1056 (9th Cir. 1997). Additional factors considered by courts have included: "the number of [a debtor's]
bankruptcy filings; the extent of any prejudice to a bona fide purchaser; the debtor's overall good faith; the
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debtor's compliance with the Code; how quickly the creditor moved for annulment; and how quickly the debtor
moved to set aside the transfer." In re Williams, 323 B.R. at 700, citing In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. 12, 24-25 (9th
Cir. BAP 2003). Further, "in any given case, one factor may so outweigh the others as to be dispositive." Id.
In In re Williams, a chapter 13 debtor sought to recover damages for a creditor's violation of the
automatic stay. The debtor resided in a condominium purchased in 1995, deeded to the debtor's fiancee on
April 21, 1999 and quitclaim deeded back to the debtor that same day. The deed to the debtor was unrecorded.
When the debtor failed to pay homeowners dues, the creditor gave notice of intent to conduct a non-judicial
foreclosure sale. The debtor filed for bankruptcy two days prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale. The creditor
proceeded with the non-judicial sale with full knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy filing. The bid-purchaser
brought an action against the debtor in state court for unlawful detainer which resulted in a judgment for the
bid-purchaser. The bid-purchaser, having been successful in state court, took possession of the premises until
the bankruptcy court issued an order that allowed the debtor to return to the property. Subsequently, the
debtor's bankruptcy case was dismissed for failure to comply with bankruptcy requirements whereupon the
automatic stay was terminated.
Upon termination of the automatic stay, the bid-purchaser brought an action in state court to quiet title
and to cancel the debtor's deed. The debtor proceeded to file his third bankruptcy petition. The bid-purchaser
moved for relief from stay to "obtain possession" of the premises and to annul the automatic stay. The debtor
opposed the motion and argued that the bid-purchaser had violated the automatic stay in debtor's second
bankruptcy case. 323 B.R. at 695. The bankruptcy court annulled the stay, and in so doing, reviewed a number
of the aforementioned factors. The debtor had filed multiple (three) bankruptcy cases, each as a means to avoid
foreclosure and eviction. The debtor was unable to confirm a plan. The debtor had engaged in numerous
litigation tactics to avoid eviction, including filing actions in state court. 	Finally, the debtor had not moved
to set aside the foreclosure sale as void. Id at 701-702.
Relief from the automatic stay may be granted for "cause," which is not defined specifically by Section
362. "Bad faith" by a debtor in the filing or conduct of his bankruptcy may constitute "cause" for relief from
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the automatic stay. In re AUFCMP Church, 184 B.R. 207, 218 (Bankr. D. Del. 1995), citing In re Dixie
Broadcasting, Inc., 871 F. 2d 1023, 1027 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 853, 110 S. Ct. 154, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 112 (1989). Bad faith, based on the pre-petition transfers of assets to a different debtor has been found
when "the substantive rights of any of the creditors to assets, available prior to the transfer of the property, have
been eroded by the transfer and subsequent [bankruptcy] filing." In re Allen, 300 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D.D.C.
2003), citing In re Franklin Mortgage & Inv. Co., Inc., 143 B.R. 295, 300 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992).
In Allen, the debtor received a deed conveying to her a 50% ownership interest in her son's home, only
"days before" she filed her bankruptcy case. 300 B.R. at 111. At the time of the conveyance, the debtor's son
was in default in payment under a note secured by a deed of trust on the property, but he was ineligible to file
for bankruptcy. Based on the default, the creditor who was unaware of the debtor's interest in the property,
conducted a foreclosure sale on the property without obtaining stay relief. The property was sold to a bid
purchaser. The bankruptcy court was later asked to annul to the stay.
The court determined that the third party purchaser would be unfairly prejudiced. It found that the
debtor had engaged in what has sometimes been called "new debtor syndrome " - a scenario in which a former
debtor who has become ineligible to file bankruptcy conveys property to another individual (e.g., a mother or
spouse), who then becomes a new debtor by filing a bankruptcy petition to protect the property from
foreclosure. The court in Allen found that the debtor's conduct constituted an abuse of the bankruptcy system
and was an effort to frustrate and delay the creditor and third party purchaser. The court annulled the stay and
the codebtor stay. 	Id. at 123.
D. 	Equitable Servitude
In In re Yimam, 214 B. R. 463 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997), this Court (the Honorable Paul Mannes),
fashioned an elegant remedy to prevent continuing abuse of the bankruptcy system by a chapter 13 debtor and
the debtor's nonfiling spouse who between them had filed seven individual bankruptcy cases designed to thwart
creditor foreclosure action on their residence. Relying upon reasoning in In re Snow (Great Western Bank v.
Snow), 201 B.R. 968 (Bankr. C. D. CA. 1996), this Court issued an in rem order that operated as an "equitable
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6The Court made clear that the equitable servitude did not preclude the debtor or spouse from
filing another bankruptcy petition when permitted by law to do so, (e.g., when any time bars to filing
elapsed), and did not bar sale or refinance of the property. Id. at 467.
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servitude" on property "to preclude the debtor and his successors from taking advantage of the automatic stay
. . . for a period sufficient to enable the creditor holding the secured claim to consummate a foreclosure." 214
B.R. at 466. The equitable servitude consisted of placing a restriction on the subject property such that the
filing of a bankruptcy case by an entity would not extend the protection of the automatic stay to that property
for a given period, and would not thwart any foreclosure action then pending or later filed.6
In Yimam, as noted, the debtor and her spouse had filed numerous individual bankruptcy cases and had
failed to comply with various bankruptcy requirements. The Yimam case arose in the context of a trustee's
motion to dismiss, but is not limited in its application to cases in that procedural posture. Yimam should be
equally applicable to a case in a different procedural posture, e g. to a lift stay case, or indeed to any case in
which the imposition of an equitable servitude would curb a similar abuse and permit sufficient time (where
equitable) for a creditor to consummate a foreclosure.
IV. 	DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This Court finds grounds for retroactively annulling the automatic stay and codebtor stay to validate
the April 26, 2005 sale, and permit ratification of the Creditor's foreclosure sale in Prince George's County.
In the instant case, Debtor and Co-Debtor together have filed five bankruptcy cases. Neither party ever
successfully reorganized. The Debtor has failed to meet even the minimal demands of bankruptcy, such as
filing the routine documents and appearing at meetings of creditors. The Debtor has admitted that his purpose
in filing his bankruptcy petitions has been to avoid imminent foreclosures. 	On March 4, 2005, almost
immediately after Co-Debtor's second bankruptcy case was dismissed, the Co-Debtor conveyed the subject
Property via Quitclaim Deed to the Debtor for $10.00. The Debtor then proceeded to file his third bankruptcy
petition on April 25, 2005, and sought to evade an imminent foreclosure sale on April 26, 2005. The Debtor
and Co-Debtor utilized a Quitclaim Deed to convey an interest in the subject Property to the Debtor, who was
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eligible to file bankruptcy, and thus evaded the Co-Debtors's existing bar against filing. 	The Debtor has
engaged in dilatory and evasive tactics. The Court deems these actions to have been inequitable, prejudicial
to the Creditor, and abusive of the privileges afforded by bankruptcy. In their totality, they constitute bad faith
on the part of the Debtor and CoDebtor in the filing and conduct of case(s) under title 11.
The Creditor, on the other hand, has acted reasonably and responsibly. On its own and in concert with
the substitute trustee, the Creditor has performed due diligence right up to the day of sale (i.e., checked the
Court's "Pacer" system for new bankruptcies by the Co-Debtor and Debtor, and performed a title search to
corroborate its belief that the Debtor did not own the Property). The Creditor did not know of the alleged
Quitclaim Deed at the time of sale and acted in the good faith belief that the Debtor did not own the Property.
The Creditor acted timely in seeking stay relief/annulment. The Creditor will be unfairly prejudiced if the
consummation of this foreclosure sale is permitted to be thwarted.
Consistent with holdings in cases such as Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp., Williams and Allen, all supra, the
Court finds in this case factors demonstrative of bad faith on the Debtor's and Co-Debtor's part. The patterns
exhibited by the Debtor and Co-Debtor and their actions as catalogued above constitute bad faith, and are
compelling cause for the Court to lift the stay and the codebtor stay, and to exercise its discretion to annul the
automatic stay and the codebtor stay retroactively.
The Court also finds in the circumstances of this case, consistent with the Yimam case, supra., that
reason exists to impose an equitable servitude on the Property for the period through August 31, 2006, to permit
the Creditor to conclude its foreclosure case. Such remedy is necessary and appropriate to provide the Creditor
with complete relief given that the Co-Debtor is again eligible to file another bankruptcy case as of August 30,
2005. (See f.n. 2, supra.). Further filing(s) and abuse of the automatic stay to thwart the Creditor's foreclosure
would be possible absent such in rem relief. It would be inequitable to permit further abuse of the system and
prejudice to the Creditor.
The Court will grant Bank One N.A.'s Motion for Relief from Stay to Permit Ratification of Foreclosure
Sale on Property Located at 904 Maher Court, Fort Washington, MD 20744 or, in the Alternative, Annulment
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of Automatic Stay Nunc Pro Tunc to April 25, 2005 and allow Creditor to proceed with State Court ratification
of the foreclosure sale. 	Annulment of the automatic stay and codebtor stay is appropriate based on the
foregoing findings, as is the imposition of an equitable servitude on the subject real property for the specified
period.
An appropriate order has been entered.
cc:
Michael Brooker, Debtor
Tracye Brooker, Co-Debtor
Eric Soderberg, Esq.
Gene Jung, Esq
Chapter 13 Trustee
US Trustee
END OF MEMORANDUM
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