Alcantara Guerrero v. Wesling et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
DONEIBYS ALCANTARA GUERRERO, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-10928-JEK
)
DAVID WESLING, ANTONE MONIZ, 	)
TODD LYONS, and MARKWAYNE 	)
MULLIN,1 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
KOBICK, J.
Petitioner Doneibys Alcantara Guerrero, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, has filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking his immediate release or,
alternatively, a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In December 2022, Alcantara
Guerrero entered the United States and, after a short detention, was released on an interim parole
that expired in February 2023. On January 19, 2026, he was arrested for, and charged with, assault
and battery on a police officer, in violation of M.G.L. c. 265, § 13D, and then detained by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
The respondents contend that Alcantara Guerrero is subject to mandatory detention as an
applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). They acknowledge, however, that this Court
has repeatedly held in similar cases that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—not Section 1225(b)—governs the
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current U.S. Secretary of Homeland
Security, Markwayne Mullin, is substituted as a defendant in this action.
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detention of petitioners like Alcantara Guerrero. Thus, in the alternative, the respondents argue
that Alcantara Guerrero is subject to mandatory detention under the Laken Riley Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1)(E), as a noncitizen who is inadmissible and has been charged with, and arrested for,
assault on a law enforcement officer. Assuming without deciding that his arrest for assault and
battery on a police officer falls within the scope of that statute, requiring mandatory detention
based solely on his arrest and charge—without the opportunity for a bond hearing or any initial
procedural protections—violates Alcantara Guerrero’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
Accordingly, his petition will be granted and the respondents will be ordered to release him in one
week unless they provide him with a bond hearing.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Statutory Framework.
Two statutes principally govern the detention of “noncitizens” or “aliens” pending removal
proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225, which applies to noncitizens “present in
the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), “authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country,” Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Section 1226, in contrast, “authorizes the Government to detain certain
aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added).
Section 1226(a) establishes a discretionary detention framework for noncitizens arrested and
detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” For such individuals, the Attorney
General (1) “may continue to detain the arrested alien,” (2) “may release the alien on . . . bond of
at least $1,500,” or (3) “may release the alien on . . . conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(1)-
(2). The arresting immigration officer makes an initial custody determination, but noncitizens have
the right to request a custody redetermination or bond hearing before an immigration judge. See 8
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C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). Bond may be denied only if the government “either (1) prove[s] by
clear and convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community or
(2) prove[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.”
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021).
Section 1226(c) is the sole exception to Section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention
framework. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (c) . . . the Attorney General
. . . may”); id. § 1226(c)(1) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . .”
(emphasis added)). Until recently, Section 1226(c) required the detention of noncitizens who are
inadmissible or deportable because they have committed or been sentenced for certain criminal
offenses, or because they are affiliated with terrorist groups or activities. See id. §§ 1226(c)(1)(A)-
(D). Through the Laken Riley Act, enacted in January 2025, Congress expanded Section 1226(c)’s
mandatory detention to a new category of noncitizens who meet two criteria. See Pub. L. No. 119-
1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025) (adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)). Under the Act, the Attorney General
must also detain a noncitizen if he (i) is inadmissible because he is present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), obtained documents or admission
through misrepresentation or fraud, id. § 1182(a)(6)(C), or lacks valid documentation, id.
§ 1182(a)(7); and (ii) “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed,
or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny,
shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or
serious bodily injury to another person,” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(E).
II. 	Factual Background.
On December 4, 2022, Alcantara Guerrero entered the United States from the Dominican
Republic without inspection and was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. ECF 1,
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¶¶ 2, 22; ECF 7-1. He was released on interim parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) three days
later. ECF 1-1; ECF 1, ¶ 3. That same month, ICE initiated removal proceedings against him by
issuing a Notice to Appear, which was subsequently filed in Boston Immigration Court. ECF 7-1.
His parole expired in February 2023. ECF 1-1; ECF 1, ¶ 3.
Nearly three years later, on January 19, 2026, Alcantara Guerrero was arrested for assault
and battery on a police officer, in violation of M.G.L. c. 265, § 13D, and for the common-law
offense of interfering with a police officer. ECF 10, at 2-4. Those charges remain pending in
Lawrence 	District 	Court. 	See 	ECF 	7-2; 	Commonwealth 	v. 	Alcantara 	Guerrero, 	No.
2618CR000186 (Lawrence Dist. Ct.). That same day, ICE arrested him under a Form I-200 warrant
that was “authorized pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act”—
i.e., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1357. ECF 7-3, at 1; see ECF 1, ¶¶ 6, 22. Alcantara Guerrero remains
in ICE’s custody at Plymouth County Correctional Facility in Massachusetts. ECF 1, ¶¶ 6, 13.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Section 1226(a) versus Section 1225(b).
The respondents contend that Alcantara Guerrero is lawfully detained as an applicant for
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), even though he has been in this country for three years
and was brought into ICE custody pursuant to a warrant issued by the Attorney General. The
respondents acknowledge, however, that “the legal issues presented in this Petition are similar to
those addressed by this Court” in Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265 (D. Mass. 2025); dos Santos
v. Noem, No. 25-cv-12052-JEK, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Sampiao v. Hyde,
799 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D. Mass. 2025); and Escobar Avelar v. Moniz, No. 26-cv-10509-JEK, ECF 8
(D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2026). ECF 7, at 3. In those cases, this Court held that the discretionary
detention framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—not the mandatory detention framework of Section
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1225(b)—governed the petitioner’s detention. See Gomes, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 276; dos Santos,
2025 WL 2370988, at *7; Sampiao, 799 F. Supp. 3d at 28; ECF 8, Escobar Avelar, No. 26-cv-
10509-JEK. The respondents contend that “[s]hould the Court follow its reasoning in Gomes, dos
Santos, Sampiao, and Escobar Avelar it would reach the same conclusion.” ECF 7, at 3-4. The
Court agrees. For the reasons given in those cases, and absent another statutory basis for detention,
Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), governs Alcantara Guerrero’s detention.
II. 	Section 1226(c)(1)(E).
The respondents alternatively argue that Alcantara Guerrero is subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), as amended by the Laken Riley Act. That statute provides, in
pertinent part, that the “Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . . (i) is
inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this title; and (ii) is
charged with [or] is arrested for . . . any . . . assault of a law enforcement officer offense.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1)(E). The term “assault of a law enforcement officer” is defined to “have the meanin[g]
given . . . in the jurisdiction in which the ac[t] occurred.” Id. § 1226(c)(2).
The parties dispute whether the crime for which Alcantara Guerrero was arrested and
charged—assault and battery upon a police officer, in violation of M.G.L. c. 265, § 13D—
constitutes an “assault of a law enforcement officer offense” under the Laken Riley Act. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1)(E). In Alcantara Guerrero’s view, Section 1226(c)(1)(E) does not apply to the
Massachusetts offense because, under the categorical approach, the state crime is not an exact term
match with the federal statute.2 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-95 (2013) (using
2 At the time of Alcantara Guerrero’s arrest, Section 13D criminalized “commit[ting] an assault
and battery upon any public employee when such person is engaged in the performance of his
duties at the time of such assault and battery.” M.G.L. c. 265, § 13D. The Supreme Judicial Court
has explained that the statute “encompasses all assault and batteries against ‘any public employee,’
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the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction for possession with intent to distribute
marijuana under Georgia law constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, a determination that affected the noncitizen’s eligibility for relief from removal).
The respondents disagree that the Court should apply the categorical approach to assess whether
the federal statute covers the state offense. They also maintain that an Immigration Judge, not this
Court, should determine in the first instance whether the Laken Riley Act applies to the crime for
which Alcantara Guerrero was arrested and with which he is charged.
The Court does not need to resolve these disputes because it can assume, favorably to the
respondents, that Alcantara Guerrero’s arrest and charge for assault and battery on a police officer
qualifies as an “assault of a law enforcement officer offense” under the Laken Riley Act. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). Even so, the Court must determine whether, as Alcantara Guerrero argues,
mandatory detention pursuant to that statute infringes his procedural due process rights. In his
view, Section 1226(c)(1)(E) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by requiring
mandatory detention based solely on his arrest and charge, without affording him a bond hearing
or any other initial procedural safeguard. Disputing that due process entitles Alcantara Guerrero
to a bond hearing, the respondents point to Demore v. Kim, which held that mandatory detention
pursuant to Section 1226(c) based on a prior conviction is constitutionally permissible for a limited
period of time. See 538 U.S. 510, 513, 529 (2003) (under Section 1226(c), “detention ha[s] a
definite termination point” and “in the majority of cases it lasts for less than . . . 90 days”). As the
respondents see it, this Court should consider only whether Alcantara Guerrero’s detention is
unreasonably prolonged, and they argue that, at less than three months, it is not.
and is not restricted to police officers.” Commonwealth v. Beal, 474 Mass. 341, 353 (2016),
abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Guardado, 493 Mass. 1 (2023).
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Demore cannot bear the weight the respondents put on it. In Demore, the petitioner
“conceded that he [was] deportable” and subject to Section 1226(c) because he had been convicted
of two crimes—first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors—“following the full procedural
protections our criminal justice system offers.” Id. at 513, 531. Mandatory detention of such
convicted noncitizens “necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens
from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings” and thus comports with due process,
the Supreme Court explained. Id. at 528. The Court looked in particular to Congress’s findings
that allowing discretionary release of noncitizens with criminal convictions “pending their removal
hearings would lead to large numbers . . . skipping their hearings and remaining at large in the
United States unlawfully.” Id.
Here, by contrast, Alcantara Guerrero has merely been arrested for, and charged with,
assault and battery on a police officer. He has not been convicted of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, nor has he received “the full procedural protections” of the criminal justice
system, including a trial by a jury of his peers. Id. at 513; see also id. at 525 n.9 (noting that the
petitioners were detained after “criminal convictions that were secured following full procedural
protections” and that “Congress considered relevant to future dangerousness”). Alcantara Guerrero
is not in the same “class of noncitizens who ha[ve] already been convicted (beyond a reasonable
doubt) of committing certain serious crimes” for whom the Supreme Court found mandatory
detention to be constitutionally permissible. Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35. And unlike the
portion of Section 1226(c) considered in Demore, the Laken Riley Act does not contain
comparable legislative findings to support the proposition that people arrested for or charged
with—though not convicted of—any of the listed offenses pose a heightened danger to the
community or a flight risk. See Doe v. Moniz, 800 F. Supp. 3d 203, 216-17 (D. Mass. 2025)
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(rejecting the government’s argument that Demore authorizes mandatory detention for mere arrests
under the Laken Riley Act and concluding that such detention without a bond hearing violates due
process).
Demore does not, accordingly, suggest that the government may constitutionally subject
Alcantara Guerrero to mandatory detention without any process at all, so long as the detention
does not become unreasonably prolonged. Rather, the question whether the Laken Riley Act, as
applied, comports with due process must be analyzed by looking to the factors articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-28 (applying the
Mathews factors to a due process challenge under Section 1226(a)); Black v. Almodovar, 156 F.4th
171, 203, 210 (2d Cir. 2025) (statement in supp. of denial of reh’g en banc) (suggesting that the
“new breadth of § 1226(c),” which “was amended to cover . . . those who have no criminal
convictions but have been arrested or charged with certain offenses,” “may call for new
considerations” under “the Mathews balancing framework”). Those factors are: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
The first factor weighs heavily in Alcantara Guerrero’s favor. The Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from “depriv[ing]” any “person . . . of . . . liberty
. . . without due process of law.” “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Because “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
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trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
755 (1987), civil “commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection,” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quotation marks
omitted). For nearly three months, Alcantara Guerrero has been detained at Plymouth County
Correctional Facility alongside criminal inmates. ECF 1, ¶ 29. He has been unable to work and is
an hour away from his family and home. Id. This constitutes “a substantial deprivation of [his]
liberty.” Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 28.
The second factor strongly supports Alcantara Guerrero as well. The risk of erroneous
deprivation is high because he is being detained based solely on an arrest and charge for which he
is presumed innocent. See Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 216-17 (addressing shoplifting arrest). He has
not been afforded the opportunity to contest that charge or offered “the full procedural protections”
of the criminal justice system. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529; see Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 152
(2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]he almost nonexistent procedural protections in place for section 1226(c)
detainees markedly increased the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioners’ private liberty
interests.”). Nor are the respondents required to prove that he poses a flight risk or is a danger to
the community to keep him detained. See Brito v. Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 246 (1st Cir. 2021).
Without any congressional finding that noncitizens like Alcantara Guerrero pose a heightened risk
of flight or danger, the respondents are relying solely on the fact that he has been charged with an
offense to keep him detained. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 36 (distinguishing Demore on the
ground that “no similar findings regarding dangerousness or flight risk have been made as to the
class of noncitizens detained under section 1226(a)”).
The third factor, which “ultimately entails an assessment of the ‘public interest,’” “is
uncertain at best” for the respondents. Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 32-33 (quoting Mathews, 424
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U.S. at 347). The respondents have an interest, as Alcantara Guerrero acknowledges, in “ensuring
that persons subject to possible removal do not commit crimes or evade law enforcement during
the pendency of their removal proceedings.” ECF 1, ¶ 33. But that interest would be protected by
giving Alcantara Guerrero a bond hearing, which would evaluate whether he poses a risk of flight
or danger to the community. Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. And the respondents do not explain
why an “interest in securing appearance at removal proceedings and for deportation holds sway
where a noncitizen is not a flight risk” or risk of danger. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). Further, there
are societal benefits to “limiting the use of detention to only those noncitizens who are dangerous
or a flight risk”: the more nuanced approach “may save the government, and therefore the public,
from expending substantial resources on needless detention.” Id. at 33. And “unnecessary
detention imposes substantial societal costs,” including decreased tax revenue and economic
contributions by detained noncitizens. Id. The public interest is not well served where, as here, a
noncitizen is detained without a bond hearing—and thus an opportunity for an immigration judge
to determine whether he poses a danger to the community or a flight risk—simply because he was
arrested for, and charged with, an offense under Section 1226(c). See Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 217;
Black, 103 F.4th at 154 (finding public interest “in minimizing the enormous impact of
incarceration in cases where it serves no purpose” because “the noncitizen poses no danger and is
not a flight risk” (quotation marks omitted)).
On balance, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Alcantara Guerrero. His significant
liberty interest, together with the substantial risk of erroneous deprivation from being detained
based solely on an arrest and unproven charge, outweighs any administrative burden associated
with providing him a bond hearing. Because Alcantara Guerrero’s continued detention violates his
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant
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to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Doe, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 217; C.R.R. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-1282-MJD-
DJF, 2026 WL 752462, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 2026) (collecting Laken Riley Act cases holding
that “a bond hearing was the appropriate remedy for the violation of due process”).3
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Alcantara Guerrero’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF 1, is GRANTED. The respondents are ORDERED to release Alcantara
Guerrero from the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement by 5:00 p.m. on April
13, 2026 unless an Immigration Judge determines, at a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), that he poses a flight risk or a danger to the community under the standard set forth in
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). The respondents are further ORDERED
to file a status report on or before April 14, 2026, notifying the Court whether Alcantara Guerrero
has been granted bond and released or, if his request for bond was denied, providing the reasons
for that denial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Julia E. Kobick
JULIA E. KOBICK
Dated: April 6, 2026 	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 The respondents’ invocation of Zambrano Urena v. Plymouth Cnty. Corr. Facility is also
misplaced. ECF 16, No. 25-cv-13352-JEK (D. Mass. Dec. 9, 2025). In that case, unlike here, the
petitioner did not “contest the government’s reliance on Section 1226(c)(1)(E) as a basis for his
detention” or “rais[e] any other challenge to the Laken Riley Act.” Id.
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