Roldan Roldan v. Moniz et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
NOE EXCEQUIEL ROLDAN ROLDAN,
Petitioner,
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Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-10017-IT
v. 	*
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ANTONE MONIZ, Superintendent of Plymouth
County Correctional Facility; DAVID WESLING,
Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Enforcement Removal
Operations, Boston Field Office; PATRICIA
HYDE, Acting Field Office Director; TODD M.
LYONS, Acting Director U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; KRISTI L. NOEM, U.S.
Secretary of Homeland Security; PAMELA
BONDI, U.S. Attorney General.
Respondents.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
January 21, 2026
TALWANI, D.J.
Petitioner Noe Excequiel Roldan Roldan is a Ecuadorian national residing in
Massachusetts. Resp’ts’ Opp’n, Ex. 1 at 1 [Doc. No. 6-1], Ex. 4 at 2 [Doc. No. 6-4] (listing
Westborough, Massachusetts address). Petitioner was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) on January 3, 2026. Resp’ts’ Opp’n 2 [Doc. No. 6]. Petitioner alleges, and
Respondents agree, that, “Petitioner is currently detained at Plymouth County Correctional
Facility pursuant to ICE custody.” Pet. ¶ 12 [Doc. No. 1]; Resp’ts’ Opp’n 2 [Doc. No. 6].
I. 	Background
On January 5, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1]
with this court. Petitioner contends that ICE’s detention of him, denial of a bond hearing, and
confiscation of his personal property violate Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth
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Amendment. Petitioner asserts that he is a member of the “Guerra-Orellana [sic] class” which
entitles him to an individualized bond hearing. Pet. ¶¶ 5–4 [Doc. No. 1]; see Guerrero Orellana v.
Moniz, No. 25-cv-12664-PBS, 2025 WL 3687757, at *10 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2025). Petitioner
asks this court to order either his “immediate release from ICE custody[,]” his release on
recognizance, or a bond hearing “before a neutral adjudicator.” Pet. 7 [Doc. No. 1]. Petitioner
also seeks an order compelling Respondents to “produce a complete written inventory of all
personal property seized from Petitioner” and return such property. Id.
Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1). Resp’ts’ Opp’n 10 [Doc. No. 6]. Petitioner was apprehended at the U.S. border in
Laredo, Texas on or around June 12, 2024, after which he was determined to be inadmissible. Id.
Ex. 1 at 1 [Doc. 6-1]. DHS placed Petitioner into expedited removal proceedings, pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Id. After Petitioner stated his intent to apply for asylum, DHS determined
that Petitioner presented a credible fear of return to Ecuador, vacated the expedited removal
order, and released Petitioner on parole on August 7, 2024. Id. Ex. 2 at 4 [Doc. No. 6-2]; Ex. 3 at
1 [Doc. No. 6-3]; Ex. 4 at 1–2 [Doc. No. 6-4]. DHS ordered him to appear in person at the
Burlington, Massachusetts field office September 26, 2024. Id. Ex. 4 at 1–2 [Doc. No. 6-4].
Respondents assert that, because Petitioner’s parole expired on August 7, 2025, he has no
authorization to remain in the country and is subject to expedited removal proceedings. Resp’ts’
Opp’n 11 [Doc. No. 6]. Respondents maintain that 8 U.S.C. § 1225 mandates detention during
the pendency of Petitioner’s removal proceedings, even if he wishes to restate his fear of return
to Ecuador and apply for asylum. Id. at 10–11. Respondents also deny that Petitioner is a
member of the Guerrero Orellana class because DHS has placed him in expedited removal
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proceedings. Id. 13–14. Finally, Respondents contend that, as an “arriving” noncitizen, Petitioner
lacks constitutional rights. Id. 14–19.
II. 	Analysis
Regarding the applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the court finds that Petitioner is not a
Guerrero Orellana classmember. He was “paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) at the time of [his] entry]” and is therefore expressly excluded from the class.
Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 2025 WL 3033769, at *14 (D. Mass Oct. 30, 2025.
Taking Respondents’ remaining arguments in the reverse, the court finds that a protected
liberty interest arose when Respondents released Petitioner on parole on August 7, 2024. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1972) (describing a parolee’s interest “in his
continued liberty.”). When Respondents determined that Petitioner had a credible fear of return
to Ecuador and released him, Petitioner had a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to
retain his liberty and remain out of immigration custody. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
601–03 (1972) (finding reliance on governmental representations may establish a legitimate
claim of entitlement to a constitutionally-protected interest). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons in the United States, regardless of status, see A.A.R.P. v.
Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025), and Petitioner’s “liberty is valuable and must be seen as within
the protection of” due process, Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
Having established that Petitioner is due some measure of process before being “deprived
of . . . [his] liberty,” U.S. C ONST. amend. V., the court addresses how much process should be
afforded. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19,
27–28 (1st Cir. 2021) (applying Mathews balancing test in context of noncitizen detention).
In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”:
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
Regarding the first factor, the court finds that Petitioner’s liberty interest is fundamental.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the
liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). With respect to the second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is high where he has not received a bond or custody
redetermination hearing. The decision to grant parole is within DHS’s discretion, affording no
additional procedural safeguards. See Tenemasa-Lema v. Hyde, __ F. Supp.3d __, 2025 WL
3280555, at *4 (D. Mass. Nov. 25, 2025). Finally, regarding the third factor, the court recognizes
that “[t]he prompt execution of removal orders is a legitimate governmental interest, which
detention may facilitate.” Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 32. However, the administrative cost of
providing a bond hearing is relatively minimal. See Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det.
Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025) (citing cases).
DHS determined in 2024 that Petitioner did not present a flight risk or danger to his
community in 2024 when he was released on parole. Respondents do not assert that Petitioner
has presented a flight risk or danger for the past 18 months that he has lived in Massachussetts. A
bond hearing would allow Repsondents, at minimal cost to DHS, to determine whether
Petitioner’s re-detention is necessary. Respondents concur that, should the court provide relief,
“the appropriate remedy” is “a bond hearing.” Resp’ts’ Opp’n 19 [Doc. No. 6]. On balance, the
court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor of relief, that Petitioner’s detention without a
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bond hearing violates his due-process rights, and that a bond hearing is an appropriate and
minimally invasive additional procedure to ensure that right. 424 U.S. at 334.
The court need not address Respondents’ remaining arguments given that due process
demands an individualized bond hearing to determine whether Petitioner’s re-detention is
justified. Regarding Petitioner’s request that the court address DHS’s alleged seizure of his
personal property, this court lacks jurisdiction to address such claims on a habeas petition. See
28 U.S.C. § 2241.
III. 	Conclusion
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is therefore GRANTED. Roldan
Roldan must be provided a bond hearing no later than January 28, 2026, or, if the immigration
judge declines to conduct a bond hearing, Respondents shall so advise the court by that date so
that this court may conduct the bond hearing. Any decision by the immigration judge to retain
Roldan Roldan in custody following a bond hearing shall set forth the reasons for the continued
detention.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 21, 2026 	/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
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